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Re: Beiser on Hegel's "originality"

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  • Beat
    ... John, How did Schelling know this movement? He did not. As Hölderlin and Sinclair he did not know how to combine the union (Vereinigung) of the subject
    Message 1 of 13 , Nov 4 3:09 AM
      --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "john" <jgbardis@...> wrote:
      >
      >
      >
      > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, greuterb <greuterb@> wrote:
      > >
      > > Am 22.10.2011 16:21, John writes:
      > >
      > > > I mentioned that Beiser's _German Idealism_ is in four parts: 1. Kant,
      > > > 2. Fichte, 3. Holderlin, Novalis, Schlegel, 4. early Schelling.
      > > >
      > > > So it is, basically, a very important work of Schelling scholarship.
      > > > But it also, obviously, sets the scene for Hegel's Phenomenology. In
      > > > this regard Beiser writes:
      > > >
      > > > "What Hegel portrayed as his own characteristic doctrine, what he
      > > > regarded as his unique achievement, was all too often said years
      > > > before him. There is not a single Hegelian theme that cannot be traced
      > > > back to his predecessors in Jena, to many earlier thinkers whom Hegel
      > > > and the Hegelian school either belittled or ignored.
      > > >
      > > > "The fathers of absolute idealism were Holderlin, Schlegel, and
      > > > Schelling [mainly Schelling]--though the first would find no mention
      > > > in Hegel's history of philosophy,the second would be trivialized and
      > > > dismissed, and the third treated as a mere footstool.
      > > >
      > > > "So many ideas that are seen as uniquely Hegelian--the dialectic,
      > > > immanent critique, the synthesis of Fichte and Spinoza, the absolute
      > > > as the identity of identity and nonidentity, the importance of history
      > > > within philosophy, self-positing spirit, alienation, the unity of
      > > > community and individual liberty--were all commonplaces in Jena before
      > > > Hegel came there in 1801.
      > > >
      > > > "To say this is not to belittle Hegel's acheivement: in unsurpassed
      > > > fashion he summarized and integrated into one system all the themes
      > > > his less scholastic and organized contemporaries had left in fragments
      > > > or notebooks.
      > > >
      > > > "Nevertheless, to say this is to put Hegel in proper historical
      > > > perspective: he was not the creative and original thinker that his
      > > > history suggests or that his disciples imply. Hegel's strenght lay in
      > > > his synthetic and systematic powers, in rationalizing and organizing
      > > > the wealth of ideas created by his contemporaries.
      > > >
      > > > "In truth, Hegel was just as his friends in the Stift once portrayed
      > > > him: der alte Mann, who ambled along on crutches. He was a tortoise
      > > > among hares; and, when all the hares had squandered or consumed their
      > > > energies, he alone trudged, slowly but surely, over the finish line.
      > > > Like all victors, he then rewrote history from his point of view, as a
      > > > tale of his own triumph."
      > > >
      > > > [page 10f]
      > > >
      > >
      > >
      > >
      > > John,
      > >
      > > This is all obviously not true. It is what Hegel's adversaries always
      > > said: Hegel is not an original philosopher but only has systematized
      > > what already was there (as for instance Christian Wolff did with the
      > > philosophy of Leibniz), has constructed systems, and with this even has
      > > betrayed true philosophical thinking which has to come from the
      > > immediate deepness of the soul as for instance with Hölderlin. However,
      > > Hegel's idea of the Concept as concrete with the experience and the
      > > empirical included in it and the necessary consequence from this that
      > > thinking is a critical dialectical movement of this concrete Concept is
      > > his very own original thought. Nobody before and after him has ever had
      > > such a thought though the emergence of this thought came from the
      > > discussion of Kant's (Fichte's) philosophy together with his friends
      > > (Schelling, Hölderlin and others) between 1796 and 1806.
      > >
      > > Regards,
      > > Beat Greuter
      >
      >
      >
      > To a large extent, Beat, it may be an exaggeration. It may even not be true to some extent.
      >
      > But Schelling knew very well the dialectical movement of the concrete concept.


