"God is absent in Hegel's systematic exposition". This is barefaced falsehood, certainly if we are speaking of "the Science of Logic" in its later version (Encyclopaedia), but one can't ignore the final chapter of GL here either. This, though annoying, as it is doubtless meant to be, is maybe not so important. It is not the mere "name" that counts.

It is not difficult to see a sense to the postulated identity of identity (where not abstract) and difference that is not self-contradictory. This is the whole point of it. Perhaps the most far-reaching application of this comes in the discussion of Good and Evil and the implication that reconciliation actually proceeds conceptually beyond even pardon.

The division between the good and the bad, as found in the classic Matthean parable, is transcended, at least in a way, by the parabolic conclusion, "Let both grow together until harvest", Why really? if the tares really were distinct from the wheat it would indeed be possible to root them out.

Hegel is here at his most exploratory, anticipating Nietzsche in many ways, that most anti-Christian Christian. After the first sweeping out of the devils the last state of that man is worse than the first, unless he takes the further, dialectical step. We have the highest authority for this. Not that I am relying on that here.

Once a riddle is solved it is no longer a riddle, while an unsolvable riddle isn't even a riddle. Hegel, properly read, is clarity itself. We recognise that we have always known these things, deep down in our speculative selves.

So the principle, whatever it was, is not a direct expression of a contradiction but an uncovering of a mediated ambiguity.

Alan, like Marx, is clearly on to something. The question is, in getting it all wrong does he in fact get it all right, as he himself must necessarily believe, or believe he believes. What he maybe believes, in fact, is that nothing can be established, not even this very denial. Hegelians should have some sympathy with this as Hegel's own starting-point. It is not, all the same, Hegel's finishing point, as Alan tries, claims, to show that it is. Witness, the text.

Stephen.

---

To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
From: hegel@yahoogroups.com
Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2014 19:40:05 -0400
Subject: Re: [hegel] the non-existence of the finite

 

The identity of identity and difference is not a principle. 

Principles are tools of the understanding. Speculative philosophy may have a method but it has no principles. 

This peculiar sort of identity is the unwitting creation of the understanding as it reasons its way without intent to an inferential impasse when determinations that it means to keep distinction prove to mutually implicate. 

This inferential impasse - this dialectic - is the first appearance of an identity of identity and difference. Being an identity for the understanding it violates the basic law of the understanding, the law of noncontradiction. 

So for the understanding this identity is nonsense. At best, it is a riddle. What in the world could an identity of identity and difference mean? 

The coin as a supposed example of this identity really is not. A coin does not violate the law of noncontradiction. There is a difference of respect that can be employed to break the seeming contradiction. With respect to the coin as such we have an identity. With respect to the coin's sides we have a difference. 

So what you would like to call a principle is the direct expression of a contradiction. Again, at best it is a riddle that needs to be solved. And it is solved by introducing a reason that has its own law, the law of contradiction. 

For speculative thought everything the understanding takes as self-consistent it takes as inherently contradictory.

With this dialectical identity the understanding has come to the limit of what it is able to understand. It has come to the limit of understanding itself. 

With this dialectic we have what Hegel will call in the Phenomenology the breakdown of consciousness. Consciousness is not merely in error. It has broken down because it stands in violation of its basic law.

But this achieved point of breakdown is also what Hegel calls the truth of consciousness.

Breakdown and truth seem to occupy the same ground. Very odd. 

The truth of consciousness or the truth of the dialectic wherever it arises is the inferential impasse reconceived as absolute form.

But by what right do we make such a reconception? 

The right is the right of thought when thought is itself absolute. 

Hegel's main insight is that the absolute is not a truth apart but a truth always with us by which he means the absolute is thought as a self-concern. It is not thought off seeking some truth, some being or principle. It is thought as concerned with itself in keeping with its absolute nature. 

This self-concern is solely about thought in act. It is not about seeking what is ultimate for thought or some ultimate apart from thought. This is the way of metaphysics. It is not Hegel's way. 

Thought as absolute is thought that only thinks what it has brought into being. Thought brings into being the inferential impasse. This is then what thought is given to think when thought simply reflects upon what it has enacted.

