- Nov 12, 2018
In the Logic every identification of an immediate determination being the beginning of a speculative derivation has thought separate from the immediacy it thinks.
In the Logic thought does not rely upon nor does it need a context other than its own thinking to think this determination that Hegel calls ‘something’.
Thought at the beginning of the Logic is not trying to point out a ‘this’ in space and time. It is not trying to state that ‘this’ is so.
So, the “external pointing” is not of a ‘this’ out there in a phenomenal world.
It is thinking pointing to its thought determination.
There is no presumed distinction between an instance and a universal.
In fact, there is a logical move from something as such to a something.
The logic of this move involves showing how something as a negation of negation is an existent. Hegel discusses this in the section on Something (pages 88-90).
Thus, Hegel’s comment about language and the understanding is an aside about ordinary cognition.
It sets up the following:
“even for ordinary thinking every existence equally determines itself as an other existence, so that there is no existence that remains determined simply as an existence, none which is not outside an existence and therefore is not itself an other.”
Ordinary thinking – thinking that talks about phenomenal existents – when it says ‘this’ meaning ‘this something’ also implies that this something is also other just because it is something.
But the derivation does not hinge upon what ordinary thinking means when it points out a ‘this’ in the world.
Because the thought of something is determinate it stands as a thought in contrast to its determinate nonbeing or in contrast to its other.
So, while I believe that here in the Logic with this parenthetical comment about language and the universal Hegel is alluding to what happens to his naïve reader in Sense Certainty, what happens in the Logic is that the universal itself as the determinate thought ‘something’ is inherently self-conflicted.
When we say ‘something’ we also imply ‘other’.
In this sense, the identification of something as an immediacy is an incomplete thought. To be comprehensible it needs its negative complement.
It is not that thinking means what is particular but says what is universal.
It is that thinking means a self-standing determinacy when the truth of any determinacy is that it is self-conflicted.
Hegel also revisits this comment about language and the universal when he discusses immediate sense knowing in the Encyclopedia.
What is evident to me is that Hegel had a conflicted relationship to his first work.
There are no references to what happens in the Phenomenology that allude to precisely how this work meant to serve as an education to the standpoint of science
All references are to the naïve points, not to the speculative truths.
The comment about language and universals is a comment about abstract universals. It is a nonspeculative point. It is not relevant to the speculative truth of sense certainty.
Hegel ignores here in the Logic how in Sense Certainty there is a tension between abstract and concrete self-constituting universals. He ignores this important speculative distinction.
- Alan
From: hegel@yahoogroups.com <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Monday, November 12, 2018 8:57 AM
To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
Subject: Re: [hegel] Sense CertaintyThe passage below suggests another approach.
SL, "Something and Other":
"“This” serves to fix the distinction [between something and other, BH] and the something which is to be taken in the affirmative sense. But “this” also expresses the fact that the distinction, and the privileging of one something, is a subjective designation that falls outside the something itself. The whole determinateness falls on the side of this external pointing; also the expression “this” contains no distinctions; each and every something is just as good a “this” as any other. By “this” we mean to express something completely determinate, overlooking the fact that language, as a work of the understanding, only expresses the universal, albeit naming it as a single object. But an individual name is something meaningless in the sense that it does not express a universal. It appears as something merely posited and arbitrary for the same reason that proper names can also be arbitrarily picked, arbitrarily given as well as arbitrarily altered.[Note]"
Note: "Hegel is repeating the argument of Chapter 1 of the Phenomenology of Spirit." (SL, Di Giovanni's tanslation and note, p. 91.)
"The word 'this' serves to fix the distinction and the something which is to be taken affirmatively. But 'this' clearly expresses that this distinguishing and signalising of the one something is a subjective designating falling outside the-something itself. The entire determinateness falls into this external pointing out; even the expression 'this' contains no distinction; each and every something is just as well a 'this' as it is also an other. By 'this' we mean to express something completely determined; it is overlooked that speech, as a work of the understanding, gives expression only to universals, except in the name of a single object; but the individual name is meaningless, in the sense that it does not express a universal, and for the same reason appears as something merely posited and arbitrary; just as proper names, too, can be arbitrarily assumed, given or also altered." (Miller's translation, section 214)
What it suggests is that the weakness of Sense Certainty is that it is satisfied with the surfaces of things and doesn't care to know things in themselves.
The meaning of a proper name (it has none, "in the sense that it does not express a universal") might rely on context; but the reference of a name doesn't depend on context once it is assigned. (This assumes, of course, that each individual has its own unique name -- a truly proper name (meinen).)