      John,

      How did Schelling know this movement? He did not. As Hölderlin and Sinclair he did not know how to combine the union (Vereinigung) of the subject and the object (the infinite, Being) with the fact of the manifod and the finite consciousness. Hegel asked them again and again this question but he did not get a satisfying answer in their discussions and from their works. So, he had to find a solution himself. But in the first years of his Jena time he did not find the solution and 'Hegels erstes System: Jenenser Logik, Metaphysik und Naturphilosophie' (for his lectures) shows this very well. He was not yet able to unite these three moments, especially he could not unite the logic with the metaphysics: the Logic was still a propaedeutic for the metaphysics. But then with the Phenomenology he had the solution for both, the union of the infinite and the finite as well as the union of the logical and the metaphysical, and in a certain sense also of the philosophy of nature. The Science of Logic then was the result of this solution in pure thought (metaphysics as logic without any metaphysical presuppositions: there is no logic or metaphysics beyond experience and its conceptional moments), and the Encyclopaedia for the whole system with some not unessential changes compared with the first solution in the Phenomenology.


      >
      > For me the problem is: where are the early drafts of the Phenomenology? The religious and social writings of the pre-Jena, young Hegel certainly don't suggest the possibility of such a book. I haven't had the chance to see the pre-Penomenology Jena writings. Supposedly they are not of much interest. And, anyway, they are already in the sphere of influence of Schelling. I have looked at the Difference essay.
      >
      > So where are the early drafts of the Phenomenology? Did the book just pop out of Hegel's forehead like Athena from Zeus?


      As far as I know there are no early drafts of the Phenomenolgy. It was the result of what Hegel has looked for during 10 years of discussion and own attempts.


      >
      > Early Schelling provided the first drafts for Hegel. From 1776 to 1804 there were his three works on Naturphilosophie, his System of 1800, three books of his Identity philosophy that haven't been translated into English, plus his Bruno which has, and his lectures on the philosophy of art, and much other stuff as well.
      >
      > Schelling was a genius beyond compare. All the above was done before he turned 30. And For the last few of those years Hegel was his "assistant". I can't imagine the Phenomenology, or Hegel's system, would have been possible without Schelling. To a large extent this might have to do with correcting Schelling.


      Not correcting Schelling but changing the running direction.

      Regards,
      Beat Greuter
    • john
      ... I suppose he learned it from Hegel. This post got lost and just showed up, so all this is not presently on my mind. Beiser ends his book with Schelling
      Message 2 of 13 , Nov 4 11:32 AM
        --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "Beat" <greuterb@...> wrote:
        >
        > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "john" <jgbardis@> wrote:
        > >
        > >
        > >
        > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, greuterb <greuterb@> wrote:
        > > >
        > > > Am 22.10.2011 16:21, John writes:
        > > >
        > > > > I mentioned that Beiser's _German Idealism_ is in four parts: 1. Kant,
        > > > > 2. Fichte, 3. Holderlin, Novalis, Schlegel, 4. early Schelling.
        > > > >
        > > > > So it is, basically, a very important work of Schelling scholarship.
        > > > > But it also, obviously, sets the scene for Hegel's Phenomenology. In
        > > > > this regard Beiser writes:
        > > > >
        > > > > "What Hegel portrayed as his own characteristic doctrine, what he
        > > > > regarded as his unique achievement, was all too often said years
        > > > > before him. There is not a single Hegelian theme that cannot be traced
        > > > > back to his predecessors in Jena, to many earlier thinkers whom Hegel
        > > > > and the Hegelian school either belittled or ignored.
        > > > >
        > > > > "The fathers of absolute idealism were Holderlin, Schlegel, and
        > > > > Schelling [mainly Schelling]--though the first would find no mention
        > > > > in Hegel's history of philosophy,the second would be trivialized and
        > > > > dismissed, and the third treated as a mere footstool.
        > > > >
        > > > > "So many ideas that are seen as uniquely Hegelian--the dialectic,
        > > > > immanent critique, the synthesis of Fichte and Spinoza, the absolute
        > > > > as the identity of identity and nonidentity, the importance of history
        > > > > within philosophy, self-positing spirit, alienation, the unity of
        > > > > community and individual liberty--were all commonplaces in Jena before
        > > > > Hegel came there in 1801.
        > > > >
        > > > > "To say this is not to belittle Hegel's acheivement: in unsurpassed
        > > > > fashion he summarized and integrated into one system all the themes
        > > > > his less scholastic and organized contemporaries had left in fragments
        > > > > or notebooks.
        > > > >
        > > > > "Nevertheless, to say this is to put Hegel in proper historical
        > > > > perspective: he was not the creative and original thinker that his
        > > > > history suggests or that his disciples imply. Hegel's strenght lay in
        > > > > his synthetic and systematic powers, in rationalizing and organizing
        > > > > the wealth of ideas created by his contemporaries.
        > > > >
        > > > > "In truth, Hegel was just as his friends in the Stift once portrayed
        > > > > him: der alte Mann, who ambled along on crutches. He was a tortoise
        > > > > among hares; and, when all the hares had squandered or consumed their
        > > > > energies, he alone trudged, slowly but surely, over the finish line.
        > > > > Like all victors, he then rewrote history from his point of view, as a
        > > > > tale of his own triumph."
        > > > >
        > > > > [page 10f]
        > > > >
        > > >
        > > >
        > > >
        > > > John,
        > > >
        > > > This is all obviously not true. It is what Hegel's adversaries always
        > > > said: Hegel is not an original philosopher but only has systematized
        > > > what already was there (as for instance Christian Wolff did with the
        > > > philosophy of Leibniz), has constructed systems, and with this even has
        > > > betrayed true philosophical thinking which has to come from the
        > > > immediate deepness of the soul as for instance with Hölderlin. However,
        > > > Hegel's idea of the Concept as concrete with the experience and the
        > > > empirical included in it and the necessary consequence from this that
        > > > thinking is a critical dialectical movement of this concrete Concept is
        > > > his very own original thought. Nobody before and after him has ever had
        > > > such a thought though the emergence of this thought came from the
        > > > discussion of Kant's (Fichte's) philosophy together with his friends
        > > > (Schelling, Hölderlin and others) between 1796 and 1806.
        > > >
        > > > Regards,
        > > > Beat Greuter
        > >
        > >
        > >
        > > To a large extent, Beat, it may be an exaggeration. It may even not be true to some extent.
        > >
        > > But Schelling knew very well the dialectical movement of the concrete concept.
        >
        >
        > John,
        >
        > How did Schelling know this movement?

