- Dec 31, 2018Pushing the Leibniz connection a little bit.The Britannica and the SEP entries on Leibniz, empiricism and rationalism are complicated and confusing. However, I thought of Hegel's History of Philosophy lectures and found Leibniz on the net. It just goes to show that Hegel's obscurity is not a lack of capability. He is so incredibly clear in relation to his account of Leibniz's philosophy. He divides his account of the philosophy into two parts a and b, in which a has seven characteristic features of monads. Of these, the third below shows the face off which Hegel's Perception section in the PhS bounces off (to a degree, there are of course many more things happeneing here):quoteIn the third place, “however, these monads must at the same time have certain qualities or determinations in themselves, inner actions, through which they are distinguished from others. There cannot be two things alike, for otherwise they would not be two, they would not be different but one and the same.”(9) Here then Leibnitz's axiom of the undistinguishable comes into words. What is not in itself distinguished is not distinguished. This may be taken in a trivial sense, as that there are not two individuals which are alike. To such sensuous things the maxim has no application, it is prima facie indifferent whether there are things which are alike or not; there may also be always a difference of space. This is the superficial sense, which does not concern us. The more intimate sense is, however, that each thing is in itself something determined, distinguishing itself from others implicitly or in itself. Whether two things are like or unlike is only a comparison which we make, which falls within our ken. But what we have further to consider is the determined difference in themselves. The difference must be a difference in themselves, not for our comparison, for the subject must have the difference as its own peculiar characteristic or determination, i.e., the determination must be immanent in the individual. Not only do we distinguish the animal by its claws, but it distinguishes itself essentially thereby, it defends itself, it preserves itself. If two things are different only in being two, then each of them is one; but the fact of their being two does not constitute a distinction between them; the determined difference in itself is the principal point.end quoteIt seems particularly apt to use Hegel's account of Leibniz here, because it would tell us exactly how Hegel thought of Leibniz, and not necessarily what Leibniz thought himself.SrivatsOn Tue, Jan 1, 2019 at 9:12 AM R Srivatsan <r.srivats@...> wrote:For some reason the first time I posted this my phone seems to have deleted it:---------- Forwarded message ---------
From: R Srivatsan <r.srivats@...>
Date: Tue, Jan 1, 2019, 9:08 AM
Subject: Re: [hegel] Some difficulty in 117 PhS Miller
To: <hegel@yahoogroups.com>I agree with you on the importance of the larger process at stake here. My difficulty here is when does focusing on the larger process allow me to disregard the importance of the close focus? How can I figure out when to disregard the detail? I can't. I have to push my reading to it's limit before I am able to take a step back. I'm fairly sure now, it will make larger sense as I go along. But when there is a movement that seems to follow the logic of the understanding, I feel compelled to follow it.SrivatsFor all the twists in the plot, Hegel stays with the common way of conceiving things and properties. It may sound convoluted but nothing he says strays far from common sense or what the empiricists have already said about the thing and properties.
And although common sense says contradictory things both about things and about properties, it employs various differences of respect to cope with these contradictions.
What Hegel is trying to do is show that these stratagems fail as the differences of respect do not hold. But most of this already is the common knowledge of empiricist philosophers.
So, we might wonder why philosophers appear here and nowhere else. Moreover, if Hegel is to have only one philosophical position appear over the course of the exposition, why empiricism?
Perception seems to be the one mode where what is for us and for consciousness intermingle.
I take this to be the structural feature that might be used to explain the appearance of philosophy at just this point in the exposition.
Perception is also the one mode where the reader and natural consciousness seem to occupy the same space in the same way. Or it is the one mode of Consciousness where Hegel does not seem to need us to step in for consciousness. Even though we do step in, consciousness seems also to be present and active along with us.
What I mean to suggest by these remarks is that we learn little about what Hegel is up to if we focus too narrowly on the problem of making sense of the thing with properties that Hegel is here considering. What really matters is what all this sound and fury might signify.
- Alan
From: hegel@yahoogroups.com <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Monday, December 31, 2018 1:46 AM
To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
Subject: Re: [hegel] Some difficulty in 117 PhS MillerI differ with you here Paul,
The argument is the Perception section is not a description of a chrono-historical stage of consciousness. It is rather a description of a pattern which exists in a 'primitive' (structural) form even in consciousness today. It is something that emerges in different contexts in natural consciousness. Beyond any description, this section is an argument why a strict philosophy of perception based consciousness and knowledge cannot hold significance on its own. Therefore, Hegel has to choose a pattern that is the most rigorous of all in this pattern -- I don't know if this is so, but my guess is that he chooses Leibniz's. Again, he doesn't mention Leibniz, and is not fully faithful to him, but as in sense certainty the base model is a kind of sense-empiricism, the model of perception being examined in 117 is akin to the Leibnizian model.
The consequences that emerge in the most difficult sequences in this paragraph make sense when seen with the Leibniz model as the criterion of truth in exhibition. Such a view allows us to see the circular dance of the procession that the understanding goes through at this crossroads or way station. It allows the disproof of the criterion by means of an experience of consciousness of the property that contradicts the previously held opinion about the object as a single, simple One.
