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Re: [hegel] Re: Beiser (2), the non-metaphysical Hegel

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  • greuterb
    ... Juergen, I think it is not so easy as you put it. Since Kant makes an absolute distinction between the sensibility and the normative moment of the
    Message 1 of 22 , Oct 27, 2011
      Am 25.10.2011 22:27, Juergen writes:

      > BG wrote/cited:
      > > (1) In contrast to Kant Hegel's "theory is not about the a priori
      > > conditions of the possiblility of experience but about the a priori
      > > conditions of the meaning of experience" (p. 245).
      >
      > ... possible to read as: Because Kant has made clear the conditions
      > of possibility of - critical - experience, Hegel can occupy himself with
      > the *meaning* of experience ...
      >
      > BG wrote:
      > > This means that Hegel
      > > does not look for "categories as necessary for there to be knowledge of
      > > possible sensible objects or appearances" (p. 245) as Kant does and
      > > therefore he has not to develop transcendental arguments what was
      > Kant's
      > > task.
      >
      > ... possible to read as: Hegel does not look for because Kant already had
      > looked for ... Kant looked for, and: has he got ... ?? ... "Kant's task",
      > and: which he, more or less, fulfilled ... ?? ... and therefore the
      > result of
      > this inquiry (can be) made strongly geltend/gültig (effective/valid) ... ?
      >
      > ... a certain transcendental minimal-science then ... which can be
      > rediscovered
      > anywhere and elsewhere ... for example within Hegel ...
      >



      Juergen,

      I think it is not so easy as you put it. Since Kant makes an absolute
      distinction between the sensibility and the normative moment of the
      categories he runs in some difficulties within his transcendental
      deduction. This already Kant has seen and therefore has made
      contradictory remarks about the relationship between the sensibility /
      intuition and the normative moment. This again Hegel could exploit for
      his own procedure which starts with the immediate unity of the sensible
      and the normative. For Hegel there is no sensibility which is not
      already infiltrated by reason. Since the starting point is an immediate
      unity there is at this limit not yet any determination. So, your
      following statement is quite true:


      > ... that's to say: Kant's critical business can be made valid within
      > the starting
      > point of the Hegel system as a system: Sensual certainty and the This
      > and the
      > Meinen ... sensual certainty beyond (my-)perception ... and therefore
      > sort of
      > condition of possibility of any my-perception at all ...
      >


      This beginning shows how Hegel takes the sensibility / intuition within
      the unity of apperception: For the sensible consciousness there is the
      whole particular world in its singularity and immediacy which it has now
      to take in. But for doing this it has first only the most abstract
      concepts (this, here etc.) and it is not able to mediate this absolute
      opposition and therefore has to get one-sided in the consciousness of
      perception (the same we have at the beginning of the Logic). We can
      contrast this with what the Analytical Philosophy did: 'This' etc. are
      only indicative expressions with the whole made world outside itself.
      With this of course nothing moves and all is already done. The late
      Wittgenstein has grasped this and made some corrections. So, we find
      Hegel's dialectic within the movement of the Analytical Philosophy.

      Regards,
      Beat Greuter



      > Kant's critical business can be made valid within Hegel's elementary form:
      > sensual certainty, and it's legitimate to do so ... and doing so,
      > having done so
      > has got consequences ... that's all.
      >
      > "das Meinen" does irreducibly ancor myself to earth ... sort of a
      > formal empirical
      > every-my-standpoint ...
      >
      > ... a standpoint, an dem ich immer schon stehe und immer schon
      > gestanden habe ...
      >
      > Juergen h.
      >



      [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
    • greuterb@bluewin.ch
      Am 24.10.2011 21:43, Stephen writes: Beat, I find myself agreeing with Brinkmann, or able to read it in a way that seems in agreement with me, until I come to
      Message 2 of 22 , Oct 28, 2011
        Am 24.10.2011 21:43, Stephen writes:

        "Beat,




        I find myself agreeing with Brinkmann, or able to read it
        in a way that seems in agreement with me, until I come to
        the phrase,"excludes... reference to supersensible
        entities". However, what this seems to mean is exclusion
        of a two-tiered reality, of sensible and super-sensible. I
        take Hegel as identifying the two or, rather, annulling
        this particular categorical division. The external or
        sensory (as simply meaning external)is internal, within,
        formally signifying the Concept.

        The absolute, too, is indeed "one moment" in the system
        (we are not philosophers all the time), but it is that
        moment which every other moment is identical with.

        Whether we say Hegel's philosophy is not metaphysical, in
        this odd sense of referring to a second layer of entities,
        or we say, for example, that it is a realised eschatology,
        i.e. the means are the end, is at bottom, therefore, the
        same. Again, whether we say this is the surmounting of
        metaphysics or the final and true metaphysics is the same.

        Yet this Brinkmann is clearly rhetorically tendentious in
        speaking of metaphysics of the "hubristic" kind. One
        should admit this.

        What Brinkmann is saying, to my perception, when
        translated back into the religious terms from which Hegel
        claims his philosophy necessarily springs, is that we "sit
        with Christ in the heavenly places" or that "what you do
        to another you do to me", do to the absolute subjectivity
        of the Concept.

        What this amounts to in terms of Art, the third form of
        Absolute Spirit (I have just mentioned Religion, second
        form), well, we could probably take any "opus" of the kind
        we call great, "sublime", and not merely skilful etc.

        By the way, it is only on one account that metaphysics
        stipulates supersensible beings, let alone causes. For
        Aristotle, Hegel's master more or less, it is the "science
        of being as being" (this ambiguity in meaning is discussed
        by Aquinas in his commentary on Met.).

        "The Absolute or God" is indeed the most immanent of all,
        as B. in effect says, and "being has no parts" but is one
        (Parmenides). Whether this makes it a "closed totality" is
        a matter of choice of metaphor. I would take Freedom as
        the opposite of "closed". For "not closed" need not mean
        the same as open to something "else"."










        Stephen,



        With this you contradict yourself. Where is this something "else"?
        Outside the One (Parmenides)? Freedom is not outside the One but
        within it. If you take it outside you cannot realize it in the
        process of thought evoking and reconciling its other (Concept) but you depend on
        something outside it that is unfreedom, be it God or the Absolute or
        some other dogmatic truth. For Hegel freedom is only within the
        movement of the Concept. Outside it there is not even 'nothing'. The
        negation is also in the One.



        You write further:






        "We do indeed "construct the world in thought alone", as
        I have just done here, agreeing with Hegel I believe in
        the matter as in the form.

        Well, I wonder if Brinkmann would recognise himself."





        According to Hegel this is precisely the procedure of old metaphysics and contrasts what he himself intends to do starting from Kant's transcendental logic and his undermining of earlier metaphysical thinking (the antinomy chapter in the CPR).




        Regards,

        Beat Greuter






        --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com,
        greuterb <greuterb@...>
        wrote:

        >

        > Am 24.10.2011 13:48, Bruce Merrill writes:

        >

        > > Insofar as Beiser is "paradoxically" transposing
        a term from the

        > > Vienna circle to apply to Pippin et al, then he
        is guilty of the kind

        > > of anachronism that he condemns. (He is using it
        as a term of abuse.)

        > > .

        > >

        > > To appropriate that part of Hegel that one
        considers to be plausible

        > > /useful /relevant and so discard metaphysics
        /mysticism

        > > /naturo-philosophy /Xtianity etc. does not
        qualify as positivism!

        > >

        > > As said, the proof of the pudding lies in the
        case that Beiser can

        > > make for the metaphysical /mystical
        /naturophilosophy etc. elements

        > > in Hegel. He has to justify this as "living"
        philosophy, not simply

        > > justify it as an essential part of Hegel's past
        project. Since it can

        > > be essential, yet not plausible. (As Pippin et
        al hold?)

        > >

        >

        >

        >

        > Bruce,

        >

        > According to Klaus Brinkmann's "Idealism without
        Limits, Hegel and the

        > Problem of Objectivity" (you recently gave the
        reference) taking Hegel's

        > philosophy as a metaphysics is a misunderstanding,
        and he explicitly

        > refers in a footnote to Beiser as a proponent of such
        an interpretation:

        >

        > "Frederick Beiser has been a proponent of the
        interpretation of Hegel as

        > a metaphysician against those who see in Hegel a
        philosopher of a

        > broadly transcendental orientation or one who
        advances an ontology or a

        > non-metaphysical theory of categories. A good
        overview of the arguments

        > pro and con can be found in Wartenberg (1993), Beiser
        (1993, 1995),

        > Pinkard (1990), and Pippin (1990). ......... ."

        >

        > In the following I cite the section the above
        footnote belongs to (p. 75):

        >

        > "Hegel's philosophy, in particular the Logic and the
        Encyclopedia, are

        > often said to be a metaphysics, occasionally even a
        metaphysics of the

        > hubristic kind. I would like to emphasize that Hegel
        is a philosopher of

        > the immanence of experience and, in the Logic, of the
        immanence of

        > thought. That means that metaphysics with its
        stipulation of

        > supersensible entities and causes that are located
        outside the immanence

        > of experience in a transcendent realm has no proper
        place in Hegel's

        > thought. No other philosopher (with the exception
        perhaps of Spinoza)

        > has repudiated and systematically dissolved the
        separation of the

        > mundane and the supersensible as thoroughly as Hegel,
        and in such a way

        > that both spheres are unified into one homogenous
        sphere of experience.

