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43436Re: [hegel] Re: Some difficulty in 117 PhS Miller

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  • R Srivatsan
    Dec 29, 2018
      Hi Joao,

      Thanks.  I was thinking of how the perceptual consciousness sees the thing at this stage, and somehow arrived at the idea of Leibniz's monad.  It seems that the notion of a substance, of simplicity, of self-supportedness (the non-necessity of predication) all are already there in Leibniz -- I'm looking at the SEP entry here.

      Therefore it would seem that the reference to self-identity, and the underlying notion of simplicity all point to a model of pc at this stage of the exposition as inhabiting Leibniz concept of the monad.  What happens with the property is that this concept is, as you say, leaky.

      There is also the barest glance towards Leibniz's notion of a perfect God, who as the seer of all reason, is the only one who can see the history and future shape of the haecceity.  That is that the singular is essentially unfathomable by the finite subject.

      What seems to happen is that the exposition quickly transits through this 'imperfect' model of perception by showing how it circles back through sense certainty.

      Srivats

      On Sun, Dec 30, 2018 at 7:20 AM vascojoao2003@... [hegel] <hegel@yahoogroups.com> wrote:
       

      Hi Srivats,


      Thanks for this. 

      In my view, by One Hegel means a substance, in this case an object of perception, which is able to remain within itself be justified, to be supported. Being a One, I think, refers to what supports itself, to what is self-supported, self-standing. The problem is that the universality of a property pierces that self-standingness because there is something in it that is fundamental for the One's definition while not having it, on the other hand, as a fundamental for itself. In this sense it is like the oneness of the object is leaking. The universality of the property is the leak, it becomes a matter on its own accord, able to the grasped, thought, referred to, outside of the One. The One pours itself outside itself.

      Regards,
      João


      ---In hegel@yahoogroups.com, <r.srivats@.

      Hello

      I have some difficulty in para 117, PhS Miller, which isn't going away.  It seems a fairly simple problem of concept/language, but things are deceptive (pun intended).  After Hegel speaks of unfolding the contradictions in the perceiving consciousness of what 'we' have seen, in the first couple of lines, he goes on to these two sentences:

      quote
      The object which I apprehend presents itself purely as a One; but I also perceive in it a property which is universal, and which,thereby transcends the singularity [of the object]. The first being of the objective essence as a One was therefore not its true being.
      end quote

      Why does the second sentence follow from the first?  It seems as if the truth taking consciousness first simply accepts the object seen as true -- as a One (singular).  But in this singular, I see a property that is not unique -- shared by other things.  Therefore, Hegel suggests, "the first being of the objective essence as a One was therefore not its true being".  There is something presumed here in the first sentence.  When we perceive, we simply perceive -- we don't submit to the "taking of its truth".  When we see the property, we simply take note of it, at least that's how I would see it.  We don't see a truth threatening contradiction which says that my One is not actually  a One.  What am 'I' as a perceptive consciousness assuming I perceive in this instance.  What is the 'I' expecting, and what does it posit as the outcome of its perception of a 'One'?

      This sort of 'extremism' suggests that in perception, just as the ability to sense was severely constrained in the Sense Certainty section, the ability to accommodate aspects of truth seems to be constrained here.  In other words, what is the perceptive attitude Hegel assumes in this section?

      Srivats 



      --
      R Srivatsan
      Anveshi Research Centre for Women's Studies 
      2-2-18/2/A Durgabai Deshmukh Colony
      Hyderabad 500 007
      Office Phone: +91 40 27423690
      Mobile: +91 94404 80762, +91 77027 11656
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      --
      R Srivatsan
      Anveshi Research Centre for Women's Studies 
      2-2-18/2/A Durgabai Deshmukh Colony
      Hyderabad 500 007
      Office Phone: +91 40 27423690
      Mobile: +91 94404 80762, +91 77027 11656
      Home Phone +91 40 2773 5193



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