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Re: [hegel] Beiser (2), the non-metaphysical Hegel

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  • greuterb
    ... Bruce, You are right. There are as well different transcendental category/ontology as different metaphysical interpretations whereby some proponents of the
    Message 1 of 22 , Oct 25, 2011
      Am 24.10.2011 21:11, Bruce Merrill writes:

      > Beat,
      >
      > But Brinkman's Hegel qua anti-metaphysical does not put him (Hegel)
      > into the anti-metaphysical camp which Beiser rejects. Right?
      >
      > In others words, Pippin et al may also reject "the immanence of
      > experience and, in the Logic, of the immanence of thought," which they
      > may well classify as "metaphysical," from their transcendental
      > /categorical perspective. In which case we have a dispute over how to
      > assess Hegel which is bound up with a disagreement as how to define
      > "metaphysical." And now this is a 3 way dispute, with Brinkmann,
      > Beiser and Pippin in different camps, right?
      >
      > And you concur with Brinkmann, contra Beiser, it appears?
      >
      > Bruce
      >
      > Bruce
      >



      Bruce,

      You are right. There are as well different transcendental
      category/ontology as different metaphysical interpretations whereby some
      proponents of the transcendental category/ontology interpretation call
      different interpretations of this kind 'metaphysical'. So you are right,
      first we should have an agreement about what 'metaphysical' means.
      Brinkmann even perceives a difference between Pinkard's reading of the
      transcendental element in Hegel and Pippin's more Kantian interpretation
      (p. 245, footnote 44).

      In my opinion for getting a clear concept of Hegel's unique idea of the
      relationship between pure thought and experience (empirical) we have to
      examine first the difference to Kant's Transcendental Logic and then the
      difference to pre-Kantian 'metaphysics' (Plato, Aristotle, Thomas,
      Spinoza, Leibniz). Here, I only can give some points Brinkmann makes in
      his book ("Idealism Without Limits, Hegel and the Problem of Objectivity"):

      (1) In contrast to Kant Hegel's "theory is not about the a priori
      conditions of the possiblility of experience but about the a priori
      conditions of the meaning of experience" (p. 245). This means that Hegel
      does not look for "categories as necessary for there to be knowledge of
      possible sensible objects or appearances" (p. 245) as Kant does and
      therefore he has not to develop transcendental arguments what was Kant's
      task.

      (2) However, in Hegel's Logic the categories "function as
      quasi-transcendental conditions of cognition and comprehension and of
      thinking about things generally" (p. 245). If this is true then the
      problem is how to prove that this categories can achieve objectivity.
      For Kant this is possible only since he introduces into the
      transcendental arguments (pure intuition and categories) the empirical
      manifold (form-matter dualism) and thereby contaminates his
      transcendental argument with an empirical realism.

      (3) Hegel instead claims "that the categories are not merely subjective
      forms of thought, but that they reflect the nature of things" (p. 245).
      But this means that Hegel's Logic "is not only a theory of the forms of
      thought, but an ontology" (p. 245).

      (4) However, if this is true what is the difference to the pre-Kantian
      'metaphysics' with its thought entities?

      (5) The difference is that Hegel's Logic is NOT - as Beiser tries to
      show - a " 'naturalistic' metaphysics ..... to avoid Kantian
      strictures" making a "metaphysical entity, viz. the teleological
      nature-spirit unity or 'absolute', rather than a concept the condition
      for (self-) knowledge" (p. 247, footnote 51).

      (6) However, what then is Hegel's Logic in a positive sense?

      Regards,
      Beat


      [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
    • wmdepot
      ... ... possible to read as: Because Kant has made clear the conditions of possibility of - critical - experience, Hegel can occupy himself with the *meaning*
      Message 2 of 22 , Oct 25, 2011
        BG wrote/cited:
        > (1) In contrast to Kant Hegel's "theory is not about the a priori
        > conditions of the possiblility of experience but about the a priori
        > conditions of the meaning of experience" (p. 245).

        ... possible to read as: Because Kant has made clear the conditions
        of possibility of - critical - experience, Hegel can occupy himself with
        the *meaning* of experience ...

        BG wrote:
        > This means that Hegel
        > does not look for "categories as necessary for there to be knowledge of
        > possible sensible objects or appearances" (p. 245) as Kant does and
        > therefore he has not to develop transcendental arguments what was Kant's
        > task.

        ... possible to read as: Hegel does not look for because Kant already had
        looked for ... Kant looked for, and: has he got ... ?? ... "Kant's task",
        and: which he, more or less, fulfilled ... ?? ... and therefore the result of
        this inquiry (can be) made strongly geltend/gültig (effective/valid) ... ?

        ... a certain transcendental minimal-science then ... which can be rediscovered
        anywhere and elsewhere ... for example within Hegel ...

        ... that's to say: Kant's critical business can be made valid within the starting
        point of the Hegel system as a system: Sensual certainty and the This and the
        Meinen ... sensual certainty beyond (my-)perception ... and therefore sort of
        condition of possibility of any my-perception at all ...

        Kant's critical business can be made valid within Hegel's elementary form:
        sensual certainty, and it's legitimate to do so ... and doing so, having done so
        has got consequences ... that's all.

        "das Meinen" does irreducibly ancor myself to earth ... sort of a formal empirical
        every-my-standpoint ...

        ... a standpoint, an dem ich immer schon stehe und immer schon gestanden habe ...

        Juergen h.

        [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
      • stephen theron
        One difficulty here, I feel, is with Beat s item (5). It posits an apparently necessary dilemma between (1) positing a natural entity (or whatever phrase is
        Message 3 of 22 , Oct 25, 2011
          One difficulty here, I feel, is with Beat's item (5). It posits an apparently necessary dilemma between (1) positing a natural entity (or whatever phrase is used) as condition for "(self-)knowledge", i.e. making of this the Absolute, and (2) positing a concept, in this case conceived as The Concept, as such a condition. But in Absolute Idealism it is only ideas that are actual or real. Every idea is identical with the Concept and the Concept, the Absolute, is at one and the same time the Absolute Idea. Ex-istence, for example, is just one (finite) idea among others. So, as Beat then rightly asks, what then is Hegel's Logic? He quotes someone as saying it is an Ontology. But might this not be to reinstate what has just been transcended? The absolutely actual transcends the ex-istent, cannot itself be thought otherwise in its essentiality as, just as essence, being. This is at least ontology with a difference. One should not miss either an essential connection with subjectivity. The Absolute Idea, freed from all otherness not contained, as it necessarily is, within itself... this follows from, is the meaning of (and so not "caused" by) its infinity, i.e. by Infinity, which the Idea is. It is significant that Infinity can only be ideal, Spirit, mind, thought. It is therefore Subject, not anyone's Object. It is more certainly or prior logically as Subject to any subjectivity I might postulate elsewhere, in my so-called self for example. Yet this is to place Self there, in unity with the Absolute. To say that this is manipulating metaphysical objects is just to ignore the move that has just been made. Object is an abstraction. What we have is the most perfect and hence infinitely differentiated unity and our name for that is Reason. Reason implies, therefore, that the world, which therefore cannot be a second object, entity or idea alongside the Idea, is perfect. Any theodicy etc. must start from there. Hegel here out-Leibnizes Leibniz, as when he says that all is accomplished, superseding the very idea of End. This is only misleading inasmuch as the verb-form suggests a past and finished act on the pattern of completed movement. Rather, Reason, the Concept, can be seen to require Act as supra-substantially self-constitutive as acting/actual, i.e. this is the actual and not some other (pejoratively "metaphysical") actuality. We just don't immediately see it. We need philosophy. Stephen.
          To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
          From: greuterb@...
          Date: Tue, 25 Oct 2011 21:44:18 +0200
          Subject: Re: [hegel] Beiser (2), the non-metaphysical Hegel




























          Am 24.10.2011 21:11, Bruce Merrill writes:



          > Beat,

          >

          > But Brinkman's Hegel qua anti-metaphysical does not put him (Hegel)

          > into the anti-metaphysical camp which Beiser rejects. Right?

          >

          > In others words, Pippin et al may also reject "the immanence of

          > experience and, in the Logic, of the immanence of thought," which they

          > may well classify as "metaphysical," from their transcendental

          > /categorical perspective. In which case we have a dispute over how to

          > assess Hegel which is bound up with a disagreement as how to define

          > "metaphysical." And now this is a 3 way dispute, with Brinkmann,

          > Beiser and Pippin in different camps, right?

          >

          > And you concur with Brinkmann, contra Beiser, it appears?

          >

          > Bruce

          >

          > Bruce

          >



          Bruce,



          You are right. There are as well different transcendental

          category/ontology as different metaphysical interpretations whereby some

          proponents of the transcendental category/ontology interpretation call

          different interpretations of this kind 'metaphysical'. So you are right,

          first we should have an agreement about what 'metaphysical' means.

          Brinkmann even perceives a difference between Pinkard's reading of the

          transcendental element in Hegel and Pippin's more Kantian interpretation

          (p. 245, footnote 44).



          In my opinion for getting a clear concept of Hegel's unique idea of the

          relationship between pure thought and experience (empirical) we have to

          examine first the difference to Kant's Transcendental Logic and then the

          difference to pre-Kantian 'metaphysics' (Plato, Aristotle, Thomas,

          Spinoza, Leibniz). Here, I only can give some points Brinkmann makes in

          his book ("Idealism Without Limits, Hegel and the Problem of Objectivity"):



          (1) In contrast to Kant Hegel's "theory is not about the a priori

          conditions of the possiblility of experience but about the a priori

          conditions of the meaning of experience" (p. 245). This means that Hegel

          does not look for "categories as necessary for there to be knowledge of

          possible sensible objects or appearances" (p. 245) as Kant does and

          therefore he has not to develop transcendental arguments what was Kant's

          task.



          (2) However, in Hegel's Logic the categories "function as

          quasi-transcendental conditions of cognition and comprehension and of

          thinking about things generally" (p. 245). If this is true then the

          problem is how to prove that this categories can achieve objectivity.

          For Kant this is possible only since he introduces into the

          transcendental arguments (pure intuition and categories) the empirical

          manifold (form-matter dualism) and thereby contaminates his

          transcendental argument with an empirical realism.



          (3) Hegel instead claims "that the categories are not merely subjective

          forms of thought, but that they reflect the nature of things" (p. 245).

          But this means that Hegel's Logic "is not only a theory of the forms of

          thought, but an ontology" (p. 245).



          (4) However, if this is true what is the difference to the pre-Kantian

          'metaphysics' with its thought entities?



          (5) The difference is that Hegel's Logic is NOT - as Beiser tries to

          show - a " 'naturalistic' metaphysics ..... to avoid Kantian

          strictures" making a "metaphysical entity, viz. the teleological

          nature-spirit unity or 'absolute', rather than a concept the condition

          for (self-) knowledge" (p. 247, footnote 51).



          (6) However, what then is Hegel's Logic in a positive sense?



