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Re: [hegel] Re: Schelling on Hegel

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  • Alan Ponikvar
    Okay. I was wondering if you might have been thinking of Lacan. I view the sliding away from the pure process for the purpose of insight as unforced. In fact,
    Message 1 of 69 , Sep 11, 2012
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      Okay. I was wondering if you might have been thinking of Lacan.

      I view the sliding away from the pure process for the purpose of insight as
      unforced. In fact, it is the inability of the common intellect to do
      anything other than experience the process as unwelcome that marks this
      process as its breakdown.

      One of the interesting features of the struggle to death is that it seems
      unrelated to a state of nature encounter for which such a struggle would be
      for mere survival and not about who is worthy of recognition. The story is a
      convenient myth – a retrospective posit – seemingly meant to justify the
      mastery of someone likely old and feeble over a physically more powerful
      servant. It reminds us of the capitalist myth which has the wealthy worthy
      of their wealth. But there is a better formal explanation of the encounter:
      each self-consciousness is unable to accept what is externally other as
      having an integrity of its own. What these two in conflict fail to realize
      is that the other refers back to the other self – the infinite self-movement
      of the concept – as its own origin. Thus, this struggle is oedipal.

      - Alan

      From: vascojoao2003 <vascojoao2003@...>
      Reply-To: <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
      Date: Tuesday, September 11, 2012 12:45 PM
      To: <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
      Subject: [hegel] Re: Schelling on Hegel






      Hi Alan and all,

      Just a note regarding the mirror metaphor. I mean that knowledge is both not
      a mere find, that is, as an object which was already there in place and
      which we come across and not a mere process, that is, this process is also
      productive and it is what it produces that is also for another than the
      productive process itself. I think we can say that we have the subject as
      process, as knowing, and the subject reflecting what it knows. As process I
      think we find the divide between enunciation and enunciated, as reflection
      we have its symbolic belonging.

      For Lacan the mirror stage is constitutive of the self, especially in the
      imaginary order, that is, what we commonly understand by self - a self that
      reflects the symbolic order to which it will have been true that it already
      always belonged. In this mirror stage Lacan proposes something, for me very
      interesting, the difference between the body as Real, the pure process,
      where the baby is not in control, the body is somewhat foreign to him, he
      cannot really walk, he cannot really command the movement of the
      articulations, etc and the body in the mirror, which, differently, when it
      is recognized by the baby as his own, is now something whole.

      We have then a difference between the body as Real, as I mentioned, as
      process, and the body as image, as reflection. What is interesting to notice
      is that in recognizing itself in the mirror, this recognition is only
      possible, I think, if that divide between process and whole is already
      presupposed in the process itself, that is, before the encounter in the
      mirror. That is why, I think, ultimately we talk about recognition. The
      mirror actualizes what was already in play, the difference between the Real
      (the body as process) and the Imaginary (the body as whole). However once
      this actualization is also retrospective, it is from the mirror that it can
      be recollected, it constitutes also the role of the symbolic order, that is,
      to fill this gap. The baby is whole in the mirror also next to his parents
      and to whatever is reflected in the mirror, that is, a world; he appears
      there, in a world, reflected by the mirror. Playing a bit with words, the
      baby is-there (dasein) in the world reflected to him by the mirror.

      The interest of the mirror I think is that it put in play all three
      dimensions, the Real, which disappears, the Imaginary, the body as whole,
      and the Symbolic, the other, the world in the mirror.

      Is this of any interest regarding Hegel? I think so. In Hegel we do not
      start with the Real but with the Imaginary, with an object, the process
      comes after, but, as I think we notice, it is such that we can never remain
      just with it, we necessarily turn the process into objects, the process,
      more so, I think, is merely drawn by presupposition, by the difference
      between the imaginary object and what is to take the place of its world, of
      the order which it constitutes - Hegel is also about how what the object is
      imagined to be can remain once we make explicit all its implications, that
      is, what world is presupposed in the object and how this world can coexist
      with the object. We see, for instance, how self-consciousness which in its
      imaginary order appears as mutual recognition comes to have this mutual
      recognition, once made explicit, to become something other than what it
      thought it would be: not the amenities of this mutual recognition but the
      master/servant conflict.

      The process, in Hegel, seems to run between these two poles, the Imaginary,
      the shape of truth, and the symbolic, its actualization in difference, or
      its differentiation and then its retrospective recollection and its
      prospective reconfiguration. When and if this is what the concept comes to
      be, then, we have Hegel dealing with the Real, with the pure process, but
      precisely by being made into what the notion is about in its form it again
      slides away from the pure process - this, I argue, because it cannot be
      inhabited. We inhabit appearances which are the appearances of the process,
      but I don't think we should be dismissive here and just move on as if the
      problem is solved. It is because the process is recollected only from
      appearance that the process qua process never really appears – this because
      appearances are already a play between the Imaginary and the Symbolic,
      between images and words.

