Loading ...
Sorry, an error occurred while loading the content.
 

Thought and Concept

Expand Messages
  • greuterb@bluewin.ch
    ... Hi Alan, (pure) being has no determination (otherwise it wouldn t be pure). Insofar it s the same as Nothing. Because of the missing determination it
    Message 1 of 72 , Feb 22, 2012
      --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "ulrich barth" <ulrich.barth@...> wrote:

      Hi Alan,

      (pure) being has no determination
      (otherwise it wouldn't be pure). Insofar it's
      the same as Nothing. Because of the missing determination it follows: If
      pure
      Being "is" then necessarily Nothing is also. If Nothing wouldn't be Being it's
      determinate. Here you get a
      contradiction.



      Ulli,

      You are right. Hegel writes in the SL about 'Nothing':

      "Nichts, das reine Nichts; es ist
      einfache Gleichheit mit sich selbst, vollkommene Leerheit, Bestimmungs- und Inhaltslosigkeit; Ununterschiedenheit in
      ihm selbst. - Insofern Anschauen oder Denken hier erwähnt werden kann, so gilt es als ein Unterschied, ob etwas oder
      nichts angeschaut oder gedacht wird. Nichts Anschauen oder Denken hat also eine Bedeutung; beide werden unterschieden,
      so ist (existiert) Nichts in unserem Anschauen oder Denken; oder vielmehr ist es das leere Anschauen und Denken selbst
      und dasselbe leere Anschauen oder Denken als das reine Sein. - Nichts ist somit dieselbe Bestimmung oder vielmehr
      Bestimmungslosigkeit und damit überhaupt dasselbe, was das reine Sein ist." (TWA 5, 83, B. Nichts)

      "Nothing, pure
      nothing: it is simply equality with itself, complete emptiness, absence of all determination and content —
      undifferentiatedness in itself. In so far as intuiting or thinking can be mentioned here, it counts as a distinction
      whether something or nothing is intuited or thought. To intuit or think nothing has, therefore, a meaning; both are
      distinguished and thus nothing is (exists) in our intuiting or thinking; or rather it is empty intuition and thought
      itself, and the same empty intuition or thought as pure being. Nothing is, therefore, the same determination, or rather
      absence of determination, and thus altogether the same as, pure being." (B Nothing, § 133)

      It seems that for Hegel
      there is an equivalent convertibility in both directions,from Being to Nothing as well as from Nothing to Being. So, if
      we assess Nothing then we realize a subsistence, a Being (Klaus Hartmann, "Hegels Logik", p. 41). However, is this at
      this point of the Logic a sound argumentation? The difference between Being and Nothing is derived epistemologically
      ('in so far as intuiting or thinking can be mentioned here'), that is, in a discursive way (comparison of Being and
      Nothing). But this is not allowed here at the beginning of the Logic, so we should only assume a conversion from Being
      to Nothing insofar as with Being there is an absence of determination, a Nothing of determination. I do not think that
      we get here a contradiction as you propose but Hegel's argumentation in B. Nothing is vague. Only with 'Becoming' when
      'Being' and 'Nothing' turn into moments an equivalent convertibility is achieved ("their truth is therefore, this
      movement of the immediate vanishing of the one into the other: becoming, a movement in which both are distinguished,
      but by a difference which has equally immediately resolved itself": Coming-to-be and Ceasing-to-be).

      Regards,
      Beat
      Greuter



      Am 19.02.2012 um 19:28 schrieb Alan Ponikvar <ponikvaraj@...>:

      > I think the challenge for Hegelians
      is how the explain that being and
      > nothing are not simply two names for one thought. In the past we have
      > discussed
      this matter on this site.
      >
      > You can imagine that if someone said: "Being is nothing." and someone else
      > then said:
      "Well then, let's think about this nothing." That the usual
      > response of the first person would be: "No, that is not
      what I meant. When I
      > said being is nothing I meant there is nothing to think. We can stop
      > thinking."
      >
      > What this
      comic exchange indicates is that we do not usually take the
      > activity of thinking as part of the thought content when
      we make a
      > declarative sentence. Thinking means to be about some content. And if there
      > is no content then there is
      no thought.
      >
      > What I am suggesting is that Hegel has us situated differently at the
      > beginning of the Logic. We are
      invited to attend to what the thinking
      > exhibits when the thought content brings us to an impasse. If it were not
      >
      for the fact that we seem to have our thought blocked there would be no need
      > to turn to a consideration of the
      thinking.
      >
      > I simple way this works in ordinary thinking is that if I get a mathematical
      > proof right I point with
      pride to my accomplishment. However, if I get stuck
      > then I start to look at what when wrong with my thought process.
      That is, we
      > normally turn to consider the activity when we have made a mistake.
      >
      > The curious thing about Hegel is
      that the seeming error is in fact also when
      > viewed differently the truth of the matter. That is, Hegel has us
      thinking
      > in this odd place – thinking a dialectic - where failed and true thinking
      > share the same content. The
      only difference is the point of view on this
      > dialectic.
      >
      > The skeptic has taught us that circular reasoning is not
      a good thing. It
      > indicates an inferential impasse. Hegel sees an inferential impasse as a
      > mutual implication. Same
      content, different point of view.
      >
      > As mutually implicating moments reveal the impasse to be in truth a newfound
      >
      coherent thought. So being/nothing coheres as becoming. Becoming is what
      > thought is doing while thinking
      being/nothing.
      >
      > So back to the issue: there are actually two pitfalls to be avoided when
      > saying being is nothing.

      >
      > First, we need to avoid turning nothing into a mysterious metaphysical
      > principle such as a divine being beyond
      human comprehension.
      >
      > And second, we need to see that there is still something to think or that we
      > are not done
      with thought with this first thought that being is nothing.
      >
      > - Alan
      >
      > From: Herman Triplegood <hbthreeg@verizon.
      net>
      > Reply-To: <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
      > Date: Sun, 19 Feb 2012 17:40:06 -0000
      > To: <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
      >
      Subject: [hegel] Re: Thought and Concept
      >
      > Alan.
      >
      > I will try to bear in mind your point about the difference
      between ordinary
      > reason and speculative reason, and, your point about actuality as opposed to
      > possibility.
      >
      > Yes,
      the first inversion is strange. But it strangely makes sense to me to
      > say, in effect, that the disjunction, "there is
      being or there is nothing"
      > necessitates the conjunction that "being is nothing and nothing is being"
      > therefore,
      that nothing is as surely as being is.
      >
      > I continue to be puzzled, in a good way, by the very fact that there is
      >
      logic. I have not bumped into very many philosophers that go beyond the
      > assumed prescriptive function of logic and
      take it up as a philosophical
      > question in its own right.
      >
      > Hb3g
      >
      > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%
      40yahoogroups.com> , Alan
      > Ponikvar <ponikvaraj@...> wrote:
      > >
      > > A few comments.
      > >
      > > The phrase that needs to
      be cashed out in your first paragraph is
      > > "necessarily leads to". This is where most accounts of Hegel's logic
      falter.
      > >
      > > You might think we need to be careful about what we say about being. But if
      > > we are too careful we
      might decide that we can say nothing at all about pure
      > > being. But Hegel does not seem to be overly bothered by
      this. He just goes
      > > ahead and speaks in a negative way about what seemingly we can say nothing
      > > determinate.
      > >

