- Nov 9, 2018
The distortion comes when “god” is taken as what Hegel means by the absolute.
Then your phase-free reading becomes a distortion.
- Alan
From: hegel@yahoogroups.com <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Friday, November 9, 2018 6:11 AM
To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
Subject: Re: [hegel] Hegel's DashBut where is the distortion, and clear too?
Stephen.
From: hegel@yahoogroups.com <hegel@yahoogroups.com> on behalf of 'Alan Ponikvar' ponikvaraj@... [hegel] <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: 08 November 2018 20:26
To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
Subject: RE: [hegel] Hegel's DashThis is a clear example of why a theological reading of Hegel fails.
To square Hegel with the Christian tradition, Hegel has to be distorted to fit this tradition.
- Alan
From: hegel@yahoogroups.com <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Thursday, November 8, 2018 2:22 PM
To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
Subject: Re: [hegel] Hegel's DashAh, then I misread you.
No, not over time. The generation of the Son, in Trinitarian theology, is precisely eternal, ever in act, never in the past or falling back in that sense, despite the "begotten of the Father before all worlds" of the Creed. That is a figure and has to be, or do you imagine a moment when that took place? That would anyhow be Arianism. Now you may find this wierd but it is not provenly self-contradictory (this expression maybe appears to you (or me) pre-Hegelian!). The father is this fathering relation, by the Augustinian-Thomist account, if I can trust myself in this difficult area.
So there are no phases to this generation (itself not free of figure, all the same), as, as you say, Hegel well appreciates, no phases to God or revelation, which God is (Hegel), at all, the beginning is contained in the end and vice versa. This revelation, all the same, is differently suited to people at different cultural levels. This, I find, is the sense of Hegel¡s "true reason world".
No doubt all these positions are finite and will serve their turn in theological discourse down the ages, all the same. This unfortunately can give rise, from the side of organised religious life, to confusion between the true and the opportune, with which philosophy can have, it seems to me, nothing to do. Thus Ontologism, the 19th century version of Hegelianism best known then at Rome, was rejected as "not safe for teaching" and later propsitions taken as expressing "ontologisms" , e.g. by Rosmini, were "condemned" up into the 1880s (Giacomo Rinaldi, whose work I admire, accuses me of "unpardonable ignorance" for asserting this but I can give theprimary source).
Stephen Theron.
From: hegel@yahoogroups.com <hegel@yahoogroups.com> on behalf of 'Alan Ponikvar' ponikvaraj@... [hegel] <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: 08 November 2018 18:18
To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
Subject: RE: [hegel] Hegel's DashJust two comments.
First, the thinkers who I say see through Hegel I take to be O’Regan and Desmond.
Second, if god were the self-generating subject, then god would be in the process of generating himself over time as our world. God would no longer be eternal. What would persist would be the self-generating process. What would be generated would go through phases. God would go through phases. This might be an interesting theology, but there is no evidence that this is what Hegel had in mind.
- Alan
From: hegel@yahoogroups.com <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Thursday, November 8, 2018 6:56 AM
To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
Subject: Re: [hegel] Hegel's DashYes.
For me it was just interesting, pleasing, to find something in this direction: I happily concur, therefore, in quite some of your critical remarks. It is more the theme than these two writers that interests me, and you I suppose.
Just now I won't attempt more than a few immediate reactions, comments, to yours, scattered if you will. I treat the subject systematically, or, where not that, more thoroughly, in several of my books, an effort over these ten years which seems to have rather exhausted me. So, not such a good interlocutor.
I was myself disappointed with Desmond and O'Regan, employed at denomenational universities, as also with Von Balthasar SJ over a series of half-remembered issues, going back a long way to even (my) pre-Hegelain days. And the same applies to Fr. Jamros, who just doesn't write philosophy, however.
It is not quite clear to me in yours where you speak or where these authors speak. However, where you (clearly) continue from the quote from them to saying "there is something just not quite right about Hegel's God-talk you make a jump. They do not say that. It is, if you can accept the word, your usual insinuation again. It is a mark of good theology, and always has been (I don't know how familiar you are with this) to boldly developa new and creative theme, beginning, let's say, with St. Paul (or the prophets of Israel), and reaching to, but not ending with, Cardinal, now Saint, John Henry Newman's Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine (1845). Newman puts this forth as itself a doctrine and the clear conclusion from that is that this doctrine of development must itself go on developing, up to and after 1845. Pope Benedict XVI Ratzinger, generally considered "conservative", canonised Newman (made him a saint) with, undoubtedly, such writings as this in mind. The nature of some of your remarks elicit the necessity of including some such merely para-philosophical observations, re matter of which you may or may not be aware.
The clash between such theology and hypothetical ordinary believers has always existed, it's in the Gospels. As Hegel says, echoing the Founder, it is not always profitable to try to intiate just anyone into the philosophical (theological) citadel. On the other hand one can raise the question, as did Geach, whether a reciter of the Nicene Creed who understands nothing of what is said about, say, the Trinity there (or maybe none of the text at all) can be said to truly believe this would-be statement of belief, whatever else he believes. I cannot attempt to resolve this puzzle here. Hegel is very aware of it as his concept of a "true reason world" shows (it attempts an answer).