      Regards,
      João.

      --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> , Alan
      Ponikvar <ponikvaraj@...> wrote:
      >
      > I mean to draw a distinction between a truth that involves a looking once
      > vs. a truth that involves a looking twice. One then might ask: do I look
      > once at this looking twice? That is, do I not create for myself a
      > self-referential paradox?
      >
      > I have addressed this on this site before. The looking twice is in and of
      > itself prosaic. It is not limited to speculative thinking. But when
      > speculative thought becomes relevant the looking twice is what distinguishes
      > this thought from the approach of the common intellect.
      >
      > We can see this difference as it relates to Socratic wisdom â€" the claim that
      > I know that I do not know. For the singular gaze this claim is taken as a
      > fixed truth or a standard that means to validate skepticism. But Socrates
      > was not a skeptic. Why not? I would suggest that the reason is that this
      > wisdom involves a looking twice. It is a recollective truth. We do not
      > anticipate our ignorance but come to be acquainted with our ignorance. Our
      > ignorance is something we have to discover as it emerges in act.
      >
      > For Hegel, I believe the relevant opposition is not between knowledge
      > (either the reader's or that of natural consciousness) and the absolute. It
      > is between what appears and its true import. It is the distinction between a
      > direct view of what we take to be true and the true import of what is in
      > view once recollected in light of its subsequent mediation. But the
      > implications of this alternative distinction are not self-evident.
      >
      > I was first struck by this feature of Hegel's thought and only later
      > realized that absolute knowing itself first appears and then appears again
      > in light of its true import. In the first case, when taken as the truth of
      > consciousness absolute form is simply something for us. Only when we come to
      > Absolute Knowing do we have the opportunity to discover that it also has
      > been about us or about our own experience. Our initial insight into absolute
      > form instigates the progression of forms that mediates our speculative
      > insights.
      >
      > Progress is slow as our frustration with Hegel's text is always related to
      > how we remain bound to the ways and expectations of the common intellect. So
      > there may be moments of insight. But it would be wrong in my view to believe
      > that Hegel is leading his readers to a culminating eureka moment.
      >
      > In philosophic inquiry the habitual ways of thinking in light of the common
      > intellect colors what we see and the kind of questions we ask. It is not as
      > if we can come to see the falsity of the opposition of consciousness and
      > then set it aside and go about the business of thinking speculatively. The
      > process of comprehension involves a continual unmasking as the early efforts
      > at comprehension are still under the spell of the common intellect.
      >
      > So I would question the adequacy of the mirror metaphor for knowledge. This
      > is but one moment, the immediate moment, of a comprehended truth.
      >
      > Finally, a god without a back is also without a front even though all talk
      > of god's wisdom is a front facing "god's eye view". A truly omniscient god
      > is not only the unimaginable all views at once; it is also radically
      > particular and in no need of the heuristic of concepts or any other ordering
      > tools. It is truly terrifying to contemplate.
      >
      > - Alan
      >
      >
      >
      >
      >
      > From: vascojoao2003 <vascojoao2003@...>
      > Reply-To: <hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> >
      > Date: Tuesday, September 11, 2012 2:44 AM
      > To: <hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> >
      > Subject: [hegel] Re: Schelling on Hegel
      >
      >
      >
      >
      >
      >
      >
      >
      > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
      <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> ,
      > "vascojoao2003" <vascojoao2003@> wrote:
      > >
      > >
      > >
      > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
      <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> , Alan Ponikvar
      > <ponikvaraj@> wrote:
      > > >
      > > > There is clearly a reiterative aspect to self-consciousness. We can never
      > > > catch ourselves thinking. This has led to the regress of self-reflection,
      > > > seeking the ultimate horizon within which thought may be framed only to
      have
      > > > this ultimate always flee from us.
      > > >
      > > > Kant attempts to break the regress by positing the
      empirical/transcendental
      > > > distinction. The transcendental frames the empirical. If we ask what
      frames
      > > > the transcendental Kant would say that this is a misconceived question.
      That
      > > > the transcendental frames the empirical is not brought about by a
      reflective
      > > > stepping back. It is brought about due to the fact that when reason
      > > > oversteps its bounds it gets caught in antinomies. It is to avoid this
      > > > outcome that transcendental thought is brought to bear upon empirical
      > > > thought. There is a specific problem that provokes the move to the
      > > > transcendental.
      > > >
      > > > With the turn to Self-Consciousness in the PhS we have what appears to be
      an
      > > > open-ended progress suggested by your distinction between the subject and
      > > > subject/object. I = I may look like a simple tautology; but if the self is
      > > > to know itself as self-conscious what we have is a reiterative nesting
      such
      > > > as:
      > > >
      > > > I = (I = (I = (I = ...)))
      > > >
      > > > That is, the object as subject/object seems to outrun our gaze just as the
      > > > reflective regress slipped out of our grasp. We have the problem of the
      self
      > > > knowing itself as knowing itself as knowing itself … when the self
      means
      > to
      > > > be true to itself.