      > > What you are calling the being-nothing opposition is I believe the result
      > > of a mediation. He really does start
      with pure being alone. To get to
      > > being-nothing I contend in the post you are responding to is not as simple
      > > as
      it might seem. It already involves a strange bit of Hegelian philosophy,
      > > an inversion.
      > >
      > > So when you say that
      thinking nothing goes hand in hand with thinking being
      > > I am suggesting that this follows after as a reflection upon
      what has
      > > happened to get from 'being is nothing' to 'nothing is'.
      > >
      > > It may seem sensible to say as you do
      that the Logic is "a scientific
      > > investigation of the ontological bases of formal logic, and, of reason in
      > >
      general." But I do not believe this is true for several reasons. First we
      > > have to answer your question as to what
      logic is.
      > >
      > > For Hegel, there is no 'reason in general. There is common reason that most
      > > people take to be
      reason in general and then there is speculative reason. So
      > > for Hegel there are two species that in the Hegelian
      manner relate as an
      > > identity in difference. That is why the Logic begins with the understanding
      > > and with each
      new determination has to 'go speculative' to bring the new
      > > determination forward.
      > >
      > > Also for Hegel a
      scientific account is not another account of the
      > > 'conditions of the possibility' of some domain of knowledge. For
      Hegel
      > > philosophic truth is not about possibilities but about actualities. Truths
      > > are not specimens of analysis
      but emergent. They make actual appearances.
      > >
      > > It is interesting that Hegel's philosophy covers a lot of ground.
      But this
      > > itself creates a problem. Why does it behave in this way? Why does thought
      > > as actual span so many
      domains? I have my own views about this. But here I
      > > just want to say that this feature of Hegel's philosophy
      perplexes rather
      > > than comforts.
      > >
      > > - Alan
      > >
      > >
      > > From: Herman Triplegood <hbthreeg@...>
      > > Reply-To:
      <hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> >
      > > Date: Sun, 19 Feb 2012 09:16:59 -0000
      > > To:
      <hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> >
      > > Subject: [hegel] Re: Thought and Concept
      > >
      > >
      > >
      > >

      > >
      > >
      > > I think that what Hegel has in mind in the first few paragraphs of the
      > > Doctrine of Being is that the
      concept of pure being necessarily leads to the
      > > concept of a determination and mediation of being, and determination
      and
      > > mediation are, essentially, what thinking does. This isn't obvious in these
      > > first few paragraphs, but it
      "plays out" through the first two chapters,
      > > until, a few paragraphs into chapter 3, Hegel explicitly connects the
      >
      > ongoing process with consciousness:
      > >
      > > "Consciousness, even as such, contains in principle the determination of

      > > being-for-self in that it represents to itself and object which it senses,
      > > or intuits, and so forth; that is,
      it has within it the content of the
      > > object, which in this manner has an ideal being; in its very intuiting and,
      > >
      in general, in its entanglement with the negative of itself, with its other,
      > > consciousness is still only in the
      presence of its own self."
      > >
      > > [SL, Miller trans., p. 158]
      > >
      > > At this stage of the game, at the very beginning
      of the Doctrine of Being,
      > > however, I think we have to carefully avoid saying things like "being is an
      > > empty
      concept" or "being is the most universal concept" because such
      > > statements are already assigning a determinate
      content to what, at this
      > > stage, is conceived of as indeterminate. These kinds of statements and
      > > statements like
      "pure being is empty" or "pure being has no content" which,
      > > although, in a sense, all state the obvious, also tend
      to miss the mark,
      > > because, what Hegel is driving home, I think, in these first few paragraphs
      > > is the
      inevitability of a being-nothing opposition that stands prior to any
      > > determinate mediation of the concept by
      thinking.
      > >
      > > Here, Hegel is looking at pure being pre-predicatively. He finds nothing in
      > > it because nothing
      has been or can be predicated at this stage. What I think
      > > Hegel shows, if we read between the lines as we go, is
      that the predications
      > > that will follow depend upon the inseparable nothing that we find goes hand
      > > in hand with
      thinking pure being, i.e., that the entire process of
      > > subsequent determinations is a process consisting of a series
      of negations
      > > that determine the content.
      > >
      > > I think we have to take the title of Hegel's "Science of Logic" at
      face
      > > value. It is, a scientific investigation of the ontological bases of formal
      > > logic, and, of reason in
      general. Logic is something that we have, in the
      > > past, thought of as being just the rules for good thinking, or,
      more
      > > recently, as just a brand of mathematics, and, most recently, as part of a
      > > study of language. I think that
      these interpretations of logic, although
      > > they may be relevant in certain ways, all miss the mark because they do
      not
      > > address the question, what, per se, is logic?
      > >
      > > The impression that I got when I read the Science of
      Logic a few years back
      > > was that what Hegel was trying to say was this: that logic, per se, is the
      > > immanent
      progressive determination and mediation of being through thinking,
      > > which, in turn, relies upon an important but, I
      think, reasonable assumption
      > > about thinking that Hegel probably got from Parmenides, namely, that
      > > thinking
      isn't only the conceptualization of being, but is also being in its
      > > own right. The thinking being is being
      thinking. See what I mean? So, at
      > > bottom, we do arrive at what seems to be a kind of circularity. When we
      > > think
      the absolute, in so far as it pertains to being, the absolute, per se,
      > > is instantiated within the very being of
      that thinking.
      > >
      > > If I understand Hegel correctly, thinking the absolute is exactly what the
      > > standpoint of
      science, in the deepest sense, is. There is no a priori reason
      > > why it should not be possible to be "scientific" in
      this deep sense about
      > > all of the kinds of natural and humanistic phenomena that we see, including
      > > art, religion
      and history. Indeed, if Hegel's logic really is what it is
      > > alleged to be, how could it not be the process of
      mediation that underlies
      > > these phenomena?
      > >
      > > I think it is easy to jump to the conclusion that since Hegel
      taught
      > > philosophy of religion he must have had underlying theological motives. But
      > > this is not born out by the
      tone of his early theological writings. I think
      > > that what Hegel was doing when he taught philosophy of religion was
      simply
      > > the subjecting of the humanistic phenomenon of religion to an exhaustive
      > > logical analysis. One thing
      that probably does not help, either, is the
      > > translation of Geist as Spirit, with all of the "good old down home
      > >
      religion" associations that it has, particularly, in American culture.
      > > Personally, I prefer to see it translated as
      mind. But all one has to do is
      > > just pay attention to the fact that Geist is, for Hegel, a technical
      > >
      philosophical term which operates, throughout his writings, with a meaning
      > > that is more sophisticated than
      colloquial usage. We run into this problem,
      > > reading Plato and Aristotle, when we blithely translate arete as virtue
      and
      > > eudaimonia as happiness and end up reading a different message into the text
      > > than the one that was actually
      intended.
      > >
      > > Hb3g
      > >
      > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
      > <mailto:hegel%
      40yahoogroups.com> , Alan
      > > Ponikvar <ponikvaraj@> wrote:
      > > >
      > > > The issue here is how do we get from 'being is
      nothing' to 'nothing is'.
      > > >
      > > > If we are limited to the singular gaze then when told that being is
      nothing
      > > >
      we might say: "Okay, sure that makes sense." We would leave it at that.
      > > >
      > > > The Hegelian innovation is that the
      first sentence inverts to become the
      > > > second.
      > > >
      > > > The obvious question is: how does this happen?
      > > >
      > >
      > But before we get to that we need to understand what happens if we simply
      > > > stick to being is nothing as the
      final thought. There is a natural
      tendency
      > > > to make this thought as final also profound. Thinking in its purity