It seems to be your words that "·these subtle thinkers .... are able to see through the subterfuge.. They are not ready to buy into Hegel's speculative reworking of the tradition". But they are, Alan, and this is the point of their article, if you read carefully. This second paragraph, namely, "At times etc." continues their previous paragraph, "But even these luminaries, etc.", continuing to describe how they, suspicious of Hegel, see things. I have myself been in touch with them and can vouch for theiropenness or, let's say for the moment, commitment to Hegel, whom they relate to Maximus the Confessor, on whom at least one of them is working. You can find a similar situation in the case of Ryan Haecker, who used to be on this list, and is now working, in a context of Hegelian theology, on Origen and the Alexandrian Church Fathers with Millbank and others (including the Anglican Archbishop of Canterbury) at Cambridge U., England..
After this one comes to the philosophical meat of your comment. It's long and I'll have to pause here, just observing that, for example, God may well be a self-generating subject. I am not sure if you want to reject this or not. I would think God has to be that, as absolute freedom and, in religious terms, Lord of his being. Being would then turn out to be precisely being that Lord, however.
The infinite emptying into finitude seems to me a figure in quite some measure (I mean, all language is partly that).
What dies is always the God of previous religion. It, or perhaps he, is and has been continually doing that. In the end all talk will stop. Our philosophy is in that sense provisional and always has been. You say this yourself, "often utilised" etc.
Notions of truth, moreover, can be freely elaborated. All of which speaks for less biased theological, i.e. philosophical, consideration of Hegel, the reconciler.
There may even be a place for some version of your view of things. Your remark about Catholics is not apposite. All philosophers, religious persons or artists, absolute spirit itself, leaves the everyday behind during its activity, answering only to itself. The person of faith believes that evertything he thinks fits in. he is not hampered or hindered but rather the opposite. this is also hegel's account of faith, Irecall. remember, the things which are seen, like your "Catholics", are temporal, passing away, not eternal and therefore not seen.
I have perhaps lapsed into conversational mode, in case I do not get opportulity etc. to continue in the above mode.
I hope my meaning is graspable.
Stephen Theron
From: hegel@yahoogroups.com <hegel@yahoogroups.com> on behalf of 'Alan Ponikvar' ponikvaraj@... [hegel] <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: 07 November 2018 20:25
To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
Subject: RE: [hegel] Hegel's DashThis was an interesting read.
I will start with this:
“But even these luminaries [Desmond and O’Regan] seem curiously gloomed by Hegel’s shade. There is a palpable, almost anxious, urgency about their negative verdict against Hegel’s use for Catholic theology. He is not just wrong about this or that. He is corrupt to the core. In nearly every conceivable way Hegel’s speculative philosophy erects a “counterfeit” god, a “Doppelgänger” of the original. He is “heterodox” to such a degree that it is an “impossibility” to read not just his principal writings, but his entire oeuvre in a Christian manner.”
This is where we need to start. There is something just not quite right about Hegel’s god-talk. One does not have to have atheistic biases to notice this. One needs to explain what strikes a careful reader as being out of joint.. One cannot pretend that all is right in Denmark when Hegel begins to speak about god.
The author goes on:
“At times the rhetoric even slips into the realm of ill intent. Hegel’s speculative retelling of the biblical narrative “masquerades as authentically Christian and masks its anti-Christian bias and ethos.” He “articulates nothing less than a kind of post-Christian Christianity that exists as a kind of Trojan horse within the representational discourse of Christianity.” O’Regan sympathizes with von Balthasar that “in the end Hegel is a seducer,” whose very manner of speaking constitutes “a mode of theological discourse that has to be resisted at all costs.” Hegel lures us into “a bewitchment,” Desmond warns, “complete with the god that we have created for ourselves to adore, and the becalmed bewitchment feels it no longer needs to go beyond itself.”
Here we get the suspicion that was already in the air in Hegel’s time. So, even with all his efforts to disguise the difficulty with his heterodox rendering of the Christian tradition there are those ready to burn Hegel at the stake. These subtle thinkers who have read Hegel’s lectures on religion are able to see through the subterfuge. They are not ready to buy into Hegel’s speculative reworking of the tradition.
However, because they are not speculative thinkers they are unable to see the problem as anything other than a being unfaithful to the true history. They are unable to comprehend what it is that makes Hegel’s thought truly dangerous.
That the infinite remains infinite even as it empties into finitude may be viewed as the power of the infinite as god to bear its own negativity. But this would be to reify god as a substance that withstands becoming a self-generating subject..
It would be to misunderstand Hegel’s absolute as a substance-like thing that withstands rather than emerges from its own self-generating activity.
For Hegel, the negativity inherent to absolute substance dissolves the substance qua substance leaving only the negativity that as subject generates itself.
This is why this infinite process is often utilized in a death of god narrative. God dies so that reason as human rational self-generating activity might emerge in its place.
What dies is the god of religion as the appropriate expression of the speculative infinite. What appears through this death is the spiritual community which in turn gives way to absolute knowing as made evident in the Phenomenology.
Now it is understandable why someone might call such a narrative a corruption. But as with all his narratives - for example, the master/slave, faith and pure insight, and the beautiful soul - Hegel is not offering a history. He is offering an allegory about the interaction between common and speculative reason.
Any attempt to critique Hegel by measuring his narrative against the true teaching of the Church simply is missing the point. It is a critique that treats truth as an absolute by which Hegel’s own rendering of truth might be measured.
Hegel’s truth is a truth that as true to itself is indifferent to a truth alien to its own self-rendering.
One might wonder what gives Hegel the right to ignore a truth other than his own.
He would respond: independent truths are matters of empirical interest. And this would even include the independent truth that is Church doctrine.
While one might view these “higher” truths as rational. For Hegel, because they are not self-generated they are irrational or dogmatic truths.
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