PH wrote:
Perhaps a native German speaking reader would be kind enough to put there translation against A. V. Miller's and say what they think; to what extent the later's translation was influenced by his philosophical interpretation ...

JH:
... I'm going to write some English now, maybe that'll sound a bit awkward, so I beg your pardon ... I won't and couldn't give ad hoc a translation of the pieces of the "Wissenschaft der Logik" concerning formal logic, but I would like to give an example which seems to verify the assumption of PH, an example concerning the "Phaenomenologie des Geistes", one sentence only, the very first sentence of PhdG ... which - in my opinion - is the one I already posted in this list:

Die sinnliche Gewissheit oder das Diese und das Meinen
Das Wissen, welches unmittelbar unser Gegenstand ist, kann kein anderes sein als dasjenige, welches selbst unmittelbares Wissen, Wissen des Unmittelbaren oder Seienden ist.

Shortly said: you are well all right, PH, Miller's translation IS influenced by his philosophical interpretation, even more: it is influenced by it to a degree, that - concerning the PhdG - the crucial point of it - as it seems to me - is missed from the very beginning ... and that not only by Miller but as well by Baillie: there, it becomes even more obvious in some respect ... on the other hand: the 'missings' of Baillie and Miller give a lot of possible hints to the "possible real meaning" of the PhdG which is initiated by Hegel in this very first sentence of the PhdG ...

My thesis is that anglo-american native speaker translators tend to involve conceptions of anglosaxan "classical empirism" (Locke, Hume etc.) where Hegel's approach could be read as a principle critique of Empirism and Sensualism ... or - spoken in modern terms - as a critique of "mentalism" (by the way: I owe this insight to W. van Orman Quine) ...

Let's take the headline:

I. Die sinnliche Gewissheit oder das Diese und das Meinen [Hegel]
I. Sense-Certainty, This, and Meaning (Baillie)
I. Sense-Certainty: or The 'This' and 'Meaning' (*MEINEN*) (Miller)

Miller's translation is 'better' than Baillie's because Miller does not neglect the "or" which indicates - in my view - a sort of a strong adequacy: The "sinnliche Gewissheit" is adequate to "das Diese und das Meinen"; next point is the AND, which - in my view - indicates as strong conjunction: the "Diese" AND the "Meinen", not only an enumeration ...

... to translate "Meinen" with "Meaning - in my view - is 'totally wrong' because it seems to me that the english word "meaning" has its root in "mean" in the sense of "common" ... correct me if I am wrong, dear english native speakers !!!

... "Meinen" - in my view - indicates just the very very opposite to mean or common opinion (if I am not misled with the connex of "meaning" and "mean") ... it does not indicate the common but the very very MINE ... this is made clear by Hegel throughout the whole first paragraph ...

... as a consequence I would prefer a sort of 'word by word-translation' even if - for the taste of english native speakers - there may be some 'awkward germanisms' involved ... a crucial point is the translation of "Sinnliche Gewissheit" with "sense-certainty" because by this a first switch is put ... a switch into the direction of Sensualism, Empirism and Mentalism ...

... in my view it is absolutely necessary to keep "Bewusstsein" and "Gewissheit" strongly together ... this cannot be managed - as it seems to me - with latin-english vocabulary but problably must or should be made with anglo-saxon english vocabulary ...
BeWUSSTsein and GeWISSheit both corresponds with "wissen, wusste, gewusst" (to know, knew, known) ... (this is not just a play with german words but - as I see it concerning Hegel - a procedure of getting coherent sense) ... an adequate anglo-saxon term could be "wit" (taken in a certain sense) which - if I am not misled - strongly corresponds with "wissen": "wit" and "wissen", "Gewissheit" and "witness" ... and finally: we probably won't have to talk about "senses" but about "sensuality", which moves the stress from (seeming) "concrete senses" to (seeming) "abstract sensuality" (but remember the famous piece of Hegel: "Who is thinking abstractly") ...

My dictionary puts it this way: to wit = OBSOLETE wissen (to know) ... and for me following this further going "obsolency": the wit = das Wissen (knowledge)

yes, this term may be obsolete in contemporary English but is seems to me to be non-obsolete to get 'the wit' of this first Hegel-sentence ... okay, let me do the first sentence then in my way, with awkward germanisms and maybe funny neologisms ...

... well then, my translation would now be this (new defects not excluded):

I. Die sinnliche Gewissheit oder das Diese und das Meinen [Hegel]
I. (The) Sensual Witness OR the (sg.) These AND the Mineness

... I do not know if "mineness" is a neologism for english native speakers, but if it is, I would like to suggest to translate Hegel with this neologism ... as far as my interpretation is concerned "mineness" could be a necessary term "to get the sense of it" ... but - for your relief - this isn't stressed by german interpreters as I do stress it and would have to stress it by holding an keeping the term "Phenomenology" ... in this context, another possible trap for english native speakers is a possible entanglement of "phenomenology" and "phenomenomenalism", as another way to Sensualism, Mentalism and Empirism ... I refer to a german Phenomenologue resp. Phenomenologist C.F. Grauman who indicates this entanglement as one of the most often actualized misunderstandings ... well then: "phenomenology is not such thing as phenomenomenalism"

I. Die sinnliche Gewissheit oder das Diese und das Meinen [Hegel]
I. (The) Sensual Witness OR the (sg.) "These" AND the "Mineness"

Das Wissen, welches unmittelbar unser Gegenstand ist, kann kein anderes sein als dasjenige,
The wit, which is immediately our 'counterstanding', can be non other than that,

welches selbst unmittelbares Wissen, Wissen des Unmittelbaren oder Seienden ist.
which is by itself immediate wit, wit of the immediate or being.

... yes I would insist of taking this awkward germanism or neologism "counterstanding" (if it, then, indeed is an awkward germanism or neologism) ... I would 'set' 'counterstanding' instead of 'object' because I am strongly convinced that Hegel sets immediate counterstanding of "you and me" or "the likes of us" ... this on the one hand and on the other hand the countestanding of 'the like of us' to 'things': being of beings and being of things ...

okay, I'll stop with this for the moment not knowing what you will associate with this writing ...

RF wrote:
I welcome any comments.


... well then, this is mine ...

best regards
Juergen Hilbers







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