Bill
"(Recall the story by Raymond Roussel of his discovery, in a dusty provincial museum, under glass, of the skull of Voltaire as a child.)" (Fredric Jameson)
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From: hegel@yahoogroups.com <hegel@yahoogroups.com> on behalf of vascojoao2003@... [hegel] <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Friday, November 9, 2018 11:35:50 AM
To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
Subject: Re: [hegel] Sense Certainty
In my view, Sense-Certainty is an idea, a notion, of what is true. It belongs to a perspective where one could be found saying that all is doubtful and debatable, uncertain, except the material world that [and as it] simply presents itself. The voice Hegel gives it is to put this concept of truth in play, explaining itself.All concepts of truth are, in their own concept, generic, that is, implying the genus, self-consciousness, the Polis or the State, and so they should explain themselves to the people. In this sense, we can find, retrospectively, in this act of giving words to a simply impositive diktat - sense-certainty in its immediacy, and insofar as all ideas of what is true are tendentially political, can be said to be a diktat - in order to have its case evaluated by the people, the reader, the streak of sympathy in Hegel for the democratic state, even if lead by a sovereign.
Regards,
João.
---In hegel@yahoogroups.com, <r.srivats@I find this much more congenial. Yes, by artificial, I mean a mode that tries to mimic the implications of what a sense certain consciousness should be in order to satisfy pre Hegelian thinking about Sense Certainty. Artificial in the sense of excluding, bracketing out some of the registers of consciousness that would automatically come into play in natural sense certainty -- as in the case of Frau Bauer and her cow Lisa in Harris' commentary (in Hegel's Ladder) on these paragraphs.
Best
Srivats
On Fri, Nov 9, 2018 at 7:51 PM bill.hord bill.hord@... [hegel] <hegel@yahoogroups.com> wrote:
Srivats, I'm having trouble picking up your sense of "artificial." I don't think there's any direct mention of artificiality in the text. Your two examples suggest to me 1) we assume the perspective of the sense certain I at that point, and 2) we put aside conceptual thought (alien to sense certainty as it thinks) and sense as SC does. These seem to reduce to the same thing -- maybe that is what you intended.
If sense certainty were not inherent in "our" own shape of consciousness -- not yours and mine, of course, but that of the science-educated guide -- then the sense of "artificial" might be "pretended," a pose to mislead us (us?).
However, there is good reason to believe that sense certainty is sublated in absolute knowing. In that case sense certain knowing is an I that is a we, and a we that is an I. Is a we that is an I artificial or an anticipation of the truth? If both, then the "artificial" will sublate to truth -- it's only provisionally artificial.
On the other hand, there seems to be a view that sense certain knowing is completely alien to us (both we who are reading and the guide we in the PoS). While this might be the view of SC consciousness, explaining why it turns away from us -- who needs conceptual thought? -- we know better, because we have seen conceptual thought assert its necessity in the course of trying to limit our thought to SC thought.
I think non-philosophical friends would probably agree with SC, and still we know -- speculative knowing is seeing the whole that is true -- that implicit in SC is much more than it imagines.
Bill
"(Recall the story by Raymond Roussel of his discovery, in a dusty provincial museum, under glass, of the skull of Voltaire as a child.)" (Fredric Jameson)
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From: hegel@yahoogroups.com <hegel@yahoogroups.com> on behalf of R Srivatsan r.srivats@... [hegel] <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Thursday, November 8, 2018 9:18 PM
To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
Subject: Re: [hegel] Sense CertaintyI seemed to have misunderstood you then. But as for proof about the artificial We, I think there are indications for instance:
quote
105. Since, then, this certainty will no longer come forth to us when we direct its attention to a Now that is night, or to an 'I' to whom it is night, we will approach it and let ourselves point to the Now that is asserted. We must let ourselves point to it; for the truth of this immediate relation is the truth of this 'I' which confines itself to one 'Now' or one 'Here'. Were we to examine this truth afterwards, or stand at a distance from it, it would lose its significance entirely; for that would do away with the immediacy which is essential to it. We must therefore enter the same point of time or space, point them out to ourselves, i.e. make ourselves into the same singular 'I' which is the one who knows with certainty. Let us, then, see how that immediate is constituted that is pointed out to us.
end quote
Let me take into account Inwood's (paragraph note in his translation) and Houlgate's (Hegel Reader) correction of Miller's translation into account that rather than say 'let ourselves point out', say instead 'let it be pointed out to us'. I.e., We, who enter the position allow sense certainty to point out to us what it means by the truth or essence. This truth or essence is what Sense Certainty means, and 'we' must try to understand it. If we stood apart from where Sense Certainty wants us to stand (i.e., if we adopt a POV as you say with respect to this that is independent of Sense Certainty's pointing) that would do away with the immediacy that is essential to it. Let 'us' enter that singular point, that same I and see what it means, 'see how that immediate is constituted for us'. This is of a piece with the line at the end of paragraph 90 of sense certainty:
quote
Our approach to the object must also be immediate or receptive; we must alter nothing in the object as it presents itself. In apprehending it, we must refrain from trying to comprehend it.
end quote
So when we approach Sense Certainty to know the truth, we must simply apprehend, not comprehend -- there are three uses of the word 'must' that indicate how we must bracket out our frame (as we are as readers of Hegel, leave aside our own bright ideas) to see what Sense Certainty sees as the truth.