Srivats
On Mon, Dec 31, 2018 at 11:11 AM Paul Trejo petrejo@... [hegel] <hegel@yahoogroups.com> wrote:
Srivats,
Here are the lines under examination:
4. The object I apprehend presents itself as purely “one” and single.
5. I am aware of the “properties” in it, properties which are Universal, thereby transcending its singularity!
6. The first form of being, the objective reality of singularity, was thus an illusion.
Here are you're questions:
> Why should 4 be the 'natural attitude' when
> my natural attitude is nothing like it?
I question this. Why is your "natural attitude" different from mine? I naturally perceive each objects in the world as "one" single object. Don't you? How do you "naturally" perceive each object?
> Why should 5 result in the falsifying of my
> 'natural attitude'?
Well, Srivats, insofar as the "natural attitude" is to perceive each object in the world as "one" single object, then the recognition that the object is a vehicle for countless "properties" that it shares with countless other objects requires careful thought and reflection.
Are you saying, Srivats, that you already perceive objects as Unified by some Cosmic Scheme of shared properties? That would be unusual, in my opinion. In my opinion, most people naturally perceive each object in the world as "one" single object. To see it otherwise requires careful thought and reflection. Most people are not "naturally" thoughtful or reflective. That takes TIME.
> And why, thus, should 6 result, i.e.., that as
> you put it, 'the objective reality of a singularity'
> be an illusion?
This is the result of Philosophy -- careful thought and reflection reveal that each object in the world is really one single carrier for Common Properties that are shared by countless objects in the world.
Since this is the case, then clearly, each object is not unique -- it isn't singular -- it's only one INSTANCE of a CLASS of objects. (This logic is also common to object-oriented programming.)
So, I hope I've made my interpretation clear, there. Then you wrote:
> What is the shape Hegel constrains his 'natural attitude'
> or this stage of perceptual consciousness to, so that this
> syllogism ensues?
Hegel's "natural attitude" of Perception Consciousness is only one stage removed from the most primitive stage of human thought, the Sense-Certain Consciousness, where all things are merely, "This," pointing; "That," pointing; "Here," pointing; "There," pointing; "Me," pointing; "You," pointing.
We have attained Perception Consciousness, where all things have Names. Even all the animals finally have Names. However, things are still not sophisticated or scientific. The "natural" attitude is that the world is composed of trillions of separate and unique objects -- each one separate, distinct and exclusive of all the others. That may be naive -- but that is the "natural attitude" as Hegel sees it -- and also as I see it. I see it in myself as well as in others.
> My answer based on all your (everybody who
> has responded, and my own thinking) is that this
> model of the perceptual consciousness in para 117
> is a model that is close to Leibniz's model, i.e., that
> the perceptual consciousness posits that its truth is
> simple (no necessity for predicates), single and
> self-sustaining, i.e., its truth is Substance.
I cannot agree, Srivats, because Substance is a Universal Category and automatically transcends the Particular and Individual. To attain the Concept of Substance is far beyond what Hegel calls the "natural attitude."
The Concept of Substance can suggest the philosophy of Materialism (and even Engels said that old Spinoza was right). Yet Hegel does not even have Materialism in mind when he speaks of the "natural attitude" in para. 117 of his PhG (1807).
Materialism is a thoughtful philosophy (even though it is mistaken, IMHO). It is beyond the "natural attitude," which in my interpretation is something like the attitude of a modern, seven-year old child. Everything is different and distinct and unique. They don't reflect very much about it.
> However, the moment the property is seen
> specifically, there is predication and the manner
> in which the object is constituted fails according
> to its own logic -- that of Leibniz's model. This is
> why it now moves on to the next, i.e., looking at
> the property, etc., which you have described,
> and which I will now focus on.
>
> Srivats
No, Srivats, I disagree on the same grounds. The concept of Leibniz is too advanced for Hegel's "natural attitude," here, and so the attribution of predicates is not what Hegel gets at with his next step, in my reading.
In any case, it seems you have moved on.
All best,
--Paul
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On Sunday, December 30, 2018, 5:29:06 AM CST, R Srivatsan r.srivats@gmail..com [hegel] <hegel@yahoogroups.com> wrote:
Paul,
Again thanks for this. My question was about 4, 5 and 6
quote
4. The object I apprehend presents itself as purely “one” and single..
5. I am aware of the “properties” in it, properties which are Universal, thereby transcending its singularity!
6. The first form of being, the objective reality of singularity, was thus an illusion.
end quote
Why should 4 be the 'natural attitude' when my natural attitude is nothing like it? Why should 5 result in the falsifying of my 'natural attitude'? And why, thus, should 6 result, i.e.., that as you put it, 'the objective reality of a singularity' be an illusion?