          Regards,

          Beat



          [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]


















          [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
        • Alan Ponikvar
          I think I would take issue with Brinkmann over the attribution of theory to Hegel. Theories are a level removed from what is actual and given Hegel s
          Message 4 of 22 , Oct 25, 2011
            I think I would take issue with Brinkmann over the attribution of theory to
            Hegel. Theories are a level removed from what is actual and given Hegel's
            insistence that the rational is actual I think we should be careful about
            such an attribution.

            Moreover, once we are settled that Hegel is offering a theory then there are
            a host of assumptions that follow. So Brinkman has no trouble speaking about
            Hegel offering an a priori account. This domesticates Hegel. We know how
            such accounts work and can then go on to assess Hegel in light of this
            pre-understanding. So Brinkman can speak of 'quasi-transcendental'
            conditions since theories set conditions.

            Philosophers love to use labels. So Brinkman carries out the clerical task
            of labeling what Hegel is doing in the Logic as an ontology. But we need to
            move down from the level of the possible to the actual to see what Hegel is
            up to. He is not offering an ontology. He is providing an exposition of the
            actual emergence of concepts, an emergence that disrupts thought and shows
            how an attention to what is thought also requires an attention to thinking.
            I do not know what you would call this. It does not fit into the usual
            slots. 'Absolute idealism' is typically the label applied. But this is a
            class with one member.

            So Brinkman asks a question of Hegel (4) that really reveals Brinkman's own
            confusion. Having slotted Hegel's Logic as an ontology, and thus depriving
            it of its uniqueness, he is able to ask how this is not a regress to the
            pre-Kantian tradition of metaphysics.

            So in Brinkman's world there seem to be only two real possibilities: either
            Hegel is offering a naturalistic metaphysics (the bad choice) or he is
            offering the conceptual conditions for self-knowledge (the good choice).
            But, in fact, either choice is a caricature of Hegel.

            It is not easy writing about a great philosopher. We are all invariably less
            able than the thinker we are writing about. The tendency is to distort the
            thought because the thought is too strong to think. We have to make it less
            than it is so we can speak intelligently about it. This is especially the
            case for a thinker as obscure and challenging as Hegel.

            I have looked through Brinkman's book. I was hoping for something better
            since I have enjoyed reading some of his articles. But I must say I was
            disappointed. His chapter on sense certainty is 17 pages long and he only
            gives two brief paragraphs to the third test of this form of consciousness
            in which he says basically we already have seen this in the previous two
            tests. That sense certainty is not properly brought to its limits until the
            third test entirely is lost to Brinkman. The bulk of his account should have
            been about this third test which is nothing like the previous two.

            Maybe Brinkman has better moments elsewhere in his book. But I am not
            interested in putting in the effort to find out.

            - Alan

            From: greuterb <greuterb@...>
            Reply-To: <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
            Date: Tue, 25 Oct 2011 21:44:18 +0200
            To: <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
            Subject: Re: [hegel] Beiser (2), the non-metaphysical Hegel






            Am 24.10.2011 21:11, Bruce Merrill writes:

            > Beat,
            >
            > But Brinkman's Hegel qua anti-metaphysical does not put him (Hegel)
            > into the anti-metaphysical camp which Beiser rejects. Right?
            >
            > In others words, Pippin et al may also reject "the immanence of
            > experience and, in the Logic, of the immanence of thought," which they
            > may well classify as "metaphysical," from their transcendental
            > /categorical perspective. In which case we have a dispute over how to
            > assess Hegel which is bound up with a disagreement as how to define
            > "metaphysical." And now this is a 3 way dispute, with Brinkmann,
            > Beiser and Pippin in different camps, right?
            >
            > And you concur with Brinkmann, contra Beiser, it appears?
            >
            > Bruce
            >
            > Bruce
            >

            Bruce,

            You are right. There are as well different transcendental
            category/ontology as different metaphysical interpretations whereby some
            proponents of the transcendental category/ontology interpretation call
            different interpretations of this kind 'metaphysical'. So you are right,
            first we should have an agreement about what 'metaphysical' means.
            Brinkmann even perceives a difference between Pinkard's reading of the
            transcendental element in Hegel and Pippin's more Kantian interpretation
            (p. 245, footnote 44).

            In my opinion for getting a clear concept of Hegel's unique idea of the
            relationship between pure thought and experience (empirical) we have to
            examine first the difference to Kant's Transcendental Logic and then the
            difference to pre-Kantian 'metaphysics' (Plato, Aristotle, Thomas,
            Spinoza, Leibniz). Here, I only can give some points Brinkmann makes in
            his book ("Idealism Without Limits, Hegel and the Problem of Objectivity"):

            (1) In contrast to Kant Hegel's "theory is not about the a priori
            conditions of the possiblility of experience but about the a priori
            conditions of the meaning of experience" (p. 245). This means that Hegel
            does not look for "categories as necessary for there to be knowledge of
            possible sensible objects or appearances" (p. 245) as Kant does and
            therefore he has not to develop transcendental arguments what was Kant's
            task.

            (2) However, in Hegel's Logic the categories "function as
            quasi-transcendental conditions of cognition and comprehension and of
            thinking about things generally" (p. 245). If this is true then the
            problem is how to prove that this categories can achieve objectivity.
            For Kant this is possible only since he introduces into the
            transcendental arguments (pure intuition and categories) the empirical
            manifold (form-matter dualism) and thereby contaminates his
            transcendental argument with an empirical realism.

            (3) Hegel instead claims "that the categories are not merely subjective
            forms of thought, but that they reflect the nature of things" (p. 245).
            But this means that Hegel's Logic "is not only a theory of the forms of
            thought, but an ontology" (p. 245).

            (4) However, if this is true what is the difference to the pre-Kantian
            'metaphysics' with its thought entities?

            (5) The difference is that Hegel's Logic is NOT - as Beiser tries to
            show - a " 'naturalistic' metaphysics ..... to avoid Kantian
            strictures" making a "metaphysical entity, viz. the teleological
            nature-spirit unity or 'absolute', rather than a concept the condition
            for (self-) knowledge" (p. 247, footnote 51).

            (6) However, what then is Hegel's Logic in a positive sense?

            Regards,
            Beat

            [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]









            [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
          • greuterb
            ... Juergen, I think it is not so easy as you put it. Since Kant makes an absolute distinction between the sensibility and the normative moment of the
            Message 5 of 22 , Oct 27, 2011
              Am 25.10.2011 22:27, Juergen writes:

              > BG wrote/cited:
              > > (1) In contrast to Kant Hegel's "theory is not about the a priori
              > > conditions of the possiblility of experience but about the a priori
              > > conditions of the meaning of experience" (p. 245).
              >
              > ... possible to read as: Because Kant has made clear the conditions
              > of possibility of - critical - experience, Hegel can occupy himself with
              > the *meaning* of experience ...
              >
              > BG wrote:
              > > This means that Hegel
              > > does not look for "categories as necessary for there to be knowledge of
              > > possible sensible objects or appearances" (p. 245) as Kant does and
              > > therefore he has not to develop transcendental arguments what was
              > Kant's
              > > task.
              >
              > ... possible to read as: Hegel does not look for because Kant already had
              > looked for ... Kant looked for, and: has he got ... ?? ... "Kant's task",
              > and: which he, more or less, fulfilled ... ?? ... and therefore the
              > result of
              > this inquiry (can be) made strongly geltend/gültig (effective/valid) ... ?
              >
              > ... a certain transcendental minimal-science then ... which can be
              > rediscovered
              > anywhere and elsewhere ... for example within Hegel ...
              >



              Juergen,

              I think it is not so easy as you put it. Since Kant makes an absolute
              distinction between the sensibility and the normative moment of the
              categories he runs in some difficulties within his transcendental
              deduction. This already Kant has seen and therefore has made
              contradictory remarks about the relationship between the sensibility /
              intuition and the normative moment. This again Hegel could exploit for
              his own procedure which starts with the immediate unity of the sensible
              and the normative. For Hegel there is no sensibility which is not
              already infiltrated by reason. Since the starting point is an immediate
              unity there is at this limit not yet any determination. So, your
              following statement is quite true:


              > ... that's to say: Kant's critical business can be made valid within
              > the starting
              > point of the Hegel system as a system: Sensual certainty and the This
              > and the
              > Meinen ... sensual certainty beyond (my-)perception ... and therefore
              > sort of
              > condition of possibility of any my-perception at all ...
              >


              This beginning shows how Hegel takes the sensibility / intuition within
              the unity of apperception: For the sensible consciousness there is the
              whole particular world in its singularity and immediacy which it has now
              to take in. But for doing this it has first only the most abstract
              concepts (this, here etc.) and it is not able to mediate this absolute
              opposition and therefore has to get one-sided in the consciousness of
              perception (the same we have at the beginning of the Logic). We can
              contrast this with what the Analytical Philosophy did: 'This' etc. are
              only indicative expressions with the whole made world outside itself.
              With this of course nothing moves and all is already done. The late
              Wittgenstein has grasped this and made some corrections. So, we find
              Hegel's dialectic within the movement of the Analytical Philosophy.

              Regards,
              Beat Greuter



              > Kant's critical business can be made valid within Hegel's elementary form:
              > sensual certainty, and it's legitimate to do so ... and doing so,
              > having done so
              > has got consequences ... that's all.
              >
              > "das Meinen" does irreducibly ancor myself to earth ... sort of a
              > formal empirical
              > every-my-standpoint ...
              >
              > ... a standpoint, an dem ich immer schon stehe und immer schon
              > gestanden habe ...
              >
              > Juergen h.
              >



              [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
            • greuterb@bluewin.ch
              Am 24.10.2011 21:43, Stephen writes: Beat, I find myself agreeing with Brinkmann, or able to read it in a way that seems in agreement with me, until I come to
              Message 6 of 22 , Oct 28, 2011
                Am 24.10.2011 21:43, Stephen writes:

                "Beat,




                I find myself agreeing with Brinkmann, or able to read it
                in a way that seems in agreement with me, until I come to
                the phrase,"excludes... reference to supersensible
                entities". However, what this seems to mean is exclusion
                of a two-tiered reality, of sensible and super-sensible. I
                take Hegel as identifying the two or, rather, annulling
                this particular categorical division. The external or
                sensory (as simply meaning external)is internal, within,
                formally signifying the Concept.

                The absolute, too, is indeed "one moment" in the system
                (we are not philosophers all the time), but it is that
                moment which every other moment is identical with.

                Whether we say Hegel's philosophy is not metaphysical, in
                this odd sense of referring to a second layer of entities,
                or we say, for example, that it is a realised eschatology,
                i.e. the means are the end, is at bottom, therefore, the
                same. Again, whether we say this is the surmounting of
                metaphysics or the final and true metaphysics is the same.

                Yet this Brinkmann is clearly rhetorically tendentious in
                speaking of metaphysics of the "hubristic" kind. One
                should admit this.