      > > >
      > > > So whereas the reflective regress means to establish the possibility of
      > > > knowledge the progress means to establish the actuality of self-conscious
      > > > knowing. Of course, in Hegel this actuality is always a systematic
      > > > presentation. The progression is not simply iterative but bends back upon
      > > > itself.
      > >
      > > Hi Alan,
      > >
      > > Let me just make a pause here in your post for a brief comment (I am too
      tired
      > to risk more than just a short remark, for now):
      > >
      > > It is interesting to notice, in my opinion, how perhaps this distinction
      > Subject / subject-object may also serve to address some of your points, made
      > throughout your participation here (as long as I am here), about the role of
      the
      > reader. You have been arguing that there is no "voila" moment at the end of
      the
      > exposition and although I am still to get there I cannot see how there could
      be
      > one, that is, at the end there will still be the reader on the one hand and
      the
      > absolute on the other. I think, again, that we come up to this difference or
      > distinction being dealt with in these last posts. The difference between the
      > enunciation and the enunciated seems to be good way to put it, in my opinion.
      > >
      > > - I have a few more thoughts on this, namely around the question if the
      > reader can represent the point of enunciatio from the presupposition that at
      the
      > end there will still be two readers in one, that is, the reader merged, let's
      > say, with the exposition, the reader of the experience of the exposition, the
      > reader which will get to know and the reader that it is simply different from
      > it, different from this knowing - in the sense that it will never merge with
      it,
      > vanish in it - the reader that is the truth of this knowing, in the sense of a
      > hole in knowledge, that is, as the point which is not known so that knowledge
      > can become and so that, in fact, the exposition can be exposed, If I may put
      it
      > this way. And also because it is concrete, it is there in the exposition,
      > although its proper place may show itself to be a bit less than easy to pin
      > point.
      > >
      > > Knowledge is always for a mirror and the the questioning at some point must
      be
      > about the difference between the mirror and the knowledge which is for it.
      > >
      > > Anyway this is all I can put out now. It is a bit too precarious and I need
      to
      > think this better but I wanted to put this ball in play – the reader, that
      is.
      > >
      > > Regards,
      > > João.
      >
      > PS: The importance of the reader here is also because it is the same
      > position as the writer (Hegel), maybe we can say that it starts one lap
      > behind, but fundamentally it is the same position. Now, Kojève says,
      > metaphorically, that Hegel had to become God to write the SL and I think we
      > should take this seriously, especially because it is a metaphor.
      >
      > And I think we should think God, here, in the Judaic-Christian tradition, it
      > is a God that also thinks, it is a Subject, we might say, a Him. God, in
      > this sense, is said to be everywhere, except, I argue, behind His back,
      > namely because there is no back - if there was then God wasn't God as it is
      > understood ( we can see this in Thomas' arguments for the existence of God –
      > as ending the infinite regress, for instance).
      >
      > So, I argue, like the point of enunciation - it also is certainly
      > presupposed everywhere anything is enunciated, but also it can never go
      > behind its back.
      >
      > > >
      > > > Like Kant, Hegel means to establish a fundamental divide brought about by
      > > > how one responds to the antinomic character of reason at its limits.
      > > >
      > > > Reason at its limits is equivocal or indeterminate or the place of a void.
      > > > However, this place is not to be avoided. We do not put limits on reason
      to
      > > > avoid this unpleasant antinomic outcome. Instead, we notice that reason as
      > > > antinomic does away with the essential/unessential distinction employed by
      > > > the common intellect in ordinary knowing so that we might appreciate the
      > > > rational coherence of absolute form for which both moments of the knowing
      > > > relation become essential when thought comes to equivocate in its attempt
      to
      > > > be self-knowing.
      > > >
      > > > What breaks the progress of the subject/object that seems to outrun our
      gaze
      > > > is a logic that has these two moments mutually implicate. So while in the
      > > > PhS it seems that one form gives way to another which in turn gives way,
      > > > what is also happening is a retrospective gathering of the progress. Thus,
      > > > Reason is not just the third in a sequence. It is a third seen as an
      > > > expression of the mutual implication of the previous two. The progress is
      > > > always also a recollection.
      > > >
      > > > Self-knowing then does not outrun our gaze; instead, it constitutes itself
      > > > after the fact. The equivocation has thought attending both to what looks
      > > > forward and what looks back. When in Absolute Knowing the looking back and
      > > > looking forward becomes the theme â€" when we recollect the forms of
      natural
      > > > consciousness as moments of our own self-knowing and anticipate a move
      into
      > > > the Logic - it is this being caught between that characterizes speculative
      > > > thought that inaugurates the Logic.
      > > >
      > > > This move into the Logic recollects the move from Revealed Religion to
      > > > Absolute Knowing. In RR the Christian community is caught between the
      > > > recollection of the event of Christ and the anticipation of his return.
      > > > However, it is this actual community that is the truth of self-conscious
      > > > spirit. What is this truth? It is the persistence of the being caught
      > > > between. It is the truth of knowing as essentially transitional when