      becomes
      > > > elusive. The very fact that it is beyond reach gives it an aura. It is not
      > > > surprising then that
      theological and metaphysical thinking have made pure
      > > > indeterminate being into a first principle.
      > > >
      > > >
      Hegel deflates this misstep as thought ends up being caught in what
      appears
      > > > to be a senseless dialectic.
      > > >
      >
      > > So we need to see how he gets us to the dialectic.
      > > >
      > > > I contend that what happens here is that rather than
      saying we have
      nothing
      > > > more to think about Hegel suggests we might take another look only this
      time
      > > > look at
      the act of thinking the thought of this empty being. It is this
      > > > empty thought of pure being that is. Or pure
      emptiness is since we are
      > > > thinking this emptiness.
      > > >
      > > > At this point we have a thought ­ nothing is Ã
      ‚­ that seems to be the
      same
      > > > thought we just left, pure being. Or having brought thinking itself
      forward
      > > >
      as a thought what we have is the apparent ambiguity of the unity of being
      > > > and nothing. Thought itself does not
      know where to settle.
      > > >
      > > > What this little narrative makes evident is that in the Logic Hegel has
      put
      > > > on
      display the trauma of thought. He acknowledges how unsettling his
      > > > beginning is. But this is not just unsettling
      to someone unprepared to
      think
      > > > speculatively.
      > > >
      > > > It is speculative thought itself which is the
      unsettling event as the
      common
      > > > understanding is always the attitude of thought for one-sided thoughts.
      The
      > > >
      inferential impasse frustrates the understanding. That being is nothing is
      a
      > > > traumatic thought for the
      understanding.
      > > >
      > > > In brief, even logic is not a mere matter of concepts until concepts are
      > > > properly
      conceived not as possibilities but as actualities. As actualities
      > > > that are about events. And events have a
      pathological component.
      > > >
      > > > When truth is conceived as emergent, truth is conceived as a startling
      event
      > > >
      of something new and unexpected coming on the scene.
      > > >
      > > > Thus the trauma of thought is the cut of the absolute
      as it transitions
      from
      > > > the understanding to the speculative.
      > > >
      > > > - Alan
      > > >
      > > > From: vascojoao2003
      <vascojoao2003@>
      > > > Reply-To: <hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
      > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.
      com> >
      > > > Date: Sun, 19 Feb 2012 04:10:29 -0000
      > > > To: <hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
      >
      <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> >
      > > > Subject: [hegel] Re: Thought and Concept
      > > >
      > > >
      > > >
      > > >
      > > >
      > > >
      >
      > > Hi Mary,
      > > >
      > > > When we think being without the thought of thinking being what content do
      we
      > > > extract
      from being but nothing? But why Nothing and not just the endless
      > > > repetition of Being, pure being, Being, pure
      being...Being...?
      > > >
      > > > And why Being and not Nothing? Isn't in the priority of Being the
      > > > presupposition of
      Being being thought? The Nothing from being is not the
      > > > same, I think, as it would if Nothing was the first
      category and not the
      > > > second. I think that by positing Being Hegel presupposes thought and Being
      > > > is the
      category for the immediate content of thought, or of thought as
      > > > immediate.
      > > >
      > > > But by focussing on the
      immediate content of thought without the thought
      > > > which presupposes it, this immediate content is the same as
      nothing. But
      in
      > > > here there is a reflection, a movement, there is thought in this
      transition
      > > > but a thought
      which does not yet think itself as thinking. It thinks Being
      > > > and without positing itself for its own gaze,
      mediated by the thought of
      > > > Being, thought gazes pure Being and finds Nothing.
      > > >
      > > > Regards,
      > > > João.

      > > >
      > > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
      > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
      > >
      <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> , "Mary"
      > > > <josephson45r@> wrote:
      > > > >
      > > > > João,
      > > > >
      > > > > My
      understanding of Hegel's Nothing might be askew or preconditioned,
      and
      > I
      > > > might not understand you correctly,
      but I don't think non-thought is the
      > same
      > > as
      > > > 'pure' Nothing or Being. Thought is capable of thinking only
      itself (Be
      the
      > > cut,
      > > > as Alan mentioned) but simultaneously the actualization of difference
      makes
      > > the
      > > >
      Absolute aware it is Nothing-Being without the Becoming difference
      > instigates.
      > > > Being doesn't become Nothing. It
      is Nothing, pure thought, but thought of
      > only
      > > > "itself.'
      > > > >
      > > > > Mary
      > > > >
      > > > > --- In
      hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
      > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
      > > <mailto:hegel%
      40yahoogroups.com> ,
      > > > "vascojoao2003" <vascojoao2003@> wrote:
      > > > > >
      > > > > > "It seems to me that thought is
      that for which the SL is."
      > > > > >
      > > > > > Moreover, it seems to me that thought is that from which the Logic
      >
      emerges
      > > > and develops and that for which it is.
      > > > > >
      > > > > > For me the transition of Being to Nothing, or
      the Nothing emerging
      from
      > > pure
      > > > being enacts the lack of thought in pure Being so that Nothing is thought,
      >
      or
      > > > thinking, claiming its presence. That is Nothing is the negative presence
      of
      > > > thought in Being, pure
      being, it is thought present as not present, acting
      > as
      > > > not acting.
      > > > > > Being, without thought becomes
      Nothing. Being is, I think, for
      thought,
      > > but
      > > > because in the opening of the Logic the thought for which pure
      being is
      > thinks
      > > > Being without thinking the thought of Being, Being becomes Nothing.
      > > > > >
      > > > > >
      Regards,
      > > > > > João.
      > > > > >
      > > > > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
      > <mailto:
      hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
      > > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> ,
      > > > "vascojoao2003" <vascojoao2003@> wrote:
      > > > > >
      >
      > > > > > > Hi Will,
      > > > > > >
      > > > > > >
      > > > > > > You said: "The movement from there onward is always in
      concepts,
      from
      > > > Being to Becoming to Determinate Being, to Essence, to Life, etc. It is
      > > because
      > > > of this
      conceptual development that the activity of thinking takes on
      > concrete
      > > > significance. But thinking or Thought as
      such are never a categorical part
      > of
      > > > Logic. Thought as such only becomes a single fleeting moment in Hegel's
      >
      > > philosophy in the sphere of Spirit."
      > > > > > >
      > > > > > > It seems to me that thought is that for which the SL
      is.
      > > > > > >
      > > > > > > If not what we have is an absolute developing and unfolding in
      itself
      > > with
      > > > us
      merely attending to it - which already is a contradiction, as attending
      > to
      > > > the development of the Logic is to
      think. What we could think is that us,
      as
      > > the
      > > > thinking of the movements of the conceptual development of the
      Absolute,
      are
      > > > unessential to it, but if this is your position then I think it is fair to
      > ask
      > > > you to deal
      with the treatment Hegel gave to this idea of the
      unessentiality
      > > of
      > > > consciousness over against the true in
      the Consciousness Section of the
      > > > Phenomenology.
      > > > > > >
      > > > > > > Regards,
      > > > > > >
      > > > > > > João.

      > > > > > >
      > > > > > >
      > > > > > >
      > > > > > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
      > <mailto:
      hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
      > > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> , Will
      > > > Mellon <willmellon@> wrote:
      > > > > > > >
      >
      > > > > > > Thought and Concept
      > > > > > > >
      > > > > > > > This is offered in hope of clarification and answering
      several
      > > questions
      > > > that
      > > > > > > > have been raised. It may be very difficult or impossible for some
      or
      > >
      all
      > > > on this
      > > > > > > > list to understand, due to various factors. But it is presented
      > anyway
      > > > in case