        > We should not be misled by Hegel's frequent reference
        to the Absolute or

        > God. These are technically speaking expressions for
        the immanence of

        > experience and thought, or the closed totality that,
        like Parmenidean

        > One, has nothing outside itself, not even
        nothingness. It is true that

        > in the Encyclopedia, Hegel goes so far as to
        charaterize his Logic as a

        > theory of the "definition of the Absolute, as the
        metaphysical

        > definition of God" (E § 85). But again, this needs to
        be understood

        > properly in its context. First, the fact that the
        Encyclopedia,

        > especially with its posthumous Additions to Hegel's
        published text,

        > belongs to what one might call Hegel's exoteric
        writings should be an

        > indicator that this language includes a dose of
        pedagogic popularization

        > and/or a deliberate attempt on Hegel's part to
        intervene in public

        > controversies about the nature of philosophy. And
        second, what is meant

        > by "metaphysical" should be seen in the light of
        Hegel's definition of

        > metaphysics in the Logic, viz. as the "scientific
        construction of the

        > world in thought alone" (SL 63/WdL I 46). This
        definition excludes any

        > connotation of metaphysical realism,
        representationalism, or reference

        > to supersensible entities. Moreover, the Science of
        Logic, which I would

        > call an esoteric work by comparison, avoids almost
        all reference to God,

        > and its technical definition of the Absolute makes
        this category an

        > abstract precursor of the Spinozistic substance, the
        identity of the

        > inner and outer aspects of essence. In other words,
        the Absolute is here

        > strictly speaking one moment of the totality of the
        "system of concepts"

        > [System der Begriffe] (SL 54/WdL I 36) or the "system
        of the

        > determinations of thought" [System der
        Denkbestimmungen] (SL 63/WdL I 46)."

        >

        > Regards,

        > Beat

        >

        >

        >

        > > Since the volume at hand stops with Hegel,
        perhaps this lies ahead of

        > > him? There is also FB's book, _Hegel_ and
        perhaps he fulfills his

        > > claims therein?

        > >

        > > But he case for Schelling is very valuable.
        Whether it needs to be

        > > made at Hegel's expense is another question.

        > >

        > > One missing person in Beiser's pantheon is
        Schiller. And yet Hegel

        > > says, at one point, that Schiller is the single
        most important figure

        > > in regard to countering Kant. And Beiser has
        written a book on

        > > _Schiller as a Philosopher_. So Schiller's
        absence puzzles me.

        > >

        > > Earlier I quoted a chunk here from a Beiser
        review which was also very

        > > combative, on 19C history. He likes a fight.

        > >

        > > Bruce














        [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
      • stephen theron
        Beat, Thank you! There seems to be a language problem here. You ask, where is this something else? But that is what I have just there explicitly ruled out. I
        Message 3 of 22 , Oct 28, 2011
          Beat, Thank you! There seems to be a language problem here. You ask, where is this something else? But that is what I have just there explicitly ruled out. I want to reject Brinkmann's metaphor of "closed" (totality), since the Absolute is Freedom which is surely denotes openness rather, and so I state that openness need NOT mean openness to something "else" and I put the "else" in scare-quotes to indicate that I do not think there can be an "else", or anything outside of the Absolute. Yet you say I contradict myself in positing this "else". Is it that that is what you expected me to say? "Closed" very definitely suggests finitude, perhaps in B's view of necessity or in retaining an image of a certain compositeness at variance with the Concept as explained by Hegel, identical with each of the "parts" which are hence not parts. But please focus on your mistake there. I don't like to be misrepresented and hope it is not gratuitous. I would say freedom is not so much within the one but, better, that freedom is the one. It is even one with necessity. But why do you go on to say I "depend on... the Absolute" as something "outside the Concept"? It is surely not outside it, whatever you might mean there. ..."the definition that now results for us is that the Absolute is the Notion" (EL160 Zus.), i.e. the Concept (Begriff), if I can trust this translation. It is actually the Concept which sets up "the other... which is in reality not an other" in the text I have here (EL161 Zus.), never mind B's prejudices, whereas you say here, "the process of thought evokes its other (the concept)", its other, the Concept. How can this be when the text says the "movement of the Concept" (as pure play) sets up the other, finding this "expressed in Christianity". So we have the Concept which is the other (your account) sets up the other. Can this be? If not, what is this other? Or need we not identify it? What do you think about this? Are their other texts that support your different version? Is there anything in this difference? Yes the negation is also in the one. And what is this about some other dogmatic truth? You are not only arguing ad hominem, but you have got your homo quite wrong, or you find it easier to misrepresent him. You end by saying something is precise without being precise about what it is. A lot of people do this kind of thing but I hope, principally, I have shown you you misrepresent me completely with your first words here. Stephen.
          To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
          From: greuterb@...
          Date: Fri, 28 Oct 2011 18:21:03 +0000
          Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Beiser (2), the non-metaphysical Hegel
































          Am 24.10.2011 21:43, Stephen writes:



          "Beat,



          I find myself agreeing with Brinkmann, or able to read it

          in a way that seems in agreement with me, until I come to

          the phrase,"excludes... reference to supersensible

          entities". However, what this seems to mean is exclusion

          of a two-tiered reality, of sensible and super-sensible. I

          take Hegel as identifying the two or, rather, annulling

          this particular categorical division. The external or

          sensory (as simply meaning external)is internal, within,

          formally signifying the Concept.



          The absolute, too, is indeed "one moment" in the system

          (we are not philosophers all the time), but it is that

          moment which every other moment is identical with.



          Whether we say Hegel's philosophy is not metaphysical, in

          this odd sense of referring to a second layer of entities,

          or we say, for example, that it is a realised eschatology,

          i.e. the means are the end, is at bottom, therefore, the

          same. Again, whether we say this is the surmounting of

          metaphysics or the final and true metaphysics is the same.



          Yet this Brinkmann is clearly rhetorically tendentious in

          speaking of metaphysics of the "hubristic" kind. One

          should admit this.



          What Brinkmann is saying, to my perception, when

          translated back into the religious terms from which Hegel

          claims his philosophy necessarily springs, is that we "sit

          with Christ in the heavenly places" or that "what you do

          to another you do to me", do to the absolute subjectivity

          of the Concept.



          What this amounts to in terms of Art, the third form of

          Absolute Spirit (I have just mentioned Religion, second

          form), well, we could probably take any "opus" of the kind

          we call great, "sublime", and not merely skilful etc.



          By the way, it is only on one account that metaphysics

          stipulates supersensible beings, let alone causes. For

          Aristotle, Hegel's master more or less, it is the "science

          of being as being" (this ambiguity in meaning is discussed

          by Aquinas in his commentary on Met.).



          "The Absolute or God" is indeed the most immanent of all,

          as B. in effect says, and "being has no parts" but is one

          (Parmenides). Whether this makes it a "closed totality" is

          a matter of choice of metaphor. I would take Freedom as

          the opposite of "closed". For "not closed" need not mean

          the same as open to something "else"."



          Stephen,



          With this you contradict yourself. Where is this something "else"?

          Outside the One (Parmenides)? Freedom is not outside the One but

          within it. If you take it outside you cannot realize it in the

          process of thought evoking and reconciling its other (Concept) but you depend on

          something outside it that is unfreedom, be it God or the Absolute or

          some other dogmatic truth. For Hegel freedom is only within the

          movement of the Concept. Outside it there is not even 'nothing'. The

          negation is also in the One.



          You write further:



          "We do indeed "construct the world in thought alone", as

          I have just done here, agreeing with Hegel I believe in

          the matter as in the form.



          Well, I wonder if Brinkmann would recognise himself."



          According to Hegel this is precisely the procedure of old metaphysics and contrasts what he himself intends to do starting from Kant's transcendental logic and his undermining of earlier metaphysical thinking (the antinomy chapter in the CPR).



          Regards,



          Beat Greuter



          --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com,

          greuterb <greuterb@...>

          wrote:



          >



          > Am 24.10.2011 13:48, Bruce Merrill writes:



          >



          > > Insofar as Beiser is "paradoxically" transposing

          a term from the



          > > Vienna circle to apply to Pippin et al, then he

          is guilty of the kind



          > > of anachronism that he condemns. (He is using it

          as a term of abuse.)



          > > .



          > >



          > > To appropriate that part of Hegel that one

          considers to be plausible



          > > /useful /relevant and so discard metaphysics

          /mysticism



          > > /naturo-philosophy /Xtianity etc. does not

          qualify as positivism!



          > >



          > > As said, the proof of the pudding lies in the

          case that Beiser can



          > > make for the metaphysical /mystical

          /naturophilosophy etc. elements



          > > in Hegel. He has to justify this as "living"

          philosophy, not simply



          > > justify it as an essential part of Hegel's past

          project. Since it can



          > > be essential, yet not plausible. (As Pippin et

          al hold?)



          > >



          >



          >



          >



          > Bruce,



          >



          > According to Klaus Brinkmann's "Idealism without

          Limits, Hegel and the



          > Problem of Objectivity" (you recently gave the

          reference) taking Hegel's



          > philosophy as a metaphysics is a misunderstanding,

          and he explicitly



          > refers in a footnote to Beiser as a proponent of such

          an interpretation:



          >



          > "Frederick Beiser has been a proponent of the

          interpretation of Hegel as



          > a metaphysician against those who see in Hegel a

          philosopher of a



          > broadly transcendental orientation or one who

          advances an ontology or a



          > non-metaphysical theory of categories. A good

          overview of the arguments



          > pro and con can be found in Wartenberg (1993), Beiser

          (1993, 1995),



          > Pinkard (1990), and Pippin (1990). ......... ."



          >



          > In the following I cite the section the above

          footnote belongs to (p. 75):



          >



          > "Hegel's philosophy, in particular the Logic and the

          Encyclopedia, are



          > often said to be a metaphysics, occasionally even a

          metaphysics of the



          > hubristic kind. I would like to emphasize that Hegel

          is a philosopher of



          > the immanence of experience and, in the Logic, of the

          immanence of



          > thought. That means that metaphysics with its

          stipulation of



          > supersensible entities and causes that are located

          outside the immanence



          > of experience in a transcendent realm has no proper

          place in Hegel's



          > thought. No other philosopher (with the exception

          perhaps of Spinoza)



          > has repudiated and systematically dissolved the

          separation of the



          > mundane and the supersensible as thoroughly as Hegel,

          and in such a way



          > that both spheres are unified into one homogenous

          sphere of experience.