This is about as clear an indication as any that there is an artificial We involved.
SrivatsOn Fri, Nov 9, 2018 at 8:24 AM bill.hord bill.hord@... [hegel] <hegel@yahoogroups.com> wrote:
Srivats, I gave the wrong impression if I suggested "a simple indifferent and random diversity." I thought I was giving the textual evidence for the order that is in the text with respect to Hegel's use of I and we in this chapter. I think there isn't much interest here in actually looking at what the text says.
So, yes, the Introduction says there is a need for a standard. It also says the experience of consciousness is the application of the implicit standard. SC, as a shape of consciousness, has such an experience. In my view, the we isn't artificial and the I isn't constructed by Hegel here... Is there any textual support for such an interpretation? Even a small acknowledgement by Hegel that he's doing such a thing?
Bill
"(Recall the story by Raymond Roussel of his discovery, in a dusty provincial museum, under glass, of the skull of Voltaire as a child.)" (Fredric Jameson)
This email may contain confidential and/or privileged information. If you are not the intended recipient (or have received this email in error) please notify the sender immediately and destroy this email. Any unauthorized copying, disclosure or distribution of the material in this email is strictly prohibited.
From: hegel@yahoogroups.com <hegel@yahoogroups.com> on behalf of R Srivatsan r.srivats@... [hegel] <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Thursday, November 8, 2018 7:44:59 PM
To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
Subject: Re: [hegel] Sense CertaintyBill,
I agree with you entirely that there is a whole flood of ways in which Hegel uses the term 'we' in Sense Certainty (and perhaps elsewhere too in the PhS). However, I do think that this multitude of ways is not a simple indifferent and random diversity. It is a flexibility, plasticity of thought if you will, that arises from an organic/speculative comprehension of the moment of the 'we' in the Absolute as process that takes place in the relationship between consciousness and self consciousness.
As far as the 'I' goes, it is far more straightforward to me. Either it is a naive I, which now turns to a tree or a house or writes Night; Or it is 'the I' which is the ultimate indexical.
It is to my mind a Catch 22 situation for Sense Certainty to 'examine itself'. To examine is to mediate, to frame, to measure against a criterion or standard of truth. While the Introduction sets this measurement against a criterion as the goal of the PhS, the problem with Sense Certainty as Hegel caricatures its use by philosophers before him who used the term or its aliases to describe the process of direct unmediated absorption of the Truth (in all its senses) is that it implies what I call an emaciated or evacuated observer with no frame of reference. In such an artificial situation, the Sense Certain consciousness has no resources to conduct the examination. It is for this purpose that an artificial 'we' or naive 'I' is constructed to enter the picture.
Srivats
On Thu, Nov 8, 2018 at 8:53 PM bill.hord bill.hord@... [hegel] <hegel@yahoogroups.com> wrote:
Srivats, as an interim observation and response ...
Hegel's use of "we" and "I" in this chapter have to be examined. Hegel uses these pronouns in a variety of ways throughout the Phenomenology. The standard view is that, In the PoS, "we" refers to the phenomenological observer, the guide, or this guide and his readers. However, we can easily spot exceptions to this rule in Chapter 1.
One explanation for this is that Hegel seems to easily slip into something like "erlebte rede": in writing about a shape of consciousness he adopts the POV and language of that shape, without warning.
90. We and our here refer to the guide and his readers.
91. In the first sentence, Hegel describes SC experience apparently from the POV of SC and he uses we: "either when we reach out into space and time in which it is dispersed, or when we take a bit of this wealth, and by division enter into it."
91b. Later in 91 Hegel switches to I when he speaks from the SC POV: "Consciousness, for its part, is in this certainty only as a pure 'I'; or I am in it only as a pure 'This’ and the object similarly only as a pure 'This', I, this particular I, am certain of this particular thing, not because I, qua consciousness, in knowing it have developed myself or thought about it in various ways."
92. We refers to the guide. In 92-94 the guide reminds us how SC experience should look to us; and directs us to observe SC knowing itself.
95. This is where you raise your question, and I think you take we and us in this section to refer to the guide. I suggest that after 92-94 Hegel here switches to the POV of SC and uses we and us to refer to that POV: "To the question: 'What is Now?', let us answer, e.....g. 'Now is Night.'" My response to you is that this "we" is the voice of sense certain knowing.