      > > > > > > > there is even one who may benefit from it. Having done the work of
      > > > laboring over
      > > > > > > >
      Hegel's texts, and developing an intimate familiarity with them
      will
      > > > help. For
      > > > > > > > those who haven't
      done that, it will probably be impossible to
      > > > understand.
      > > > > > > >
      > > > > > > > The revolutionary conception
      that separates Hegel from practically
      > all
      > > > other
      > > > > > > > philosophers, and all para-philosophers (would-be
      philosophers) is
      > his
      > > > discovery
      > > > > > > > or realization that thinking as such is not a non-distinct

      abstract
      > > > activity
      > > > > > > > that can only be a "thinking about" something, because it lack all
      > > > content
      in
      > > > > > > > itself. It is not even a thinking about itself as a non-distinct
      > > > abstract
      > > > > > > >
      activity. And it certainly is not about the movement of this pure
      > > > abstract
      > > > > > > > activity as such. For
      what is it that would be moving!
      > > > > > > >
      > > > > > > > If this is what he discovered as NOT being what thinking
      is, then
      we
      > > > must
      > > > > > > > understand clearly what Hegel positively discovered to be actual
      > > > thinking.
      For
      > > > > > > > Hegel, thinking is concrete -- the movement of concepts. It is not
      > > that
      > > > there is
      > > > > >
      > > thinking and there are concepts, as well as the thinking about
      > > concepts.
      > > > This
      > > > > > > > would again
      leave thinking as an undefined abstract activity.
      > Thinking
      > > > means the
      > > > > > > > movement of concepts, and
      this is what gives thinking its
      > concreteness
      > > > and
      > > > > > > > fundamental importance.
      > > > > > > >
      > > > > >
      > > Because it is so easy to fall into the oblivion of abstraction
      when
      > > the
      > > > word
      > > > > > > > 'thinking' is
      used, due to its prominent misunderstanding in the
      > > modern
      > > > world,
      > > > > > > > as well as for centuries in
      the past, it is better to call it
      > > conceptual
      > > > > > > > thinking, or conceptual movement, or movement of
      concepts in order
      > to
      > > > make it
      > > > > > > > clear what Hegel is writing about.
      > > > > > > >
      > > > > > > > What
      is Thought as such? Thought is the same pure, simple,
      immediate
      > > > self-
      > > > > > > > identity as Being, which is
      the same as Nothing. In other words,
      to
      > > talk
      > > > about
      > > > > > > > Thought as such, is to talk about Nothing.
      Those who remain at
      this
      > > > level are
      > > > > > > > Voidists, or Nihilists.
      > > > > > > >
      > > > > > > > Notice that
      Hegel begins his Science of Logic with Being. He
      doesn't
      > > > start with
      > > > > > > > Thought as such. He doesn't
      even mention Thought as one of the
      > > > categories of the
      > > > > > > > Logic, because Thought as such is pure
      abstraction as such. Hegel
      > > begins
      > > > > > > > immediately with Being, and this can be said to be the same
      >
      immediacy
      > > as
      > > > Thought
      > > > > > > > as such, but he doesn't ever call it Thought to avoid the immense
      > > >
      confusion this
      > > > > > > > might cause, and distract from the fact that the very first moment
      > of
      > > > thinking
      > >
      > > > > > is the purely abstract concept Being.
      > > > > > > >
      > > > > > > > The movement from there onward is always in
      concepts, from Being
      to
      > > > Becoming to
      > > > > > > > Determinate Being, to Essence, to Life, etc. It is because of
      this
      > > > conceptual
      > > > > > > > development that the activity of thinking takes on concrete
      > > > significance. But

      > > > > > > > thinking or Thought as such are never a categorical part of Logic.
      > > > Thought as
      > > > > > > > such
      only becomes a single fleeting moment in Hegel's philosophy
      in
      > > the
      > > > sphere
      > > > > > > > of Spirit.
      > > > > >
      > >
      > > > > > > > Science or scientific thinking is the progressive development of
      > > > concepts from
      > > > > > > >
      one another. It is not we who think, it is the concepts that
      develop
      > > > themselves
      > > > > > > > out of themselves
      that is called thinking. To take the perspective
      > > that
      > > > we think
      > > > > > > > the development of the concepts
      of Logic is to stand outside of
      > > Science,
      > > > to hold
      > > > > > > > on to an abstract understanding of thinking
      about Logic, and fail
      to
      > > > comprehend
      > > > > > > > that thinking and the movement of concepts are not distinct.
      The
      > idea
      > > > that
      > > > > > > > there can be a thinking about the Logic gives a meaningless
      > > significance
      > > >
      to that
      > > > > > > > thinking, for what is it? It is an abstract nothingness that does
      > and
      > > > can do
      > > > > > >
      > nothing.
      > > > > > > >
      > > > > > > > The engine that moves the development is the dialectical and
      > > sublational
      > >
      > nature
      > > > > > > > of concepts themselves. There is no additional concept-less
      > "thinking"
      > > > needed as
      > > > >
      > > > a protagonist to push the development along by perspectives and
      > > shifts.
      > > > This
      > > > > > > > would
      immediately throw one into an external para-philosophical
      > > > position. The
      > > > > > > > concepts develop themselves
      out of their own intrinsic dialectical
      > > > necessity.
      > > > > > > > This "necessity" is not really necessary, and is,
      in fact, a
      concept
      > > on
      > > > its own
      > > > > > > > in the Logic. The actual necessity in the development is the
      >
      oneness
      > > of
      > > > the
      > > > > > > > Idea. "Necessity" arises due to the nature of the Idea being a One
      > > that
      > >
      > is also
      > > > > > > > divided into differences in its development. This universal
      oneness
      > > that
      > > > > > > >
      sublates its differences in unifying them is called necessity at
      the
      > > > level of
      > > > > > > > the relating
      differences. Otherwise there is no necessity or cause
      > and
      > > > effect in
      > > > > > > > the development, each of
      these terms, themselves, being categories
      > > that
      > > > show
      > > > > > > > themselves in the development. With this
      understanding it may be
      > valid
      > > > to refer
      > > > > > > > to the dialectical necessity of the development due to the
      unity
      of
      > > the
      > > > Idea
      > > > > > > > that underlies the developmental moments. And, of course, this
      > > >
      tautological
      > > > > > > > movement is not a temporal process.
      > > > > > > >
      > > > > > > > Para-philosophy
      > > > > > >
      >
      > > > > > > > Those who stand outside of philosophy are under the misconception
      > that
      > > > there is
      > > > > > > >
      an abstract activity called concept-less thinking as such. Because
      > it
      > > > has no
      > > > > > > > concrete content on
      its own, it has to be engaged as a thinking
      > ABOUT
      > > > something.
      > > > > > > > It does not change the situation to
      say one is thinking about
      > > thinking.
      > > > It
      > > > > > > > merely becomes one abstract movement about another,
      which is not a
      > > > movement,
      > > > > > > > because there is nothing. Nothing is there, so there is nothing to
      > >
      move.
      > > > > > > >
      > > > > > > > The language of the para-philosopher is easy to discern. Because
      he
      > > > maintains
      >
      > > > > > > an abstract, concept-less idea of thinking as yet being something
      > in
      > > > itself, he
      > > > > > > >
      speaks from that isolated tower of his so-called thinking ABOUT
      > > > philosophy and
      > > > > > > > even thinking, all
      the while being insulted from actual philosophy
      > and
      > > > concrete
      > > > > > > > conceptual thinking. Thus he
      speaks/writes in terms of
      > > 'perspectives,'
      > > > > > > > 'shifts,' insight' (as if seeing into something from his
      outside
      > > vantage
      > > > point),
      > > > > > > > 'cuts,' 'gaps' (all spatial images, space being externality
      > itself),

      > > > etc., and
      > > > > > > > finally demanding ex-planations ('ex' implying: outside of that
      > which
      > > is
      > > > to
      be
      > > > > > > > explained).
      > > > > > > >
      > > > > > > > Anyone may carefully comb through Hegel's Science of Logic, or
      any
      > of
      > > > his
      > > > > > > > writings, in vain to find such terms being used as categories in
      his
      > > > exposition

