Dear List,

It is appalling to see how discussions about Hegel's political philosophy
most often turn out to be pathetic elucubrations based on false premises.
The very premises of those who are content to stick to their own (mistaken)
views of what their "homemade Hegel" has said, without feeling compelled to
verify those views by actually reading what Hegel wrote.

This is for instance the case of the following remarks:

> I did not mean that Hegel regarded Caesar and
> Napoleon as tyrants, and I certainly disagree with Hegel that they were

liberators

> from tyrants. But most historians and in addition, I, too, regard these

two as

> tyrants. There is no argument that the two affected the development of
> civilization in many positive ways. My contention is that Hegel is

equating a

> 'benevolent World Spirit' with these two despots. And you know as well as

I that

> Hegel's term, 'benevolent World Spirit' and the rational movement of

history

> etc means in the last analysis, the inclusion of the concept of God. We

then

> have a theodicy to discuss.

Let's now turn our eyes to Hegel's own words (or at least the version of his
words as taken down by his pupils and then mixed up in a new text called the
"Lectures of the Philosophy of History", which is currently being dissected
by the philologists of the Hegel-Archiv in Bochum) -- Hegel's own words
about Caesar. All quotes are taken from the 3rd Part (The Roman World) -
Section II, translated by J. Sibree.

>>

In this way the world-wide sovereignty of Rome became the property of a
single possessor. This important change must not be regarded as a thing of
chance [etwas Zufaelliges]; it was necessary - postulated by the
circumstances [durch die Umstaende bedingt]. The democratic constitution
could no longer be really maintained [bewahrt, actually it means "preserved"
MC] in Rome, but only kept up in appearances.
<<

Let's carefully follow Hegel here. He is not expressing any judgment of
value. He is just analysing the situation in Rome at the time of Caesar's
"putsch" and acutely observing that - given the circumstances - the old
Roman constitution (the "democratic" constitution, but we all know that it
wasn't a proper democracy, more an oligarchy) could not but collapse.

Hegel has already explained why this constitution was no longer in tune with
its time:

>>

We thus see the most terrible and dangerous powers arising against Rome; yet
the military force of this state is victorious over all. Great individuals
now appear on the stage [...] It was from the disruption of the state, which
had no longer any consistency or firmness in itself, that these colossal
individualities arose, instinctively inpelled to restore that political
unity which was no longer to be found in men's dispositions. [...] The idea
for an organization for the vast empire being altogether absent, the Senate
could not assert the authority of government [...] We should refer to Cicero
to see how all affairs of state were decided in riotous fashion, and with
arms in hand, by the wealth and power of the grandees on the one side, and
by a troop of rabble on the other.
<<

Trying to sum up: Rome was in the aftermath of a very difficult period; its
existence was threatened by its confrontation in war with other powers. Its
borders had changed to inglobe more and more possessions and territories,
each one with its own culture, political tradition, language, religion and
population. But no clear project existed on how to organise and keep all
this united. The old constitution wasn't enough.

It is important to see that there is absolutely no hint at any kind of
admiration of this situation by Hegel. Like any other historian, Hegel is
describing a situation, using the tools and the knowledge at his disposal in
the 1820s. A judgment of value, even though implicit, is present later in
the text:

>>

All the tendencies of the Roman principle were to sovereignty and military
force: it contained in it no spiritual cntre which it could make the object,
occupation and enjoyment of its spirit. The aim of patriotism, that of
preserving the state, ceases when the lust of personal dominion becomes the
impelling passion. The citizens were alienated from the state, for they
found in it no objective satisfaction; and the interests of the individuals
did not take the same direction as among the Greeks, who could set against
the incipient corruption of the practical worldm the noblest work of art in
painting, sculpture and poetry, and especially a highly cultivated
philosophy. [...] To the Romans, Greek slaves were their poets [...] the
instructor of their children.
<<

To paraphrase Hegel's clear words: the characteristic of the Roman nation
was brutality, lust of dominion and military imposition. They were not like
the Greeks, who - at a time of crisis - turned themselves towards art and
philosophy: no; they turned to the military and violent conquest of the
outer world. And to dominate on a world acquired with force, the autocratic
power of a tyrant was the most suitable - given the circumstances - kind of
regime.

Hegel does not hide his own preference for the Greeks and his criticism of
the Romans. How strange that someone could consider him as an admirer of
Caesar or the Romans! From the careful reading of Hegel's words you can
infer exactly the opposite. But Hegel goes on:

>>

it was not the mere accident of Caesar's existence [die Zufaelligkeit
Caesars] that destroyed the republic -- it was necessity [...] Caesar, who
may be adduced as a paragon of Roman adaptation of means to ends [but this
is an inadequate translation: the German locution actually means that Caesar
was the "right man at the right time" for the Roman spirit in those
circumstance, MC] - who formed his resolves with the most unerring
perspicuity, and executed them with the greatest vigor and practical skill,
without any superfluous excitement of mind [but the German word is simply
"Leidenschaft", passion MC] - Caesar, judged by the great scope of history
[weltgeschichtlich], did the right [das Rechte, meaning "the right thing"].
<<

Meaning: the very phisical existence of Caesar did not add anything to the
situation, but Caesar's own intelligence and "practical skill"; the Republic
was going to fall under the pressure of the circumstances. Caesar, the right
man at the right time for Rome, the person who epitomises "the Roman
principle" - i.e. the very brutality Hegel condemned a few lines before -
Caesar did the right thing from the point of view of the development of
history, because he resolved the contradiction of the Roman constitution by
making clear that Rome was already undemocratic and impossible to rule under
the old constitution.