                What Brinkmann is saying, to my perception, when
                translated back into the religious terms from which Hegel
                claims his philosophy necessarily springs, is that we "sit
                with Christ in the heavenly places" or that "what you do
                to another you do to me", do to the absolute subjectivity
                of the Concept.

                What this amounts to in terms of Art, the third form of
                Absolute Spirit (I have just mentioned Religion, second
                form), well, we could probably take any "opus" of the kind
                we call great, "sublime", and not merely skilful etc.

                By the way, it is only on one account that metaphysics
                stipulates supersensible beings, let alone causes. For
                Aristotle, Hegel's master more or less, it is the "science
                of being as being" (this ambiguity in meaning is discussed
                by Aquinas in his commentary on Met.).

                "The Absolute or God" is indeed the most immanent of all,
                as B. in effect says, and "being has no parts" but is one
                (Parmenides). Whether this makes it a "closed totality" is
                a matter of choice of metaphor. I would take Freedom as
                the opposite of "closed". For "not closed" need not mean
                the same as open to something "else"."










                Stephen,



                With this you contradict yourself. Where is this something "else"?
                Outside the One (Parmenides)? Freedom is not outside the One but
                within it. If you take it outside you cannot realize it in the
                process of thought evoking and reconciling its other (Concept) but you depend on
                something outside it that is unfreedom, be it God or the Absolute or
                some other dogmatic truth. For Hegel freedom is only within the
                movement of the Concept. Outside it there is not even 'nothing'. The
                negation is also in the One.



                You write further:






                "We do indeed "construct the world in thought alone", as
                I have just done here, agreeing with Hegel I believe in
                the matter as in the form.

                Well, I wonder if Brinkmann would recognise himself."





                According to Hegel this is precisely the procedure of old metaphysics and contrasts what he himself intends to do starting from Kant's transcendental logic and his undermining of earlier metaphysical thinking (the antinomy chapter in the CPR).




                Regards,

                Beat Greuter






                --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com,
                greuterb <greuterb@...>
                wrote:

                >

                > Am 24.10.2011 13:48, Bruce Merrill writes:

                >

                > > Insofar as Beiser is "paradoxically" transposing
                a term from the

                > > Vienna circle to apply to Pippin et al, then he
                is guilty of the kind

                > > of anachronism that he condemns. (He is using it
                as a term of abuse.)

                > > .

                > >

                > > To appropriate that part of Hegel that one
                considers to be plausible

                > > /useful /relevant and so discard metaphysics
                /mysticism

                > > /naturo-philosophy /Xtianity etc. does not
                qualify as positivism!

                > >

                > > As said, the proof of the pudding lies in the
                case that Beiser can

                > > make for the metaphysical /mystical
                /naturophilosophy etc. elements

                > > in Hegel. He has to justify this as "living"
                philosophy, not simply

                > > justify it as an essential part of Hegel's past
                project. Since it can

                > > be essential, yet not plausible. (As Pippin et
                al hold?)

                > >

                >

                >

                >

                > Bruce,

                >

                > According to Klaus Brinkmann's "Idealism without
                Limits, Hegel and the

                > Problem of Objectivity" (you recently gave the
                reference) taking Hegel's

                > philosophy as a metaphysics is a misunderstanding,
                and he explicitly

                > refers in a footnote to Beiser as a proponent of such
                an interpretation:

                >

                > "Frederick Beiser has been a proponent of the
                interpretation of Hegel as

                > a metaphysician against those who see in Hegel a
                philosopher of a

                > broadly transcendental orientation or one who
                advances an ontology or a

                > non-metaphysical theory of categories. A good
                overview of the arguments

                > pro and con can be found in Wartenberg (1993), Beiser
                (1993, 1995),

                > Pinkard (1990), and Pippin (1990). ......... ."

                >

                > In the following I cite the section the above
                footnote belongs to (p. 75):

                >

                > "Hegel's philosophy, in particular the Logic and the
                Encyclopedia, are

                > often said to be a metaphysics, occasionally even a
                metaphysics of the

                > hubristic kind. I would like to emphasize that Hegel
                is a philosopher of

                > the immanence of experience and, in the Logic, of the
                immanence of

                > thought. That means that metaphysics with its
                stipulation of

                > supersensible entities and causes that are located
                outside the immanence

                > of experience in a transcendent realm has no proper
                place in Hegel's

                > thought. No other philosopher (with the exception
                perhaps of Spinoza)

                > has repudiated and systematically dissolved the
                separation of the

                > mundane and the supersensible as thoroughly as Hegel,
                and in such a way

                > that both spheres are unified into one homogenous
                sphere of experience.

                > We should not be misled by Hegel's frequent reference
                to the Absolute or

                > God. These are technically speaking expressions for
                the immanence of

                > experience and thought, or the closed totality that,
                like Parmenidean

                > One, has nothing outside itself, not even
                nothingness. It is true that

                > in the Encyclopedia, Hegel goes so far as to
                charaterize his Logic as a

                > theory of the "definition of the Absolute, as the
                metaphysical

                > definition of God" (E § 85). But again, this needs to
                be understood

                > properly in its context. First, the fact that the
                Encyclopedia,

                > especially with its posthumous Additions to Hegel's
                published text,

                > belongs to what one might call Hegel's exoteric
                writings should be an

                > indicator that this language includes a dose of
                pedagogic popularization

                > and/or a deliberate attempt on Hegel's part to
                intervene in public

                > controversies about the nature of philosophy. And
                second, what is meant

                > by "metaphysical" should be seen in the light of
                Hegel's definition of

                > metaphysics in the Logic, viz. as the "scientific
                construction of the

                > world in thought alone" (SL 63/WdL I 46). This
                definition excludes any

                > connotation of metaphysical realism,
                representationalism, or reference

                > to supersensible entities. Moreover, the Science of
                Logic, which I would

                > call an esoteric work by comparison, avoids almost
                all reference to God,

                > and its technical definition of the Absolute makes
                this category an

                > abstract precursor of the Spinozistic substance, the
                identity of the

                > inner and outer aspects of essence. In other words,
                the Absolute is here

                > strictly speaking one moment of the totality of the
                "system of concepts"

                > [System der Begriffe] (SL 54/WdL I 36) or the "system
                of the

                > determinations of thought" [System der
                Denkbestimmungen] (SL 63/WdL I 46)."

                >

                > Regards,

                > Beat

                >

                >

                >

                > > Since the volume at hand stops with Hegel,
                perhaps this lies ahead of

                > > him? There is also FB's book, _Hegel_ and
                perhaps he fulfills his

                > > claims therein?

                > >

                > > But he case for Schelling is very valuable.
                Whether it needs to be

                > > made at Hegel's expense is another question.

                > >

                > > One missing person in Beiser's pantheon is
                Schiller. And yet Hegel

                > > says, at one point, that Schiller is the single
                most important figure

                > > in regard to countering Kant. And Beiser has
                written a book on

                > > _Schiller as a Philosopher_. So Schiller's
                absence puzzles me.

                > >

                > > Earlier I quoted a chunk here from a Beiser
                review which was also very

                > > combative, on 19C history. He likes a fight.

                > >

                > > Bruce














                [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
              • stephen theron
                Beat, Thank you! There seems to be a language problem here. You ask, where is this something else? But that is what I have just there explicitly ruled out. I
                Message 7 of 22 , Oct 28, 2011
                  Beat, Thank you! There seems to be a language problem here. You ask, where is this something else? But that is what I have just there explicitly ruled out. I want to reject Brinkmann's metaphor of "closed" (totality), since the Absolute is Freedom which is surely denotes openness rather, and so I state that openness need NOT mean openness to something "else" and I put the "else" in scare-quotes to indicate that I do not think there can be an "else", or anything outside of the Absolute. Yet you say I contradict myself in positing this "else". Is it that that is what you expected me to say? "Closed" very definitely suggests finitude, perhaps in B's view of necessity or in retaining an image of a certain compositeness at variance with the Concept as explained by Hegel, identical with each of the "parts" which are hence not parts. But please focus on your mistake there. I don't like to be misrepresented and hope it is not gratuitous. I would say freedom is not so much within the one but, better, that freedom is the one. It is even one with necessity. But why do you go on to say I "depend on... the Absolute" as something "outside the Concept"? It is surely not outside it, whatever you might mean there. ..."the definition that now results for us is that the Absolute is the Notion" (EL160 Zus.), i.e. the Concept (Begriff), if I can trust this translation. It is actually the Concept which sets up "the other... which is in reality not an other" in the text I have here (EL161 Zus.), never mind B's prejudices, whereas you say here, "the process of thought evokes its other (the concept)", its other, the Concept. How can this be when the text says the "movement of the Concept" (as pure play) sets up the other, finding this "expressed in Christianity". So we have the Concept which is the other (your account) sets up the other. Can this be? If not, what is this other? Or need we not identify it? What do you think about this? Are their other texts that support your different version? Is there anything in this difference? Yes the negation is also in the one. And what is this about some other dogmatic truth? You are not only arguing ad hominem, but you have got your homo quite wrong, or you find it easier to misrepresent him. You end by saying something is precise without being precise about what it is. A lot of people do this kind of thing but I hope, principally, I have shown you you misrepresent me completely with your first words here. Stephen.
                  To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
                  From: greuterb@...
                  Date: Fri, 28 Oct 2011 18:21:03 +0000
                  Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Beiser (2), the non-metaphysical Hegel
































                  Am 24.10.2011 21:43, Stephen writes:



                  "Beat,



                  I find myself agreeing with Brinkmann, or able to read it

                  in a way that seems in agreement with me, until I come to

                  the phrase,"excludes... reference to supersensible

                  entities". However, what this seems to mean is exclusion

                  of a two-tiered reality, of sensible and super-sensible. I

                  take Hegel as identifying the two or, rather, annulling

                  this particular categorical division. The external or

                  sensory (as simply meaning external)is internal, within,

                  formally signifying the Concept.



                  The absolute, too, is indeed "one moment" in the system

                  (we are not philosophers all the time), but it is that

                  moment which every other moment is identical with.



                  Whether we say Hegel's philosophy is not metaphysical, in

                  this odd sense of referring to a second layer of entities,

                  or we say, for example, that it is a realised eschatology,

                  i.e. the means are the end, is at bottom, therefore, the

                  same. Again, whether we say this is the surmounting of

                  metaphysics or the final and true metaphysics is the same.



                  Yet this Brinkmann is clearly rhetorically tendentious in

                  speaking of metaphysics of the "hubristic" kind. One

                  should admit this.



                  What Brinkmann is saying, to my perception, when

                  translated back into the religious terms from which Hegel

                  claims his philosophy necessarily springs, is that we "sit

                  with Christ in the heavenly places" or that "what you do

                  to another you do to me", do to the absolute subjectivity

                  of the Concept.



                  What this amounts to in terms of Art, the third form of

                  Absolute Spirit (I have just mentioned Religion, second

                  form), well, we could probably take any "opus" of the kind

                  we call great, "sublime", and not merely skilful etc.