        I suppose he learned it from Hegel. This post got lost and just showed up, so all this is not presently on my mind. Beiser ends his book with Schelling faced with various problems that he can't adequately address. So this is the starting point of the work of the mature Hegel.

        I just got Beiser's book on Hegel to see how the story continues. Again, he begins by finding fault with almost all contemporary Hegel scholarship in that it denies Hegel's metaphysics. Without going into the matter, just on a purely superficial level, Beiser is obviously right. If people suppose that Hegel's metaphysics is just a return to pre-Kantian metaphysics, then, obviously, that isn't the case. Or if people suppose that Hegel was simply a follower of Kant, then obviously that also isn't the case. So the question is, then, what did Hegel do? What he does is something different than pre-Kantian metaphysics and also something different from some form of neo-Kantianism.

        John
      • eupraxis@aol.com
        John, Are speaking about the Beiser text titled Hegel ? How are you finding it thus far? Wil ... From: john To: hegel
        Message 3 of 13 , Nov 4 11:42 AM
          John,

          Are speaking about the Beiser text titled "Hegel"? How are you finding it thus far?

          Wil







          -----Original Message-----
          From: john <jgbardis@...>
          To: hegel <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
          Sent: Fri, Nov 4, 2011 1:33 pm
          Subject: [hegel] Re: Beiser on Hegel's "originality"







