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AW: Re: [hegel] Re: Owl, Volume 42, Nos. 1-2

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  • greuterb@bluewin.ch
    ... Von: bob@robertmwallace.com Datum: 30.09.2011 04:56 An: Betreff: Re: [hegel] Re: Owl, Volume 42, Nos. 1-2 Hello again. ... is the
    Message 1 of 1 , Oct 1, 2011
      ----Urspr├╝ngliche Nachricht----
      Von: bob@...
      Datum: 30.09.2011 04:56
      An: <hegel@yahoogroups.com>

      Betreff: Re: [hegel] Re: Owl, Volume 42, Nos. 1-2

      Hello again.

      On Sep 29, 2011, at 7:32 PM, ponikvaraj wrote:

      > This
      is the naïve reading to which I refer. The cave is a metaphor for
      > Socrates' Athens. Socrates never left Athens. Nor
      did he have all
      > that much
      > success turning the souls of his fellow Athenians to see the truth
      > of their
      >
      existence, a truth that would have them see a flourishing life
      > within the
      > polis as an impoverished existence. In
      fact, the cave might better
      > be seen
      > as an counter-image to actual Socratic practice. The cave metaphor
      > itself
      is
      > vulgar. It is how nonphilosophers see the work of philosophy. It is
      > the
      > trivial answer to the question: What
      good is philosopy? Well,
      > philosophy
      > lifts your soul.
      >
      More precisely, the view I've stated (and that I endorse)
      is that
      philosophy can help you to be more rational, and thus to lead a more
      rational life. When Socrates says at
      Republic 352d that "the argument
      concerns no ordinary topic, but how we ought to live," I think it is
      clear that
      this question orients the greater part of what Plato
      investigates in the Republic and the other dialogues. Is this
      a
      "naive" or "trivial" question?

      best, Bob



      Bob,

      What does this mean "a more rational life". Which are the
      criteria for measuring a rational or a more rational life? Does philosophy give me advises for evaluating my life with
      respect to reason? What is a reasonable life? That I have rational reasons for justifying my convictions, actions and
      person? So, philosophy is the judge of my life with respect to formal and substantial criteria? This is certainly most
      un-Hegelian. Perhaps it is Kantian and Habermasian. According to Hegel philosophy always comes too late, and life and
      reason cannot be separated in a causal relationship. And then, where is the irrationality of life? Most decisions are
      irrational and only the whole as the result gives perhaps at the end the possibility of an assessement. I think that
      all this talking about 'reason' is only the sign for a subjective feeling of the loss of objective rationality. But
      with this you cannot bring back objective rationality. And, for Hegel the modern world should give a relief for
      individual rationality within the created objective rationality.

      Regards,
      Beat



      > As for Kant, Zizek is good on the
      traumatic truth of the categorical
      > imperative.
      >
      > In general, I believe your predisposition as to what philosophy

      > means to
      > offer determines what you find when you interpret texts. Your big life
      > change - the theological fip from
      atheism to theism - was a
      > psychological
      > event. You do not seem to have allowed philosophy to play anything
      >
      more than
      > a supporting role in the wonder of being you. In my view, you are too
      > self-absorbed to be open to the
      transformative effects of true
      > philosophic
      > engagement.
      >
      > Both Plato and Hegel offer an alternative reason that
      is easily
      > reduced to
      > yet another natural assumption. Socratic wisdom is wisdom because it
      > means
      > to
      recognize that truth stands against everything we think we know or
      > naturally assume to be the case. Philosophic
      activity is a matter of
      > coming
      > to know what we do not yet know about how truth is distorted by the
      > common
      >
      reason we employ to get on in the world. Comprehending philosophic
      > inversion
      > - not being converted to some point
      of view - is the philosophic
      > task for
      > those who would take Plato and Hegel seriously. Everything we think
      > we
      know
      > has to be turned on its head.
      >
      > And, by the way, convincing you is not in any way an important test
      > of the

      > viability of anything I might have to say.
      >
      > - Alan
      >
      > -----Original Message-----
      > From: hegel@yahoogroups.com
      [mailto:hegel@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf
      > Of
      > Robert Wallace
      > Sent: Thursday, September 29, 2011 10:01 PM
      > To:
      hegel@yahoogroups.com
      > Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Owl, Volume 42, Nos. 1-2
      >
      > Hi Alan,
      >
      > I take it then that you do
      not grant that Plato has an interest in a
      > kind of
      > 'uplifting,' in the Cave and the Symposium? Nor Kant, either?
      >
      They don't think we'd be better off exiting the Cave, or reaching
      > the "sea
      > of beauty," or being fully autonomous?
      Nor do they think that their
      > analyses
      > of this sort of rational ascent may aid us in pursuing it?
      >
      > Best, Bob
      >