                  By the way, it is only on one account that metaphysics

                  stipulates supersensible beings, let alone causes. For

                  Aristotle, Hegel's master more or less, it is the "science

                  of being as being" (this ambiguity in meaning is discussed

                  by Aquinas in his commentary on Met.).



                  "The Absolute or God" is indeed the most immanent of all,

                  as B. in effect says, and "being has no parts" but is one

                  (Parmenides). Whether this makes it a "closed totality" is

                  a matter of choice of metaphor. I would take Freedom as

                  the opposite of "closed". For "not closed" need not mean

                  the same as open to something "else"."



                  Stephen,



                  With this you contradict yourself. Where is this something "else"?

                  Outside the One (Parmenides)? Freedom is not outside the One but

                  within it. If you take it outside you cannot realize it in the

                  process of thought evoking and reconciling its other (Concept) but you depend on

                  something outside it that is unfreedom, be it God or the Absolute or

                  some other dogmatic truth. For Hegel freedom is only within the

                  movement of the Concept. Outside it there is not even 'nothing'. The

                  negation is also in the One.



                  You write further:



                  "We do indeed "construct the world in thought alone", as

                  I have just done here, agreeing with Hegel I believe in

                  the matter as in the form.



                  Well, I wonder if Brinkmann would recognise himself."



                  According to Hegel this is precisely the procedure of old metaphysics and contrasts what he himself intends to do starting from Kant's transcendental logic and his undermining of earlier metaphysical thinking (the antinomy chapter in the CPR).



                  Regards,



                  Beat Greuter



                  --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com,

                  greuterb <greuterb@...>

                  wrote:



                  >



                  > Am 24.10.2011 13:48, Bruce Merrill writes:



                  >



                  > > Insofar as Beiser is "paradoxically" transposing

                  a term from the



                  > > Vienna circle to apply to Pippin et al, then he

                  is guilty of the kind



                  > > of anachronism that he condemns. (He is using it

                  as a term of abuse.)



                  > > .



                  > >



                  > > To appropriate that part of Hegel that one

                  considers to be plausible



                  > > /useful /relevant and so discard metaphysics

                  /mysticism



                  > > /naturo-philosophy /Xtianity etc. does not

                  qualify as positivism!



                  > >



                  > > As said, the proof of the pudding lies in the

                  case that Beiser can



                  > > make for the metaphysical /mystical

                  /naturophilosophy etc. elements



                  > > in Hegel. He has to justify this as "living"

                  philosophy, not simply



                  > > justify it as an essential part of Hegel's past

                  project. Since it can



                  > > be essential, yet not plausible. (As Pippin et

                  al hold?)



                  > >



                  >



                  >



                  >



                  > Bruce,



                  >



                  > According to Klaus Brinkmann's "Idealism without

                  Limits, Hegel and the



                  > Problem of Objectivity" (you recently gave the

                  reference) taking Hegel's



                  > philosophy as a metaphysics is a misunderstanding,

                  and he explicitly



                  > refers in a footnote to Beiser as a proponent of such

                  an interpretation:



                  >



                  > "Frederick Beiser has been a proponent of the

                  interpretation of Hegel as



                  > a metaphysician against those who see in Hegel a

                  philosopher of a



                  > broadly transcendental orientation or one who

                  advances an ontology or a



                  > non-metaphysical theory of categories. A good

                  overview of the arguments



                  > pro and con can be found in Wartenberg (1993), Beiser

                  (1993, 1995),



                  > Pinkard (1990), and Pippin (1990). ......... ."



                  >



                  > In the following I cite the section the above

                  footnote belongs to (p. 75):



                  >



                  > "Hegel's philosophy, in particular the Logic and the

                  Encyclopedia, are



                  > often said to be a metaphysics, occasionally even a

                  metaphysics of the



                  > hubristic kind. I would like to emphasize that Hegel

                  is a philosopher of



                  > the immanence of experience and, in the Logic, of the

                  immanence of



                  > thought. That means that metaphysics with its

                  stipulation of



                  > supersensible entities and causes that are located

                  outside the immanence



                  > of experience in a transcendent realm has no proper

                  place in Hegel's



                  > thought. No other philosopher (with the exception

                  perhaps of Spinoza)



                  > has repudiated and systematically dissolved the

                  separation of the



                  > mundane and the supersensible as thoroughly as Hegel,

                  and in such a way



                  > that both spheres are unified into one homogenous

                  sphere of experience.



                  > We should not be misled by Hegel's frequent reference

                  to the Absolute or



                  > God. These are technically speaking expressions for

                  the immanence of



                  > experience and thought, or the closed totality that,

                  like Parmenidean



                  > One, has nothing outside itself, not even

                  nothingness. It is true that



                  > in the Encyclopedia, Hegel goes so far as to

                  charaterize his Logic as a



                  > theory of the "definition of the Absolute, as the

                  metaphysical



                  > definition of God" (E � 85). But again, this needs to

                  be understood



                  > properly in its context. First, the fact that the

                  Encyclopedia,



                  > especially with its posthumous Additions to Hegel's

                  published text,



                  > belongs to what one might call Hegel's exoteric

                  writings should be an



                  > indicator that this language includes a dose of

                  pedagogic popularization



                  > and/or a deliberate attempt on Hegel's part to

                  intervene in public



                  > controversies about the nature of philosophy. And

                  second, what is meant



                  > by "metaphysical" should be seen in the light of

                  Hegel's definition of



                  > metaphysics in the Logic, viz. as the "scientific

                  construction of the



                  > world in thought alone" (SL 63/WdL I 46). This

                  definition excludes any



                  > connotation of metaphysical realism,

                  representationalism, or reference



                  > to supersensible entities. Moreover, the Science of

                  Logic, which I would



                  > call an esoteric work by comparison, avoids almost

                  all reference to God,



                  > and its technical definition of the Absolute makes

                  this category an



                  > abstract precursor of the Spinozistic substance, the

                  identity of the



                  > inner and outer aspects of essence. In other words,

                  the Absolute is here



                  > strictly speaking one moment of the totality of the

                  "system of concepts"



                  > [System der Begriffe] (SL 54/WdL I 36) or the "system

                  of the



                  > determinations of thought" [System der

                  Denkbestimmungen] (SL 63/WdL I 46)."



                  >



                  > Regards,



                  > Beat



                  >



                  >



                  >



                  > > Since the volume at hand stops with Hegel,

                  perhaps this lies ahead of



                  > > him? There is also FB's book, _Hegel_ and

                  perhaps he fulfills his



                  > > claims therein?



                  > >



                  > > But he case for Schelling is very valuable.

                  Whether it needs to be



                  > > made at Hegel's expense is another question.



                  > >



                  > > One missing person in Beiser's pantheon is

                  Schiller. And yet Hegel



                  > > says, at one point, that Schiller is the single

                  most important figure



                  > > in regard to countering Kant. And Beiser has

                  written a book on



                  > > _Schiller as a Philosopher_. So Schiller's

                  absence puzzles me.



                  > >



                  > > Earlier I quoted a chunk here from a Beiser

                  review which was also very



                  > > combative, on 19C history. He likes a fight.



                  > >



                  > > Bruce



                  [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]


















                  [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                • eupraxis@aol.com
                  Stephen, Your definition of mysticism here ( that things are not as they immediately appear ) is at best facile, if you pardon the criticism. Those of us who
                  Message 8 of 22 , Oct 30, 2011
                    Stephen,

                    Your definition of mysticism here ("that things are not as they immediately appear") is at best facile, if you pardon the criticism. Those of us who have been in this theological debate over these many months and years know what you really mean by the term: religion, or a feeling of unity with (a) God. Some read Hegel's true infinite as a notion that culminates in that unity; I and some others contend that it, in Hegel's texts, leads through it to its sublation into an open 'system'. I cannot reconcile Hegel with the 'Parmenidean' monism that results, or seems to, in your reading, although you can read Hegel any way you like within your privileged and presupposed religious orientation, if such allows you to broaden that view of matters for your own purposes. It is a perfectly fair theological position, if one is given to theology.

                    But qua Hegel, I think, as you know, that it misses the whole point, and even the point of his philosophy of religion. More to the point, if I may, the Absolute doesn't 'contain' anything; it is not a grand sum of knowledge or a set of all sets. It is the very inside out of all sets. It is not the mind of God in his eternal substance. It isn't 'the' Real. It is what un-closes -- dis-closes -- the Real as that about which nothing can be said except by again participating in the dialectical process of thinking in a higher or wiser manner. I feel that you hypostasize the Absolute -- just as any idea of God is, as far as I am concerned, an hypostatization.

                    I am given to the suggestion of Zizek that, taking a large view of Hegel, Reality isn't singular or monist, and certainly not 'Platonic' and two-world, but rather fundamentally incomplete.

                    As for Beiser, I am just into the book.

                    Best,
                    Wil









                    -----Original Message-----
                    From: Stephen <stephentheron@...>
                    To: hegel <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
                    Sent: Sun, Oct 30, 2011 12:00 pm
                    Subject: AW: RE: [hegel] Re: Beiser (2), the non-metaphysical Hegel





                    Dear Beat (and anyone interested in the substantive issues here),

                    I think this is a good answer in the circumstances.

                    We each think the other "misses" Hegel, I don't know about "fully".

                    I have searched your letters but can find no question (you say I did not answer it) except your "Where is this 'else'"? If you mean that one you must be asserting I "turn" something my way there. Do you not believe me when I say I think there is no "else", as I said there, that all is "in" the Absolute? I merely add that that does not make it, as infinite, something fittingly called "closed". I know we speak of a closed circle and this might suggest a counter-argument. But, again, is returning on self being "closed", as if excluding something?

                    I have been thinking about this today. To me it is amazing that some people today think there is nothing "mystical" about Hegel's thinking. To me this word here means simply that things are not as they immediately appear, the cardinal point of the Doctrine of Essence (as it took me some time to realise: you no doubt will jump to deny this in your usual either/or way). This depends either upon those people's presuppositions or is an academic misrepresentation in the interest of generating acceptable secondary literature, they think.

                    Not even Marx took that view. For him Hegel was mistaken precisely in his philosophical "idealism" and he offered an alternative more congenial to him.

                    It is possible to take Hegel's general philosophy of Spirit seriously without postulating a two-tier world, one substituting the other, which is the principal cause of distaste. Hegel's position, rather, just as it is with intelligent religious persons or, especially, with poets (art), is that there is just one reality and it is not what we see immediately. That appearance is, rather, annulled. You will know the texts. Of course the position can be discussed at length, "the being of the phenomenon and the phenomenon of being" as Sartre put it (that does not mean I put it so). In any case, there is, for Hegel, as for McTaggart, just one reality, outside or inside indifferently. I know I do not miss Hegel fully and I suppose you do too.

                    Perhaps it is assumed that if we are talking about concepts then we are not talking about the Absolute as real. I would counter, we are rather saying that reality is subject, subjectivity. Religious people are familiar with this, that God, say, can be a thought, an active concept as Hegel says. Substance-philosophy is indeed left behind, though theology has used a substance-vocabulary to say just this.