          --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "Beat" <greuterb@...> wrote:
          >
          > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "john" <jgbardis@> wrote:
          > >
          > >
          > >
          > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, greuterb <greuterb@> wrote:
          > > >
          > > > Am 22.10.2011 16:21, John writes:
          > > >
          > > > > I mentioned that Beiser's _German Idealism_ is in four parts: 1. Kant,
          > > > > 2. Fichte, 3. Holderlin, Novalis, Schlegel, 4. early Schelling.
          > > > >
          > > > > So it is, basically, a very important work of Schelling scholarship.
          > > > > But it also, obviously, sets the scene for Hegel's Phenomenology. In
          > > > > this regard Beiser writes:
          > > > >
          > > > > "What Hegel portrayed as his own characteristic doctrine, what he
          > > > > regarded as his unique achievement, was all too often said years
          > > > > before him. There is not a single Hegelian theme that cannot be traced
          > > > > back to his predecessors in Jena, to many earlier thinkers whom Hegel
          > > > > and the Hegelian school either belittled or ignored.
          > > > >
          > > > > "The fathers of absolute idealism were Holderlin, Schlegel, and
          > > > > Schelling [mainly Schelling]--though the first would find no mention
          > > > > in Hegel's history of philosophy,the second would be trivialized and
          > > > > dismissed, and the third treated as a mere footstool.
          > > > >
          > > > > "So many ideas that are seen as uniquely Hegelian--the dialectic,
          > > > > immanent critique, the synthesis of Fichte and Spinoza, the absolute
          > > > > as the identity of identity and nonidentity, the importance of history
          > > > > within philosophy, self-positing spirit, alienation, the unity of
          > > > > community and individual liberty--were all commonplaces in Jena before
          > > > > Hegel came there in 1801.
          > > > >
          > > > > "To say this is not to belittle Hegel's acheivement: in unsurpassed
          > > > > fashion he summarized and integrated into one system all the themes
          > > > > his less scholastic and organized contemporaries had left in fragments
          > > > > or notebooks.
          > > > >
          > > > > "Nevertheless, to say this is to put Hegel in proper historical
          > > > > perspective: he was not the creative and original thinker that his
          > > > > history suggests or that his disciples imply. Hegel's strenght lay in
          > > > > his synthetic and systematic powers, in rationalizing and organizing
          > > > > the wealth of ideas created by his contemporaries.
          > > > >
          > > > > "In truth, Hegel was just as his friends in the Stift once portrayed
          > > > > him: der alte Mann, who ambled along on crutches. He was a tortoise
          > > > > among hares; and, when all the hares had squandered or consumed their
          > > > > energies, he alone trudged, slowly but surely, over the finish line.
          > > > > Like all victors, he then rewrote history from his point of view, as a
          > > > > tale of his own triumph."
          > > > >
          > > > > [page 10f]
          > > > >
          > > >
          > > >
          > > >
          > > > John,
          > > >
          > > > This is all obviously not true. It is what Hegel's adversaries always
          > > > said: Hegel is not an original philosopher but only has systematized
          > > > what already was there (as for instance Christian Wolff did with the
          > > > philosophy of Leibniz), has constructed systems, and with this even has
          > > > betrayed true philosophical thinking which has to come from the
          > > > immediate deepness of the soul as for instance with Hölderlin. However,
          > > > Hegel's idea of the Concept as concrete with the experience and the
          > > > empirical included in it and the necessary consequence from this that
          > > > thinking is a critical dialectical movement of this concrete Concept is
          > > > his very own original thought. Nobody before and after him has ever had
          > > > such a thought though the emergence of this thought came from the
          > > > discussion of Kant's (Fichte's) philosophy together with his friends
          > > > (Schelling, Hölderlin and others) between 1796 and 1806.
          > > >
          > > > Regards,
          > > > Beat Greuter
          > >
          > >
          > >
          > > To a large extent, Beat, it may be an exaggeration. It may even not be true to some extent.
          > >
          > > But Schelling knew very well the dialectical movement of the concrete concept.
          >
          >
          > John,
          >
          > How did Schelling know this movement?

          I suppose he learned it from Hegel. This post got lost and just showed up, so all this is not presently on my mind. Beiser ends his book with Schelling faced with various problems that he can't adequately address. So this is the starting point of the work of the mature Hegel.

          I just got Beiser's book on Hegel to see how the story continues. Again, he begins by finding fault with almost all contemporary Hegel scholarship in that it denies Hegel's metaphysics. Without going into the matter, just on a purely superficial level, Beiser is obviously right. If people suppose that Hegel's metaphysics is just a return to pre-Kantian metaphysics, then, obviously, that isn't the case. Or if people suppose that Hegel was simply a follower of Kant, then obviously that also isn't the case. So the question is, then, what did Hegel do? What he does is something different than pre-Kantian metaphysics and also something different from some form of neo-Kantianism.

          John









          [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
        • john
          I just got it today. I like the way he so easily waves aside almost all of contemporary sholarship on Hegel. For instance in a foot-note he writes: For the
          Message 4 of 13 , Nov 4 11:59 AM
            I just got it today. I like the way he so easily waves aside almost all of contemporary sholarship on Hegel. For instance in a foot-note he writes:

            "For the theory of categories interpretation, see Hartmann and White; for the neo-Kantian interpretation, see Pippin, for the protohermeneutical interpretation, see Redding; for the social epistemology interpretation, see Pinkard; and for the humanist interpretation, see Solomon. I have criticized some of these deflationary interpretations in earlier works."