          > We should not be misled by Hegel's frequent reference

          to the Absolute or



          > God. These are technically speaking expressions for

          the immanence of



          > experience and thought, or the closed totality that,

          like Parmenidean



          > One, has nothing outside itself, not even

          nothingness. It is true that



          > in the Encyclopedia, Hegel goes so far as to

          charaterize his Logic as a



          > theory of the "definition of the Absolute, as the

          metaphysical



          > definition of God" (E � 85). But again, this needs to

          be understood



          > properly in its context. First, the fact that the

          Encyclopedia,



          > especially with its posthumous Additions to Hegel's

          published text,



          > belongs to what one might call Hegel's exoteric

          writings should be an



          > indicator that this language includes a dose of

          pedagogic popularization



          > and/or a deliberate attempt on Hegel's part to

          intervene in public



          > controversies about the nature of philosophy. And

          second, what is meant



          > by "metaphysical" should be seen in the light of

          Hegel's definition of



          > metaphysics in the Logic, viz. as the "scientific

          construction of the



          > world in thought alone" (SL 63/WdL I 46). This

          definition excludes any



          > connotation of metaphysical realism,

          representationalism, or reference



          > to supersensible entities. Moreover, the Science of

          Logic, which I would



          > call an esoteric work by comparison, avoids almost

          all reference to God,



          > and its technical definition of the Absolute makes

          this category an



          > abstract precursor of the Spinozistic substance, the

          identity of the



          > inner and outer aspects of essence. In other words,

          the Absolute is here



          > strictly speaking one moment of the totality of the

          "system of concepts"



          > [System der Begriffe] (SL 54/WdL I 36) or the "system

          of the



          > determinations of thought" [System der

          Denkbestimmungen] (SL 63/WdL I 46)."



          >



          > Regards,



          > Beat



          >



          >



          >



          > > Since the volume at hand stops with Hegel,

          perhaps this lies ahead of



          > > him? There is also FB's book, _Hegel_ and

          perhaps he fulfills his



          > > claims therein?



          > >



          > > But he case for Schelling is very valuable.

          Whether it needs to be



          > > made at Hegel's expense is another question.



          > >



          > > One missing person in Beiser's pantheon is

          Schiller. And yet Hegel



          > > says, at one point, that Schiller is the single

          most important figure



          > > in regard to countering Kant. And Beiser has

          written a book on



          > > _Schiller as a Philosopher_. So Schiller's

          absence puzzles me.



          > >



          > > Earlier I quoted a chunk here from a Beiser

          review which was also very



          > > combative, on 19C history. He likes a fight.



          > >



          > > Bruce



          [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]


















          [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
        • eupraxis@aol.com
          Stephen, Your definition of mysticism here ( that things are not as they immediately appear ) is at best facile, if you pardon the criticism. Those of us who
          Message 4 of 22 , Oct 30, 2011
            Stephen,

            Your definition of mysticism here ("that things are not as they immediately appear") is at best facile, if you pardon the criticism. Those of us who have been in this theological debate over these many months and years know what you really mean by the term: religion, or a feeling of unity with (a) God. Some read Hegel's true infinite as a notion that culminates in that unity; I and some others contend that it, in Hegel's texts, leads through it to its sublation into an open 'system'. I cannot reconcile Hegel with the 'Parmenidean' monism that results, or seems to, in your reading, although you can read Hegel any way you like within your privileged and presupposed religious orientation, if such allows you to broaden that view of matters for your own purposes. It is a perfectly fair theological position, if one is given to theology.

            But qua Hegel, I think, as you know, that it misses the whole point, and even the point of his philosophy of religion. More to the point, if I may, the Absolute doesn't 'contain' anything; it is not a grand sum of knowledge or a set of all sets. It is the very inside out of all sets. It is not the mind of God in his eternal substance. It isn't 'the' Real. It is what un-closes -- dis-closes -- the Real as that about which nothing can be said except by again participating in the dialectical process of thinking in a higher or wiser manner. I feel that you hypostasize the Absolute -- just as any idea of God is, as far as I am concerned, an hypostatization.

            I am given to the suggestion of Zizek that, taking a large view of Hegel, Reality isn't singular or monist, and certainly not 'Platonic' and two-world, but rather fundamentally incomplete.

            As for Beiser, I am just into the book.

            Best,
            Wil









            -----Original Message-----
            From: Stephen <stephentheron@...>
            To: hegel <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
            Sent: Sun, Oct 30, 2011 12:00 pm
            Subject: AW: RE: [hegel] Re: Beiser (2), the non-metaphysical Hegel





            Dear Beat (and anyone interested in the substantive issues here),

            I think this is a good answer in the circumstances.

            We each think the other "misses" Hegel, I don't know about "fully".

            I have searched your letters but can find no question (you say I did not answer it) except your "Where is this 'else'"? If you mean that one you must be asserting I "turn" something my way there. Do you not believe me when I say I think there is no "else", as I said there, that all is "in" the Absolute? I merely add that that does not make it, as infinite, something fittingly called "closed". I know we speak of a closed circle and this might suggest a counter-argument. But, again, is returning on self being "closed", as if excluding something?

            I have been thinking about this today. To me it is amazing that some people today think there is nothing "mystical" about Hegel's thinking. To me this word here means simply that things are not as they immediately appear, the cardinal point of the Doctrine of Essence (as it took me some time to realise: you no doubt will jump to deny this in your usual either/or way). This depends either upon those people's presuppositions or is an academic misrepresentation in the interest of generating acceptable secondary literature, they think.

            Not even Marx took that view. For him Hegel was mistaken precisely in his philosophical "idealism" and he offered an alternative more congenial to him.

            It is possible to take Hegel's general philosophy of Spirit seriously without postulating a two-tier world, one substituting the other, which is the principal cause of distaste. Hegel's position, rather, just as it is with intelligent religious persons or, especially, with poets (art), is that there is just one reality and it is not what we see immediately. That appearance is, rather, annulled. You will know the texts. Of course the position can be discussed at length, "the being of the phenomenon and the phenomenon of being" as Sartre put it (that does not mean I put it so). In any case, there is, for Hegel, as for McTaggart, just one reality, outside or inside indifferently. I know I do not miss Hegel fully and I suppose you do too.

            Perhaps it is assumed that if we are talking about concepts then we are not talking about the Absolute as real. I would counter, we are rather saying that reality is subject, subjectivity. Religious people are familiar with this, that God, say, can be a thought, an active concept as Hegel says. Substance-philosophy is indeed left behind, though theology has used a substance-vocabulary to say just this.

            Beat, you need not reply if you prefer, though I think I showed that I like discussion. And, you know, you did not answer my question either. Shall I conclude that you have fully missed Hegel? One is not insulting if the cap fits. However, I would of course wish to avoid personal attacks. I think though it is quite "personal" if you, especially as having a quasi-official role, have begun it by plainly misrepresenting me (perhaps originally through a misreading?)and ignored my protest then. There was no opening for "interpretation".I had to resort to a couple of home-truths or else acquiesce in this. It is humiliating to get involved in this kind of thing. I hope we can avoid it in future.

            Stephen.

            Stephen.