                    Beat, you need not reply if you prefer, though I think I showed that I like discussion. And, you know, you did not answer my question either. Shall I conclude that you have fully missed Hegel? One is not insulting if the cap fits. However, I would of course wish to avoid personal attacks. I think though it is quite "personal" if you, especially as having a quasi-official role, have begun it by plainly misrepresenting me (perhaps originally through a misreading?)and ignored my protest then. There was no opening for "interpretation".I had to resort to a couple of home-truths or else acquiesce in this. It is humiliating to get involved in this kind of thing. I hope we can avoid it in future.

                    Stephen.

                    Stephen.

                    --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "greuterb@..." <greuterb@...> wrote:
                    >
                    > Stephen,
                    >
                    > I think you did not answer my question. Therefore, I have to assume that you miss Hegel fully. So, I think
                    > that there is no base for further discussion also because you feel always misinterpreted when you have turned a contra
                    > argument into your old misguided standpoint which then is challenged. Ich habe die Nase auch voll, especially since I
                    > did not insult you personally as you did with me.
                    >
                    > Regards,
                    > Beat Greuter
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > ----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----
                    > Von:
                    > stephentheron@...
                    > Datum: 30.10.2011 12:50
                    > An: "hegel hegel"<hegel@yahoogroups.com>
                    > Betreff: RE: AW: RE: [hegel]
                    > Re: Beiser (2), the non-metaphysical Hegel
                    >
                    >
                    > Dear Beat, Did you forget or do you not think you should apologise to me
                    > for the misrepresentation of me you, as moderator, have offered the group? Philosophers normally and naturally exercise
                    > a basic courtesy to one another. Perhaps that is not recognised in whatever field you distinguished yourself in? Of
                    > course I give you credit for being ready to communicate in a language other than your mother-tongue. Aber ich habe die
                    > Nase voll, vollgestrichen. The relation of Hegel to Kant is/was complex and debatable. You seem to pass over an obvious
                    > if restrained contempt or unqualified negative evaluation he shows at certain places for "the critical philosophy",
                    > though he balances it with praise at others. So one should not be too afraid of openings being left for tendentiously
                    > suggesting he regressed behind Kant, as in a kind of restorationaist spirit. This is not born out by the overall upshot
                    > of his thought. As for my not answering your comments, you yourself totally ignore my pointing out an apparent
                    > inconsistency arising from an expression of yours, in reporting Hegel, though I said I would like to know what your
                    > view was there. But perhaps my text was too complicated for you, something I would not be proud of. I can see, let me
                    > say, that you are long and deeply read in Hegel, but I do rather wonder sometimes if you do not read him like the Devil
                    > reads the Bible, as we say. On the other hand I also suspect you might find more agreement of mine with your thought if
                    > you came upon it elsewhere. Now let's have that apology, recantation or whatever! It doesn't cost much. Stephen.
                    > To:
                    > hegel@yahoogroups.com
                    > From: greuterb@...
                    > Date: Sun, 30 Oct 2011 10:58:36 +0000
                    > Subject: AW: RE: [hegel] Re:
                    > Beiser (2), the non-metaphysical Hegel
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > ----Ursprüngliche
                    > Nachricht----
                    >
                    > Von: stephentheron@...
                    >
                    > Datum: 28.10.2011 21:59
                    >
                    > An: "hegel hegel"
                    >
                    > <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
                    >
                    >
                    > Betreff: RE: [hegel] Re: Beiser (2), the non-metaphysical Hegel
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > Beat, Thank you! There seems
                    >
                    > to be a language
                    > problem here. You ask, where is this something else? But that is what I have just there explicitly
                    >
                    > ruled out. I want
                    > to reject Brinkmann's metaphor of "closed" (totality), since the Absolute is Freedom which is surely
                    >
                    > denotes openness
                    > rather, and so I state that openness need NOT mean openness to something "else" and I put the "else"
                    >
                    > in scare-quotes
                    > to indicate that I do not think there can be an "else", or anything outside of the Absolute. Yet you
                    >
                    > say I contradict
                    > myself in positing this "else". Is it that that is what you expected me to say? "Closed" very
                    >
                    > definitely suggests
                    > finitude, perhaps in B's view of necessity or in retaining an image of a certain compositeness at
                    >
                    > variance with the
                    > Concept as explained by Hegel, identical with each of the "parts" which are hence not parts. But
                    >
                    > please focus on your
                    > mistake there. I don't like to be misrepresented and hope it is not gratuitous. I would say
                    >
                    > freedom is not so much
                    > within the one but, better, that freedom is the one. It is even one with necessity. But why do
                    >
                    > you go on to say I
                    > "depend on... the Absolute" as something "outside the Concept"? It is surely not outside it,
                    >
                    > whatever you might mean
                    > there. ..."the definition that now results for us is that the Absolute is the Notion" (EL160
                    >
                    > Zus.), i.e. the Concept
                    > (Begriff), if I can trust this translation. It is actually the Concept which sets up "the
                    >
                    > other... which is in
                    > reality not an other" in the text I have here (EL161 Zus.), never mind B's prejudices, whereas you
                    >
                    > say here, "the
                    > process of thought evokes its other (the concept)", its other, the Concept. How can this be when the
                    >
                    > text says the
                    > "movement of the Concept" (as pure play) sets up the other, finding this "expressed in Christianity". So
                    >
                    > we have the
                    > Concept which is the other (your account) sets up the other. Can this be? If not, what is this other? Or
                    >
                    > need we not
                    > identify it? What do you think about this? Are their other texts that support your different version? Is
                    >
                    > there
                    > anything in this difference? Yes the negation is also in the one. And what is this about some other dogmatic
                    >
                    > truth?
                    > You are not only arguing ad hominem, but you have got your homo quite wrong, or you find it easier to
                    >
                    > misrepresent
                    > him. You end by saying something is precise without being precise about what it is. A lot of people do
                    >
                    > this kind of
                    > thing but I hope, principally, I have shown you you misrepresent me completely with your first words here.
                    >
                    > Stephen.
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > Stephen,
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > It would have been better if you would have answered the second part of my comment (copy see
                    >
                    > below)
                    > instead of making a philosophy about 'precise'. "Constructing the world in thought alone" is not Hegel's job.
                    >
                    > Hegel's
                    > job is a critical unfolding of the categories with which we give our experience meaning or explanation. This
                    >
                    > happens
                    > within experience and not from outside. Klaus Brinkmann also writes (p 247, Idealism Without Limits, Hegel an
                    >
                    > the
                    > Problem of Objectivity):
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > "......... Hegel's Logic is not about [substantial] entities whose existence is to be
                    >
                    >
                    > proved [in thought alone as in the old metaphysics], but about conceptual content or explanatory conceptions whose
                    >
                    >
                    > instantiation is granted."
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > Otherwise, Hegel would have fallen back behind Kant as many of his opponents claim.
                    > Hegel's
                    >
                    > absolute does not mean absolute truth but only the path of our conceptual experience which does not know an
                    > eternal
                    >
                    > substantial truth of thouhgt outside it. But this does also mean that the categories are not merely formal
                    > and
                    >
                    > subjective with a content outside it as with Kant. So, Hegel has a much wider concept of experience which
                    > includes all
                    >
                    > world relationships of man and their development and not only the immediate empirical ones which are
                    > bound to
                    >
                    > previously fixed categories.
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > Regards,
                    >
                    > Beat Greuter
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > You [Stephen] write further:
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > "We do indeed
                    > "construct the world
                    >
                    > in thought alone", as
                    >
                    > I have just done here, agreeing with Hegel I believe in
                    >
                    > the matter as in
                    > the form.
                    >
                    > Well, I wonder
                    >
                    > if Brinkmann would recognise himself."
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > According to Hegel this is precisely the
                    > procedure of old metaphysics and
                    >
                    > contrasts what he himself intends to do starting from Kant's transcendental logic
                    > and his undermining of earlier
                    >
                    > metaphysical thinking (the antinomy chapter in the CPR).
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
                    >
                    >
                    > From: greuterb@...
                    >
                    > Date:
                    >
                    > Fri, 28 Oct 2011 18:21:03 +0000
                    >
                    > Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Beiser (2), the non-
                    > metaphysical Hegel
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > Am 24.10.2011 21:43, Stephen writes:
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > "Beat,
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > I find myself agreeing with
                    >
                    > Brinkmann, or
                    > able to read it
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > in a way that seems in agreement with me, until I come to
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > the phrase,"excludes...
                    >
                    > reference to
                    > supersensible
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > entities". However, what this seems to mean is exclusion
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > of a two-tiered reality, of
                    >
                    > sensible and
                    > super-sensible. I
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > take Hegel as identifying the two or, rather, annulling
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > this particular categorical
                    >
                    > division.
                    > The external or
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > sensory (as simply meaning external)is internal, within,
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > formally signifying the Concept.
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > The
                    > absolute, too, is indeed "one moment" in the system
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > (we are not philosophers all the time), but it is that
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > moment
                    > which every other moment is identical with.
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > Whether we say Hegel's philosophy is not metaphysical, in
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > this
                    >
                    > odd
                    > sense of referring to a second layer of entities,
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > or we say, for example, that it is a realised eschatology,
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > i.
                    > e.
                    >
                    > the means are the end, is at bottom, therefore, the
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > same. Again, whether we say this is the surmounting of
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > metaphysics or the final and true metaphysics is the same.
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > Yet this Brinkmann is clearly rhetorically tendentious in
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > speaking of metaphysics of the "hubristic" kind. One
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > should admit this.
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > What Brinkmann is saying, to my
                    >
                    >
                    > perception, when
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > translated back into the religious terms from which Hegel
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > claims his philosophy necessarily
                    > springs,
                    >
                    > is that we "sit
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > with Christ in the heavenly places" or that "what you do
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > to another you do to me", do
                    > to the absolute
                    >
                    > subjectivity
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > of the Concept.
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > What this amounts to in terms of Art, the third form of
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > Absolute Spirit (I have just
                    >
                    > mentioned Religion, second
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > form), well, we could probably take any "opus" of the kind
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > we call great, "sublime", and
                    >
                    > not merely skilful etc.
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > By the way, it is only on one account that metaphysics
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > stipulates supersensible beings, let
                    >
                    > alone causes. For
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > Aristotle, Hegel's master more or less, it is the "science
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > of being as being" (this ambiguity in
                    >
                    > meaning is discussed
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > by Aquinas in his commentary on Met.).
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > "The
                    > Absolute or God" is indeed the most immanent of
                    >
                    > all,
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > as B. in effect says, and "being has no parts" but is one
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > (Parmenides). Whether this makes it a "closed
                    >
                    > totality" is
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > a matter of choice of metaphor. I would take Freedom as
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > the opposite of "closed". For "not closed" need
                    >
                    > not mean
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > the same as open to something "else"."
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > Stephen,
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > With this you contradict yourself. Where is this
                    >
                    > something "else"?
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > Outside the One (Parmenides)? Freedom is not
                    > outside the One but
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > within it. If you take it outside
                    >
                    > you cannot realize it in the
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > process of thought evoking
                    > and reconciling its other (Concept) but you depend on
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > something outside it that is unfreedom, be it God or the
                    > Absolute or
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > some other dogmatic truth. For Hegel freedom is
                    >
                    > only within the
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > movement of the Concept. Outside it
                    > there is not even 'nothing'. The
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > negation is also in the One.
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > You write further:
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > "We do indeed "construct the
                    > world in thought alone", as
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > I have just done here, agreeing with
                    >
                    > Hegel I believe in
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > the matter as in the form.
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > Well, I wonder if Brinkmann would recognise himself."
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > According
                    >
                    > to Hegel this is precisely the procedure of old
                    > metaphysics and contrasts what he himself intends to do starting from
                    >
                    > Kant's transcendental logic and his undermining
                    > of earlier metaphysical thinking (the antinomy chapter in the CPR).
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > Regards,
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > Beat Greuter
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > --- In