            I really do believe all these so-called interpretations loose everything "original" in Hegel. They miss just exactly what Hegel was trying to do (even if they are very successful, perhaps, in capturing various things that Hegel is doing--all those interpretations listed above sound important to me, even if limited).

            John

            --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, eupraxis@... wrote:
            >
            > John,
            >
            > Are speaking about the Beiser text titled "Hegel"? How are you finding it thus far?
            >
            > Wil
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            > -----Original Message-----
            > From: john <jgbardis@...>
            > To: hegel <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
            > Sent: Fri, Nov 4, 2011 1:33 pm
            > Subject: [hegel] Re: Beiser on Hegel's "originality"
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "Beat" <greuterb@> wrote:
            > >
            > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "john" <jgbardis@> wrote:
            > > >
            > > >
            > > >
            > > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, greuterb <greuterb@> wrote:
            > > > >
            > > > > Am 22.10.2011 16:21, John writes:
            > > > >
            > > > > > I mentioned that Beiser's _German Idealism_ is in four parts: 1. Kant,
            > > > > > 2. Fichte, 3. Holderlin, Novalis, Schlegel, 4. early Schelling.
            > > > > >
            > > > > > So it is, basically, a very important work of Schelling scholarship.
            > > > > > But it also, obviously, sets the scene for Hegel's Phenomenology. In
            > > > > > this regard Beiser writes:
            > > > > >
            > > > > > "What Hegel portrayed as his own characteristic doctrine, what he
            > > > > > regarded as his unique achievement, was all too often said years
            > > > > > before him. There is not a single Hegelian theme that cannot be traced
            > > > > > back to his predecessors in Jena, to many earlier thinkers whom Hegel
            > > > > > and the Hegelian school either belittled or ignored.
            > > > > >
            > > > > > "The fathers of absolute idealism were Holderlin, Schlegel, and
            > > > > > Schelling [mainly Schelling]--though the first would find no mention
            > > > > > in Hegel's history of philosophy,the second would be trivialized and
            > > > > > dismissed, and the third treated as a mere footstool.
            > > > > >
            > > > > > "So many ideas that are seen as uniquely Hegelian--the dialectic,
            > > > > > immanent critique, the synthesis of Fichte and Spinoza, the absolute
            > > > > > as the identity of identity and nonidentity, the importance of history
            > > > > > within philosophy, self-positing spirit, alienation, the unity of
            > > > > > community and individual liberty--were all commonplaces in Jena before
            > > > > > Hegel came there in 1801.
            > > > > >
            > > > > > "To say this is not to belittle Hegel's acheivement: in unsurpassed
            > > > > > fashion he summarized and integrated into one system all the themes
            > > > > > his less scholastic and organized contemporaries had left in fragments
            > > > > > or notebooks.
            > > > > >
            > > > > > "Nevertheless, to say this is to put Hegel in proper historical
            > > > > > perspective: he was not the creative and original thinker that his
            > > > > > history suggests or that his disciples imply. Hegel's strenght lay in
            > > > > > his synthetic and systematic powers, in rationalizing and organizing
            > > > > > the wealth of ideas created by his contemporaries.
            > > > > >
            > > > > > "In truth, Hegel was just as his friends in the Stift once portrayed
            > > > > > him: der alte Mann, who ambled along on crutches. He was a tortoise
            > > > > > among hares; and, when all the hares had squandered or consumed their
            > > > > > energies, he alone trudged, slowly but surely, over the finish line.
            > > > > > Like all victors, he then rewrote history from his point of view, as a
            > > > > > tale of his own triumph."
            > > > > >
            > > > > > [page 10f]
            > > > > >
            > > > >
            > > > >
            > > > >
            > > > > John,
            > > > >
            > > > > This is all obviously not true. It is what Hegel's adversaries always
            > > > > said: Hegel is not an original philosopher but only has systematized
            > > > > what already was there (as for instance Christian Wolff did with the
            > > > > philosophy of Leibniz), has constructed systems, and with this even has
            > > > > betrayed true philosophical thinking which has to come from the
            > > > > immediate deepness of the soul as for instance with Hölderlin. However,
            > > > > Hegel's idea of the Concept as concrete with the experience and the
            > > > > empirical included in it and the necessary consequence from this that
            > > > > thinking is a critical dialectical movement of this concrete Concept is
            > > > > his very own original thought. Nobody before and after him has ever had
            > > > > such a thought though the emergence of this thought came from the
            > > > > discussion of Kant's (Fichte's) philosophy together with his friends
            > > > > (Schelling, Hölderlin and others) between 1796 and 1806.
            > > > >
            > > > > Regards,
            > > > > Beat Greuter
            > > >
            > > >
            > > >
            > > > To a large extent, Beat, it may be an exaggeration. It may even not be true to some extent.
            > > >
            > > > But Schelling knew very well the dialectical movement of the concrete concept.
            > >
            > >
            > > John,
            > >
            > > How did Schelling know this movement?
            >
            > I suppose he learned it from Hegel. This post got lost and just showed up, so all this is not presently on my mind. Beiser ends his book with Schelling faced with various problems that he can't adequately address. So this is the starting point of the work of the mature Hegel.
            >
            > I just got Beiser's book on Hegel to see how the story continues. Again, he begins by finding fault with almost all contemporary Hegel scholarship in that it denies Hegel's metaphysics. Without going into the matter, just on a purely superficial level, Beiser is obviously right. If people suppose that Hegel's metaphysics is just a return to pre-Kantian metaphysics, then, obviously, that isn't the case. Or if people suppose that Hegel was simply a follower of Kant, then obviously that also isn't the case. So the question is, then, what did Hegel do? What he does is something different than pre-Kantian metaphysics and also something different from some form of neo-Kantianism.
            >
            > John
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
            >
          • eupraxis@aol.com
            John, Thanks. He has been favorably compared to Houlgate. I have ordered it. Should have it tomorrow. (Gotta love that Amazon.com!) Wil ... From: john
            Message 5 of 13 , Nov 4 12:12 PM
              John,

