PH wrote:
"... the sublime point that makes speculative logic rational in a way that empirical logic is not and can never be"

JH wrote:
(...) make that soberly reasonable which means to let aside any resentments (...) a sober description of the Hegel-meaning of "irrational" ... this cannot be found by thinking that the Hegel-meant irrationality of subjective logic as such (...) has no rationality at all on/at/in itself ... that would be an wrong/awkward alternative ...

PH:
... it has just taken a very long time to complete; cover all the exceptions that an empiricist might come up with.

JH:
... probably you wouldn't be able to anticipate all exceptions, because it may be impossible to do so ...

PM:
I also take it that your comments regarding the translation of the Wissenschaft der Logik II might be the best I've come accross so far; because of your knowledge of German, English ...

PM:
... and I presume mathematical logic. That is, you also appear to agree that rationality and irrationality has a different meaning for Speculative Logic then it does for Empirical Logic. Is that right?

JH:
... yes, I do agree; you put that very clear ...

empirical logic ---> rationality, irrationality
speculative logic ---> rationality, irrationality

... and then you put:
mathematical logic = empirical logic = mathematical empirical logic

[... in german: = mathematical empirical logic = formal logic = mathematical-formal logic]
[... very interesting ... in german you would talk about "formal logic" and thus 'forget' the referance to "the empirical basis" of this mathematically processed logic; while the english language "empirical logic" thus is giving the hint by putting a switch to the experience that "mathematical logic" is "formal" on the one hand and "empirical" other hand; therefore the translation "empirical logic" is a translation that - for a german native speaker - can hit a/the point ...]

... then I would prefer:
(mathematical/formal) empirical logic [-versus-] speculative logic
(which does not exclude an "empirical momentum" in the latter)

empirical logic vs speculative logic ... both in small letters ...

... and - maybe:
empirical logic vs speculative logic = deduction vs speculation

... but - maybe as well:
every deduction has got a momentum of speculation;

... because "de-ductio, -onis" could mean:

a) "demonstrativly" away from a (true) premise = de= away from,
and
b) "speculatively" towards a (intuitively or reasonably found) scientific conclusion = de = towards

... therfore:
"No true deduction without speculation" and, maybe, "No true speculation without deduction" ...

that means:
... it cannot be excluded that even pure mathematical-scientifical conclusions may be speculatively generated and demonstrated, this "demonstration lege artis" being apodictical ...

... last but not least then:
rationality of mathematical-empirical logic may be made irrational in speculative logic

example:
... the "schlechte Unendlichkeit" ("bad infinity") - which in german language (strongly put) means as well: b) "schlichte Unendlichkeit" ("naive infinity") and c) "schlechthinnige Unendlichkeit" ("infinity as such", "infinite infinity"... topos c) meaning that in "schlecht(hinnig)e Unendlichkeit" "infinity" has got no and will get to no contact with "finitity" ... this makes the "rational infinity" of empirical logic irrational "at the end" ...

... "because"/although - logically put - an idea of infinity "truely" can only be generated as such "before the background" of a certain (even implicit) knowledge of "finity" ... as well as the idea of "finity" "truely" can only be generated in relation with "infinity" ... primarily purely and logically put, not onto-logically ...

that means: ... irrationality of mathematical-empirical logic may be made rational in speculative logic ... the rationality of infinity in mathematical-empirical concept of "infinity" (e.g. infinite number of, infinite amount of) "is" as well irrational ...

Hegel then:
"schlechte Unendlichkeit" versus "wahrhafte Unendlichkeit" (true infinity)

JH:
... and "empirical infinity" versus "speculative infinity" and - maybe - following: "empirical rationality" versus "speculative rationality"

example:
... antinomical sentences at the level of understanding - maybe - can be made to non-antinomical sentences in reason ... doing that without any involvement of formal contradiction ...

PM:
This appears to be further supported by the beginning of your translation that includes a reference to the General, Particular and individual;

JH:
... this "Hegel-remark" is from the beginning of "Subjective Logic", not from the very beginning, but from the beginning - The table of contents says: "Zweiter Teil. Die subjektive Logik oder die Lehre vom Begriff" ... and then - surprise, surprise - in the table of contents this "remark" even has got a headline:

"The usual kinds of conceptions"

PM:
Hume I take it, unlike Hegel rejects the universality of the absolute relation.

JH:
... I would support that, because if the philosophy of Hume is a "philsosophy of incident", sensual incident, "philosophy of the finite" then; therefore Hume cannot assert an universality of absolute relation ... but what he **can** assert - it seems - is the possibility and the criterion of "absolute" = apodictical, clear and evident demonstration:

PH:
(...) faced with a clear and evident demonstration, which is all Hume in fact asked for. See section 8; 'Of the inference from the impression to the idea'. Treatise of Human Nature.

That is, they [today's empiricists] will see that the general is just a particular kind of relation for which a finite number of individuals belong. Where as the universal as a possible thought is a relation which is true for all individuals.

JH:
... as - following Hegel - the individual, the particular and the general are not totally separated from one another, because:

"It has occured out of the previous [objective logic !?!], that the different determined conceptions, as such, are rather one and the same concept, instead of falling apart in number."

... thus it may occur that absolute relation has got "some participation" with particular and individual (and even with the general) relation, and that individual, particular, general relation "always" have participation in an absolute idea of relation, an (idea of) absolute relation ... maybe that "the universal" could be called "a perfect synthesis of individual, particular, general"; more: a conceptually GOTTEN synthesis of "individual, particular, general", gotten by concept ... gotten by a concept of concept while thinking the thinking ... etc.

regards - jh

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