                    > hegel@yahoogroups.com,
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > greuterb <greuterb@>
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > wrote:
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > Am 24.10.2011 13:
                    >
                    > 48, Bruce Merrill writes:
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > > Insofar as Beiser is "paradoxically" transposing
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > a term from the
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > > Vienna
                    >
                    > circle to apply to Pippin
                    > et al, then he
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > is guilty of the kind
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > > of anachronism that he condemns. (He is using it
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > as a term of abuse.)
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > > .
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > > To appropriate that part of Hegel that one
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > considers to be plausible
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > >
                    >
                    > > /useful
                    > /relevant and so discard metaphysics
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > /mysticism
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > > /naturo-philosophy /Xtianity etc. does not
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > qualify
                    >
                    > as
                    > positivism!
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > > As said, the proof of the pudding lies in the
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > case that Beiser can
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > > make for the
                    >
                    >
                    > metaphysical /mystical
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > /naturophilosophy etc. elements
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > > in Hegel. He has to justify this as "living"
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > philosophy, not simply
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > > justify it as an essential part of Hegel's past
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > project. Since it can
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > > be
                    >
                    >
                    > essential, yet not plausible. (As Pippin et
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > al hold?)
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > Bruce,
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > According to
                    >
                    >
                    > Klaus Brinkmann's "Idealism without
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > Limits, Hegel and the
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > Problem of Objectivity" (you recently gave the
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > reference) taking Hegel's
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > philosophy as a metaphysics is a misunderstanding,
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > and he explicitly
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > refers in
                    > a
                    >
                    > footnote to Beiser as a proponent of such
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > an interpretation:
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > "Frederick Beiser has been a proponent
                    > of the
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > interpretation of Hegel as
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > a metaphysician against those who see in Hegel a
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > philosopher of a
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > >
                    > broadly
                    >
                    > transcendental orientation or one who
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > advances an ontology or a
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > non-metaphysical theory of
                    > categories. A good
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > overview of the arguments
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > pro and con can be found in Wartenberg (1993), Beiser
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > (1993,
                    > 1995),
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > Pinkard
                    >
                    > (1990), and Pippin (1990). ......... ."
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > In the following I cite the section the above
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > footnote belongs to
                    >
                    > (p. 75):
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > "Hegel's philosophy, in particular the Logic and the
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > Encyclopedia, are
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > often said to be a
                    >
                    > metaphysics, occasionally even a
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > metaphysics of the
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > hubristic kind. I would like to
                    > emphasize that Hegel
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > is a
                    >
                    > philosopher of
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > the immanence of experience and, in the Logic, of the
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > immanence
                    > of
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > thought. That means that
                    >
                    > metaphysics with its
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > stipulation of
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > supersensible entities and causes that
                    > are located
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > outside the immanence
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > of experience in a transcendent realm has no proper
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > place in Hegel's
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > thought. No other philosopher (with the
                    >
                    > exception
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > perhaps of Spinoza)
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > has repudiated and systematically
                    > dissolved the
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > separation of the
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > mundane
                    >
                    > and the supersensible as thoroughly as Hegel,
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > and in such a way
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > that both spheres are unified into one
                    >
                    > homogenous
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > sphere of experience.
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > We should not be misled by
                    > Hegel's frequent reference
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > to the Absolute or
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > >
                    >
                    > God. These are technically speaking expressions for
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > the
                    > immanence of
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > experience and thought, or the closed
                    >
                    > totality that,
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > like Parmenidean
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > One, has nothing
                    > outside itself, not even
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > nothingness. It is true that
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > in
                    >
                    > the Encyclopedia, Hegel goes so far as to
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > charaterize his Logic as a
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > theory of the "definition of the Absolute,
                    >
                    > as the
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > metaphysical
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > definition
                    > of God" (E § 85). But again, this needs to
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > be understood
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > properly in its
                    >
                    > context. First, the fact that the
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > Encyclopedia,
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > especially with its posthumous Additions to Hegel's
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > published
                    >
                    > text,
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > belongs to what one
                    > might call Hegel's exoteric
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > writings should be an
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > indicator that this language
                    >
                    > includes a dose of
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > pedagogic popularization
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > and/or a deliberate attempt on Hegel's part to
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > intervene in public
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > >
                    > controversies about the nature of philosophy. And
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > second, what is meant
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > by "metaphysical" should be seen in
                    >
                    >
                    > the light of
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > Hegel's definition of
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > metaphysics in the Logic, viz. as the "scientific
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > construction of the
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > >
                    >
                    > world in thought alone" (SL 63/WdL I 46). This
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > definition excludes any
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > connotation of metaphysical
                    > realism,
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > representationalism, or reference
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > to supersensible entities. Moreover, the Science of
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > Logic, which
                    > I would
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > >
                    >
                    > call an esoteric work by comparison, avoids almost
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > all reference to God,
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > and its technical
                    > definition of the
                    >
                    > Absolute makes
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > this category an
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > abstract precursor of the Spinozistic substance, the
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > identity of the
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > >
                    >
                    > inner and outer aspects of essence. In other words,
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > the Absolute is here
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > strictly
                    > speaking one moment of the
                    >
                    > totality of the
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > "system of concepts"
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > [System der Begriffe] (SL 54/WdL I 36) or
                    > the "system
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > of the
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > >
                    >
                    > determinations of thought" [System der
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > Denkbestimmungen] (SL 63/WdL I 46)."
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > >
                    > Regards,
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > Beat
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > > Since the volume at hand stops with Hegel,
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > perhaps this lies ahead of
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > > him? There is also FB's book,
                    >
                    > _Hegel_ and
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > perhaps he fulfills his
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > > claims therein?
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > > But he
                    > case for Schelling is very valuable.
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > Whether it needs to be
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > > made at Hegel's expense is another question.
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > >
                    > >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > > One missing person in Beiser's
                    >
                    > pantheon is
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > Schiller. And yet Hegel
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > > says, at one point, that
                    > Schiller is the single
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > most important figure
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > >
                    >
                    > > in regard to countering Kant. And Beiser has
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > written a book
                    > on
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > > _Schiller as a Philosopher_. So Schiller's
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > absence puzzles me.
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > > Earlier I quoted a chunk here
                    > from a Beiser
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > review which was also very
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > >
                    >
                    > combative, on 19C history. He likes a fight.
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > > > Bruce
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > [Non-text portions of this message have been
                    >
                    > removed]
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > [Non-text portions of this message have been
                    > removed]
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > ------------------------------------
                    >
                    >
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                    [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                  • stephen theron
                    Dear Wil, You are right of course, though I think that on your general theses we could meet one another halfway, or more. I wasn t though claiming to define
                    Message 9 of 22 , Oct 30, 2011
                      Dear Wil, You are right of course, though I think that on your general theses we could meet one another halfway, or more. I wasn't though claiming to define mysticism just here. I really wanted to claim that saying things are not as they immediately appear does not entail a "two-world view" which, like you, i reject both in itself and as un-Hegelian. Rather, I think we go over to the mediated world in an act "annulling" the point d'appui or jumping-off point. The first world is thereafter not even a bad memory. After that we can then work out what status exactly we are to assign to phenomena. Maybe a good place for that is the chapter on "The Critical Philosophy" in EL, as some people here seem to think Hegel regarded Kant's philosophy as sacrosanct. That chapter shows obvious disdain for a good deal of it, though he is more positive about Kant's ethical (not much more though) and aesthetic views. I agree the system is open. But then I suppose I think God is open too. Still, believe me or not, I agree with Hegel that "it would e.g. be expedient to avoid the name 'God', because this word is not in its primary use a conception as well" and for the second reason he adds there (Phen. Mind, Baillie p. 124). And sure enough, "God" is not one of his categories in the Logic. Yet he does say, and that repeatedly, things like "the Absolute... purports to express God" (EL85), while of Absolute Mind he says "Religion, as this supreme sphere may be in general designated" (Enc. 554, his italics), in general, because "for all men" (he is just coming out of Objective Spirit, which you and I discussed together once. I'm still hoping to write that up). He says that art "has its future in true religion" and that philosophy "is the unity of Art and Religion", all three having identical content. I could express my philosophy perfectly without using the name "God". Why don't I? Because I naturally relate it to our cultural experience (noting the root there of "cult"). I agree that "in" is a containment metaphor, as in religion too. We rather have to do with identity: Hegel thus brings out the meaning of spiritual indwelling, for example, or of unity among men. Each of us is the Notion/Concept, completely. That means we are not (really) substances but subjects and not really subjects but Subjectivity and not really contingent but necessary. Well, that's my more developed view, confirmed in McTaggart. I think it's good Hegel interpretation, just incidentally. I tell you what I think, since you tell me what you think. You don't prove it, and maybe nor do I, for the moment. But of course there may always be a point, and "the whole point", that I'm missing. Still, even error can be fruitful. I am meaning, with Hegel, that God has no substance. So I can't be hypostasising the Absolute. As for ourselves, we are images, aspects, ideas, of the Absolute in both passive (our usual Vorstellung) and active sense. This has to be worked out more carefully as a piece of language, of course. So Reality is both One and Many, infinitely so, a perfect unity then (the meaning of Reason as essentially universal), and perfect means finished but that is a temporal image. Reality is neither closed nor finitely immobile but the reverse, not so much "new every moment" as "ever new"., my point being that Reason demands this. Language, being naturally metaphorical despite all our efforts, cannot entirely shake off a certain poetic sheen. Why should it though, really? Cheers,Stephen.
                      To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
                      From: eupraxis@...
                      Date: Sun, 30 Oct 2011 14:14:22 -0400
                      Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Beiser (2), the non-metaphysical Hegel




























                      Stephen,



                      Your definition of mysticism here ("that things are not as they immediately appear") is at best facile, if you pardon the criticism. Those of us who have been in this theological debate over these many months and years know what you really mean by the term: religion, or a feeling of unity with (a) God. Some read Hegel's true infinite as a notion that culminates in that unity; I and some others contend that it, in Hegel's texts, leads through it to its sublation into an open 'system'. I cannot reconcile Hegel with the 'Parmenidean' monism that results, or seems to, in your reading, although you can read Hegel any way you like within your privileged and presupposed religious orientation, if such allows you to broaden that view of matters for your own purposes. It is a perfectly fair theological position, if one is given to theology.