            --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "greuterb@..." <greuterb@...> wrote:
            >
            > Stephen,
            >
            > I think you did not answer my question. Therefore, I have to assume that you miss Hegel fully. So, I think
            > that there is no base for further discussion also because you feel always misinterpreted when you have turned a contra
            > argument into your old misguided standpoint which then is challenged. Ich habe die Nase auch voll, especially since I
            > did not insult you personally as you did with me.
            >
            > Regards,
            > Beat Greuter
            >
            >
            >
            > ----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----
            > Von:
            > stephentheron@...
            > Datum: 30.10.2011 12:50
            > An: "hegel hegel"<hegel@yahoogroups.com>
            > Betreff: RE: AW: RE: [hegel]
            > Re: Beiser (2), the non-metaphysical Hegel
            >
            >
            > Dear Beat, Did you forget or do you not think you should apologise to me
            > for the misrepresentation of me you, as moderator, have offered the group? Philosophers normally and naturally exercise
            > a basic courtesy to one another. Perhaps that is not recognised in whatever field you distinguished yourself in? Of
            > course I give you credit for being ready to communicate in a language other than your mother-tongue. Aber ich habe die
            > Nase voll, vollgestrichen. The relation of Hegel to Kant is/was complex and debatable. You seem to pass over an obvious
            > if restrained contempt or unqualified negative evaluation he shows at certain places for "the critical philosophy",
            > though he balances it with praise at others. So one should not be too afraid of openings being left for tendentiously
            > suggesting he regressed behind Kant, as in a kind of restorationaist spirit. This is not born out by the overall upshot
            > of his thought. As for my not answering your comments, you yourself totally ignore my pointing out an apparent
            > inconsistency arising from an expression of yours, in reporting Hegel, though I said I would like to know what your
            > view was there. But perhaps my text was too complicated for you, something I would not be proud of. I can see, let me
            > say, that you are long and deeply read in Hegel, but I do rather wonder sometimes if you do not read him like the Devil
            > reads the Bible, as we say. On the other hand I also suspect you might find more agreement of mine with your thought if
            > you came upon it elsewhere. Now let's have that apology, recantation or whatever! It doesn't cost much. Stephen.
            > To:
            > hegel@yahoogroups.com
            > From: greuterb@...
            > Date: Sun, 30 Oct 2011 10:58:36 +0000
            > Subject: AW: RE: [hegel] Re:
            > Beiser (2), the non-metaphysical Hegel
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            > ----Ursprüngliche
            > Nachricht----
            >
            > Von: stephentheron@...
            >
            > Datum: 28.10.2011 21:59
            >
            > An: "hegel hegel"
            >
            > <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
            >
            >
            > Betreff: RE: [hegel] Re: Beiser (2), the non-metaphysical Hegel
            >
            >
            >
            > Beat, Thank you! There seems
            >
            > to be a language
            > problem here. You ask, where is this something else? But that is what I have just there explicitly
            >
            > ruled out. I want
            > to reject Brinkmann's metaphor of "closed" (totality), since the Absolute is Freedom which is surely
            >
            > denotes openness
            > rather, and so I state that openness need NOT mean openness to something "else" and I put the "else"
            >
            > in scare-quotes
            > to indicate that I do not think there can be an "else", or anything outside of the Absolute. Yet you
            >
            > say I contradict
            > myself in positing this "else". Is it that that is what you expected me to say? "Closed" very
            >
            > definitely suggests
            > finitude, perhaps in B's view of necessity or in retaining an image of a certain compositeness at
            >
            > variance with the
            > Concept as explained by Hegel, identical with each of the "parts" which are hence not parts. But
            >
            > please focus on your
            > mistake there. I don't like to be misrepresented and hope it is not gratuitous. I would say
            >
            > freedom is not so much
            > within the one but, better, that freedom is the one. It is even one with necessity. But why do
            >
            > you go on to say I
            > "depend on... the Absolute" as something "outside the Concept"? It is surely not outside it,
            >
            > whatever you might mean
            > there. ..."the definition that now results for us is that the Absolute is the Notion" (EL160
            >
            > Zus.), i.e. the Concept
            > (Begriff), if I can trust this translation. It is actually the Concept which sets up "the
            >
            > other... which is in
            > reality not an other" in the text I have here (EL161 Zus.), never mind B's prejudices, whereas you
            >
            > say here, "the
            > process of thought evokes its other (the concept)", its other, the Concept. How can this be when the
            >
            > text says the
            > "movement of the Concept" (as pure play) sets up the other, finding this "expressed in Christianity". So
            >
            > we have the
            > Concept which is the other (your account) sets up the other. Can this be? If not, what is this other? Or
            >
            > need we not
            > identify it? What do you think about this? Are their other texts that support your different version? Is
            >
            > there
            > anything in this difference? Yes the negation is also in the one. And what is this about some other dogmatic
            >
            > truth?
            > You are not only arguing ad hominem, but you have got your homo quite wrong, or you find it easier to
            >
            > misrepresent
            > him. You end by saying something is precise without being precise about what it is. A lot of people do
            >
            > this kind of
            > thing but I hope, principally, I have shown you you misrepresent me completely with your first words here.
            >
            > Stephen.
            >
            >
            >
            >
            > Stephen,
            >
            >
            >
            > It would have been better if you would have answered the second part of my comment (copy see
            >
            > below)
            > instead of making a philosophy about 'precise'. "Constructing the world in thought alone" is not Hegel's job.
            >
            > Hegel's
            > job is a critical unfolding of the categories with which we give our experience meaning or explanation. This
            >
            > happens
            > within experience and not from outside. Klaus Brinkmann also writes (p 247, Idealism Without Limits, Hegel an
            >
            > the
            > Problem of Objectivity):
            >
            >
            >
            > "......... Hegel's Logic is not about [substantial] entities whose existence is to be
            >
            >
            > proved [in thought alone as in the old metaphysics], but about conceptual content or explanatory conceptions whose
            >
            >
            > instantiation is granted."
            >
            >
            >
            > Otherwise, Hegel would have fallen back behind Kant as many of his opponents claim.
            > Hegel's
            >
            > absolute does not mean absolute truth but only the path of our conceptual experience which does not know an
            > eternal
            >
            > substantial truth of thouhgt outside it. But this does also mean that the categories are not merely formal
            > and
            >
            > subjective with a content outside it as with Kant. So, Hegel has a much wider concept of experience which
            > includes all
            >
            > world relationships of man and their development and not only the immediate empirical ones which are
            > bound to
            >
            > previously fixed categories.
            >
            >
            >
            > Regards,
            >
            > Beat Greuter
            >
            >
            >
            > You [Stephen] write further:
            >
            >
            >
            > "We do indeed
            > "construct the world
            >
            > in thought alone", as
            >
            > I have just done here, agreeing with Hegel I believe in
            >
            > the matter as in
            > the form.
            >
            > Well, I wonder
            >
            > if Brinkmann would recognise himself."
            >
            >
            >
            > According to Hegel this is precisely the
            > procedure of old metaphysics and
            >
            > contrasts what he himself intends to do starting from Kant's transcendental logic
            > and his undermining of earlier
            >
            > metaphysical thinking (the antinomy chapter in the CPR).
            >
            >
            >
            > To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
            >
            >
            > From: greuterb@...
            >
            > Date:
            >
            > Fri, 28 Oct 2011 18:21:03 +0000
            >
            > Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Beiser (2), the non-
            > metaphysical Hegel
            >
            >
            >
            > Am 24.10.2011 21:43, Stephen writes:
            >
            >
            >
            > "Beat,
            >
            >
            >
            > I find myself agreeing with
            >
            > Brinkmann, or
            > able to read it
            >
            >
            >
            > in a way that seems in agreement with me, until I come to
            >
            >
            >
            > the phrase,"excludes...
            >
            > reference to
            > supersensible
            >
            >
            >
            > entities". However, what this seems to mean is exclusion
            >
            >
            >
            > of a two-tiered reality, of
            >
            > sensible and
            > super-sensible. I
            >
            >
            >
            > take Hegel as identifying the two or, rather, annulling
            >
            >
            >
            > this particular categorical
            >
            > division.
            > The external or
            >
            >
            >
            > sensory (as simply meaning external)is internal, within,
            >
            >
            >
            > formally signifying the Concept.
            >
            >
            >
            > The
            > absolute, too, is indeed "one moment" in the system
            >
            >
            >
            > (we are not philosophers all the time), but it is that
            >
            >
            >
            > moment
            > which every other moment is identical with.
            >
            >
            >
            > Whether we say Hegel's philosophy is not metaphysical, in
            >
            >
            >
            > this
            >
            > odd
            > sense of referring to a second layer of entities,
            >
            >
            >
            > or we say, for example, that it is a realised eschatology,
            >
            >
            >
            > i.
            > e.
            >
            > the means are the end, is at bottom, therefore, the
            >
            >
            >
            > same. Again, whether we say this is the surmounting of
            >
            >
            >
            >
            > metaphysics or the final and true metaphysics is the same.
            >
            >
            >
            > Yet this Brinkmann is clearly rhetorically tendentious in
            >
            >
            >
            >
            > speaking of metaphysics of the "hubristic" kind. One
            >
            >
            >
            > should admit this.
            >
            >
            >
            > What Brinkmann is saying, to my
            >
            >
            > perception, when
            >
            >
            >
            > translated back into the religious terms from which Hegel
            >
            >
            >
            > claims his philosophy necessarily
            > springs,
            >
            > is that we "sit
            >
            >
            >
            > with Christ in the heavenly places" or that "what you do
            >
            >
            >
            > to another you do to me", do
            > to the absolute
            >
            > subjectivity
            >
            >
            >
            > of the Concept.
            >
            >
            >
            > What this amounts to in terms of Art, the third form of
            >
            >
            >
            >
            > Absolute Spirit (I have just
            >
            > mentioned Religion, second
            >
            >
            >
            > form), well, we could probably take any "opus" of the kind
            >
            >
            >
            >
            > we call great, "sublime", and
            >
            > not merely skilful etc.
            >
            >
            >
            > By the way, it is only on one account that metaphysics
            >
            >
            >
            >
            > stipulates supersensible beings, let
            >
            > alone causes. For
            >
            >
            >
            > Aristotle, Hegel's master more or less, it is the "science
            >
            >
            >
            >
            > of being as being" (this ambiguity in
            >
            > meaning is discussed
            >
            >
            >
            > by Aquinas in his commentary on Met.).
            >
            >
            >
            > "The
            > Absolute or God" is indeed the most immanent of
            >
            > all,
            >
            >
            >
            > as B. in effect says, and "being has no parts" but is one
            >
            >
            >
            >
            > (Parmenides). Whether this makes it a "closed
            >
            > totality" is
            >
            >
            >
            > a matter of choice of metaphor. I would take Freedom as
            >
            >
            >
            >
            > the opposite of "closed". For "not closed" need
            >
            > not mean
            >
            >
            >
            > the same as open to something "else"."
            >
            >
            >
            > Stephen,
            >
            >
            >
            >
            > With this you contradict yourself. Where is this
            >
            > something "else"?
            >
            >
            >
            > Outside the One (Parmenides)? Freedom is not
            > outside the One but
            >
            >
            >
            > within it. If you take it outside
            >
            > you cannot realize it in the
            >
            >
            >
            > process of thought evoking
            > and reconciling its other (Concept) but you depend on
            >
            >
            >
            > something outside it that is unfreedom, be it God or the
            > Absolute or
            >
            >
            >
            > some other dogmatic truth. For Hegel freedom is
            >
            > only within the
            >
            >
            >
            > movement of the Concept. Outside it
            > there is not even 'nothing'. The
            >
            >
            >
            > negation is also in the One.
            >
            >
            >
            > You write further:
            >
            >
            >
            > "We do indeed "construct the
            > world in thought alone", as
            >
            >
            >
            > I have just done here, agreeing with
            >
            > Hegel I believe in
            >
            >
            >
            > the matter as in the form.
            >
            >
            >
            >
            > Well, I wonder if Brinkmann would recognise himself."
            >
            >
            >
            > According
            >
            > to Hegel this is precisely the procedure of old
            > metaphysics and contrasts what he himself intends to do starting from
            >
            > Kant's transcendental logic and his undermining
            > of earlier metaphysical thinking (the antinomy chapter in the CPR).
            >
            >
            >
            > Regards,
            >
            >
            >
            > Beat Greuter
            >
            >
            >
            > --- In
            > hegel@yahoogroups.com,
            >
            >
            >
            > greuterb <greuterb@>
            >
            >
            >
            > wrote:
            >
            >
            >
            > >
            >
            >
            >
            > > Am 24.10.2011 13:
            >
            > 48, Bruce Merrill writes:
            >
            >
            >
            >
            > >
            >
            >
            >
            > > > Insofar as Beiser is "paradoxically" transposing
            >
            >
            >
            > a term from the
            >
            >
            >
            > > > Vienna
            >
            > circle to apply to Pippin
            > et al, then he
            >
            >
            >
            > is guilty of the kind
            >
            >
            >
            > > > of anachronism that he condemns. (He is using it
            >
            >
            >
            > as a term of abuse.)
            >
            >
            >
            >
            > > > .
            >
            >
            >
            > > >
            >
            >
            >
            > > > To appropriate that part of Hegel that one
            >
            >
            >
            > considers to be plausible
            >
            >
            >
            > >
            >
            > > /useful
            > /relevant and so discard metaphysics
            >
            >
            >
            > /mysticism
            >
            >
            >
            > > > /naturo-philosophy /Xtianity etc. does not