      > > > > > > > of philosophy. As such, it is NOT Hegelian philosophy that we can
      > find
      > > > in such
      > > > > > > >
      ramblings. By thinking one has already understood philosophy, one
      > > > remains
      > > > > > > > insulated from the actual
      study and learning of Hegel's
      philosophy.
      > > That
      > > > study
      > > > > > > > begins by actually reading through his
      books, following the
      > > development
      > > > of the
      > > > > > > > concept and learning how it takes place. No ex-
      planations are
      > needed.
      > > > The
      > > > > > > > development will directly be self-evident.
      > > > > > > >
      > > > > > > >
      Philosophy is not about the finite individual or his/her thinking.
      > It
      > > is
      > > > about
      > > > > > > > the Absolute
      Idea that thinks itself (or Himself) in and as
      > > necessarily
      > > > > > > > determinate or finite actuality or man,
      because thinking is
      > > > determination,
      > > > > > > > negation or limitation, it is thus the activity of specific
      >
      concepts.
      > > > Thinking
      > > > > > > > is the activity of the universal, not of the finite individual.
      [It
      > > may
      > >
      > be true
      > > > > > > > that the stubborn adherence to the finite individual's thinking
      (as
      > > > finite) that
      > > > >
      > > > an atheistic view engenders, may make it more difficult to
      > > > > > > > understand this point.]
      > > > > > > >
      >
      > > > > > > In conclusion (if I may suggest), it would seem appropriate in a
      > Hegel
      > > > > > > > discussion list to
      actually discuss Hegel's philosophy instead of
      > the
      > > > individual
      > > > > > > > personal para-philosophies of its
      various members, to the neglect
      of
      > > > Hegel.
      > > > > > > >
      > > > > > > > [Non-text portions of this message have
      been removed]
      > > > > > > >
      > > > > > >
      > > > > >
      > > > >
      > > >
      > > >
      > > >
      > > >
      > > >
      > > >
      > > >
      > > >
      > > >
      > > >
      [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
      > > >
      > >
      > >
      > >
      > >
      > >
      > >
      > >
      > >
      > >
      > > [Non-text portions
      of this message have been removed]
      > >
      >
      > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
      >
      >


      [Non-text
      portions of this message have been removed]
    • vascojoao2003
      This is an important subject, sublation, I mean. What does it mean, what does it imply? As I see it, sublation is the movement by which a content is made
      Message 72 of 72 , Feb 27, 2012
        This is an important subject, sublation, I mean. What does it mean, what does it imply?

        As I see it, sublation is the movement by which a content is made explicit not by a definition but by pulling out of the position where we see things from the perspective of a certain content to see the content of that perspective. What makes it concrete is that the pulling out of a perspective implied in a content, in a truth, is that it emerged from that same truth, that is, a truth is taken to its limits, to the object in which it realizes itself and so we come to a divide between what that object answers to and what it doesn't answer, what it doesn't answer is then a new problem which places a new perspective in play.

        This new perspective which on the one hand is a negative of the former on the other hand is picked up as a new shape, a new look which presupposes the path to it but insofar as it exceeds it. From this excess, then, which is presented as a new shape of truth, with its own perspective, we can look back and grasp the prior movement as a whole. We no longer see or think from it but see or think it from the excess which it realized once brought to its limits by the shape of a new truth which the former shape fell short to realize.

        What this new perspective presupposes then is the former perspective and what in it was opposed to it as its negative, what appears beyond its limits, that which it came to without however sustain it as a truth which belongs to it in its concept. The shape of this negative will then, I think, recollect the prior shape as a moment of the necessity od its coming to be, but a moment exceeded.

        As you surly notice this is still a bit too abstract and even confusing or frail. Let it be had then as a mere contribution to an ongoing questioning of sublation.

        Regards,
        João.


