In response to the Thu29May03 post by Tahir Wood:

> ...Does this not mean that these different religions then
> have differing contents as well as differing forms?
> Tahir

Let's hear from Hegel, Tahir, about your provocative
question. The Religions are sometimes in vigorous
conflict with one another; does Hegel recognize this?
He does; the conflict is part of the inner dialectic of
Religion.

Hegel approaches Religion, like all phenomena,
dialectically. He begins with the abstract-thesis,
continues to the negative-antithesis, and concludes
with the concrete-synthesis.

The first moment in the philosophy of Religion is
the concept of Religion itself. Hegel begins with the
question: what is Religion, that is, what do all the
various Religions have in common? Hegel says,

"The beginning of Religion, its Content,
is the Concept of Religion itself, that is,
that God is the absolute truth, the truth of
all things, and subjectively that Religion
alone is the absolutely True Knowledge."
(Hegel, LECTURES ON THE PHILOSOPHY
OF RELIGION, 1827, trans. P.C. Hodgson,
1990, U. of California Press, one-vol. ed.
p. 114)

According to Hegel, the Content of all Religions is
simply, God. However, although all Religions are equal
as regards Content, they are radically different as regards
Form. Different Religions portray God in profoundly
different manners.

The second moment of the philosophy of Religion is
the negative, the antithetic, the finite, distinct moment
of *difference*. Hegel says,

"The Determinate concept of Religion,
is Religion in its finitude, finite Religion,
something one-sided, constituted in
opposition to other Religions as one
particular type set against another."
(Hegel, LPR, ibid. p. 101)

Hegel devotes more pages to Determinate Religion
than to any other moment in his narrative, because
in this section he must review all of the Religions of
the World. That is no easy task, and Hegel is, to me,
among the most brilliant contributors to the science of
Comparative Religion. Hegel does not merely catalog
the Religions, and strain to show only what they have
in common. Rather, Hegel goes into great detail,
showing as many *differences* between the
Determinate Religions as he can describe.

The moment of negative-antithesis or distinction has
a multiplicity of movements. For one, God and Human
are sharply distinguished. Also, the Human strives
energetically to elevate human reality back to God, and
this striving takes on many, many Forms. Hegel says,

"The second moment is precisely what
is called, 'relationship,' the going-apart
of this unity. Here we have subjective
consciousness, for which this universal
in-and-for-itself exists, and which relates
itself to it. This can be called, 'elevation
of the human being to God,' because the
human being and God are related to each
other as *distinct*. (Hegel, LPR, ibid. p.
105)

Also,

"The second moment is the activity of
self-determining, of entering into
existence of being-for-another, of
bringing its moments into mutual
distinction and spreading out. These
distinctions are nothing else but the
determinations that the concept itself
inwardly contains. In respect to the
concept of Religion, to the activity of
the Religious Spirit, this self-determining
yields the Determinate or Ethnic
Religions." (Hegel, LPR, ibid. p. 108)

One is not surprised to hear that Hegel also has a third
moment, a moment of the synthesis of the Determinate
Religions within a Consummate Religion. But that is
another story. For now it is sufficient to recognize that,
for Hegel, even though the Forms of the Ethnic Religions
are radically separate and distinct from one another, their
Spiritual Content is one and the same.

Best regards,
--Paul Trejo

>>> petrejo@... 05/29/03 04:55PM >>>

In response to the Thu29May03 post by Tahir Wood:

For now it is sufficient to recognize that,
for Hegel, even though the Forms of the Ethnic Religions
are radically separate and distinct from one another, their
Spiritual Content is one and the same.

The earlier correspondent was not referring only to "Ethnic Religions", the question concerned different theologies arising due to changing social conditions within the same nominal religion, e.g. within Christianity.

Another question though: is belief in some kind of otherworldly reality, such as heaven, nirvana, etc., part of the form or content of religion? It seems to me to be common to all religions and therefore in terms of your argument should be part of the content. How does Hegel express himself on this specific religious topic?

Tahir

I will address Pratyush's and Tahir's other posts later on, with the aim of
refocusing the discussion, but for the moment I just want to say that it is
impossible that the spiritual content of different religions remain the
same while only the forms differ. Even from a Hegelian standpoint, this
would directly contradict any notion of historical progress and would so
completely sever form from content as to make any historical claims
impossible. This is a common enough argument, though, by religious
liberalizers, ecumenical thinkers, mystics, mythologists, etc., that its
spurious claims need to be analyzed. You can abstract out common features
from various religious belief systems all you please, argue their
similarities and further "prove" they have a higher meaning than their
vulgar common social existence recognizes. However, once you have done
that, you have created an ideological construct that bears little
similarity to either the specificity of these belief systems or to the
specific social circumstances encoded in their texts and practices.

Centuries before postmodernism came along, theologians as well as lawyers
knew you could make any text mean whatever you want it to mean. The
compulsory nature of religious and cultural frames of reference combined
with their requirement to be comprehensive and adaptable both necessitated
and enabled factional disputes over the meaning of common symbolic
constructs. This is true in all complex civilizations, and also of
philosophy where it held a central role among the intelligentsia as it did
in China. It is impossible to make any intelligent analysis of the social
functioning of religious ideologies without understanding this and without
demythologizing these hermeneutic mechanisms.

Also, if one feels that various religious expressions are not completely
meaningless if even the religious standpoint is to be rejected, one needs
to know how and why they function, how mythopoeic reasoning and symbolic
expression work, what ideas are encoded in mythic form that reflect the
stage of development of the society, and when they have reached the
historical stage where they require transformation into rational content.

It seems to me that scientific investigation of these matters, as critic
Kenneth Burke argued in THE RHETORIC OF RELIGION, must focus on the
this-sidedness of religion, shared by religionists and secularists alike,
rather than on the transcendental claims of these belief systems
themselves. And then we can also see who really has depth and who is
clueless and shallow. I've learned a lot in this regard from my studies of
Blake and my interaction with religious and secular interpreters. My other
major interest is a study of the personal mystical systems operating within
the avant-garde jazz community of the 1960s.

At 05:01 PM 5/29/2003 +0200, Tahir Wood wrote:

> >>> petrejo@... 05/29/03 04:55PM >>>
>In response to the Thu29May03 post by Tahir Wood:
>
> For now it is sufficient to recognize that,
>for Hegel, even though the Forms of the Ethnic Religions
>are radically separate and distinct from one another, their
>Spiritual Content is one and the same.
>
>The earlier correspondent was not referring only to "Ethnic Religions",
>the question concerned different theologies arising due to changing social
>conditions within the same nominal religion, e.g. within Christianity.
>
>Another question though: is belief in some kind of otherworldly reality,
>such as heaven, nirvana, etc., part of the form or content of religion? It
>seems to me to be common to all religions and therefore in terms of your
>argument should be part of the content. How does Hegel express himself on
>this specific religious topic?
>
>Tahir

Paul Trejo wrote:

>> For now it is sufficient to recognize that, for Hegel, even though the

Forms of the Ethnic Religions are radically separate and distinct from one
another, their spiritual Content is one and the same. <<

I believe that what Hegel actually said is that *all* religions have *a*
spiritual content.

However, because form and content are, if taken in themselves, abstractions,
one cannot say that this content remain identical when the form changes. The
content, although remaining "spiritual", changes along with the form.

Maurizio Canfora