      > On Sep 29, 2011, at 5:38 PM, ponikvaraj wrote:
      >
      > > Yes, we know all this. I was just addressing Mary's concerns.
      And
      > no I
      > > do not think any serious philosophy is uplifting unless read
      > naively.
      > >
      > > - Alan
      > >
      > > -----
      Original Message-----
      > > From: hegel@yahoogroups.com [mailto:hegel@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf
      > > Of Robert Wallace
      >
      > Sent: Thursday, September 29, 2011 5:42 PM
      > > To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
      > > Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Owl, Volume 42,
      Nos. 1-2
      > >
      > > Hello Alan,
      > >
      > > Yes, we know this is your view. As for "uplifting," would you grant
      > > that Plato
      has an interest in a kind of "uplifting," e.g. in the
      > Cave
      > > and the Symposium? So does Kant, and so does Hegel.
      It's an
      > uplifting
      > > toward a more thorough-going rationality. If Zizek has no sympathy
      > for
      > > this
      tradition, he's missing a central thread of western philosophy.
      > >
      > > As for the "strong tie to some religion," I am
      a counterexample to
      > > your generalization. (Robbert Veen does have such a tie, and has
      > > problems with Hegel that
      result from his religious views.)
      > >
      > > As for ruptures and voids, you use these terms a lot, but I'm not
      > > aware
      that Hegel does. Perhaps they are helpful in understanding
      > him;
      > > I don't yet see that this is the case.
      > >
      > >
      As for what Hegel actually has to say about the finite and
      > infinite in
      > > the Logic, you and I have discussed
      this, and neither has converted
      > > the other.
      > > We've both read it; we disagree about what it means.
      > >
      > > Best,
      Bob
      > >
      > > On Sep 29, 2011, at 11:01 AM, ponikvaraj wrote:
      > >
      > > > This is the kind of writing on Hegel that drives
      Zizek crazy. This
      > > is
      > > > the uplifting Hegel. It is the Hegel who knows nothing of ruptures
      > > and
      > > > voids.

      > > >
      > > > Ultimately, it is the theological Hegel, a reading that has many
      > > > advocates but all of whom have a
      strong tie to some religion.
      > > >
      > > > The best way to see oneself clear of all this is by reading what
      > > Hegel
      > >
      > actually has to say about the finite and infinite in the Logic.
      > > >
      > > > - Alan
      > > >
      > > > From:
      hegel@yahoogroups.com [mailto:hegel@yahoogroups.com] On
      > Behalf
      > > > Of Josie
      > > > Sent: Thursday, September 29,
      2011 10:48 AM
      > > > To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
      > > > Subject: [hegel] Re: Owl, Volume 42, Nos. 1-2
      > > >
      > > > I'm
      extremely interested in descriptions of a true infinite which
      > > > seems to 'depend' on a description of other. I
      found a helpful
      > > > exchange between yourself and Robbert Veen here:
      > > >
      > > > http://www.hegelcourses.com/the-finite-and-the-infinite-2/
      > > >
      > > > Mary
      > > >
      > > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.
      com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> ,
      > > Robert
      > > > Wallace <bob@...> wrote:
      > > > >
      > > > > Hi Wil,
      > > > >
      > > >
      > I just got home last night and received my copy. I'll probably
      > > > post on
      > > > > my blog a response to Williams's
      final comments. I'll let y'all
      > > know
      > > > > when I do that.
      > > > >
      > > > > best, Bob W
      > > > >
      > > > > On Sep 28,
      2011, at 8:22 AM, eupraxis wrote:
      > > > >
      > > > > > Has anyone (else) been reading the latest Owl? Specifically,
      >
      the
      > > > > > exchange between Robert Williams and Bob Wallace on the
      > question
      > > > of
      > > > > > the true
      infinite, etc?
      > > > > >
      > > > > > Bob, any additional thoughts on the matter?
      > > > > >
      > > > > > Wil
      > > > > >
      > > >
      > >
      > > > > >
      > > > >
      > > > > Robert Wallace
      > > > > website: www.robertmwallace.com
      > > > > email: bob@...
      > > > > phone: 414-617-3914
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