--- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "Stephen Cowley" <stephen.cowley@...>
wrote:

>
> I think we covered this point before. I remember suggesting that

proper names were a counter example of recognition of the particular
in language. I seem to recall that the phone went dead at that point
from those who agreed with Hegel's analysis from chapter 1 of the

>Phenomenology, but it still seems to me like a valid point.

-=-=-=-=

If I understand you correctly, Stephen, I believe you are saying that
if I type in "here", then here for me as I type is different from
here for you when you read this. Or if I type in "now", now when I
type isn't the same now as when you read. So "here" and "now" are
just universals with no particular reference.

But if I type in "Hegel", even though we probably have very different
views of Hegel, still there will be a large over-lap in meaning, and
to some extent at least the word "Hegel" will mean the same thing for
me as it does for you.

I don't think, though, that proper names hardly exist at the level of
sense-certainty--or even at the level of consciousness as a whole.
Even at the level of self-consciousness, although people do show up
there, they tend not to be particular people but rather universals--
such as "the master" or "the religious devotee". It might not be
until the second half of the Reason chapter that proper names can
begin to truly have a particular reference.

John