        --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, stephen theron <stephentheron@...> wrote:
        >
        >
        > Well what I meant to say, but it seems I didn´t quite get across, is that "absorbed" and "annulled" are in part placeholders (for aufgehoben), though already they have some conceptual and hence explanatory power, whereas Aufhebung itself gets quite full and repeated explanation or is "cashed out" (this highly figurative expression actually leans heavily towards a type of atomising, more often than not reductive explanation which Hegel himself severely deprecates. Of course "explanation" has the same idea etymologically built in, uncreasing the folds, but leaves us a bit more freedom to resist the "bewitchment of language" or, for that matter, of the cash-till).
        > I do not see that "metaphysical" and "speculative" are mutually exclusive terms, though that is a discussion going on in other posts here right now. Hegel explicitly links speculative reason to speculative mysticism, but of course even the latter is maybe not "metaphysical" in quotes.
        > Next step: query "links".
        >
        > Stephen
        >
        >
        >
        > To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
        > From: ponikvaraj@...
        > Date: Sun, 26 Feb 2012 16:54:48 -0500
        > Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Thought and Concept
        >
        >
        >
        >
        >
        >
        > Nice try.
        >
        > But absorbed and annulled like preserve and suspend are placeholders.
        >
        > In the modern idiom they need to be cashed out.
        >
        > How is distinction absorbed and annulled?
        >
        > One can offer a metaphysical explanation of what this is about or one can
        > offer a speculative explanation. The words are placeholders for this dispute
        > and any other candidate explanations for how distinctions are aufgehoben.
        >
        > In brief, to ask what Hegel means by any of these words is not an idol
        > question.
        >
        > It is a question with many varied answers none of which you provide here.
        >
        > - Alan
        >
        > From: Stephen <stephentheron@...>
        > Reply-To: <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
        > Date: Sun, 26 Feb 2012 20:39:26 -0000
        > To: <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
        > Subject: [hegel] Re: Thought and Concept
        >
        > Yes we must interpret Aufhebung/sublation; that is to say though, we must
        > intepret Hegel´s own interpretation/explanation of it. Certainly he does not
        > simply put a word there to act as a "placeholder". That would indeed not be
        > proper. But he offers a developing explanation of it throughout.
        >
        > So, as cited in an addition to EL (does it matter where it comes from if it
        > speaks for itself?) he says "As simple Being, the One is simple
        > self-reference; as Being modified it is determinate: but the
        > determninateness is not in this case a finite determinateness - a somewhat
        > in distinction from another - but infinite, because it contains distinction
        > absorbed and annulled in itself."
        >
        > This absorption and annulling of distinction already instances "Aufhebung".
        >
        > He goes on to attack the thought that "besides reality there is also (this
        > word italicised) an ideality", making the two "equal and parallel... the
        > notion of ideality just lies in its being the truth of reality."
        >
        > This is what elicits Aufhebung/sublation, such as only thought can
        > accomplish and actively real-ise or "explicitly put".
        >
        > Without such Aufhebung of reality, he says, ideality... would be no better
        > than an empty name", a place-holder indeed.
        >
        > It is even an ideality of "existence", which thus "if retained in isolation
        > expresses no truth". Existence, that is, must itself be "aufgehoben", and
        > there are strong supporting texts for this.
        >
        > He allows it may not be improper to contrast Nature and Mind as reality and
        > ideality, but only for a moment, the text implies. Nature is "far from being
        > so fixed and complete, as to exist even without that." Well, everyone grants
        > that, one might think (cf. Frege: "What is the world without the reason?").
        >
        > In Mind Nature first "attains its truth". Mind "involves Nature as absorbed
        > in itself" and here, and elsewhere in the book, "absorbed" is a
        > "placeholder" for "aufgehoben"!
        >
        > Hegel then adds this general remark:
        >
        > Apropos of this, we should note the double meaning of the German word
        > aufheben (to put by, or set aside). We mean by it (1) to clear away, or
        > annul:...(2) to keep or preserve... This double usage... is not an
        > accident... We should rather recognise in it the speculative spirit of our
        > language rising above the mere 'either-or' of understanding.
        >
        > Now this "new way of thinking" (not new at all), "rising above the mere
        > 'either-or' of understanding", is what is explained, i.e. Aufhebung is
        > explained, throughout the Logic, I would submit. But I agree we can always
        > supplement, expand, further explain this (EL96 Zusatz).
        >
        > Stephen.
        >
        > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> , Alan
        > Ponikvar <ponikvaraj@> wrote:
        > >
        > > Yes, thinking opposition differently will be a challenge.
        > >
        > > But you could also say we are challenged to think identity differently.
        > >
        > > In fact, we are challenged to think the difference as it exhibits an
        > > identity.
        > >
        > > My interest is in interpreting aufheben. This is a reference to your final
        > > point 5. In my view, the word itself is a placeholder for a proper
        > > explanation of this new way of thinking.
        > >
        > > - Alan
        > >
        > > From: Herman Triplegood <hbthreeg@>
        > > Reply-To: <hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> >
        > > Date: Sat, 25 Feb 2012 03:47:11 -0000
        > > To: <hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> >
        > > Subject: [hegel] Re: Thought and Concept
        > >
        > >
        > >
        > >
        > >
        > >
        > > Friends.
        > >
        > > In response to the general conversation about being and nothing in the first
        > > few pages of Hegel's Science of Logic, I think we need to not get stuck
        > > there on the very first page and keep reading. Hegel addresses our concerns
        > > in the twenty six pages of explanatory text that follow.
        > >
        > > The first thing that I notice is that the "follow on" explanatory text is
        > > divided into sections in the following manner:
        > >
        > > 1. Unity of Being and Nothing
        > > a. Opposition of Being and Nothing in Ordinary Thinking
        > > b. Defectiveness of the Expression: Unity...
        > > c. The Isolating of These Abstractions
        > > d. Incomprehensibility of the Beginning
        > > 2. Moments of Becoming
        > > 3. Sublation of Becoming
        > >
        > > So, it looks to me like Hegel is addressing, head on, the way in which we
        > > normally think opposition and how we are going to have to think opposition
        > > differently:
        > >
        > > 1. Why our concept of unity (identity) is defective.
        > > 2. How our one-sided thinking separates the two sides of the
        > > oppositional relation, and that we really need to think the two
        > > sides of the oppositional relation as inseparable from each other.
        > > 3. How this one-sided thinking makes not only "the beginning"
        > > incomprehensible to us, but, as a matter of fact, it makes "all
        > > beginnings" incomprehensible, which is a problem that we need to
        > > resolve if we are to move forward with a logical analysis of truth
        > > genesis.
        > > 4. How the phenomenology of things coming-to-be and things
        > > ceasing-to-be directly challenges our one-sided thinking and
        > > forces us to consider an alternative kind of thinking.
        > > 5. How the conceptual operation of sublation offers us this new way
        > > to think through, and beyond, these immediate difficulties.
        > >
        > > Hb3g
        > >
        > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
        > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> , stephen
        > > theron <stephentheron@> wrote:
        > > >
        > > >
        > > > Wil,
        > > >
        > > >
        > > >
        > > >
        > > > To: hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
        > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
        > > > From: eupraxis@
        > > > Date: Fri, 24 Feb 2012 08:46:38 -0500
        > > > Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Thought and Concept
        > > >
        > > >
        > > >
        > > >
        > > >
        > > >
        > > > In common parlance, and in grammar as taught in school, "is" is a verb.
        > > > And the coplua in this case was "is". What am I missing?
        > > >
        > > > Wil,
        > > >
        > > > You are just missing something in my own not the best of texts.
        > > > In TFL , as found in quite a few commentaries on TFL (e.g. on Aristotle's
        > "On
        > > Interpretation"), the copula signifies identity. Aquinas stresses that IS
        > > denotes an act , or even act of acts, even in this function (of denoting the
        > > "truth of a proposition", i.e. "is" is not entirely equivocal as between that
        > > and this "act of being", which others, like Scotus say, said they knew nothing
        > > about). But still, as I said, the verb-function can well appear in the
        > (logical)
        > > predicate, as thus conceived, as in our continuous present, e.g. , in the SisP
        > > form, to which you were pointing,
        > > >
        > > > John IS fishing
        > > >
        > > > which might be logical parsed as the identity
        > > >
        > > > John IS a (or the) man now fishing.
        > > >
        > > > What I mean is the copula is not the only verb, though it has always the
        > > verbal function of acts. One can assert this even for strict identity
        > statments,
        > > because even there, whether its "Tully is Tully" or "Tully is Cicero"
        > > indifferently the second, predicated mention of the identical terms "functions
        > > af6ter the manner of a predicate", the first "after the manner of a subject",
        > > i.e. even there there is a difference in the identity.
        > > >
        > > > Still, Hegel's argument against the jdgment-form, one of them, seems to be
        > > that a strict identity is asserted such as cannot hold between two things,
        > while
        > > the Fregeans, for there part, maintain that IS when stating an identity has a
        > > special, different and unique meaning as against "the bare (blosse) copula"
        > and
        > > I think I have found traces of this attitude in Hegel too but put to a so to
        > say
        > > opposite use.
        > > >
        > > > So all IS is a verb but not all verbs IS is. Well, you can of course give
        > > "verb" any sense you want.
        > > >
        > > > But I do not see myself as contradicting what you wrote.
        > > >
        > > > This stuff is interesting and obviously much of Hegel's analyses are in
        > > function of the Aristotelian logic and metaphysics. Among other things they
        > can
        > > be used to show that Fregeans are not obliged to consign syllogistic to a
        > > useless corner of limited old logic, as many seem to think. Cf. Henry Veatch´s
        > > work and several perceptive pieces by Peter Geach, a foremost Frege apostle in
        > > England once upon a time. An example of misunderstanding or trivialisation of
        > > Aristotle's insights, well meqant, can maybe be found in frequent presentation
