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- Jan 1Srivats,We certainly do differ on some points, but not on all points. Hegel's entire Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) has an undeniable chrono-historical component.That said -- this cannot mean that Humanity has outgrown all its earlier stages of development. Even in 1831, when Hegel wrote his final lines, there were still people on Earth living in forests and caves in large numbers. (There are still some today.)So, there is no strict chrono-historical movement -- but only a relative, chrono-historical component of what I have called Social Evolution -- or just Evolution. This is the very theme of Hegel's PhG (1807).So, of course, there are still many millions of people even today who fail to rise above Perceptual Consciousness.Perception is not the highest form of human Consciousness, nor is it the lowest form. It is a middling form. Perception, as Hegel ably shows, is a self-contradiction, because it cannot decide whether the Thing is One, Many-in-One, One-in-Many, or what.The Metaphysical paradox of the Thing is that it is One, Many, both and neither. Dialectical Reason can see this, but Perception cannot figure it out. Perceptual Consciousness eventually just moves on.That said, Hegel is, as you say, arguing that "a strict philosophy of perception-based consciousness" cannot stand on its own. Yet I don't find Leibniz to be Hegel's target. If Leibniz was the target, then in my view Hegel would have cited or alluded to this fact in his History of Philosophy (1830), within his rich section on Leibniz.Yet the term, "Perception," does not arise in those many pages. Instead we find much detail on Leibniz's theory of "Monads," which Hegel calls a "metaphysics," as well as Leibniz's famous phrase, "the best of all possible worlds," in his book entitled, Theology (1690), which includes a lengthy discourse on the Problem of Evil.Hegel in that section also takes care to distinguish the philosophy of Leibniz from the empiricism of Locke -- yet that does not inspire me to suggest that Hegel's section on Sense-certainty was a discourse on Locke.Rather -- it is the simple human mind that regards the Things in the world as simple "ones". The advanced mind of Leibniz cannot be reduced to such a simplistic model.Happy New Year,--Paul-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
On Monday, December 31, 2018, 12:46:42 AM CST, R Srivatsan r.srivats@... [hegel] <hegel@yahoogroups.com> wrote:
I differ with you here Paul,The argument is the Perception section is not a description of a chrono-historical stage of consciousness. It is rather a description of a pattern which exists in a 'primitive' (structural) form even in consciousness today. It is something that emerges in different contexts in natural consciousness. Beyond any description, this section is an argument why a strict philosophy of perception based consciousness and knowledge cannot hold significance on its own. Therefore, Hegel has to choose a pattern that is the most rigorous of all in this pattern -- I don't know if this is so, but my guess is that he chooses Leibniz's. Again, he doesn't mention Leibniz, and is not fully faithful to him, but as in sense certainty the base model is a kind of sense-empiricism, the model of perception being examined in 117 is akin to the Leibnizian model.The consequences that emerge in the most difficult sequences in this paragraph make sense when seen with the Leibniz model as the criterion of truth in exhibition. Such a view allows us to see the circular dance of the procession that the understanding goes through at this crossroads or way station. It allows the disproof of the criterion by means of an experience of consciousness of the property that contradicts the previously held opinion about the object as a single, simple One.Srivats-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Srivats,Here are the lines under examination:4. The object I apprehend presents itself as purely “one” and single.5. I am aware of the “properties” in it, properties which are Universal, thereby transcending its singularity!6. The first form of being, the objective reality of singularity, was thus an illusion.Here are you're questions:> Why should 4 be the 'natural attitude' when> my natural attitude is nothing like it?I question this. Why is your "natural attitude" different from mine? I naturally perceive each objects in the world as "one" single object. Don't you? How do you "naturally" perceive each object?> Why should 5 result in the falsifying of my> 'natural attitude'?Well, Srivats, insofar as the "natural attitude" is to perceive each object in the world as "one" single object, then the recognition that the object is a vehicle for countless "properties" that it shares with countless other objects requires careful thought and reflection.Are you saying, Srivats, that you already perceive objects as Unified by some Cosmic Scheme of shared properties? That would be unusual, in my opinion. In my opinion, most people naturally perceive each object in the world as "one" single object. To see it otherwise requires careful thought and reflection. Most people are not "naturally" thoughtful or reflective. That takes TIME.> And why, thus, should 6 result, i.e.., that as> you put it, 'the objective reality of a singularity'> be an illusion?This is the result of Philosophy -- careful thought and reflection reveal that each object in the world is really one single carrier for Common Properties that are shared by countless objects in the world.Since this is the case, then clearly, each object is not unique -- it isn't singular -- it's only one INSTANCE of a CLASS of objects. (This logic is also common to object-oriented programming.)So, I hope I've made my interpretation clear, there. Then you wrote:> What is the shape Hegel constrains his 'natural attitude'> or this stage of perceptual consciousness to, so that this> syllogism ensues?Hegel's "natural attitude" of Perception Consciousness is only one stage removed from the most primitive stage of human thought, the Sense-Certain Consciousness, where all things are merely, "This," pointing; "That," pointing; "Here," pointing; "There," pointing; "Me," pointing; "You," pointing.We have attained Perception Consciousness, where all things have Names. Even all the animals finally have Names. However, things are still not sophisticated or scientific. The "natural" attitude is that the world is composed of trillions of separate and unique objects -- each one separate, distinct and exclusive of all the others. That may be naive -- but that is the "natural attitude" as Hegel sees it -- and also as I see it. I see it in myself as well as in others.> My answer based on all your (everybody who> has responded, and my own thinking) is that this> model of the perceptual consciousness in para 117> is a model that is close to Leibniz's model, i.e., that> the perceptual consciousness posits that its truth is> simple (no necessity for predicates), single and> self-sustaining, i.e., its truth is Substance.I cannot agree, Srivats, because Substance is a Universal Category and automatically transcends the Particular and Individual. To attain the Concept of Substance is far beyond what Hegel calls the "natural attitude."The Concept of Substance can suggest the philosophy of Materialism (and even Engels said that old Spinoza was right). Yet Hegel does not even have Materialism in mind when he speaks of the "natural attitude" in para. 117 of his PhG (1807).Materialism is a thoughtful philosophy (even though it is mistaken, IMHO). It is beyond the "natural attitude," which in my interpretation is something like the attitude of a modern, seven-year old child. Everything is different and distinct and unique. They don't reflect very much about it.> However, the moment the property is seen> specifically, there is predication and the manner> in which the object is constituted fails according> to its own logic -- that of Leibniz's model. This is> why it now moves on to the next, i.e., looking at> the property, etc., which you have described,> and which I will now focus on.>> SrivatsNo, Srivats, I disagree on the same grounds. The concept of Leibniz is too advanced for Hegel's "natural attitude," here, and so the attribution of predicates is not what Hegel gets at with his next step, in my reading....All best,--Paul - << Previous post in topic Next post in topic >>