      > > > absolute. The extravagant religious story of god's descent into man is
      then
      > > > more modestly reenacted with the turn to Absolute Knowing as the reader's
      > > > descent to take the place of natural consciousness. And when we do so it
      is
      > > > the dual perspective of a transitional knowing that is the truth about us
      as
      > > > readers. Speculative thought as inherently dual then is the truth carried
      > > > over into the Logic.
      > > >
      > > > So to attempt to answer your question: we enter the Logic inhabiting the
      > > > void of self-knowing and then proceed to fill this void with
      determinations
      > > > that emanate from this void. How does this emanation come about? It starts
      > > > from the insight that an inferential impasse that elicits a dialectic is
      the
      > > > void, only as vortex. That is, what we first learn upon entry into the
      Logic
      > > > is that pure being â€" the seemingly empty thought not unlike Kant's
      thing
      > in
      > > > itself â€" is not the truth of indeterminate thought. The truth is
      becoming.
      > > > The void as vortex is not simply what forever remains indeterminate. It is
      a
      > > > specific sort of indeterminate, an indeterminate that equivocates at
      > > > reason's own limits.
      > > >
      > > > When thought is absolute there is not knowledge on one side and the
      absolute
      > > > on the other. There is not this mysterious gap engendering Kant's thing in
      > > > itself. Instead, there is thought unfixed and in motion â€" the infinite
      > > > movement. As with Kant, Hegel does not look out at an unframed mighty
      > > > expanse of being with a puny intellect forever unequal to the task of
      > > > knowing this expanse. Instead, Hegel locates the absolute where the
      expanse
      > > > of pure being itself equivocates, indicating the site of a speculative
      > > > reason as what fills the void.
      > > >
      > > > We do not have the "mere appearance/mysterious being" divide that marks a
      > > > metaphysics oriented by the common intellect. Instead, we have the divide
      > > > between the two ways of viewing the impasse of reason with the first
      common
      > > > way of viewing blocked by means of equivocation the misconceived notion of
      a
      > > > truth for thought that lies beyond thought. In place of this common
      thought,
      > > > the truth is the speculative that lies beyond the common intellect even as
      > > > it is the origin of what the latter thinks.
      > > >
      > > > - Alan
      > > >
      > > > From: vascojoao2003 <vascojoao2003@>
      > > > Reply-To: <hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
      <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> >
      > > > Date: Monday, September 10, 2012 4:43 PM
      > > > To: <hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
      <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> >
      > > > Subject: [hegel] Re: Schelling on Hegel
      > > >
      > > >
      > > >
      > > >
      > > >
      > > >
      > > > I am even thinking if we can radicalize this some more.
      > > >
      > > > When the true infinite is enunciated again the point of enunciation is
      > > > somewhere else, that is, this point is always somewhere else in relation
      to
      > > > the enunciated, to the explicit thought or concept - precisely for this
      > > > thought of concept to be to be made explicit.
      > > >
      > > > So, back to Lacan's point: "I think where I am not, therefore I am where I
      > > > think not". I am not there in my thought - in the case at hand the true
      > > > infinite - made explicit, I am, as this concept is thought, in the point
      of
      > > > enunciation, which itself is not thought so that the true infinite can. In
      > > > short, I argue that the point of enunciation is always somewhere else in
      > > > relation to the enunciated and thus it cannot really be itself enunciated
      -
      > > > for me this is one of the points of the subject as void, the subject of
      the
      > > > enunciation -he is always different from what he says or conceives.
      > > >
      > > > I think this relates also to your point of the inherent divide of absolute
      > > > thought. The subject that is the unity and difference of subject and
      object,
      > > > or the difference between the moments of its concept - subject and object
      -
      > > > and the concept of its moments - Subject; in this case not like the
      subject
      > > > relating to the object, an I or a self, but as an It to that self.
      > > >
      > > > It seems from this that the inner divide of the absolute is not between
      > > > subject and object, but between subject/object and the subject for which
      > > > this subject/object is but which is not this subject/object whatever shape
      > > > that subject/object may take, but its ever elusive point of enunciation -
      > > > what I am calling here the "It", "Das Es".
      > > >
      > > > When we look at this I think we can relate it to Hegel with the notion of
      > > > absolute difference, or infinite difference - right away between the I, or
      > > > Self, and the It. Infinite difference which, it seems to me, is one of if
      > > > not the most empty of notions and a reminder, I think, that whatever is,
      is
      > > > always somewhere else – probably this can be one of the reasons why
      Lacan's
      > > > thought is also said anti-philosophy, that is, insofar as philosophy aims
      at
      > > > closing holes. For Zizek, though, opening holes is what precisely
      philosophy
      > > > first and foremost is about.
      > > >
      > > > Relating again all this to Hegel, we can ask if Hegel is a filler of holes
      > > > or an opener of holes.
      > > >
      > > > Regads,
      > > > João.
      > > >
      > > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
      <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
      > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> , Alan
      > > > Ponikvar <ponikvaraj@> wrote:
      > > > >
      > > > > You make the point that "once the finite is enunciated the true infinite
      > is