            >
            >
            >
            > qualify
            >
            > as
            > positivism!
            >
            >
            >
            > > >
            >
            >
            >
            > > > As said, the proof of the pudding lies in the
            >
            >
            >
            > case that Beiser can
            >
            >
            >
            > > > make for the
            >
            >
            > metaphysical /mystical
            >
            >
            >
            > /naturophilosophy etc. elements
            >
            >
            >
            > > > in Hegel. He has to justify this as "living"
            >
            >
            >
            >
            > philosophy, not simply
            >
            >
            >
            > > > justify it as an essential part of Hegel's past
            >
            >
            >
            > project. Since it can
            >
            >
            >
            > > > be
            >
            >
            > essential, yet not plausible. (As Pippin et
            >
            >
            >
            > al hold?)
            >
            >
            >
            > > >
            >
            >
            >
            > >
            >
            >
            >
            > >
            >
            >
            >
            > >
            >
            >
            >
            > > Bruce,
            >
            >
            >
            > >
            >
            >
            >
            > > According to
            >
            >
            > Klaus Brinkmann's "Idealism without
            >
            >
            >
            > Limits, Hegel and the
            >
            >
            >
            > > Problem of Objectivity" (you recently gave the
            >
            >
            >
            >
            > reference) taking Hegel's
            >
            >
            >
            > > philosophy as a metaphysics is a misunderstanding,
            >
            >
            >
            > and he explicitly
            >
            >
            >
            > > refers in
            > a
            >
            > footnote to Beiser as a proponent of such
            >
            >
            >
            > an interpretation:
            >
            >
            >
            > >
            >
            >
            >
            > > "Frederick Beiser has been a proponent
            > of the
            >
            >
            >
            > interpretation of Hegel as
            >
            >
            >
            > > a metaphysician against those who see in Hegel a
            >
            >
            >
            > philosopher of a
            >
            >
            >
            > >
            > broadly
            >
            > transcendental orientation or one who
            >
            >
            >
            > advances an ontology or a
            >
            >
            >
            > > non-metaphysical theory of
            > categories. A good
            >
            >
            >
            > overview of the arguments
            >
            >
            >
            > > pro and con can be found in Wartenberg (1993), Beiser
            >
            >
            >
            > (1993,
            > 1995),
            >
            >
            >
            > > Pinkard
            >
            > (1990), and Pippin (1990). ......... ."
            >
            >
            >
            > >
            >
            >
            >
            > > In the following I cite the section the above
            >
            >
            >
            >
            > footnote belongs to
            >
            > (p. 75):
            >
            >
            >
            > >
            >
            >
            >
            > > "Hegel's philosophy, in particular the Logic and the
            >
            >
            >
            > Encyclopedia, are
            >
            >
            >
            >
            > > often said to be a
            >
            > metaphysics, occasionally even a
            >
            >
            >
            > metaphysics of the
            >
            >
            >
            > > hubristic kind. I would like to
            > emphasize that Hegel
            >
            >
            >
            > is a
            >
            > philosopher of
            >
            >
            >
            > > the immanence of experience and, in the Logic, of the
            >
            >
            >
            > immanence
            > of
            >
            >
            >
            > > thought. That means that
            >
            > metaphysics with its
            >
            >
            >
            > stipulation of
            >
            >
            >
            > > supersensible entities and causes that
            > are located
            >
            >
            >
            > outside the immanence
            >
            >
            >
            > > of experience in a transcendent realm has no proper
            >
            >
            >
            > place in Hegel's
            >
            >
            >
            >
            > > thought. No other philosopher (with the
            >
            > exception
            >
            >
            >
            > perhaps of Spinoza)
            >
            >
            >
            > > has repudiated and systematically
            > dissolved the
            >
            >
            >
            > separation of the
            >
            >
            >
            > > mundane
            >
            > and the supersensible as thoroughly as Hegel,
            >
            >
            >
            > and in such a way
            >
            >
            >
            >
            > > that both spheres are unified into one
            >
            > homogenous
            >
            >
            >
            > sphere of experience.
            >
            >
            >
            > > We should not be misled by
            > Hegel's frequent reference
            >
            >
            >
            > to the Absolute or
            >
            >
            >
            > >
            >
            > God. These are technically speaking expressions for
            >
            >
            >
            > the
            > immanence of
            >
            >
            >
            > > experience and thought, or the closed
            >
            > totality that,
            >
            >
            >
            > like Parmenidean
            >
            >
            >
            > > One, has nothing
            > outside itself, not even
            >
            >
            >
            > nothingness. It is true that
            >
            >
            >
            > > in
            >
            > the Encyclopedia, Hegel goes so far as to
            >
            >
            >
            >
            > charaterize his Logic as a
            >
            >
            >
            > > theory of the "definition of the Absolute,
            >
            > as the
            >
            >
            >
            > metaphysical
            >
            >
            >
            > > definition
            > of God" (E § 85). But again, this needs to
            >
            >
            >
            > be understood
            >
            >
            >
            > > properly in its
            >
            > context. First, the fact that the
            >
            >
            >
            >
            > Encyclopedia,
            >
            >
            >
            > > especially with its posthumous Additions to Hegel's
            >
            >
            >
            > published
            >
            > text,
            >
            >
            >
            > > belongs to what one
            > might call Hegel's exoteric
            >
            >
            >
            > writings should be an
            >
            >
            >
            > > indicator that this language
            >
            > includes a dose of
            >
            >
            >
            >
            > pedagogic popularization
            >
            >
            >
            > > and/or a deliberate attempt on Hegel's part to
            >
            >
            >
            > intervene in public
            >
            >
            >
            > >
            > controversies about the nature of philosophy. And
            >
            >
            >
            > second, what is meant
            >
            >
            >
            > > by "metaphysical" should be seen in
            >
            >
            > the light of
            >
            >
            >
            > Hegel's definition of
            >
            >
            >
            > > metaphysics in the Logic, viz. as the "scientific
            >
            >
            >
            > construction of the
            >
            >
            >
            >
            > >
            >
            > world in thought alone" (SL 63/WdL I 46). This
            >
            >
            >
            > definition excludes any
            >
            >
            >
            > > connotation of metaphysical
            > realism,
            >
            >
            >
            > representationalism, or reference
            >
            >
            >
            > > to supersensible entities. Moreover, the Science of
            >
            >
            >
            > Logic, which
            > I would
            >
            >
            >
            > >
            >
            > call an esoteric work by comparison, avoids almost
            >
            >
            >
            > all reference to God,
            >
            >
            >
            > > and its technical
            > definition of the
            >
            > Absolute makes
            >
            >
            >
            > this category an
            >
            >
            >
            > > abstract precursor of the Spinozistic substance, the
            >
            >
            >
            >
            > identity of the
            >
            >
            >
            > >
            >
            > inner and outer aspects of essence. In other words,
            >
            >
            >
            > the Absolute is here
            >
            >
            >
            > > strictly
            > speaking one moment of the
            >
            > totality of the
            >
            >
            >
            > "system of concepts"
            >
            >
            >
            > > [System der Begriffe] (SL 54/WdL I 36) or
            > the "system
            >
            >
            >
            > of the
            >
            >
            >
            > >
            >
            > determinations of thought" [System der
            >
            >
            >
            > Denkbestimmungen] (SL 63/WdL I 46)."
            >
            >
            >
            > >
            >
            >
            >
            > >
            > Regards,
            >
            >
            >
            > > Beat
            >
            >
            >
            > >
            >
            >
            >
            > >
            >
            >
            >
            > >
            >
            >
            >
            > > > Since the volume at hand stops with Hegel,
            >
            >
            >
            > perhaps this lies ahead of
            >
            >
            >
            >
            > > > him? There is also FB's book,
            >
            > _Hegel_ and
            >
            >
            >
            > perhaps he fulfills his
            >
            >
            >
            > > > claims therein?
            >
            >
            >
            > > >
            >
            >
            >
            > > > But he
            > case for Schelling is very valuable.
            >
            >
            >
            > Whether it needs to be
            >
            >
            >
            > > > made at Hegel's expense is another question.
            >
            >
            >
            > >
            > >
            >
            >
            >
            > > > One missing person in Beiser's
            >
            > pantheon is
            >
            >
            >
            > Schiller. And yet Hegel
            >
            >
            >
            > > > says, at one point, that
            > Schiller is the single
            >
            >
            >
            > most important figure
            >
            >
            >
            > >
            >
            > > in regard to countering Kant. And Beiser has
            >
            >
            >
            > written a book
            > on
            >
            >
            >
            > > > _Schiller as a Philosopher_. So Schiller's
            >
            >
            >
            > absence puzzles me.
            >
            >
            >
            > > >
            >
            >
            >
            > > > Earlier I quoted a chunk here
            > from a Beiser
            >
            >
            >
            > review which was also very
            >
            >
            >
            > > >
            >
            > combative, on 19C history. He likes a fight.
            >
            >
            >
            > > >
            >
            >
            >
            > > > Bruce
            >
            >
            >
            >
            > [Non-text portions of this message have been
            >
            > removed]
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            > [Non-text portions of this message have been
            > removed]
            >
            >
            >
            > ------------------------------------
            >
            >
            >
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            > Homepage: http://hegel.net
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            > Listowners Homepage: http://kai.in
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            >
            > only Hegel related mails, scientific level intended.
            >
            > Particpants are expected to show a respectfull and scientific
            > attitude both to Hegel and to each other. The usual "netiquette" as well as scientific standards apply.
            >
            > The copyright
            > policy for mails sent to this list is same as for Hegel.Net, that is the copyright of the mails belongs to the author
            > and hegel.net. Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify the mails of this list under the terms of the
            > GNU Free Documentation License, Version 1.2 or any later version, published by the Free Software Foundation. The mails
            > are also licensed under a Creative Commons License and under the Creative Commons Developing Nations license (see
            > footer of http://hegel.net/en/e0.htm ) Yahoo! Groups Links
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          • stephen theron
            Dear Wil, You are right of course, though I think that on your general theses we could meet one another halfway, or more. I wasn t though claiming to define
            Message 5 of 22 , Oct 30, 2011
              Dear Wil, You are right of course, though I think that on your general theses we could meet one another halfway, or more. I wasn't though claiming to define mysticism just here. I really wanted to claim that saying things are not as they immediately appear does not entail a "two-world view" which, like you, i reject both in itself and as un-Hegelian. Rather, I think we go over to the mediated world in an act "annulling" the point d'appui or jumping-off point. The first world is thereafter not even a bad memory. After that we can then work out what status exactly we are to assign to phenomena. Maybe a good place for that is the chapter on "The Critical Philosophy" in EL, as some people here seem to think Hegel regarded Kant's philosophy as sacrosanct. That chapter shows obvious disdain for a good deal of it, though he is more positive about Kant's ethical (not much more though) and aesthetic views. I agree the system is open. But then I suppose I think God is open too. Still, believe me or not, I agree with Hegel that "it would e.g. be expedient to avoid the name 'God', because this word is not in its primary use a conception as well" and for the second reason he adds there (Phen. Mind, Baillie p. 124). And sure enough, "God" is not one of his categories in the Logic. Yet he does say, and that repeatedly, things like "the Absolute... purports to express God" (EL85), while of Absolute Mind he says "Religion, as this supreme sphere may be in general designated" (Enc. 554, his italics), in general, because "for all men" (he is just coming out of Objective Spirit, which you and I discussed together once. I'm still hoping to write that up). He says that art "has its future in true religion" and that philosophy "is the unity of Art and Religion", all three having identical content. I could express my philosophy perfectly without using the name "God". Why don't I? Because I naturally relate it to our cultural experience (noting the root there of "cult"). I agree that "in" is a containment metaphor, as in religion too. We rather have to do with identity: Hegel thus brings out the meaning of spiritual indwelling, for example, or of unity among men. Each of us is the Notion/Concept, completely. That means we are not (really) substances but subjects and not really subjects but Subjectivity and not really contingent but necessary. Well, that's my more developed view, confirmed in McTaggart. I think it's good Hegel interpretation, just incidentally. I tell you what I think, since you tell me what you think. You don't prove it, and maybe nor do I, for the moment. But of course there may always be a point, and "the whole point", that I'm missing. Still, even error can be fruitful. I am meaning, with Hegel, that God has no substance. So I can't be hypostasising the Absolute. As for ourselves, we are images, aspects, ideas, of the Absolute in both passive (our usual Vorstellung) and active sense. This has to be worked out more carefully as a piece of language, of course. So Reality is both One and Many, infinitely so, a perfect unity then (the meaning of Reason as essentially universal), and perfect means finished but that is a temporal image. Reality is neither closed nor finitely immobile but the reverse, not so much "new every moment" as "ever new"., my point being that Reason demands this. Language, being naturally metaphorical despite all our efforts, cannot entirely shake off a certain poetic sheen. Why should it though, really? Cheers,Stephen.
              To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
              From: eupraxis@...
              Date: Sun, 30 Oct 2011 14:14:22 -0400
              Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Beiser (2), the non-metaphysical Hegel




