              Thanks. He has been favorably compared to Houlgate. I have ordered it. Should have it tomorrow. (Gotta love that Amazon.com!)



              Wil



              -----Original Message-----
              From: john <jgbardis@...>
              To: hegel <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
              Sent: Fri, Nov 4, 2011 1:59 pm
              Subject: [hegel] Re: Beiser on Hegel's "originality"





              I just got it today. I like the way he so easily waves aside almost all of contemporary sholarship on Hegel. For instance in a foot-note he writes:

              "For the theory of categories interpretation, see Hartmann and White; for the neo-Kantian interpretation, see Pippin, for the protohermeneutical interpretation, see Redding; for the social epistemology interpretation, see Pinkard; and for the humanist interpretation, see Solomon. I have criticized some of these deflationary interpretations in earlier works."

              I really do believe all these so-called interpretations loose everything "original" in Hegel. They miss just exactly what Hegel was trying to do (even if they are very successful, perhaps, in capturing various things that Hegel is doing--all those interpretations listed above sound important to me, even if limited).

              John

              --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, eupraxis@... wrote:
              >
              > John,
              >
              > Are speaking about the Beiser text titled "Hegel"? How are you finding it thus far?
              >
              > Wil
              >
              >
              >
              >
              >
              >
              >
              > -----Original Message-----
              > From: john <jgbardis@...>
              > To: hegel <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
              > Sent: Fri, Nov 4, 2011 1:33 pm
              > Subject: [hegel] Re: Beiser on Hegel's "originality"
              >
              >
              >
              >
              >
              >
              >
              > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "Beat" <greuterb@> wrote:
              > >
              > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "john" <jgbardis@> wrote:
              > > >
              > > >
              > > >
              > > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, greuterb <greuterb@> wrote:
              > > > >
              > > > > Am 22.10.2011 16:21, John writes:
              > > > >
              > > > > > I mentioned that Beiser's _German Idealism_ is in four parts: 1. Kant,
              > > > > > 2. Fichte, 3. Holderlin, Novalis, Schlegel, 4. early Schelling.
              > > > > >
              > > > > > So it is, basically, a very important work of Schelling scholarship.
              > > > > > But it also, obviously, sets the scene for Hegel's Phenomenology. In
              > > > > > this regard Beiser writes:
              > > > > >
              > > > > > "What Hegel portrayed as his own characteristic doctrine, what he
              > > > > > regarded as his unique achievement, was all too often said years
              > > > > > before him. There is not a single Hegelian theme that cannot be traced
              > > > > > back to his predecessors in Jena, to many earlier thinkers whom Hegel
              > > > > > and the Hegelian school either belittled or ignored.
              > > > > >
              > > > > > "The fathers of absolute idealism were Holderlin, Schlegel, and
              > > > > > Schelling [mainly Schelling]--though the first would find no mention
              > > > > > in Hegel's history of philosophy,the second would be trivialized and
              > > > > > dismissed, and the third treated as a mere footstool.
              > > > > >
              > > > > > "So many ideas that are seen as uniquely Hegelian--the dialectic,
              > > > > > immanent critique, the synthesis of Fichte and Spinoza, the absolute
              > > > > > as the identity of identity and nonidentity, the importance of history
              > > > > > within philosophy, self-positing spirit, alienation, the unity of
              > > > > > community and individual liberty--were all commonplaces in Jena before
              > > > > > Hegel came there in 1801.