      > > > > already presupposed." This relates to positing the presupposition which
      I
      > > > > take to be a two step process: first there is the enunciation that
      > exhibits
      > > > > absolute form and then this form itself, as the new posit, points to
      what
      > > > > lies beyond the Logic as its forgotten other face, namely the infinite
      > > > > movement that brings the PhS to a close even as it initiates the Logic.
      > > > >
      > > > > This is one way the common intellect differs from speculative thought.
      The
      > > > > most natural way to read the Logic is to leave the PhS behind and just
      > > > > follow the conceptual development. But the first immediate posit
      â€"
      > pure
      > > > > being â€" is the abstract face of the prior infinite movement of
      > absolute
      > > > > knowing. This is what for speculative thought all finite determination
      > > > > presupposes. Once the Logic gets going we can see this infinite/finite
      > > > > interface with reference to the Logic's own determinations. The
      > > > > becoming/Dasein couple recollects the absolute divide between the PhS
      and
      > > > > the Logic or we might say the conceptual development posits its own
      > > > > presupposition out of its original posit, pure being.
      > > > >
      > > > > This is one of the curious features of thought that is absolute. The
      first
      > > > > posit is both immediate and implicitly mediated by reference to its
      origin
      > > > > as an alienated expression of the infinite concept. This first thought's
      > > > > task then is not to ground what follows but to recollect its origin, in
      > this
      > > > > way becoming true to itself. Being true to itself means actualizing the
      > fact
      > > > > that it is but one moment of an absolute identity in difference.
      Absolute
      > > > > thought as true always involves this turning upon itself. All the cycle
      of
      > > > > determinations does is make what is already implicitly true explicitly
      > true.
      > > > >
      > > > > So what lies beyond finite thought is the coming to be of what precedes
      > > > > finite thought. This is what happens to the finite when thought as
      > absolute
      > > > > is self-involved. For the common intellect self-involved thought looks
      > > > > solipsistic. If what is true stands apart from thought then how can
      > thought
      > > > > that does not get beyond itself but only means to be true to itself
      > actually
      > > > > get hold of the truth? The answer is that it does not get hold of the
      > truth
      > > > > because when thought itself is what we mean to truly comprehend we are
      > that
      > > > > which we are attempting to comprehend. The true is what either slips
      away
      > > > > from the attempt to grasp it â€" the dialectic â€" or it is
      this
      > slipping away
      > > > > as it exhibits absolute form. The latter speculative way of viewing the
      > > > > matter has thought in act rather than as content as the place where
      truth
      > > > > appears. It is truth that only is actual as behind the back of the
      thought
      > > > > that brings it into being.
      > > > >
      > > > > Why this is not a mere trick of speculative reason â€" why it
      should
      > matter to
      > > > > us â€" has to do with how the self-divide inherent to the absolute
      > accounts
      > > > > for the origin of the actual abstract concepts employed by the common
      > > > > intellect. Absolute knowing is not about refuting the skeptic and
      showing
      > > > > how it is possible to actually know. It is instead about showing that
      the
      > > > > pertinent problem of knowledge is not its possibility but its actual
      > origin.
      > > > > Whence comes our common concepts? They have their origin out of, as the
      > > > > abstract face of, absolute knowing. The examination of knowledge as it
      > > > > appears in the PhS is not a systematic refutation of all the possible
      > > > > self-standing truth standards. It is a systematic generation of these
      > > > > standards as the abstract face of the truth of the prior form of
      > > > > consciousness. The various ways we orient to our world as exhibited both
      > in
      > > > > the PhS and the Encyclopedia reveal how they arise as the determinate
      face
      > > > > of what is at bottom the indeterminate absolute.
      > > > >
      > > > > The dialectic that exhibits absolute form is thought as indeterminate or
      > as
      > > > > equivocal. Thus, when Hegel says that we find contradiction wherever we
      > look
      > > > > what he means is that every determinate thought holds within itself the
      > > > > implicit trace of its origin out of absolute form.
      > > > >
      > > > > So the true infinite is of special interest in part because it seems to
      > come
      > > > > closer to exhibiting what thought as absolute is about. The immediate
      > shift
      > > > > from the true infinite to being-for-self reminds us of the dual face of
      > > > > absolute knowing with the transition from Consciousness to
      > > > > Self-Consciousness in the PhS. The indeterminate thought of pure
      > difference
      > > > > as the infinite concept settles to become the empty place that is
      > > > > self-knowing.
      > > > >
      > > > > We might say that the move from philosophy to psychology is the move
      from
      > > > > thought as dialectically disturbed to the unnatural animal with an out
      of
      > > > > sorts psyche. The illusive lure of a harmonious whole as the truth we
      seek
      > > > > to know gives way to an examination of what it is that makes both
      > > > > speculative thought and man peculiar and unnatural. In this way, the
      > > > > marriage of Hegel and Lacan is apt.
      > > > >
      > > > > - Alan
      > > > >
      > > > >
      > > >
      > > >
      > > >
      > > >
      > > >
      > > >
      > > >
      > > >
      > > >
      > > > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
      > > >
      > >
      >
      >
      >
      >
      >
      >
      >
      >
      >
      > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
      >









