On Sun, Dec 30, 2018 at 5:54 AM Paul Trejo petrejo@... [hegel] <hegel@yahoogroups.com> wrote:

 

Hi Srivats,

Let's look closer at Φ 117 in Hegel's PhG (1807). Hegel is speaking of Perception in the context of our simple analysis of an object.  You note only two sentences from Hegel in that paragraph, as follows: 

"(1) The object which I apprehend presents itself purely as a 

One; but I also perceive in it a property which is universal, 

and which, thereby transcends the singularity. (2) The first 

being of the objective essence as a One was therefore not its 

true being."  (Hegel, 1807, PhG, Φ 117)

You puzzle over the meaning, i.e., "why does the second sentence follow from the first?"  I submit your puzzle really begins with the first sentence.  I will interpret that one first.

1. This Object appears to be Unique.  Yet this Object contains many Properties.  Also, its Properties are shared by countless other Objects -- so these Properties are Universals.  Since the Object consists of many Universals, then this Object cannot be Unique.  That is, my new interpretation of the Object "transcends the singularity." 

If we can agree on my interpretation above, then the second sentence will follow very easily.  Here is my interpretation of the second sentence:

2. My first Perception of the Object as a Unique One, was therefore an error.  The "One" was "not its true being." 

In my interpretation, the second sentence merely restates the conclusion of the first sentence..

All best,

--Paul

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On Saturday, December 29, 2018, 4:22:06 AM CST, R Srivatsan r.srivats@... [hegel] <hegel@yahoogroups.com> wrote:

Hello

I have some difficulty in para 117, PhS Miller, which isn't going away.  It seems a fairly simple problem of concept/language, but things are deceptive (pun intended).  After Hegel speaks of unfolding the contradictions in the perceiving consciousness of what 'we' have seen, in the first couple of lines, he goes on to these two sentences:

quote

The object which I apprehend presents itself purely as a One; but I also perceive in it a property which is universal, and which,thereby transcends the singularity [of the object]. The first being of the objective essence as a One was therefore not its true being..

end quote

Why does the second sentence follow from the first?  It seems as if the truth taking consciousness first simply accepts the object seen as true -- as a One (singular).  But in this singular, I see a property that is not unique -- shared by other things.  Therefore, Hegel suggests, "the first being of the objective essence as a One was therefore not its true being".  

There is something presumed here in the first sentence.  When we perceive, we simply perceive -- we don't submit to the "taking of its truth".  When we see the property, we simply take note of it, at least that's how I would see it..  We don't see a truth threatening contradiction which says that my One is not actually  a One.  

What am 'I' as a perceptive consciousness assuming I perceive in this instance.  What is the 'I' expecting, and what does it posit as the outcome of its perception of a 'One'?

This sort of 'extremism' suggests that in perception, just as the ability to sense was severely constrained in the Sense Certainty section, the ability to accommodate aspects of truth seems to be constrained here.  In other words, what is the perceptive attitude Hegel assumes in this section?

Srivats  

--

R Srivatsan
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