        > > of the Venn diagrams as containing Aristotle's full and true logical doctrine,
        > > rather than being nothing more than a misleading teaching tool if the pupil is
        > > never taken beyond them.
        > > >
        > > > best wishes,
        > > > Stephen.
        > > >
        > > >
        > > > -----Original Message-----
        > > > From: Stephen <stephentheron@>
        > > > To: hegel <hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
        > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> >
        > > > Sent: Fri, Feb 24, 2012 6:15 am
        > > > Subject: [hegel] Re: Thought and Concept
        > > >
        > > > A predicate is sometimes a noun but it can be anything whatever.
        > > > But first, the copula as such is not the verb but the sign of identity.
        > > > The verb (grammatical merely) usually comes in or is the predicate.
        > > > So,
        > > > Socrates IS (someone) fishing.
        > > > By supposition theory the predicate can be said always to "stand for"
        > > > what the subject stands for, but after the manner of a predicate.
        > > >
        > > > Logicians have often argued however that the predicate has no
        > > > "supposition" at all, as does Frege ("supposition" is close to
        > > > "reference" in meaning, but not too close).
        > > > So it would be
        > > >
        > > > Socrates IS(identical with) the man who has gone fishing,
        > > >
        > > > or whatever. The fact that this can (can it?) lead to an infinite nest
        > > > of implicit subject-predicate proposition a la Carroll is not germane.
        > > >
        > > > Similarly, the (logical)subject need not be a noun, is, rather,
        > > > noun-like. It might be a pronoun, for example. E.g. To march (marching)
        > > > can be pleasant (IS a.possibly-pleasnat-activity, etc.).
        > > >
        > > > Fregean logic attempts to dismantle this Aristotle-based structure and
        > > > becomes instead, in some critiques, "a logic that can´t say what
        > > > anything is" (Veatch). But must we be able to say what anything, or
        > > > something, is (in logic)?
        > > >
        > > > Stephen.
        > > >
        > > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
        > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> , eupraxis@
        > > wrote:
        > > > >
        > > > > Subject & predicate joined by copula (verb).
        > > > >
        > > > >
        > > > > -----Original Message-----
        > > > > From: Alan Ponikvar <ponikvaraj@>
        > > > > To: hegel <hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
        > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> >
        > > > > Sent: Thu, Feb 23, 2012 1:57 pm
        > > > > Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Thought and Concept
        > > > >
        > > > >
        > > > >
        > > > >
        > > > >
        > > > > Yes, a predicate is a noun. That doesn't change anything.
        > > > >
        > > > > - Alan
        > > > >
        > > > > From: Ulrich Barth <ulrich.barth@>
        > > > > Reply-To: <hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
        > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> >
        > > > > Date: Thu, 23 Feb 2012 20:44:36 +0100
        > > > > To: "hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
        > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> "
        > > <hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
        > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> >
        > > > > Cc: "<hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
        > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> >"
        > > <hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
        > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> >
        > > > > Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Thought and Concept
        > > > >
        > > > > Hi Alan,
        > > > >
        > > > > it might be we have different points of view because of the language.
        > > > In
        > > > > Germ an Hegel is using Nothing as a noun.
        > > > >
        > > > > Regards
        > > > >
        > > > > Ulli
        > > > >
        > > > > Von meinem iPhone gesendet
        > > > >
        > > > > Am 23.02.2012 um 19:53 schrieb Alan Ponikvar <ponikvaraj@
        > > > > <mailto:ponikvaraj%40gmail.com>;; >:
        > > > >
        > > > > > You seem to have missed the point.
        > > > > >
        > > > > > In the sentence 'being is nothing' nothing is a predicate. It is a
        > > > > > descriptive property. In the sentence 'nothing is' nothing is the
        > > > > subject.
        > > > > > It has become a substantive. What is in need of explanation is this
        > > > > shift.
        > > > > >
        > > > > > I have no trouble with employing 'iff' to formalize what has been
        > > > > > established. But the co-implication has not been established. That
        > > > is
        > > > > what
        > > > > > we are discussing. So you cannot decide the issue of whether or not
        > > > > being
        > > > > > and nothing co-implicate by showing how to formalize a relation
        > > > that
        > > > > remains
        > > > > > in question.
        > > > > >
        > > > > > The distinction that cannot be formalized is the distinction
        > > > between
        > > > > the
        > > > > > what is intuited and the intuiting. Formal logic has no interest in
        > > > > the
        > > > > > activity of the logical thinker. Hegelian logic in my view does.
        > > > > >
        > > > > > - Alan
        > > > > >
        > > > > > From: ulrich barth <ulrich.barth@
        > > > > <mailto:ulrich.barth%40gmx.ch>;; >
        > > > > > Reply-To: <hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
        > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
        > > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>;;
        > > > >
        > > > > > Date: Thu, 23 Feb 2012 17:35:43 +0100
        > > > > > To: <hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
        > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
        > > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>;; >,
        > > > > <hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
        > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
        > > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>;; >
        > > > > > Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Thought and Concept
        > > > > >
        > > > > > Hi Alan,
        > > > > >
        > > > > > the predicate is "exist" or "exists" and I don`t see where this is
        > > > > turned
        > > > > > into the subject "existence". You make a lot of assertions without
        > > > > giving
        > > > > > reasons for it (why can`t a division be formalized? ). your remark
        > > > > about
        > > > > > "iff" misses the point. You claimed Being is Nothing which I wrote
        > > > as
        > > > > B = N.
        > > > > > If you look in a textbook of 2 nd order logic you`ll find the
        > > > > definition of
        > > > > > "=" based on "iff".
        > > > > >
        > > > > > Ulli
        > > > > >
        > > > > > -------- Original-Nachricht --------
        > > > > > > Datum: Wed, 22 Feb 2012 18:10:52 -0500
        > > > > > > Von: Alan Ponikvar <ponikvaraj@
        > > > > <mailto:ponikvaraj%40gmail.com>;;
        > > > > <mailto:ponikvaraj%40gmail.com>;; >
        > > > > > > An: hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
        > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
        > > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>;;
        > > > > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>;;
        > > > > > > Betreff: Re: [hegel] Re: Thought and Concept
        > > > > >
        > > > > > > I think the key phrase from Hegel that Beat provides is:
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > "it is empty intuition and thought itself, and the same empty
        > > > > intuition or
        > > > > > > thought as pure being."
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > What allows Hegel to speak of being and nothing as two thoughts
        > > > is
        > > > > the
        > > > > > > division within thought itself, a division that cannot be
        > > > > formalized.
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > As formalized, the basis for the distinction is lost and at the
        > > > > fear of
        > > > > > > repeating myself you have only two options:
        > > > > > > 1. Two names for one thought.
        > > > > > > 2. An unexplained inversion of a predicate into a subject.
        > > > > > > As I read your comment you opt for 1 without knowing it and are
        > > > > unaware of
        > > > > > > or are unwilling to acknowledge the relevance of 2.
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > Now your use of 'iff' begs the question. What justifies the
        > > > > > > co-implication?
        > > > > > > The co-implication operator cannot be used to establish a
        > > > > co-implication
        > > > > > > that is in question.
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > When Hegel talks about tautology he makes clear that '=' is
        > > > > ambiguous. It
        > > > > > > relies both on an identity and a distinction. If B = N then
        > > > either
        > > > > just B,
        > > > > > > or B does not equal N.
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > In either case we have not come to a settled thought.
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > My comment about being determined as indeterminate is a reference
        > > > > to what
        > > > > > > happens if we simply take pure being naively. As Hegel
        > > > acknowledges,
        > > > > > > indeterminate is a contrast term. It already is a determination.
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > So, yes, Hegel wants to begin without presuppositions. The
        > > > problem
        > > > > is how
        > > > > > > can we manage this if our first thought in being tagged as
        > > > > indeterminate
        > > > > > > immediately appears determinate as a result.
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > That is, what Joao's remark makes evident is a difficulty of the
        > > > > common
        > > > > > > understanding when presented with this first thought. Declaring
        > > > it a
        > > > > > > presuppositionless thought becomes its determination.
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > As a result, we have the paradox of inverting the intent of the
        > > > > thought by
        > > > > > > simply stating it. We have what we found throughout the
        > > > > Phenomenology of a
        > > > > > > divide between what the common understanding intends and what it
        > > > > actually
        > > > > > > says.
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > In a sense you are right to say that I want it the other way
        > > > around.
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > You want to begin with thought facing the indeterminate immediate
        > > > > or pure
        > > > > > > being as if such a beginning is not paradoxical.
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > I want to begin with my thought within the element of thought or
        > > > as
        > > > > having
        > > > > > > been educated to the relevance of divided attention appropriate to
        > > > > > > absolute
        > > > > > > knowing so that I can be attuned to what Hegel is challenging us
        > > > to
        > > > > think
        > > > > > > in
        > > > > > > the above quote about empty intuiting.
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > I see thinking as situated within the absolute. You still are
        > > > > wedded to
        > > > > > > the
        > > > > > > opposition of consciousness or the opposition between your
        > > > thinking
        > > > > and
        > > > > > > Hegel's exposition.
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > - Alan
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > Date: Wed, 22 Feb 2012 21:09:02 +0100
        > > > > > > To: <hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
        > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
        > > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>;;
        > > > > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>;; >,
        > > > > > <hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
        > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
        > > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>;;
        > > > > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>;; >
        > > > > > > Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Thought and Concept
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > Hi Alan,
        > > > > > > hi Joao,
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > allow me first to make a remark about Alan`s statement " Yes,
        > > > being
        > > > > is
        > > > > > > nothing. But it does not follow in any normal sense of logical
        > > > > entailment
        > > > > > > that therefore nothing is also."
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > To use formal logic you´ve to translate "is" into "=", Then you
        > > > > have B
        > > > > > > (being) = N (nothing). From the logical definition of "=" you
        > > > have:
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > B = N iff (for all predicates P: P(B) iff P(N)).
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > Because Alan accepts B = N you have proved by this "in a normal
        > > > > sense of
        > > > > > > logical entailment" that N = B. If you predicate Being as a
        > > > > expression of
        > > > > > > existence, in doing so you predicate Nothing as a adequate
        > > > > expression of
        > > > > > > existence.
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > Nothing is not the contradictory of Being. "Not Being" is the
        > > > > > > contradictory
        > > > > > > of Being and it means that there is something which misses the
        > > > > predicate
        > > > > > > "Being". Of course this is different from "Nothing".
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > Sometimes I think it`s helpful not to think about Nothink but to
        > > > > think it
        > > > > > > itself. It`s not possible, you´ll always think something.
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > I am also unsure how to understand Alsan`s remark starting with:
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > "Of course, if this is how we arrive at our first thought it
        > > > > obviously is
        > > > > > > > not
        > > > > > > > first. Moreover, it is determined as indeterminate. So the
        > > > > challenge for
        > > > > > > > someone who thinks the Logic can begin with naïve apprehension
        > > > of
        > > > > being
        > > > > > > > is
        > > > > > > > how are these issues avoided."
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > Hegel wants a logic without presuppositions but it seems Alan
        > > > wants
        > > > > it the
        > > > > > > other way round.
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > Joao`s remark :
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > "And why isn't "pure", in "pure being", a determination of being?
        > > > It
        > > > > > > > doesn't
        > > > > > > > seem that clear that "pure" is not a determination. "
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > is correct I would say, but it only means that it is impossioble
        > > > to
        > > > > get a
        > > > > > > "pure being". Hegels uses that term to start logic from the
        > > > scratch
        > > > > > > without
        > > > > > > anything presupposed.
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > Best regards
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > Ulli
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > -------- Original-Nachricht --------
        > > > > > > > Datum: Tue, 21 Feb 2012 11:49:03 -0500
        > > > > > > > Von: Alan Ponikvar <ponikvaraj@
        > > > > <mailto:ponikvaraj%40gmail.com>;;
        > > > > <mailto:ponikvaraj%40gmail.com>;;
        > > > > > <mailto:ponikvaraj%40gmail.com>;;
        > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > > An: hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
        > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
        > > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>;;
        > > > > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>;;
        > > > > > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>;;
        > > > > > > > Betreff: Re: [hegel] Re: Thought and Concept
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > > Pure, empty, without determination are all ways of determining
        > > > > what we
        > > > > > > are
        > > > > > > > talking about. These words all suggest the common abstractive
        > > > > process
        > > > > > > that
        > > > > > > > Hegel acknowledges as the way to arrive at the common
        > > > conception
        > > > > of
        > > > > > > being
        > > > > > > > determined as indeterminate.
        > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > > Of course, if this is how we arrive at our first thought it
        > > > > obviously is
        > > > > > > > not
        > > > > > > > first. Moreover, it is determined as indeterminate. So the
        > > > > challenge for
        > > > > > > > someone who thinks the Logic can begin with naïve apprehension
        > > > of
        > > > > being
        > > > > > > > is
        > > > > > > > how are these issues avoided.
        > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > > I take the indeterminate immediate as one face of a Janus-faced
        > > > > absolute
        > > > > > > > with which the Phenomenology concludes. It is thought facing
        > > > > forward
        > > > > > > with
        > > > > > > > nothing to think while the other face is the recollection that
        > > > > completes
        > > > > > > > the
        > > > > > > > exposition and resolves the divide between two ways of viewing
        > > > > > > represented
        > > > > > > > by the reader and natural consciousness.
        > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > > Thus indeterminate being is not the contrast to determinate
        > > > > being. It is
        > > > > > > > the
        > > > > > > > first expression of thought as inherently self-divided. It is
        > > > this
        > > > > > > > self-divide that allows an empty thought to be thinkable in two
        > > > > ways
        > > > > > > > rather
        > > > > > > > than having being and nothing merely as two names for one
        > > > thought.
        > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > > - Alan
        > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > > From: vascojoao2003 <vascojoao2003@
        > > > > <mailto:vascojoao2003%40yahoo.com>;;
        > > > > > <mailto:vascojoao2003%40yahoo.com>;;
        > > > > > > <mailto:vascojoao2003%40yahoo.com>;; >
        > > > > > > > Reply-To: <hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
        > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
        > > > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>;;
        > > > > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>;;
        > > > > > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>;; >
        > > > > > > > Date: Tue, 21 Feb 2012 13:02:20 -0000
        > > > > > > > To: <hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
        > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
        > > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>;;
        > > > > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>;;
        > > > > > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>;; >
        > > > > > > > Subject: [hegel] Re: Thought and Concept
        > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > > Hi Ulli,
        > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > > Hi Herman,
        > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > > I think we take for granted that pure indeterminate being means
        > > > > anything
        > > > > > > > in
        > > > > > > > itself, but what is the movement by which such a notion - pure
        > > > > > > > indeterminate
        > > > > > > > being - is posited? I have been arguing that it is the thought
        > > > of
        > > > > being
        > > > > > > > subtracted from thinking and that this subtraction is what has
        > > > > Being
        > > > > > > first
        > > > > > > > as pure and second reflecting Nothing.
        > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > > Alan raises an important problem about the transition from
        > > > being
        > > > > is
        > > > > > > > nothing
        > > > > > > > to nothing is. It seems to me that nothing is, in the same
        > > > > measure as
        > > > > > > > being
        > > > > > > > is. Hegel says, "nothing is the absence of determination", that
        > > > > is, for
        > > > > > > > me,
        > > > > > > > the subtraction of thinking from being.
        > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > > And why isn't "pure", in "pure being", a determination of
        > > > being?
        > > > > It
        > > > > > > > doesn't
        > > > > > > > seem that clear that "pure" is not a determination.
        > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > > Regards,
        > > > > > > > João.
        > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
        > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
        > > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>;;
        > > > > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>;;
        > > > > > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>;;
        > > > > > > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>;; , Ulrich
        > > > > > > > Barth
        > > > > > > > <ulrich.barth@> wrote:
        > > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > > > Hi Alan,
        > > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > > > (pure) being has no determination (otherwise it wouldn't be
        > > > > pure).
        > > > > > > > Insofar
        > > > > > > > it's the same as Nothing. Because of the missing determination
        > > > it
        > > > > > > follows:
        > > > > > > > If
        > > > > > > > pure Being "is" then necessarily Nothing is also. If Nothing
        > > > > wouldn't be
        > > > > > > > Being
        > > > > > > > it's determinate. Here you get a contradiction.
        > > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > > > Regards
        > > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > > > Ulli
        > > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
        > > > > > > >
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > --
        > > > > > > NEU: FreePhone 3-fach-Flat mit kostenlosem Smartphone!
        > > > > > > Jetzt informieren: http://www.gmx.net/de/go/freephone/
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
        > > > > > >
        > > > > >
        > > > > > --
        > > > > > NEU: FreePhone 3-fach-Flat mit kostenlosem Smartphone!
        > > > > > Jetzt informieren: http://www.gmx.net/de/go/freephone/
        > > > > >
        > > > > >
        > > > > >
        > > > > > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
        > > > > >
        > > > > >
        > > > >
        > > > > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
        > > > >
        > > > > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
        > > > >
        > > >
        > > >
        > > >
        > > >
        > > >
        > > >
        > > > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
        > > >
        > >
        > >
        > >
        > >
        > >
        > >
        > >
        > >
        > >
        > > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
        > >
        >
        > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
        >
        >
        >
        >
        >
        >
        > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
        >
      Your message has been successfully submitted and would be delivered to recipients shortly.