What is the shape Hegel constrains his 'natural attitude' or this stage of perceptual consciousness to, so that this syllogism ensues. My answer based on all your (everybody who has responded, and my own thinking) is that this model of the perceptual consciousness in para 117 is a model that is close to Leibniz's model, i.e., that the perceptual consciousness posits that its truth is simple (no necessity for predicates), single and self-sustaining, i.e., its truth is substance. However the moment the property is seen specifically, there is predication and the manner in which the object is constituted fails according to its own logic -- that of Leibniz's model. This is why it now moves on to the next, i.e., looking at the property, etc., which you have described, and which I will now focus on.
SrivatsOn Sun, Dec 30, 2018 at 11:33 AM Paul Trejo petrejo@... [hegel] <hegel@yahoogroups.com> wrote:
Srivats,
I will tackle all your questions with my interpretation here -- Hegel's entire Φ 117 poses three errors. that we normally make the dialectic of our experience. You are currently focused on only the first error. But the paragraph requires our attention to all three errors. Here's my take on Hegel's Φ 117:
1. Consciousness forms an experience in the course of its actual perception.
2. We, who analyze the process, find this experience inside the development of the object through the attitude of our consciousness towards it.
3. The experience will be merely the development of the contradictions that appear there.
4. The object I apprehend presents itself as purely “one” and single.
5. I am aware of the “properties” in it, properties which are Universal, thereby transcending its singularity!
6. The first form of being, the objective reality of singularity, was thus an illusion.
7. Yet the illusion was the fault of my own apprehension -- not the object's fault.
8. Because "properties" are Universal, I now take the Objective Entity as a Community.
9. I also see that the "properties" are defined, opposed to each other and exclude each other.
10. That's my second error -- "properties" never indicate a Community when they clash.
11. Next, I'll strictly define each property and define the object as a singularity that and excludes.
12. However, the singularity also has many properties that don't clash, but are content to sit side by side.
13. That was my third error -- the object does not simply "exclude". It also "includes."
14. Just as formerly it was merely continuity in general, without excluding properties, a mere Universal medium.
15. Now I see the particular property -- which is shared by many others, but is also exclusive of many others.
16. But any quality is a "property" only when attached to a “one”, and finite only in relation to "others."
17. A property, as self-related, remains mere stuff -- not even negative -- and the mode of consciousness of sense data, is merely a way of “meaning” or “intending”.
18. That is, it is no longer Perception, and now it is merely a Reflection..
19. But sensory life and “meaning” automatically pass over into Perception! Now I am back where I started!
20. Perception is trapped in a vicious circle that supersedes itself in every moment and as a whole.
There's my take on Hegel's Φ 117, Srivats. The entire paragraph is intended to show the Phenomenology of Experience in Perception -- its inner contradictions, and its vicious circle.
This is not the final stage of the Phenomenology -- it is really a very early stage. There is much more to come..
All best,
--Paul
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On Saturday, December 29, 2018, 8:44:36 PM CST, R Srivatsan r.srivats@... [hegel] <hegel@yahoogroups.com> wrote:
Paul,
Thanks for confirming my own initial reading as something we see at first. My question is why does the model of this first seeing follow a system of seemingly invisible constraints, and not follow the fluidity of 'accommodation'. Why does Hegel pose this noticing of the property as a contradiction of the original 'simple substance'?
SrivatsOn Sun, Dec 30, 2018 at 5:54 AM Paul Trejo petrejo@... [hegel] <hegel@yahoogroups.com> wrote:
Hi Srivats,
Let's look closer at Φ 117 in Hegel's PhG (1807). Hegel is speaking of Perception in the context of our simple analysis of an object. You note only two sentences from Hegel in that paragraph, as follows:
"(1) The object which I apprehend presents itself purely as a
One; but I also perceive in it a property which is universal,
and which, thereby transcends the singularity. (2) The first
being of the objective essence as a One was therefore not its
true being." (Hegel, 1807, PhG, Φ 117)
You puzzle over the meaning, i.e., "why does the second sentence follow from the first?" I submit your puzzle really begins with the first sentence. I will interpret that one first.
1. This Object appears to be Unique. Yet this Object contains many Properties. Also, its Properties are shared by countless other Objects -- so these Properties are Universals. Since the Object consists of many Universals, then this Object cannot be Unique. That is, my new interpretation of the Object "transcends the singularity."
If we can agree on my interpretation above, then the second sentence will follow very easily. Here is my interpretation of the second sentence:
2. My first Perception of the Object as a Unique One, was therefore an error. The "One" was "not its true being.."
In my interpretation, the second sentence merely restates the conclusion of the first sentence..
All best,
--Paul
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On Saturday, December 29, 2018, 4:22:06 AM CST, R Srivatsan r.srivats@... [hegel] <hegel@yahoogroups.com> wrote:
Hello
I have some difficulty in para 117, PhS Miller, which isn't going away. It seems a fairly simple problem of concept/language, but things are deceptive (pun intended).. After Hegel speaks of unfolding the contradictions in the perceiving consciousness of what 'we' have seen, in the fi
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