What thought is given to think is the coherent form of this activity. An absolute form of its own creation. 

Not a god. Not some being beyond thought. 

No.

Just the absolute form of thought itself. 

And what sort of thinking is this thinking that is absolute?

It starts out as finite. It starts out as the activity of the understanding. As such, it begins with a first negative contrast between what it thinks and what it distinguishes from what it thinks. It thinks being and then it means to think nothing as an entirely different thought. It thinks something and then it seeks what is other to something as an entirely different thought. 

This first negative contrast of the understanding is what thought as absolute brings to an impasse by showing how the contrastive terms mutually implicate. This inferential impasse of the understanding is the first appearance of a double negation, a one that is one as two.  

This impasse - this problem for the understanding - is also the solution - the form of knowing when absolute. This form is the second appearance of a double negation, the fixed form of the infinite movement.

So the speculative identity of identity and difference is the axial rotation of the impasse reconceived as the axis at rest, the stable form of the movement. There is nothing more to this absolute identity then this fixed shape of the infinite movement that finite thought brings into being. 

This is why Hegel has the finite and infinite together. There is no infinite that is an a priori truth waiting for the finite to find it. The infinite is a creation of finite thinking. 

The infinite is what first appears as an error of the understanding. Without this seeming error there is no infinite. 

You might note that god is nowhere to be found in any of this. We have no need of god to think Hegel's absolute. This is why god is absent in Hegel's systematic exposition except as yet another finite or limited conception of the infinite or absolute, one that is suspended when the truth emerges. 

So, in the Phenomenology god appears briefly at times but is clearly not the truth of the matter, and in the Logic god is entirely missing from the exposition.

But then this is what we would expect if we take the trouble to see how an identity of identity and difference appears in a speculative account. 

Hegel's infinite only appears after the error of the understanding - the error of positing the infinite as something apart from the finite - is reconceived as the truth of the infinite as the inadvertent creation of finite thinking as it thinks at its own limits.

So we know why the understanding breaks down. It cannot think its own limits. Limit thinking is the infinite form of finite thought at its own limits.

Where are we to find the infinite as sought by the understanding? Somewhere beyond finite thinking? Well, no. We simply are unable to find it at all. 

In this way Hegel provides the subtle truth for those able to think without dogmatic blinders. 

For such thinkers Hegel deconstructs the bad infinite. Hegel deconstructs the god concept.

So, yes. You keep repeating yourself as do I in response. 

But what you are offering is an account based on really simple and basic mistakes such as misidentifying where one finds a first negation, and mistaking what Hegel has to say about the understanding as being about speculation.

Then, of course, there is the more understandable mistake of mistaking what Hegel means when he says the non-being of the finite is the being of the absolute. Being a speculative proposition it has the look of a riddle. 

And yet, you must suspect that this sentence does not sit well with how you read Hegel unless it is shown to say something other than what it actually says.  

But again, mistakes in reading the speculative passages are difficult to avoid. Your mistakes are for the most part far simpler to understand because they occur before you get anywhere near Hegel's speculative discourse. 

They start with the coin. 

 

I am sure you sincerely believe that you are speaking the truth. But I am also sure that you are emotionally incapable of being open to anything I say. 

In this way, you are not unlike the other theologically minded readers on this site. It really is such a simple matter to not let yourself make the effort to think speculative thoughts. 

- Alan

  

On Sep 23, 2014, at 3:47 PM, "Will Mellon willmellon@... [hegel]" <hegel@yahoogroups.com> wrote:

 

And it cannot be emphasized too often when discussing such topics, that the identity of identity and difference is the essential principle of Hegelian philosophy, so that it may never be misunderstood as mere or abstract monism, but a living spiritual Idea of concrete variety and vitality.

---

From: "Will Mellon willmellon@... [hegel]" <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
To: "hegel@yahoogroups.com" <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Tuesday, September 23, 2014 3:22 PM
Subject: Re: [hegel] the non-existence of the finite

 

I only gave that reference in jest or, at least, half jokingly. I leave it to you to decide what it all ultimately means for yourself. Your idea is what Hegel seems to conclude, and I would say, must conclude if we understand the concept of God properly.