      [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
    • vascojoao2003
      ... Hi Paul, I hope I understood your point. I am interpreting it as proposing that any determination whatsoever implies a minimal element, a lower one ground
      Message 69 of 69 , Sep 18, 2012
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        --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "paul81755" <paulmsrf@...> wrote:
        >
        >
        >
        >
        >
        >
        > João, what I think is true for the infinite following
        > Hegel, always remains the same:
        >
        > 'In Mathematics a magnitude is defined as that which
        > can be increased or diminished; in general as an
        > indifferent limit. Now since the infinitely
        > great or small is that which cannot be increased
        > or diminished, it is in fact no longer a
        > quantum as such.'(SL, Chapter on Quantum. p243
        > of A.V. Miller trans)
        >
        > For instance take 1/x as x increases with no limit,
        > 1/x tends to zero and as x diminishes by becoming
        > a smaller and smaller fraction, 1/x tends to infinity.
        > This is an example of how the standard calculus works
        > with a spurious concept; tending to infinity, rather
        > than to an 'indifferent limit'.
        > Imagine a car that cannot stop.
        >
        > By presuming that there is no limit,
        > it begs the question of how one can be computed.
        > What remains true however is what the relation signifies;
        > for all of the x's nothing effective in terms
        > of what is necessary, possible, contingently
        > or actually the case for the proportion of
        > other properties can be determined.
        > That is, just by considering the mathematical
        > relation in terms of it being self-relating
        > the standard concept of function
        > presupposes an abstract identity.
        >
        > This is why the relation of
        > the whole<regarding the unity of oppositions>
        > to the part<their disunity> is so vital to
        > comprehending the logic; it provides
        > the reason for the universal and or existential
        > cases; as in all the x's and or the ones that exist.
        >
        > Taking a big jump, so as not to loose you by making
        > it too technical, what holds, as in being the consequence for
        > the one-sided vs two sided-use of inferences given
        > the case for the infinite, is that the consequences
        > of their reasoning can be comprehended: the higher standpoint
        > of system contains the lower one ground
        > on presuppositions, like that of
        > taking the infinite to be a quantum.