                      But qua Hegel, I think, as you know, that it misses the whole point, and even the point of his philosophy of religion. More to the point, if I may, the Absolute doesn't 'contain' anything; it is not a grand sum of knowledge or a set of all sets. It is the very inside out of all sets. It is not the mind of God in his eternal substance. It isn't 'the' Real. It is what un-closes -- dis-closes -- the Real as that about which nothing can be said except by again participating in the dialectical process of thinking in a higher or wiser manner. I feel that you hypostasize the Absolute -- just as any idea of God is, as far as I am concerned, an hypostatization.



                      I am given to the suggestion of Zizek that, taking a large view of Hegel, Reality isn't singular or monist, and certainly not 'Platonic' and two-world, but rather fundamentally incomplete.



                      As for Beiser, I am just into the book.



                      Best,

                      Wil



                      -----Original Message-----

                      From: Stephen <stephentheron@...>

                      To: hegel <hegel@yahoogroups.com>

                      Sent: Sun, Oct 30, 2011 12:00 pm

                      Subject: AW: RE: [hegel] Re: Beiser (2), the non-metaphysical Hegel



                      Dear Beat (and anyone interested in the substantive issues here),



                      I think this is a good answer in the circumstances.



                      We each think the other "misses" Hegel, I don't know about "fully".



                      I have searched your letters but can find no question (you say I did not answer it) except your "Where is this 'else'"? If you mean that one you must be asserting I "turn" something my way there. Do you not believe me when I say I think there is no "else", as I said there, that all is "in" the Absolute? I merely add that that does not make it, as infinite, something fittingly called "closed". I know we speak of a closed circle and this might suggest a counter-argument. But, again, is returning on self being "closed", as if excluding something?



                      I have been thinking about this today. To me it is amazing that some people today think there is nothing "mystical" about Hegel's thinking. To me this word here means simply that things are not as they immediately appear, the cardinal point of the Doctrine of Essence (as it took me some time to realise: you no doubt will jump to deny this in your usual either/or way). This depends either upon those people's presuppositions or is an academic misrepresentation in the interest of generating acceptable secondary literature, they think.



                      Not even Marx took that view. For him Hegel was mistaken precisely in his philosophical "idealism" and he offered an alternative more congenial to him.



                      It is possible to take Hegel's general philosophy of Spirit seriously without postulating a two-tier world, one substituting the other, which is the principal cause of distaste. Hegel's position, rather, just as it is with intelligent religious persons or, especially, with poets (art), is that there is just one reality and it is not what we see immediately. That appearance is, rather, annulled. You will know the texts. Of course the position can be discussed at length, "the being of the phenomenon and the phenomenon of being" as Sartre put it (that does not mean I put it so). In any case, there is, for Hegel, as for McTaggart, just one reality, outside or inside indifferently. I know I do not miss Hegel fully and I suppose you do too.



                      Perhaps it is assumed that if we are talking about concepts then we are not talking about the Absolute as real. I would counter, we are rather saying that reality is subject, subjectivity. Religious people are familiar with this, that God, say, can be a thought, an active concept as Hegel says. Substance-philosophy is indeed left behind, though theology has used a substance-vocabulary to say just this.



                      Beat, you need not reply if you prefer, though I think I showed that I like discussion. And, you know, you did not answer my question either. Shall I conclude that you have fully missed Hegel? One is not insulting if the cap fits. However, I would of course wish to avoid personal attacks. I think though it is quite "personal" if you, especially as having a quasi-official role, have begun it by plainly misrepresenting me (perhaps originally through a misreading?)and ignored my protest then. There was no opening for "interpretation".I had to resort to a couple of home-truths or else acquiesce in this. It is humiliating to get involved in this kind of thing. I hope we can avoid it in future.



                      Stephen.



                      Stephen.



                      --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "greuterb@..." <greuterb@...> wrote:

                      >

                      > Stephen,

                      >

                      > I think you did not answer my question. Therefore, I have to assume that you miss Hegel fully. So, I think

                      > that there is no base for further discussion also because you feel always misinterpreted when you have turned a contra

                      > argument into your old misguided standpoint which then is challenged. Ich habe die Nase auch voll, especially since I

                      > did not insult you personally as you did with me.

                      >

                      > Regards,

                      > Beat Greuter

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > ----Urspr��ngliche Nachricht----

                      > Von:

                      > stephentheron@...

                      > Datum: 30.10.2011 12:50

                      > An: "hegel hegel"<hegel@yahoogroups.com>

                      > Betreff: RE: AW: RE: [hegel]

                      > Re: Beiser (2), the non-metaphysical Hegel

                      >

                      >

                      > Dear Beat, Did you forget or do you not think you should apologise to me

                      > for the misrepresentation of me you, as moderator, have offered the group? Philosophers normally and naturally exercise

                      > a basic courtesy to one another. Perhaps that is not recognised in whatever field you distinguished yourself in? Of

                      > course I give you credit for being ready to communicate in a language other than your mother-tongue. Aber ich habe die

                      > Nase voll, vollgestrichen. The relation of Hegel to Kant is/was complex and debatable. You seem to pass over an obvious

                      > if restrained contempt or unqualified negative evaluation he shows at certain places for "the critical philosophy",

                      > though he balances it with praise at others. So one should not be too afraid of openings being left for tendentiously

                      > suggesting he regressed behind Kant, as in a kind of restorationaist spirit. This is not born out by the overall upshot

                      > of his thought. As for my not answering your comments, you yourself totally ignore my pointing out an apparent

                      > inconsistency arising from an expression of yours, in reporting Hegel, though I said I would like to know what your

                      > view was there. But perhaps my text was too complicated for you, something I would not be proud of. I can see, let me

                      > say, that you are long and deeply read in Hegel, but I do rather wonder sometimes if you do not read him like the Devil

                      > reads the Bible, as we say. On the other hand I also suspect you might find more agreement of mine with your thought if

                      > you came upon it elsewhere. Now let's have that apology, recantation or whatever! It doesn't cost much. Stephen.

                      > To:

                      > hegel@yahoogroups.com

                      > From: greuterb@...

                      > Date: Sun, 30 Oct 2011 10:58:36 +0000

                      > Subject: AW: RE: [hegel] Re:

                      > Beiser (2), the non-metaphysical Hegel

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > ----Urspr��ngliche

                      > Nachricht----

                      >

                      > Von: stephentheron@...

                      >

                      > Datum: 28.10.2011 21:59

                      >

                      > An: "hegel hegel"

                      >

                      > <hegel@yahoogroups.com>

                      >

                      >

                      > Betreff: RE: [hegel] Re: Beiser (2), the non-metaphysical Hegel

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > Beat, Thank you! There seems

                      >

                      > to be a language

                      > problem here. You ask, where is this something else? But that is what I have just there explicitly

                      >

                      > ruled out. I want

                      > to reject Brinkmann's metaphor of "closed" (totality), since the Absolute is Freedom which is surely

                      >

                      > denotes openness

                      > rather, and so I state that openness need NOT mean openness to something "else" and I put the "else"

                      >

                      > in scare-quotes

                      > to indicate that I do not think there can be an "else", or anything outside of the Absolute. Yet you

                      >

                      > say I contradict

                      > myself in positing this "else". Is it that that is what you expected me to say? "Closed" very

                      >

                      > definitely suggests

                      > finitude, perhaps in B's view of necessity or in retaining an image of a certain compositeness at

                      >

                      > variance with the

                      > Concept as explained by Hegel, identical with each of the "parts" which are hence not parts. But

                      >

                      > please focus on your

                      > mistake there. I don't like to be misrepresented and hope it is not gratuitous. I would say

                      >

                      > freedom is not so much

                      > within the one but, better, that freedom is the one. It is even one with necessity. But why do

                      >

                      > you go on to say I

                      > "depend on... the Absolute" as something "outside the Concept"? It is surely not outside it,

                      >

                      > whatever you might mean

                      > there. ..."the definition that now results for us is that the Absolute is the Notion" (EL160

                      >

                      > Zus.), i.e. the Concept

                      > (Begriff), if I can trust this translation. It is actually the Concept which sets up "the

                      >

                      > other... which is in

                      > reality not an other" in the text I have here (EL161 Zus.), never mind B's prejudices, whereas you

                      >

                      > say here, "the

                      > process of thought evokes its other (the concept)", its other, the Concept. How can this be when the

                      >

                      > text says the

                      > "movement of the Concept" (as pure play) sets up the other, finding this "expressed in Christianity". So

                      >

                      > we have the

                      > Concept which is the other (your account) sets up the other. Can this be? If not, what is this other? Or

                      >

                      > need we not

                      > identify it? What do you think about this? Are their other texts that support your different version? Is

                      >

                      > there

                      > anything in this difference? Yes the negation is also in the one. And what is this about some other dogmatic

                      >

                      > truth?

                      > You are not only arguing ad hominem, but you have got your homo quite wrong, or you find it easier to

                      >

                      > misrepresent

                      > him. You end by saying something is precise without being precise about what it is. A lot of people do

                      >

                      > this kind of

                      > thing but I hope, principally, I have shown you you misrepresent me completely with your first words here.

                      >

                      > Stephen.

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > Stephen,

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > It would have been better if you would have answered the second part of my comment (copy see

                      >

                      > below)

                      > instead of making a philosophy about 'precise'. "Constructing the world in thought alone" is not Hegel's job.

                      >

                      > Hegel's

                      > job is a critical unfolding of the categories with which we give our experience meaning or explanation. This

                      >

                      > happens

                      > within experience and not from outside. Klaus Brinkmann also writes (p 247, Idealism Without Limits, Hegel an

                      >

                      > the

                      > Problem of Objectivity):

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > "......... Hegel's Logic is not about [substantial] entities whose existence is to be

                      >

                      >

                      > proved [in thought alone as in the old metaphysics], but about conceptual content or explanatory conceptions whose

                      >

                      >

                      > instantiation is granted."

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > Otherwise, Hegel would have fallen back behind Kant as many of his opponents claim.

                      > Hegel's

                      >

                      > absolute does not mean absolute truth but only the path of our conceptual experience which does not know an

                      > eternal

                      >

                      > substantial truth of thouhgt outside it. But this does also mean that the categories are not merely formal

                      > and

                      >

                      > subjective with a content outside it as with Kant. So, Hegel has a much wider concept of experience which

                      > includes all

                      >

                      > world relationships of man and their development and not only the immediate empirical ones which are

                      > bound to

                      >

                      > previously fixed categories.

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > Regards,

                      >

                      > Beat Greuter

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > You [Stephen] write further:

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > "We do indeed

                      > "construct the world

                      >

                      > in thought alone", as

                      >

                      > I have just done here, agreeing with Hegel I believe in

                      >

                      > the matter as in

                      > the form.