---

From: "John Bardis jgbardis@... [hegel]" <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
Sent: Tuesday, September 23, 2014 1:10 PM
Subject: Re: [hegel] the non-existence of the finite

 

Is that the last day? Perhaps I should rather have expressed it as the day of the LORD, the day when God will be all in all. That seems t be what you are describing below as the position of Hegel.

 

 

-----Original Message-----
From: Will Mellon willmellon@... [hegel] <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
To: hegel <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Mon, Sep 22, 2014 3:49 pm
Subject: Re: [hegel] the non-existence of the finite

 

Well, believe it or not, there was a book written about it, entitled "The Disappearance of the Universe" by Gary Renard, who is described as a self-admitted slacker whose major goals in life were to "move to Hawaii, commune with nature, and drink beer - not necessarily in that order." I didn't bother to read it because I figured - what's the use?

---

From: "John Bardis jgbardis@... [hegel]" <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
Sent: Monday, September 22, 2014 2:40 PM
Subject: Re: [hegel] the non-existence of the finite

 

Yes, that is essentially how it works. But his sounds like a description of the escatological last day. Has that day come then?

 

John

 

 

 

-----Original Message-----
From: Will Mellon willmellon@... [hegel] <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
To: hegel <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Mon, Sep 22, 2014 2:25 pm
Subject: Re: [hegel] the non-existence of the finite

 

If we remember that the Absolute or speculative Reason is always an identity of identity in difference, an identity that has difference in it, as explained in my previous post to Srivats, and as we have been discussing in the previous posts - then, although finite being and its vanishing movement vanish in its identity with Absolute being, it reappears as an ideal determiateness of the Absolute being in its difference from the Absolute being.

In other words, the finite and its movement have been sublated in Absolute being, and thus is negatively present in it or sublated within it. The repulsion of this difference appears as the ideality of the finite in the Absolute.

What this means theologically (as I interpret it) is that the material conception of reality dissolves itself by its own nature, as philosophically or religiously comprehended. A spiritual world opens up in which finitude is understood, not as self -standing being and its vanishing, but as ideally united (related) to God in love, i.e. as an identity of identity in difference.

It would be a mistake to think of this as a merging in oneness with God, as much as it would be a mistake to think of it as a oneness of the Absolute with finitude.

---

From: "stephen theron stephentheron@... [hegel]" <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
To: hegel hegel <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Monday, September 22, 2014 9:59 AM
Subject: RE: [hegel] the non-existence of the finite

 

Dear Paul, John et al.,
 
I was glad to read this of yours, Paul, especially the point about "existence" as a finite category (in Essence).
 
At the same time he says, you quote, that spirit as finite does not have genuine existence. So is this genuine existence a transcending of "ordinary" existence, i.e. not the same type of thing or anything like (though our existence, from our side, might be a faint shadow of it)?
 
As you say, there are nuances, and in general I would want to stress, if asked, that one is not reducing the absolute to reason here but elevating reason to its proper absolute character and as indeed the absolute, hence necessarily infinite, hence including something like what we value as "personal", among all the other things.
 
It has struck me here, also in connection with the text John offered us from Pannenburg,  how this exactly parallels or is even an instance of what we read in the "Athanasian Creed" (actually 9th Century or so), viz.: "Not by conversion of the godhead into flesh but by taking of the manhood into God".
 
That is, saying reason is God already goes a long way towards committing us to Hegel's dialectical reading of the various Biblical and/or evangelical narratives, beginning with his reading of "the fall of man (Adam and Eve)". It is just the opposite of what C.S. Lewis recommends somewhere, for understanding the incarnation, that we should imagine one of ourselves taking the nature of a slug (he must have been having an off-day). That is, it is not a kind of gratuitous, surprising, almost perverse thing. This seems to me what Pannenburg well brings out there.
 
But then nor is it a historical thin g, though, again, not less than historical. In fact it cancels, uplifts and absorbs history, if it does anything. But that, again, is to say that history is anyhow phenomenal, finite, absorbed, along, we would have to add, with our own lives which we do not live. This is the unmistakeable thrust of Hegel's logic, too close for some to see it. You would probably have to have been a Lutheran to have achieved this, though Augustine came pretty close. Maybe we are just getting back to that Point.
 