              > > > > >
              > > > > > "To say this is not to belittle Hegel's acheivement: in unsurpassed
              > > > > > fashion he summarized and integrated into one system all the themes
              > > > > > his less scholastic and organized contemporaries had left in fragments
              > > > > > or notebooks.
              > > > > >
              > > > > > "Nevertheless, to say this is to put Hegel in proper historical
              > > > > > perspective: he was not the creative and original thinker that his
              > > > > > history suggests or that his disciples imply. Hegel's strenght lay in
              > > > > > his synthetic and systematic powers, in rationalizing and organizing
              > > > > > the wealth of ideas created by his contemporaries.
              > > > > >
              > > > > > "In truth, Hegel was just as his friends in the Stift once portrayed
              > > > > > him: der alte Mann, who ambled along on crutches. He was a tortoise
              > > > > > among hares; and, when all the hares had squandered or consumed their
              > > > > > energies, he alone trudged, slowly but surely, over the finish line.
              > > > > > Like all victors, he then rewrote history from his point of view, as a
              > > > > > tale of his own triumph."
              > > > > >
              > > > > > [page 10f]
              > > > > >
              > > > >
              > > > >
              > > > >
              > > > > John,
              > > > >
              > > > > This is all obviously not true. It is what Hegel's adversaries always
              > > > > said: Hegel is not an original philosopher but only has systematized
              > > > > what already was there (as for instance Christian Wolff did with the
              > > > > philosophy of Leibniz), has constructed systems, and with this even has
              > > > > betrayed true philosophical thinking which has to come from the
              > > > > immediate deepness of the soul as for instance with Hölderlin. However,
              > > > > Hegel's idea of the Concept as concrete with the experience and the
              > > > > empirical included in it and the necessary consequence from this that
              > > > > thinking is a critical dialectical movement of this concrete Concept is
              > > > > his very own original thought. Nobody before and after him has ever had
              > > > > such a thought though the emergence of this thought came from the
              > > > > discussion of Kant's (Fichte's) philosophy together with his friends
              > > > > (Schelling, Hölderlin and others) between 1796 and 1806.
              > > > >
              > > > > Regards,
              > > > > Beat Greuter
              > > >
              > > >
              > > >
              > > > To a large extent, Beat, it may be an exaggeration. It may even not be true to some extent.
              > > >
              > > > But Schelling knew very well the dialectical movement of the concrete concept.
              > >
              > >
              > > John,
              > >
              > > How did Schelling know this movement?
              >
              > I suppose he learned it from Hegel. This post got lost and just showed up, so all this is not presently on my mind. Beiser ends his book with Schelling faced with various problems that he can't adequately address. So this is the starting point of the work of the mature Hegel.
              >
              > I just got Beiser's book on Hegel to see how the story continues. Again, he begins by finding fault with almost all contemporary Hegel scholarship in that it denies Hegel's metaphysics. Without going into the matter, just on a purely superficial level, Beiser is obviously right. If people suppose that Hegel's metaphysics is just a return to pre-Kantian metaphysics, then, obviously, that isn't the case. Or if people suppose that Hegel was simply a follower of Kant, then obviously that also isn't the case. So the question is, then, what did Hegel do? What he does is something different than pre-Kantian metaphysics and also something different from some form of neo-Kantianism.
              >
              > John
              >
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