              Stephen,



              Your definition of mysticism here ("that things are not as they immediately appear") is at best facile, if you pardon the criticism. Those of us who have been in this theological debate over these many months and years know what you really mean by the term: religion, or a feeling of unity with (a) God. Some read Hegel's true infinite as a notion that culminates in that unity; I and some others contend that it, in Hegel's texts, leads through it to its sublation into an open 'system'. I cannot reconcile Hegel with the 'Parmenidean' monism that results, or seems to, in your reading, although you can read Hegel any way you like within your privileged and presupposed religious orientation, if such allows you to broaden that view of matters for your own purposes. It is a perfectly fair theological position, if one is given to theology.



              But qua Hegel, I think, as you know, that it misses the whole point, and even the point of his philosophy of religion. More to the point, if I may, the Absolute doesn't 'contain' anything; it is not a grand sum of knowledge or a set of all sets. It is the very inside out of all sets. It is not the mind of God in his eternal substance. It isn't 'the' Real. It is what un-closes -- dis-closes -- the Real as that about which nothing can be said except by again participating in the dialectical process of thinking in a higher or wiser manner. I feel that you hypostasize the Absolute -- just as any idea of God is, as far as I am concerned, an hypostatization.



              I am given to the suggestion of Zizek that, taking a large view of Hegel, Reality isn't singular or monist, and certainly not 'Platonic' and two-world, but rather fundamentally incomplete.



              As for Beiser, I am just into the book.



              Best,

              Wil



              -----Original Message-----

              From: Stephen <stephentheron@...>

              To: hegel <hegel@yahoogroups.com>

              Sent: Sun, Oct 30, 2011 12:00 pm

              Subject: AW: RE: [hegel] Re: Beiser (2), the non-metaphysical Hegel



              Dear Beat (and anyone interested in the substantive issues here),



              I think this is a good answer in the circumstances.



              We each think the other "misses" Hegel, I don't know about "fully".



              I have searched your letters but can find no question (you say I did not answer it) except your "Where is this 'else'"? If you mean that one you must be asserting I "turn" something my way there. Do you not believe me when I say I think there is no "else", as I said there, that all is "in" the Absolute? I merely add that that does not make it, as infinite, something fittingly called "closed". I know we speak of a closed circle and this might suggest a counter-argument. But, again, is returning on self being "closed", as if excluding something?



              I have been thinking about this today. To me it is amazing that some people today think there is nothing "mystical" about Hegel's thinking. To me this word here means simply that things are not as they immediately appear, the cardinal point of the Doctrine of Essence (as it took me some time to realise: you no doubt will jump to deny this in your usual either/or way). This depends either upon those people's presuppositions or is an academic misrepresentation in the interest of generating acceptable secondary literature, they think.



              Not even Marx took that view. For him Hegel was mistaken precisely in his philosophical "idealism" and he offered an alternative more congenial to him.



              It is possible to take Hegel's general philosophy of Spirit seriously without postulating a two-tier world, one substituting the other, which is the principal cause of distaste. Hegel's position, rather, just as it is with intelligent religious persons or, especially, with poets (art), is that there is just one reality and it is not what we see immediately. That appearance is, rather, annulled. You will know the texts. Of course the position can be discussed at length, "the being of the phenomenon and the phenomenon of being" as Sartre put it (that does not mean I put it so). In any case, there is, for Hegel, as for McTaggart, just one reality, outside or inside indifferently. I know I do not miss Hegel fully and I suppose you do too.



              Perhaps it is assumed that if we are talking about concepts then we are not talking about the Absolute as real. I would counter, we are rather saying that reality is subject, subjectivity. Religious people are familiar with this, that God, say, can be a thought, an active concept as Hegel says. Substance-philosophy is indeed left behind, though theology has used a substance-vocabulary to say just this.



              Beat, you need not reply if you prefer, though I think I showed that I like discussion. And, you know, you did not answer my question either. Shall I conclude that you have fully missed Hegel? One is not insulting if the cap fits. However, I would of course wish to avoid personal attacks. I think though it is quite "personal" if you, especially as having a quasi-official role, have begun it by plainly misrepresenting me (perhaps originally through a misreading?)and ignored my protest then. There was no opening for "interpretation".I had to resort to a couple of home-truths or else acquiesce in this. It is humiliating to get involved in this kind of thing. I hope we can avoid it in future.



              Stephen.



              Stephen.



              --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "greuterb@..." <greuterb@...> wrote:

              >

              > Stephen,

              >

              > I think you did not answer my question. Therefore, I have to assume that you miss Hegel fully. So, I think

              > that there is no base for further discussion also because you feel always misinterpreted when you have turned a contra

              > argument into your old misguided standpoint which then is challenged. Ich habe die Nase auch voll, especially since I

              > did not insult you personally as you did with me.

              >

              > Regards,

              > Beat Greuter

              >

              >

              >

              > ----Urspr��ngliche Nachricht----

              > Von:

              > stephentheron@...

              > Datum: 30.10.2011 12:50

              > An: "hegel hegel"<hegel@yahoogroups.com>

              > Betreff: RE: AW: RE: [hegel]

              > Re: Beiser (2), the non-metaphysical Hegel

              >

              >

              > Dear Beat, Did you forget or do you not think you should apologise to me

              > for the misrepresentation of me you, as moderator, have offered the group? Philosophers normally and naturally exercise

              > a basic courtesy to one another. Perhaps that is not recognised in whatever field you distinguished yourself in? Of

              > course I give you credit for being ready to communicate in a language other than your mother-tongue. Aber ich habe die

              > Nase voll, vollgestrichen. The relation of Hegel to Kant is/was complex and debatable. You seem to pass over an obvious

              > if restrained contempt or unqualified negative evaluation he shows at certain places for "the critical philosophy",

              > though he balances it with praise at others. So one should not be too afraid of openings being left for tendentiously

              > suggesting he regressed behind Kant, as in a kind of restorationaist spirit. This is not born out by the overall upshot

              > of his thought. As for my not answering your comments, you yourself totally ignore my pointing out an apparent

              > inconsistency arising from an expression of yours, in reporting Hegel, though I said I would like to know what your

              > view was there. But perhaps my text was too complicated for you, something I would not be proud of. I can see, let me

              > say, that you are long and deeply read in Hegel, but I do rather wonder sometimes if you do not read him like the Devil

              > reads the Bible, as we say. On the other hand I also suspect you might find more agreement of mine with your thought if

              > you came upon it elsewhere. Now let's have that apology, recantation or whatever! It doesn't cost much. Stephen.

              > To:

              > hegel@yahoogroups.com

              > From: greuterb@...

              > Date: Sun, 30 Oct 2011 10:58:36 +0000

              > Subject: AW: RE: [hegel] Re:

              > Beiser (2), the non-metaphysical Hegel

              >

              >

              >

              >

              >

              >

              >

              >

              >

              >

              >

              >

              >

              >

              >

              >

              >

              >

              >

              >

              >

              >

              >

              >

              >

              >

              >

              >

              > ----Urspr��ngliche

              > Nachricht----

              >

              > Von: stephentheron@...