*** ***

From the above, it results clearly that:

a) Hegel did not admired Caesar. Rather the opposite: Caesar epitomises "the
Roman principle", i.e. brutality, violence coupled with military skill. This
principle is opposed to the Greek one, which Hegel prefers.

b) Hegel gives us a concise, but convincing, analysis of the origins of the
Roman Empire.

Which, in conclusion, means: let's start reading Hegel and let's abandon
ideology.


Best regards,
Maurizio Canfora

In response to the Fri16Jan04 post by John Bardis:

> ...When Hegel says that the Concept is God, he
> doesn't mean any old concept, but rather THE
> Concept, which certainly includes particularity,
> which certainly includes negativity...
>
> John

John, while I think your position is closer to Hegel's than
Beat's position (which assiduously resists the God-language
in Hegel's texts), your position is also a bit one-sided.

For one thing, it is too easy to jump from your wording to
the idea that the Concept for Hegel is *nothing but* the
idea of God -- which can be misleading because, as Hegel
says, many people read the terms, 'God,' 'Divine,' and 'Spirit'
in a very abstract manner.

So, to say the 'Concept is God' would suggest to many that
Hegel is only talking about the abstract concept of God
when he uses the term, 'Concept.' That would be an error.

For Hegel, the Concept is Divine -- it actually is Spirit --
however the Concept is itself the Science of Logic itself;
not an abstract system of principles, but Living Thought,
the very model for a true Science of Logic. I will quote
Hegel himself on this notion to make it clearer. Hegel
says:

"We should recall our characterization of the
metaphysical proofs of God, which serve as
the route from going from the Concept to
Being." (Hegel, 1827, LECTURES ON THE
PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION, ed. Hodgson,
1989, vol. 3, p. 278)

And this one:

"The Idea is a mystery for the Understanding
and is beyond its ken. For the Understanding
holds fast to the categories of thought,
persisting with them as utterly independent
of each other, remaining distinct, external to
each other, and fixed...But for the Concept
it is equally true that these distinctions are
sublated." (Hegel, LPR, ibid. p. 281)

Notice here that Hegel also uses the term, 'Concept,' in
the sense of a term of Logic. Hegel continues:

"The Understanding does not get beyond
the fact of the Dstinction, so it says, 'This
cannot be grasped.' For the principle of the
Understanding is abstract identity with itself,
not concrete identity, in accord with which
these distinctions exist within a single
Concept." (Hegel, LPR, ibid. p. 283)

And also:

"In religion the Truth has been revealed as
far as its Content is concerned, but it is
another matter for this Content to be present
in the Form of the Concept, of thinking, of
the Concept in Speculative Form." (Hegel,
LPR, ibid.)

Here again, Hegel speaks of the Concept in its sense as
a term of Logic.

Now, in dualist thinking, the Concept cannot be *both*
an abstract principle of Logic and also a Living, Thinking
Spirit. But for Hegel's Ontological and Metaphysical Logic,
the Concept is dynamic, alive, and is *also* the very model
of his new Science of Logic.

Long-time readers of Hegel know this, but some of them
have difficulty when this same fact is called, 'God.' Still,
that is exactly what Hegel calls it, John, so you are right
to emphasize that.

Hegel also wishes to underscore that his novel articulation
of the Concept of God (an articulation that is founded upon
his dialectical ontology) is the core and substance of his new,
dialectical Science of Logic. Hegel says,

"Today the proofs of the existence of God have
fallen into neglect or into contempt, because it
is supposed that 'we are beyond all that.' But
for the very reason that they were authoritative
for more than 1,000 years, they deserve to be
considered more closely. Even if we discover
that they have deficiencies, we shall see at
any rate what is genuine in the procedure they
express, namely that they in fact display the
process of the Elevation of the human being
to God, except that the form of Understanding
obscures it. We shall show what they lack in
order to be the form of Reason." (Hegel, 1827,
LECTURES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
ed. Hodgson, 1985, U.C. Press, vol. 1, p. 179)

Anti-metaphysical and anti-theological readers of Hegel
have the majority of 20th century and neo-Kantian scholars
on their side. It will be very difficult for them to change their
views -- yet an objective and impartial reading of Hegel's
System clearly reveals that his Science of Logic embodies
the theological and the metaphysical.

The Science of Logic, Hegel says explicitly, reveals the
*very mind of God.* These are Hegel's words, not yours or
mine, so Beat and the anti-metaphysicians remain obliged to
respond to them. Hegel says,

"Logic is to be understood as the System
of Pure Reason, as the realm of Pure
Thought. This realm is Truth as it is
without veil, and in its own Absolute
nature. It can therefore be said that
this Content is the exposition of God
as God is in God's eternal essence
before the creation of Nature and a
finite mind." (Hegel, SCIENCE OF LOGIC,
trans. Miller, p. 50)

But don't hold your breath, John; it has been years now and
we are still waiting for a careful response to these words from
Beat and the anti-metaphysicians.

Best regards,
--Paul Trejo