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43346RE: [hegel] perception

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  • Alan Ponikvar
    Dec 17, 2018

      The anti-speculative metaphysical move is to read “overcome” as a doing away with.

       

      The opposition of consciousness is overcome by being internalized. The true as an identity is an identity in difference. This difference is the inner difference of the true or absolute.

       

      What is inappropriate about John’s subject is that it is incomplete. It limits cognition to the cognition of an object.

       

      The speculative subject as self-thinking recollects its own thinking and then posits the absolute form of this thinking as its cognitive object.

       

      • Alan

       

      From: hegel@yahoogroups.com <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
      Sent: Monday, December 17, 2018 6:09 AM
      To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
      Subject: Re: [hegel] perception

       

       

      This is a big question (negative theology approached "positively"). Meanwhile I would ask John if he can show that what he calls "the psychological idea"would not in that case be finite, an inappropriate finale to hegel's system as contradicting its main affirmation.

       

      Myself I see final self-consciousness as the overcoming of all that we call conscious precisely in its finitude or "subjectivity". The I is absolute (see Nicholas opf Cusal, Eckhart, Al Hallaj) or the Psalms (and Augustine therefore), "In thy light shall we see light". This needs systematica exposition, of course, as it finds in Hegel.

       

      Stephen Theron.

       


      From: hegel@yahoogroups.com <hegel@yahoogroups.com> on behalf of 'Alan Ponikvar' ponikvaraj@... [hegel] <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
      Sent: 13 December 2018 19:36
      To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
      Subject: RE: [hegel] perception

       

       

      Every moment of this supposed metaphysics is self-subverting.

       

      Absolute knowing is Gertrude Stein’s Oakland in that there is no there there..

       

      Absolute negativity is the truth about reason.

       

      Is this a metaphysical truth?

       

      If so, then one is limited to asserting that being is void.

       

      If it is not a metaphysical truth, then this void can more appropriately identified as the cut inherent to reason that accounts for reason being active.

       

      • Alan

       

      From: hegel@yahoogroups.com <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
      Sent: Thursday, December 13, 2018 1:22 PM
      To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
      Subject: Re: [hegel] perception

       

       

      Srivats mentions the concrete universal. What is that? In the Phenomenology of Spirit it is defined as the "I" of reason that sees itself as all reality.

       

      This concrete universal is arrived at, first, at the end of the Consciousness section. So the Consciousness section is very much a self-contained whole. In it we see the universal develop from its most rudimentary form in Sense-certainty, step by step, to this "I" which is all reality.

       

      And, in fact, the so-called concrete universal, the "I" of reason that sees itself as all reality, is the final moment of all the moments of the Phenomenology. And the final moment of the Phenomenology itself, the Preface or Scientific Cognition would in itself be this "I" of reason that sees itself as all reality.

       

      And this is why the final moment of Hegel's system is Spirit, the psychological idea, rather than Logic, the theological idea. Ultimately Hegel's metaphysics takes the form of this concrete universal, of the "I" of reason that sees itself as all reality.

       

      One can see that this is quite different from Spinoza's metaphysics. For Spinoza Substance is primary, Attributes are secondary, and Modes are of almost no significance at all. In Hegel, in contrast, the Mode as the "I" of reason that sees itself as all reality, is ultimate.

       

      John

       

       

       

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