              >

              > Datum: 28.10.2011 21:59

              >

              > An: "hegel hegel"

              >

              > <hegel@yahoogroups.com>

              >

              >

              > Betreff: RE: [hegel] Re: Beiser (2), the non-metaphysical Hegel

              >

              >

              >

              > Beat, Thank you! There seems

              >

              > to be a language

              > problem here. You ask, where is this something else? But that is what I have just there explicitly

              >

              > ruled out. I want

              > to reject Brinkmann's metaphor of "closed" (totality), since the Absolute is Freedom which is surely

              >

              > denotes openness

              > rather, and so I state that openness need NOT mean openness to something "else" and I put the "else"

              >

              > in scare-quotes

              > to indicate that I do not think there can be an "else", or anything outside of the Absolute. Yet you

              >

              > say I contradict

              > myself in positing this "else". Is it that that is what you expected me to say? "Closed" very

              >

              > definitely suggests

              > finitude, perhaps in B's view of necessity or in retaining an image of a certain compositeness at

              >

              > variance with the

              > Concept as explained by Hegel, identical with each of the "parts" which are hence not parts. But

              >

              > please focus on your

              > mistake there. I don't like to be misrepresented and hope it is not gratuitous. I would say

              >

              > freedom is not so much

              > within the one but, better, that freedom is the one. It is even one with necessity. But why do

              >

              > you go on to say I

              > "depend on... the Absolute" as something "outside the Concept"? It is surely not outside it,

              >

              > whatever you might mean

              > there. ..."the definition that now results for us is that the Absolute is the Notion" (EL160

              >

              > Zus.), i.e. the Concept

              > (Begriff), if I can trust this translation. It is actually the Concept which sets up "the

              >

              > other... which is in

              > reality not an other" in the text I have here (EL161 Zus.), never mind B's prejudices, whereas you

              >

              > say here, "the

              > process of thought evokes its other (the concept)", its other, the Concept. How can this be when the

              >

              > text says the

              > "movement of the Concept" (as pure play) sets up the other, finding this "expressed in Christianity". So

              >

              > we have the

              > Concept which is the other (your account) sets up the other. Can this be? If not, what is this other? Or

              >

              > need we not

              > identify it? What do you think about this? Are their other texts that support your different version? Is

              >

              > there

              > anything in this difference? Yes the negation is also in the one. And what is this about some other dogmatic

              >

              > truth?

              > You are not only arguing ad hominem, but you have got your homo quite wrong, or you find it easier to

              >

              > misrepresent

              > him. You end by saying something is precise without being precise about what it is. A lot of people do

              >

              > this kind of

              > thing but I hope, principally, I have shown you you misrepresent me completely with your first words here.

              >

              > Stephen.

              >

              >

              >

              >

              > Stephen,

              >

              >

              >

              > It would have been better if you would have answered the second part of my comment (copy see

              >

              > below)

              > instead of making a philosophy about 'precise'. "Constructing the world in thought alone" is not Hegel's job.

              >

              > Hegel's

              > job is a critical unfolding of the categories with which we give our experience meaning or explanation. This

              >

              > happens

              > within experience and not from outside. Klaus Brinkmann also writes (p 247, Idealism Without Limits, Hegel an

              >

              > the

              > Problem of Objectivity):

              >

              >

              >

              > "......... Hegel's Logic is not about [substantial] entities whose existence is to be

              >

              >

              > proved [in thought alone as in the old metaphysics], but about conceptual content or explanatory conceptions whose

              >

              >

              > instantiation is granted."

              >

              >

              >

              > Otherwise, Hegel would have fallen back behind Kant as many of his opponents claim.

              > Hegel's

              >

              > absolute does not mean absolute truth but only the path of our conceptual experience which does not know an

              > eternal

              >

              > substantial truth of thouhgt outside it. But this does also mean that the categories are not merely formal

              > and

              >

              > subjective with a content outside it as with Kant. So, Hegel has a much wider concept of experience which

              > includes all

              >

              > world relationships of man and their development and not only the immediate empirical ones which are

              > bound to

              >

              > previously fixed categories.

              >

              >

              >

              > Regards,

              >

              > Beat Greuter

              >

              >

              >

              > You [Stephen] write further:

              >

              >

              >

              > "We do indeed

              > "construct the world

              >

              > in thought alone", as

              >

              > I have just done here, agreeing with Hegel I believe in

              >

              > the matter as in

              > the form.

              >

              > Well, I wonder

              >

              > if Brinkmann would recognise himself."

              >

              >

              >

              > According to Hegel this is precisely the

              > procedure of old metaphysics and

              >

              > contrasts what he himself intends to do starting from Kant's transcendental logic

              > and his undermining of earlier

              >

              > metaphysical thinking (the antinomy chapter in the CPR).

              >

              >

              >

              > To: hegel@yahoogroups.com

              >

              >

              > From: greuterb@...

              >

              > Date:

              >

              > Fri, 28 Oct 2011 18:21:03 +0000

              >

              > Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Beiser (2), the non-

              > metaphysical Hegel

              >

              >

              >

              > Am 24.10.2011 21:43, Stephen writes:

              >

              >

              >

              > "Beat,

              >

              >

              >

              > I find myself agreeing with

              >

              > Brinkmann, or

              > able to read it

              >

              >

              >

              > in a way that seems in agreement with me, until I come to

              >

              >

              >

              > the phrase,"excludes...

              >

              > reference to

              > supersensible

              >

              >

              >

              > entities". However, what this seems to mean is exclusion

              >

              >

              >

              > of a two-tiered reality, of

              >

              > sensible and

              > super-sensible. I

              >

              >

              >

              > take Hegel as identifying the two or, rather, annulling

              >

              >

              >

              > this particular categorical

              >

              > division.

              > The external or

              >

              >

              >

              > sensory (as simply meaning external)is internal, within,

              >

              >

              >

              > formally signifying the Concept.

              >

              >

              >

              > The

              > absolute, too, is indeed "one moment" in the system

              >

              >

              >

              > (we are not philosophers all the time), but it is that

              >

              >

              >

              > moment

              > which every other moment is identical with.

              >

              >

              >

              > Whether we say Hegel's philosophy is not metaphysical, in

              >

              >

              >

              > this

              >

              > odd

              > sense of referring to a second layer of entities,

              >

              >

              >

              > or we say, for example, that it is a realised eschatology,

              >

              >

              >

              > i.

              > e.

              >

              > the means are the end, is at bottom, therefore, the

              >

              >

              >

              > same. Again, whether we say this is the surmounting of

              >

              >

              >

              >

              > metaphysics or the final and true metaphysics is the same.

              >

              >

              >

              > Yet this Brinkmann is clearly rhetorically tendentious in

              >

              >

              >

              >

              > speaking of metaphysics of the "hubristic" kind. One

              >

              >

              >

              > should admit this.

              >

              >

              >

              > What Brinkmann is saying, to my

              >

              >

              > perception, when

              >

              >

              >

              > translated back into the religious terms from which Hegel

              >

              >

              >

              > claims his philosophy necessarily

              > springs,

              >

              > is that we "sit

              >

              >

              >

              > with Christ in the heavenly places" or that "what you do

              >

              >

              >

              > to another you do to me", do

              > to the absolute

              >

              > subjectivity

              >

              >

              >

              > of the Concept.

              >

              >

              >

              > What this amounts to in terms of Art, the third form of

              >

              >

              >

              >

              > Absolute Spirit (I have just

              >

              > mentioned Religion, second

              >

              >

              >

              > form), well, we could probably take any "opus" of the kind

              >

              >

              >

              >

              > we call great, "sublime", and

              >

              > not merely skilful etc.

              >

              >

              >

              > By the way, it is only on one account that metaphysics

              >

              >

              >

              >

              > stipulates supersensible beings, let

              >

              > alone causes. For

              >

              >

              >

              > Aristotle, Hegel's master more or less, it is the "science

              >

              >

              >

              >

              > of being as being" (this ambiguity in

              >

              > meaning is discussed

              >

              >

              >

              > by Aquinas in his commentary on Met.).

              >

              >

              >

              > "The

              > Absolute or God" is indeed the most immanent of

              >

              > all,

              >

              >

              >

              > as B. in effect says, and "being has no parts" but is one

              >

              >

              >

              >

              > (Parmenides). Whether this makes it a "closed

              >

              > totality" is

              >

              >

              >

              > a matter of choice of metaphor. I would take Freedom as

              >

              >

              >

              >

              > the opposite of "closed". For "not closed" need

              >

              > not mean

              >

              >

              >

              > the same as open to something "else"."

              >

              >

              >

              > Stephen,

              >

              >

              >

              >

              > With this you contradict yourself. Where is this

              >

              > something "else"?

              >

              >

              >

              > Outside the One (Parmenides)? Freedom is not

              > outside the One but

              >

              >

              >

              > within it. If you take it outside

              >

              > you cannot realize it in the

              >

              >

              >

              > process of thought evoking

              > and reconciling its other (Concept) but you depend on

              >

              >

              >

              > something outside it that is unfreedom, be it God or the

              > Absolute or

              >

              >

              >

              > some other dogmatic truth. For Hegel freedom is

              >

              > only within the

              >

              >

              >

              > movement of the Concept. Outside it

              > there is not even 'nothing'. The

              >

              >

              >

              > negation is also in the One.

              >

              >

              >

              > You write further:

              >

              >

              >

              > "We do indeed "construct the

              > world in thought alone", as

              >

              >

              >

              > I have just done here, agreeing with

              >

              > Hegel I believe in

              >

              >

              >

              > the matter as in the form.

              >

              >

              >

              >

              > Well, I wonder if Brinkmann would recognise himself."

              >

              >

              >

              > According

              >

              > to Hegel this is precisely the procedure of old

              > metaphysics and contrasts what he himself intends to do starting from

              >

              > Kant's transcendental logic and his undermining

              > of earlier metaphysical thinking (the antinomy chapter in the CPR).

