The object which I apprehend presents itself purely as a One; but I also perceive in it a property which is universal, and which,thereby transcends the singularity [of the object]. The first being of the objective essence as a One was therefore not its true being.

end quote

Why does the second sentence follow from the first?  It seems as if the truth taking consciousness first simply accepts the object seen as true -- as a One (singular).  But in this singular, I see a property that is not unique -- shared by other things.  Therefore, Hegel suggests, "the first being of the objective essence as a One was therefore not its true being".  There is something presumed here in the first sentence.  When we perceive, we simply perceive -- we don't submit to the "taking of its truth".  When we see the property, we simply take note of it, at least that's how I would see it.  We don't see a truth threatening contradiction which says that my One is not actually  a One.  What am 'I' as a perceptive consciousness assuming I perceive in this instance.  What is the 'I' expecting, and what does it posit as the outcome of its perception of a 'One'?

This sort of 'extremism' suggests that in perception, just as the ability to sense was severely constrained in the Sense Certainty section, the ability to accommodate aspects of truth seems to be constrained here.  In other words, what is the perceptive attitude Hegel assumes in this section?

Srivats