        Hi Paul,

        I hope I understood your point. I am interpreting it as proposing that any determination whatsoever implies a minimal element, a lower one ground - if this is what your saying - by which the so determined system can become productive, that is, can become a standing point of departure for further thought. I believe then, regarding your example, that you are saying that I could always depart from the infinite as a quantum in case all else, all other determinateness, falls or collapses.

        If it is so, if you are proposing something along these lines, I do not disagree but I think that the point which I am trying to convey still stands because if the infinite is retracted to this its minimal presupposition - to be a quantum - the question now is between a mere repetition of the process from which we got to this point or its differentiation in another than this mere repetition, that is, as inaugural of another problem.

        I would also propose that if we remain solely with "infinite is a quantum" we inevitably fall back on the two general options I proposed just before, even because, in this case, I think what we will end up with is with the infinite to be a moment of to-be-a-quantum which is to say that there is "more" quantum than infinite, this because the notion is supposed to add something to its moments as if it was pure immediate identity with its moments than nothing is gained with concept in relation to what it recollects.

        Regards,
        João.


        >
        > With this in mind, it should not be too
        > difficult to see why the lower standpoint's
        > concept of function can be falsified.
        >
        > All the best,
        >
        > Paul Healey
        >
        >
        > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "vascojoao2003" <vascojoao2003@> wrote:
        > >
        > >
        > >
        > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "paul81755" <paulmsrf@> wrote:
        > > >
        > > > João,
        > > >
        > > > does this make Lacan's logic partly empirical,
        > > > as logic is about the contingent facts
        > > > of cultural relics; old languages are replaced by
        > > > new ones? It also seems partly formal, as the rules
        > > > of its play take priority over the essence of its logic.
        > > >
        > > > Unlike Hegel, it seems the language cannot evolve
        > > > to express even more sophisticated understandings of logic;
        > > > the converse is not the case; logic doesn't
        > > > evolve to express even more sophisticated
        > > > understandings of language. To put it as simply as
        > > > I can, any understanding of logic has an
        > > > absolute speculative value. So how can true
        > > > infinity be collapsed?
        > >
        > > Hi Paul,
        > >
        > > In my view another question could be 'what is the true infinite?', 'what does it mean?'. This question, as I see it, is already the point from where I say that it collapses. In here or it slides back to the process from which it became explicit and thus, in some sense, giving away whatever was supposed to add to that process by its transit from implicitness to explicitness; or opens a path to speak somewhere else - for instance, in the category of Being-for-self. Where it never stays, I think, is just hanging by itself where it would not mean anything other than 'what does it mean?', 'what is it?'.
        > >
        > > Regards,
        > > João.
        > > >
        > > > Anyway, I find the only way I can comprehend
        > > > Hegel, is if this means the understandings of logic
        > > > can have different objective values. Hence Identity
        > > > in union with difference belonging to
        > > > every experience; subjectivity is about
        > > > the agents choice of understanding and this is
        > > > given by the reasons for their nature and the
        > > > culture that it interacts with.
        > > >
        > > > Paul Healey
        > > >
        > > > PS I like the fact you keep your posts short.
        > > >
        > > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "vascojoao2003" <vascojoao2003@> wrote:
        > > > >
        > > > > In very basic terms this is why, in my understanding, Lacan would say that an interpretation of an analytic speech by a syntesis is a false interpretaion - because it just refers back to the play which is for the analyzand the reason why he is there in the first place. A true interpretation to Lacan means, I think, that the analyzand can take that play somewhere else, in a way, to have the analyzand moving away from an obsessive or symptomatic play. An inteerpretation, still in very basic terms, is true insofar as it creates something truly new which itself must be realized in something other than the pure referring back to the play, to the symptom.
        > > > >
        > > > > João.
        > > > >
        > > > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "vascojoao2003" <vascojoao2003@> wrote:
        > > > > >
        > > > > > Hi Mary,
        > > > > >
        > > > > > It is interesting to notice the difference between what is commonly understood a synthesis to achive and what it really achieves.
        > > > > >
        > > > > > Commonly when we think of synthesis we think of a play of oppositions being resolved in a unity - we think about some kind of rest, we think we can rest upon a synthesis. However, in my view, there is no such rest; if we detach the synthetic signifier from the play of oppositions to which it refers, we turn out with an empty signifier as it means nothing without the play of oppositions of which it is the synthesis; on the other hand the synthetic signifier means to add something to the play of oppositions, that is, it means to refer to this play plus its unity, but this something else which the synthesis adds if it is not absolutely recollected by referring it back to the play of oppositions can only appear by allowing to present that play of oppositions to another subject, in the sense of another issue, another problem, another question - and this can only be achieved if the synthesis colapses, that is, colapses in the new issue to which it took the play of which it is the synthesis.
        > > > > >
        > > > > > The synthesis, then, I think, what achieves is to open a path for the speech of the play of opposites insofar as they are thought in a unity, that is, as constituting something other than their mere falling in and out of each other. This something other is what starts by remaining to be seen. That is why, or one of the reasons, why Hegel does not really talk about thesis, antithesis and synthesis, because the place of the synthesis becomes also a place of unilaterality and as such, I think we can say, of negativity.