              >

              >

              >

              > Regards,

              >

              >

              >

              > Beat Greuter

              >

              >

              >

              > --- In

              > hegel@yahoogroups.com,

              >

              >

              >

              > greuterb <greuterb@>

              >

              >

              >

              > wrote:

              >

              >

              >

              > >

              >

              >

              >

              > > Am 24.10.2011 13:

              >

              > 48, Bruce Merrill writes:

              >

              >

              >

              >

              > >

              >

              >

              >

              > > > Insofar as Beiser is "paradoxically" transposing

              >

              >

              >

              > a term from the

              >

              >

              >

              > > > Vienna

              >

              > circle to apply to Pippin

              > et al, then he

              >

              >

              >

              > is guilty of the kind

              >

              >

              >

              > > > of anachronism that he condemns. (He is using it

              >

              >

              >

              > as a term of abuse.)

              >

              >

              >

              >

              > > > .

              >

              >

              >

              > > >

              >

              >

              >

              > > > To appropriate that part of Hegel that one

              >

              >

              >

              > considers to be plausible

              >

              >

              >

              > >

              >

              > > /useful

              > /relevant and so discard metaphysics

              >

              >

              >

              > /mysticism

              >

              >

              >

              > > > /naturo-philosophy /Xtianity etc. does not

              >

              >

              >

              > qualify

              >

              > as

              > positivism!

              >

              >

              >

              > > >

              >

              >

              >

              > > > As said, the proof of the pudding lies in the

              >

              >

              >

              > case that Beiser can

              >

              >

              >

              > > > make for the

              >

              >

              > metaphysical /mystical

              >

              >

              >

              > /naturophilosophy etc. elements

              >

              >

              >

              > > > in Hegel. He has to justify this as "living"

              >

              >

              >

              >

              > philosophy, not simply

              >

              >

              >

              > > > justify it as an essential part of Hegel's past

              >

              >

              >

              > project. Since it can

              >

              >

              >

              > > > be

              >

              >

              > essential, yet not plausible. (As Pippin et

              >

              >

              >

              > al hold?)

              >

              >

              >

              > > >

              >

              >

              >

              > >

              >

              >

              >

              > >

              >

              >

              >

              > >

              >

              >

              >

              > > Bruce,

              >

              >

              >

              > >

              >

              >

              >

              > > According to

              >

              >

              > Klaus Brinkmann's "Idealism without

              >

              >

              >

              > Limits, Hegel and the

              >

              >

              >

              > > Problem of Objectivity" (you recently gave the

              >

              >

              >

              >

              > reference) taking Hegel's

              >

              >

              >

              > > philosophy as a metaphysics is a misunderstanding,

              >

              >

              >

              > and he explicitly

              >

              >

              >

              > > refers in

              > a

              >

              > footnote to Beiser as a proponent of such

              >

              >

              >

              > an interpretation:

              >

              >

              >

              > >

              >

              >

              >

              > > "Frederick Beiser has been a proponent

              > of the

              >

              >

              >

              > interpretation of Hegel as

              >

              >

              >

              > > a metaphysician against those who see in Hegel a

              >

              >

              >

              > philosopher of a

              >

              >

              >

              > >

              > broadly

              >

              > transcendental orientation or one who

              >

              >

              >

              > advances an ontology or a

              >

              >

              >

              > > non-metaphysical theory of

              > categories. A good

              >

              >

              >

              > overview of the arguments

              >

              >

              >

              > > pro and con can be found in Wartenberg (1993), Beiser

              >

              >

              >

              > (1993,

              > 1995),

              >

              >

              >

              > > Pinkard

              >

              > (1990), and Pippin (1990). ......... ."

              >

              >

              >

              > >

              >

              >

              >

              > > In the following I cite the section the above

              >

              >

              >

              >

              > footnote belongs to

              >

              > (p. 75):

              >

              >

              >

              > >

              >

              >

              >

              > > "Hegel's philosophy, in particular the Logic and the

              >

              >

              >

              > Encyclopedia, are

              >

              >

              >

              >

              > > often said to be a

              >

              > metaphysics, occasionally even a

              >

              >

              >

              > metaphysics of the

              >

              >

              >

              > > hubristic kind. I would like to

              > emphasize that Hegel

              >

              >

              >

              > is a

              >

              > philosopher of

              >

              >

              >

              > > the immanence of experience and, in the Logic, of the

              >

              >

              >

              > immanence

              > of

              >

              >

              >

              > > thought. That means that

              >

              > metaphysics with its

              >

              >

              >

              > stipulation of

              >

              >

              >

              > > supersensible entities and causes that

              > are located

              >

              >

              >

              > outside the immanence

              >

              >

              >

              > > of experience in a transcendent realm has no proper

              >

              >

              >

              > place in Hegel's

              >

              >

              >

              >

              > > thought. No other philosopher (with the

              >

              > exception

              >

              >

              >

              > perhaps of Spinoza)

              >

              >

              >

              > > has repudiated and systematically

              > dissolved the

              >

              >

              >

              > separation of the

              >

              >

              >

              > > mundane

              >

              > and the supersensible as thoroughly as Hegel,

              >

              >

              >

              > and in such a way

              >

              >

              >

              >

              > > that both spheres are unified into one

              >

              > homogenous

              >

              >

              >

              > sphere of experience.

              >

              >

              >

              > > We should not be misled by

              > Hegel's frequent reference

              >

              >

              >

              > to the Absolute or

              >

              >

              >

              > >

              >

              > God. These are technically speaking expressions for

              >

              >

              >

              > the

              > immanence of

              >

              >

              >

              > > experience and thought, or the closed

              >

              > totality that,

              >

              >

              >

              > like Parmenidean

              >

              >

              >

              > > One, has nothing

              > outside itself, not even

              >

              >

              >

              > nothingness. It is true that

              >

              >

              >

              > > in

              >

              > the Encyclopedia, Hegel goes so far as to

              >

              >

              >

              >

              > charaterize his Logic as a

              >

              >

              >

              > > theory of the "definition of the Absolute,

              >

              > as the

              >

              >

              >

              > metaphysical

              >

              >

              >

              > > definition

              > of God" (E �� 85). But again, this needs to

              >

              >

              >

              > be understood

              >

              >

              >

              > > properly in its

              >

              > context. First, the fact that the

              >

              >

              >

              >

              > Encyclopedia,

              >

              >

              >

              > > especially with its posthumous Additions to Hegel's

              >

              >

              >

              > published

              >

              > text,

              >

              >

              >

              > > belongs to what one

              > might call Hegel's exoteric

              >

              >

              >

              > writings should be an

              >

              >

              >

              > > indicator that this language

              >

              > includes a dose of

              >

              >

              >

              >

              > pedagogic popularization

              >

              >

              >

              > > and/or a deliberate attempt on Hegel's part to

              >

              >

              >

              > intervene in public

              >

              >

              >

              > >

              > controversies about the nature of philosophy. And

              >

              >

              >

              > second, what is meant

              >

              >

              >

              > > by "metaphysical" should be seen in

              >

              >

              > the light of

              >

              >

              >

              > Hegel's definition of

              >

              >

              >

              > > metaphysics in the Logic, viz. as the "scientific

              >

              >

              >

              > construction of the

              >

              >

              >

              >

              > >

              >

              > world in thought alone" (SL 63/WdL I 46). This

              >

              >

              >

              > definition excludes any

              >

              >

              >

              > > connotation of metaphysical

              > realism,

              >

              >

              >

              > representationalism, or reference

              >

              >

              >

              > > to supersensible entities. Moreover, the Science of

              >

              >

              >

              > Logic, which

              > I would

              >

              >

              >

              > >

              >

              > call an esoteric work by comparison, avoids almost

              >

              >

              >

              > all reference to God,

              >

              >

              >

              > > and its technical

              > definition of the

              >

              > Absolute makes

              >

              >

              >

              > this category an

              >

              >

              >

              > > abstract precursor of the Spinozistic substance, the

              >

              >

              >

              >

              > identity of the

              >

              >

              >

              > >

              >

              > inner and outer aspects of essence. In other words,

              >

              >

              >

              > the Absolute is here

              >

              >

              >

              > > strictly

              > speaking one moment of the

              >

              > totality of the

              >

              >

              >

              > "system of concepts"

              >

              >

              >

              > > [System der Begriffe] (SL 54/WdL I 36) or

              > the "system

              >

              >

              >

              > of the

              >

              >

              >

              > >

              >

              > determinations of thought" [System der

              >

              >

              >

              > Denkbestimmungen] (SL 63/WdL I 46)."

              >

              >

              >

              > >

              >

              >

              >

              > >

              > Regards,

              >

              >

              >

              > > Beat

              >

              >

              >

              > >

              >

              >

              >

              > >

              >

              >

              >

              > >

              >

              >

              >

              > > > Since the volume at hand stops with Hegel,

              >

              >

              >

              > perhaps this lies ahead of

              >

              >

              >

              >

              > > > him? There is also FB's book,

              >

              > _Hegel_ and

              >

              >

              >

              > perhaps he fulfills his

              >

              >

              >

              > > > claims therein?

              >

              >

              >

              > > >

              >

              >

              >

              > > > But he

              > case for Schelling is very valuable.

              >

              >

              >

              > Whether it needs to be

              >

              >

              >

              > > > made at Hegel's expense is another question.

              >

              >

              >

              > >

              > >

              >

              >

              >

              > > > One missing person in Beiser's

              >

              > pantheon is

              >

              >

              >

              > Schiller. And yet Hegel

              >

              >

              >

              > > > says, at one point, that

              > Schiller is the single

              >

              >

              >

              > most important figure

              >

              >

              >

              > >

              >

              > > in regard to countering Kant. And Beiser has

              >

              >

              >

              > written a book

              > on

              >

              >

              >

              > > > _Schiller as a Philosopher_. So Schiller's

              >

              >

              >

              > absence puzzles me.

              >

              >

              >

              > > >

              >

              >

              >

              > > > Earlier I quoted a chunk here

              > from a Beiser

              >

              >

              >

              > review which was also very

              >

              >

              >

              > > >

              >

              > combative, on 19C history. He likes a fight.

              >

              >

              >

              > > >

              >

              >

              >

              > > > Bruce

              >

              >

              >

              >

              > [Non-text portions of this message have been

              >

              > removed]

              >

              >

              >

              >

              >

              >

              >

              > [Non-text portions of this message have been

              > removed]

              >

              >

              >

              > ------------------------------------

              >

              >

              >

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