                      >

                      > Well, I wonder

                      >

                      > if Brinkmann would recognise himself."

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > According to Hegel this is precisely the

                      > procedure of old metaphysics and

                      >

                      > contrasts what he himself intends to do starting from Kant's transcendental logic

                      > and his undermining of earlier

                      >

                      > metaphysical thinking (the antinomy chapter in the CPR).

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > To: hegel@yahoogroups.com

                      >

                      >

                      > From: greuterb@...

                      >

                      > Date:

                      >

                      > Fri, 28 Oct 2011 18:21:03 +0000

                      >

                      > Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Beiser (2), the non-

                      > metaphysical Hegel

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > Am 24.10.2011 21:43, Stephen writes:

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > "Beat,

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > I find myself agreeing with

                      >

                      > Brinkmann, or

                      > able to read it

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > in a way that seems in agreement with me, until I come to

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > the phrase,"excludes...

                      >

                      > reference to

                      > supersensible

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > entities". However, what this seems to mean is exclusion

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > of a two-tiered reality, of

                      >

                      > sensible and

                      > super-sensible. I

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > take Hegel as identifying the two or, rather, annulling

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > this particular categorical

                      >

                      > division.

                      > The external or

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > sensory (as simply meaning external)is internal, within,

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > formally signifying the Concept.

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > The

                      > absolute, too, is indeed "one moment" in the system

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > (we are not philosophers all the time), but it is that

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > moment

                      > which every other moment is identical with.

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > Whether we say Hegel's philosophy is not metaphysical, in

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > this

                      >

                      > odd

                      > sense of referring to a second layer of entities,

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > or we say, for example, that it is a realised eschatology,

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > i.

                      > e.

                      >

                      > the means are the end, is at bottom, therefore, the

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > same. Again, whether we say this is the surmounting of

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > metaphysics or the final and true metaphysics is the same.

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > Yet this Brinkmann is clearly rhetorically tendentious in

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > speaking of metaphysics of the "hubristic" kind. One

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > should admit this.

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > What Brinkmann is saying, to my

                      >

                      >

                      > perception, when

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > translated back into the religious terms from which Hegel

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > claims his philosophy necessarily

                      > springs,

                      >

                      > is that we "sit

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > with Christ in the heavenly places" or that "what you do

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > to another you do to me", do

                      > to the absolute

                      >

                      > subjectivity

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > of the Concept.

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > What this amounts to in terms of Art, the third form of

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > Absolute Spirit (I have just

                      >

                      > mentioned Religion, second

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > form), well, we could probably take any "opus" of the kind

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > we call great, "sublime", and

                      >

                      > not merely skilful etc.

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > By the way, it is only on one account that metaphysics

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > stipulates supersensible beings, let

                      >

                      > alone causes. For

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > Aristotle, Hegel's master more or less, it is the "science

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > of being as being" (this ambiguity in

                      >

                      > meaning is discussed

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > by Aquinas in his commentary on Met.).

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > "The

                      > Absolute or God" is indeed the most immanent of

                      >

                      > all,

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > as B. in effect says, and "being has no parts" but is one

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > (Parmenides). Whether this makes it a "closed

                      >

                      > totality" is

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > a matter of choice of metaphor. I would take Freedom as

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > the opposite of "closed". For "not closed" need

                      >

                      > not mean

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > the same as open to something "else"."

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > Stephen,

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > With this you contradict yourself. Where is this

                      >

                      > something "else"?

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > Outside the One (Parmenides)? Freedom is not

                      > outside the One but

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > within it. If you take it outside

                      >

                      > you cannot realize it in the

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > process of thought evoking

                      > and reconciling its other (Concept) but you depend on

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > something outside it that is unfreedom, be it God or the

                      > Absolute or

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > some other dogmatic truth. For Hegel freedom is

                      >

                      > only within the

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > movement of the Concept. Outside it

                      > there is not even 'nothing'. The

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > negation is also in the One.

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > You write further:

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > "We do indeed "construct the

                      > world in thought alone", as

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > I have just done here, agreeing with

                      >

                      > Hegel I believe in

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > the matter as in the form.

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > Well, I wonder if Brinkmann would recognise himself."

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > According

                      >

                      > to Hegel this is precisely the procedure of old

                      > metaphysics and contrasts what he himself intends to do starting from

                      >

                      > Kant's transcendental logic and his undermining

                      > of earlier metaphysical thinking (the antinomy chapter in the CPR).

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > Regards,

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > Beat Greuter

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > --- In

                      > hegel@yahoogroups.com,

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > greuterb <greuterb@>

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > wrote:

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > Am 24.10.2011 13:

                      >

                      > 48, Bruce Merrill writes:

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > > Insofar as Beiser is "paradoxically" transposing

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > a term from the

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > > Vienna

                      >

                      > circle to apply to Pippin

                      > et al, then he

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > is guilty of the kind

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > > of anachronism that he condemns. (He is using it

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > as a term of abuse.)

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > > .

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > > To appropriate that part of Hegel that one

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > considers to be plausible

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > >

                      >

                      > > /useful

                      > /relevant and so discard metaphysics

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > /mysticism

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > > /naturo-philosophy /Xtianity etc. does not

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > qualify

                      >

                      > as

                      > positivism!

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > > As said, the proof of the pudding lies in the

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > case that Beiser can

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > > make for the

                      >

                      >

                      > metaphysical /mystical

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > /naturophilosophy etc. elements

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > > in Hegel. He has to justify this as "living"

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > philosophy, not simply

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > > justify it as an essential part of Hegel's past

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > project. Since it can

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > > be

                      >

                      >

                      > essential, yet not plausible. (As Pippin et

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > al hold?)

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > Bruce,

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > According to

                      >

                      >

                      > Klaus Brinkmann's "Idealism without

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > Limits, Hegel and the

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > Problem of Objectivity" (you recently gave the

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > reference) taking Hegel's

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > philosophy as a metaphysics is a misunderstanding,

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > and he explicitly

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > refers in

                      > a

                      >

                      > footnote to Beiser as a proponent of such

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > an interpretation:

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > "Frederick Beiser has been a proponent

                      > of the

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > interpretation of Hegel as

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > a metaphysician against those who see in Hegel a

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > philosopher of a

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > >

                      > broadly

                      >

                      > transcendental orientation or one who

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > advances an ontology or a

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > non-metaphysical theory of

                      > categories. A good

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > overview of the arguments

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > pro and con can be found in Wartenberg (1993), Beiser

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > (1993,

                      > 1995),

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > Pinkard

                      >

                      > (1990), and Pippin (1990). ......... ."

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > In the following I cite the section the above

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > footnote belongs to

                      >

                      > (p. 75):

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > "Hegel's philosophy, in particular the Logic and the

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > Encyclopedia, are

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > often said to be a

                      >

                      > metaphysics, occasionally even a

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > metaphysics of the

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > hubristic kind. I would like to

                      > emphasize that Hegel

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > is a

                      >

                      > philosopher of

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > the immanence of experience and, in the Logic, of the

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > immanence

                      > of

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > thought. That means that

                      >

                      > metaphysics with its

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > stipulation of

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > supersensible entities and causes that

                      > are located

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > outside the immanence

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > of experience in a transcendent realm has no proper

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > place in Hegel's

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > thought. No other philosopher (with the

                      >

                      > exception

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > perhaps of Spinoza)

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > has repudiated and systematically

                      > dissolved the

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > separation of the

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > mundane

                      >

                      > and the supersensible as thoroughly as Hegel,

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > and in such a way

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > that both spheres are unified into one

                      >

                      > homogenous

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > sphere of experience.

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > We should not be misled by

                      > Hegel's frequent reference

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > to the Absolute or

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > >

                      >

                      > God. These are technically speaking expressions for

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > the

                      > immanence of

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > experience and thought, or the closed

                      >

                      > totality that,

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > like Parmenidean

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > One, has nothing

                      > outside itself, not even

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > nothingness. It is true that

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > in

                      >

                      > the Encyclopedia, Hegel goes so far as to

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > charaterize his Logic as a

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > theory of the "definition of the Absolute,

                      >

                      > as the

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > metaphysical

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > definition

                      > of God" (E �� 85). But again, this needs to

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > be understood

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > properly in its

                      >

                      > context. First, the fact that the

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > Encyclopedia,

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > especially with its posthumous Additions to Hegel's

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > published

                      >

                      > text,

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > belongs to what one

                      > might call Hegel's exoteric

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > writings should be an

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > indicator that this language

                      >

                      > includes a dose of

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > pedagogic popularization

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > and/or a deliberate attempt on Hegel's part to

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > intervene in public

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > >

                      > controversies about the nature of philosophy. And

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > second, what is meant

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > by "metaphysical" should be seen in

                      >

                      >

                      > the light of

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > Hegel's definition of

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > metaphysics in the Logic, viz. as the "scientific

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > construction of the

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > >

                      >

                      > world in thought alone" (SL 63/WdL I 46). This

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > definition excludes any

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > connotation of metaphysical

                      > realism,

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > representationalism, or reference

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > to supersensible entities. Moreover, the Science of

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > Logic, which

                      > I would

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > >

                      >

                      > call an esoteric work by comparison, avoids almost

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > all reference to God,

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > and its technical

                      > definition of the

                      >

                      > Absolute makes

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > this category an

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > abstract precursor of the Spinozistic substance, the

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > identity of the

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > >

                      >

                      > inner and outer aspects of essence. In other words,

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > the Absolute is here

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > strictly

                      > speaking one moment of the

                      >

                      > totality of the

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > "system of concepts"

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > [System der Begriffe] (SL 54/WdL I 36) or

                      > the "system

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > of the

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > >

                      >

                      > determinations of thought" [System der

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > Denkbestimmungen] (SL 63/WdL I 46)."

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > >

                      > Regards,

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > Beat

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > > Since the volume at hand stops with Hegel,

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > perhaps this lies ahead of

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > > him? There is also FB's book,

                      >

                      > _Hegel_ and

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > perhaps he fulfills his

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > > claims therein?

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > > But he

                      > case for Schelling is very valuable.

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > Whether it needs to be

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > > made at Hegel's expense is another question.

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > >

                      > >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > > One missing person in Beiser's

                      >

                      > pantheon is

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > Schiller. And yet Hegel

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > > says, at one point, that

                      > Schiller is the single

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > most important figure

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > >

                      >

                      > > in regard to countering Kant. And Beiser has

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > written a book

                      > on

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > > _Schiller as a Philosopher_. So Schiller's

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > absence puzzles me.

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > > Earlier I quoted a chunk here

                      > from a Beiser

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > review which was also very

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > >

                      >

                      > combative, on 19C history. He likes a fight.

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > > > Bruce

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > [Non-text portions of this message have been

                      >

                      > removed]

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > [Non-text portions of this message have been

                      > removed]

                      >

                      >

                      >

                      > ------------------------------------

                      >

                      >

                      >

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