        > > > > >
        > > > > > Regards,
        > > > > > João.
        > > > > >
        > > > > >
        > > > > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "Mary" <josephson45r@> wrote:
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > I've only just begun to read through this thread, but what strikes me about Hegel's infinity is what Zizek emphasizes as void and nothingness. I see this in the Conclusion of Hegel's Faith and Knowledge, as well as Zizek's interpretation of Good Friday. Infinity "collapses" because it cannot remain as a moment of synthesis.
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/index.htm
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > Mary
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "vascojoao2003" <vascojoao2003@> wrote:
        > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "john" <jgbardis@> wrote:
        > > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "vascojoao2003" <vascojoao2003@> wrote:
        > > > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > > > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "john" <jgbardis@> wrote:
        > > > > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > > > > > As Bob makes very clear in his book, the most distinctive thing about true infinity is that it collapses at virtually the instant it arises.
        > > > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > > > > Hi John,
        > > > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > > > > I don't know how Bob puts it, but from where I stand I'd say that indeed it has to collapse, that is, being no more than the concept of the relation between the finite and the infinite it must infinitely refer back to this relation. We cannot indeed put it in our pocket, so to say, as if we collected a thing that is detachable from its moments - it is these moments, their relation and the name, the signifier attributed to it: true infinite.
        > > > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > > > > Regards,
        > > > > > > > > > João.
        > > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > > > Hello Joao,
        > > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > > > Bob doesn't really have anything to do with it. True infinity comes about very early in the SL--then it collapses.
        > > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > > > The reason I mention Bob is because Holgate's book on the SL ends with true infinity, so one never learns there of its almost immediate collapse. In Carlson's book the transition from true infinity to atomism seems to overlook the collapse almost completely. And if you attempt to read the book without commentary, then what is going on is fairly obscure. Bob's book has the merit of making all this quite clear.
        > > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > > > As to what you say about true infinity at the end of your post--does that really have any meaning? True infinity is...what? What ever it was it collapsed almost immediately. In so far as it was more thqan just a concept or a relation or some words that someone said, in so far as it was a reality--that is something you might only have glimpsed.
        > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > > Hi John,
        > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > > Yes, I was a bit too careless there, maybe too nonchalant.
        > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > > Hegel makes a point about the true infinite as a further determined becoming: "The infinite, however, like its two moments, is essentially only as a becoming, but a becoming now further determined in its moments. Becoming, in the first instance, has abstract being and nothing for its determinations; as alteration, its moments possess determinate being, something and other; now, as the infinite, they are the finite and the infinite, which are themselves in process of becoming."
        > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > > I think that as becoming already was, it is a category that must refer, as soon as it is raised, back to its moments because, as I uderstand it here, the true infinite means what is presupposed in the thought of the finite and the infinite, so that what we collect is a reconceptualization of what is meant by finite and infinite. The true infinite can be then, I think, the signifier of an experience in which the transit from a spurious relation between inifinite and finite to what is necessary for that spurious relation to have become in the first place culminates with the reconceptualization of that relation. In a way, I think, that from which the spurious was possible is shown as the proper place to sublate this spurious infinite. We see this, I think, in the few times Hegel says "we have just lo look at what we have in front of us" (or something close enough).
        > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > > In becoming, as soon as we hold forth to it, it turns into something else - in the case, determinate being. Becoming qua becoming is only the relation between being and nothing as Hegel puts it. I think the same with the true infinite, that is, as soon as we hold forth to it in independence from referring it back to its moments, it becomes something else - in this case: being-for-self.
        > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > > Regards,
        > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > > João.
        > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > > PS: I couldn't check my spelling. Sorry is it is too bad.
        > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > > > So the whole development of the SL in its first book is quite simply a failure. It _almost_ arrives at something wonderful--true infinity--but then the whole thing collapses. With the doctrine of essence Hegel starts all over again from the beginning.
        > > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > > > Zizek likes to go into this sort of thing--that the first attempt (at anything) must be a failure. So then the second attempt can succeed. I'm not aware that he actually applies this to the SL. But it certainly does apply.
        > > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > > > John
        > > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > >
        > > > > > >
        > > > > >
        > > > >
        > > >
        > >
        >
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