95b. Later, Hegel writes, "We write down this truth ..." It sounds like the we of the guide. But there also emerges here a sort of indirect free dialogue with SC. So, this we suggests a cooperative activity of the guide and SC. (Later, in 104-105, SC refuses to continue with this dialogue (because it has stubbornly sunk into its own consciousness) and the guide decides to explicitly take over its role in the dialogue.
96. Appears to be thoughts from the guide.
97. We appears as an ambiguity: "we do not strictly say what in this sense-certainty we mean to say." It is SC who holds the opposite view, presumably. If this is a general truth for all of us, we seem to have a vanishing of the different points of view into a truth.
99.... Appears to be summary of insights by the guide, but the we is ambiguous at least: "consequently, it is not what we mean by 'being" but is 'being' defined as an abstraction, or as the pure universal." This experience seems to be a summary of the guide's views, from the POV of SC.
100. We refers to the guide and his readers. But also note that SC responds: :Sense-certainty, then, though indeed expelled from the object, is not yet thereby overcome, but only driven back into the 'I', We have now to see what experience shows us about its reality in the 'I'."
101. A clear example of erlebte rede (free indirect discourse): "the vanishing of the single Now and Here that we mean is prevented by the fact that I hold them fast." The we is the guide, and the I in mid-sentence becomes SC.
101b. There is also an important transition here in this sentence: "in this relationship sense-certainty experiences the same dialectic acting upon itself as in the previous one." Hegel states that SC is aware of its own experience. Hegel continues in this vein, SC's experience for a bit.
102. In a way this paragraph looks like a mish-mash. After 101, there's a suggestion that we're getting SC's experience -- its own efforts to come to grips with the dialectial vanishing of particulars (my POV). For example: "I can no more say what I mean in the case of 'I' than I can in the case of 'Now' and "Here'."
103. Opens with a summary of SC experience, but that uses I for SC: "Sense-certainty thus comes to know by experience that its essence is neither in the object nor in the 'I', and that its immediacy is neither an immediacy of the one nor of the other; for in both, what I mean is rather something unessential, and the object and the 'I' are universals in which that 'Now' and 'Here' and 'I' which I mean do not have a continuing being, or are not."
103b. We as the guide, but to summarize universal experience: "we reach the stage where we have to posit the whole of sense-certainty itself as its essence."
103c. I only include this because it describes SC as actively responding to its experience (with the guide): "Thus it is only sense-certainty as a whole which stands firm within itself as immediacy and by so doing excludes from itself all the opposition which has hitherto obtained."
105. SC refusing to cooperate (it must recognize the untenability of its position), the guide takes over as we. 105 describes this move.
106-109. The guide explicitly assumes both roles as we examine SC experience. The result of the axamination, however, is that SC and the guide must agree: "And what consciousness will learn from experience in all sense-certainty is, in truth, only what we have seen viz. the This as a universal, the very opposite of what that assertion affirmed to be universal experience."
109b.
Bill
"(Recall the story by Raymond Roussel of his discovery, in a dusty provincial museum, under glass, of the skull of Voltaire as a child.)" (Fredric Jameson)
This email may contain confidential and/or privileged information. If you are not the intended recipient (or have received this email in error) please notify the sender immediately and destroy this email. Any unauthorized copying, disclosure or distribution of the material in this email is strictly prohibited.
From: hegel@yahoogroups.com <hegel@yahoogroups.com> on behalf of R Srivatsan r.srivats@... [hegel] <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Monday, November 5, 2018 8:38:28 PM
To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
Subject: Re: [hegel] Sense CertaintyBill
Thanks again for pushing this. I am not here trying to contradict you or argue against you.
To me, the frame's double is mediation. So if as in the first line in sense certainty, its truth is immediate and 'we' must approach it as such, it means that we try to see sense certainty as it would see itself. Now here, there is already a sleight of hand (or mind!). The moment we see or approach sense certainty as it is, we introduce an element of mediation, framing. We, picture our eye here, try to approach Sense Certainty as it is -- now that third position is already a framing or mediation. We try to keep it minimal by simply registering a change.
***
There is a speculative progression of what the object is in this section, perhaps as in other sections, that leads to a slipperiness of the text....... It is never exactly clear what the object of the investigation is, what Hegel is trying to prove and why he is going through this maze of (counterfactual?) constructions. It seems almost like the mathematical constructs he is so sarcastic about in the preface. Perhaps a later re-reading will make it clearer.
***
For example, when 'we' ask in para 95 what sense certainty sees as 'the this', we are asking what it means. But note the progression:
quote
</It is, then, sense-certainty itself that must be asked: 'What is the This?' If we take the 'This' in the twofold shape of its being, as 'Now' and as 'Here', the dialectic it has in it will receive a form as intelligible as the 'This' itself is.
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