So again, there is no reduction of philosophy, such as many fear, but a taking up of philosophy, of wisdom, to that place which it can never really have left, but now as re-vealed, bearing in mind now Hegel's job, truly not a "hatchet job", on revelation, as the inside-outside, and so much so that it can't be a revelation of anything specific but is rather revelation as such, to which the concept of glory in religion corresponds pretty neatly.
 
This now says something about man, the nature God chose to assume, as it is put in religion. It says first of all that man is not man, man is spirit. Hegel says truly, therefore, that in becoming man God becomes himself (don't ask me where he says that). It is absurd to try to make philosophy subservient to biology (Aristotle didn't realise he was doing this, inasmuch as he maybe was, if he was). Yes, I have just read a summary of one of the congresses of the World Philosophical Asociation (c.1982) or whatever it is called (an Eastern European thing, I think), on Religion and Science as theme. They come so close to the Hegelian solution (revelation), yet miss it totally.
 
But how is it that man is spirit? How is it that the Cross is the Resurrection? that one jumps directly  from the one to the other? when we appear to have two arms and two legs etc. On this, I am sure a new attempt needs to be made at what Hegel tried to do in his Philosophy of Nature, at least, that is, show its necessity (which means necessarily a priori). In the World Congress they speak of certain constants in science amid all the variables of the empirical, like the speed of light. But why couldn't we one day begin to notice that the speed of light, say, was lessening (what kind of day would that be?), This was one of the not to be questioned constants amid the flow, and so on. Still, Hegel does say light is nature's "first ideality", but this option is not open to these half-baked empiricists.
 
Well, I throw this out for discussion (Will has reminded us that this is a Group for discussion, not for the production of a common textbook or similar). I'm sorry i don't have more time to give to this group just now.
 
Stephen.
 
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---

To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
From: hegel@yahoogroups.com
Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2014 12:47:27 -0700
Subject: RE: [hegel] the non-existence of the finite

 

In response to the Thu18Sep14 post by Stephen Theron:
.
> What is the difference between the absolute and reason?
>
> Stephen.
.
Well, Stephen, in my reading of Hegel, there are only minor nuances of difference between the Absolute, the Absolute Idea, God, Holy Spirit, Spirit, Mind, Reality and Reason. Hegel says:
.
"The truth is that there is only one Reason,
only one Spirit; we have seen that Spirit as
finite does not have genuine existence."
(Hegel, LPR, vol. 3, p. 214)
.
To this statement we must add the following definition from Hegel:
.
"The definition of God is that God is the
Absolute Idea -- i.e. that God is Spirit."
(Hegel, LPR, vol. 3, p. 66)
.
There we have it from Hegel -- Reason is Spirit -- Spirit is God -- God is Absolute.
.
In German the word "Geist" is used to mean either Spirit or Mind. Thus in English translations of Hegel's work, we often find these two terms used interchangeably, especially when speaking about a Universal Mind or Spirit.
.
For Hegel, the sharp difference is between Pure Reason and the Pure Understanding. Hegel makes no apologies that these are Kant's terms. Hegel likes Kant's terminology, even while Hegel flatly rejects Kant's *conclusions*.
.
For Kant, the Truth, the Thing-in-itself, is strictly Unknowable by Reason, which Kant defines as human, finite, limited and conditioned.
.
For Hegel, the Truth, the Thing-in-itself, is certainly Knowable by Reason, which Kant defines as Divine, infinite, unlimited and unconditioned.
.
For Hegel, then, the palpable connection between God and Humanity is precisely that which we share in common -- Reason.
.
Thus, for Hegel, God is Rational -- or as he says, Reality is Rational. As Hegel says, we should not so much say that God "exists" (because existence is a category of finitude) but that God is REAL. Hegel says:
.
"There is talk of God and God's 'existence'
[Dasein]; 'existence' is determinate, finite
being -- and 'Existenz,' too, is used in a
determinate sense. But God's being is in
no way a limited being. It would be better
to say, 'God and God's being, or God's
actuality or objectivity.' (Hegel, LPR, vol. 1,
p. 417)
.
Best regards,
--Paul Trejo
.