... sensuous certainty, sense-certainty:

#a) of the outer sense and
b) of the inner sense, then ...

... form, then.

... side-by-side-being is form-being, is certain being - one-after-the-other-being is certain being ...

certain being as form-being primarily is sense-certain being, is certain-being, sense-certain-being ...

... as a'certain-being' being a being capable of no reasonable doubt: methodic doubting not possible, vulgo: senseless ...

... methodic doubting not possible any more, not anymore possible ... here and there and now ... etc.

jh

Forms of Sensibility

a) space: form of the outer sense - side-by-side-being - - counter-standing-ness (Gegen-ständlich-keit)

b) time: form of the inner sense - one-after-the-other-being; at-the-same-time-being - - synchrony, simultaneousness

Question: How is objective measurement of time (a) possible (act to do) - - human practice

space-time-form - - sensuous certainty (of human practice; negative totality) - - GWF Hegel, PhoS

regards - Juergen H.

Am 28.12.2017 um 11:46 schrieb stephen theron stephentheron@... [hegel]:

 

Paul, this is excellent. Thank you very much! You summarise confirming  my own reading but more clearly grasped, also mentioning just the point I was so to say stuck at: "Once thought begins its journey to negate religion the thinking process itself will carry the opposite through to its reconciliation". I did not find Hegel giving a clear reason for this assertion (apart, of course, from his whole philosophy) just there, and tried to supply, in my mind, what I thought or think he was hinting at (I only have the old translation and no German text). In a way your summary suggests to me more clearly that the whole section is answering this, or perhaps more narrowly what you call the synthesis of these two opposites (extremes): viz. "subjectivity develops the content from itself (but) in accord with necessity".

We don't really need his(?) "but" except to avoid a mistaken confounding of this self-development with arbitrary subjectivisms. This development, by subjectivity, is precisely the programme ("method") of logic, according to him (and not merely of "his" logic or of "speculative logic" taken as a supererogatory branch of "normal" logic seen as normative). This is perhaps as near as Hegel comes to speaking, in the traditional dualist way, of grace perfecting nature(?). The logic of the understanding is deformatory of "true reason" if left to its (abstract) self. I have maybe gone a bit ahead of the theme here.

Thank you again,

Stephen.

---

From: hegel@yahoogroups.com <hegel@yahoogroups.com> on behalf of Paul Trejo petrejo@... [hegel] <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: 28 December 2017 06:51
To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
Subject: Re: [hegel] Form

 

 

Stephen,

I'll use Hodgson's English edition of Hegel's LPR3.   The final 5 pages in that volume (before the Appendices) are pages 343-347.   I'll begin by summarizing:

Here Hegel says that Thinking is the Universal activity, the opposite of the Concrete Eternal.

Religion has "acquired" the Freedom of Reason, and now knows itself to be Spirit in-itself-for-itself.

This Freedom now turns against the External, which is utterly opposed to Freedom.

Here is the Negative, says Hegel, which is represented by the Enlightenment, which also attacks the idea of God as External.  Hegel says:

"When everything concrete in God has been thus

eradicated, this is expressed by saying: 'We cannot

know God.' -- i.e. know something specific about God."

(Hegel, LPR3,p. 343).

This is because to Know God requires grasping God's Attributes, while for the Enlightenment, God must remain a Pure Abstraction.

The Enlightenment makes a similar abstraction about Humanity, saying, "Man is basically good."   Yet since the Enlightenment thinks abstractly, the 'good' it has in mind is one-sided, abstract good, i.e. the arbitrary caprice of the subjective.  Such a subjectivity says, 'There is no such thing as Truth,' and sees itself as Beyond Good and Evil (p. 344).

Hence, Hegel has predicted the rise of Existentialism.

The closest Theological relative to this one-sided subjectivism, says Hegel, is Pietism -- a form of Christianity that rejects all dogma and Content of religion, while still claiming a private connection with Christ.

Hegel sees the Enlightenment (with its existentialist features) as "the ultimate pinnacle of the formal culture of our time."  (p. 344).  It is at the same time the greatest crudity, since it is merely abstract.

The Enlightenment on the left, and its opposite, Pietism on the right, yet match each other in their abstract subjectivity.

The synthesis of these two opposites is simply this:

"The third element consists in the fact that Subjectivity

develops the Content from itself, to be sure, but in 

accord with Necessity."  (Hegel,LPR3, p. 345)

The Subjective, thus united with the External by Necessity, realizes itself to be the Dialectical Synthesis, and therefore the Concrete which is no longer purely External.  Hegel calls this, "Free Reason" (p. 345)

Thus, Hegel recognizes that Form and Content "belong together."   The Forms are the modes of appearances of God for sensory consciousness as well as for Universality and Thought.  Hegel says:

"The Content is justified by the witness of Spirit, 

insofar as it is Thinking Spirit."  (Hegel,p. 346)

Thought is the witness of Spirit.  Thought knows the Form, and therefore the limits of the Form.  The Enlightenment failed to realize this.  Hegel says:

"The Enlightenment knows only of Negation, Limit

and Determinacy as such, and therefore does an

absolute injustice to the Content."  (Hegel, p. 346)

The Forms are necessary and essential, but Thinking consciousness sees beyond their limits toward the Content (Absolute Idea, Geist, God)

Once Thought begins its journey to negate Religion, the Thinking process itself will carry the opposite through to its Reconciliation.  This is just what Hegel calls Dialectical Philosophy -- the Reconciliation of God with God and Nature (p. 347).  Hegel says:

"Two positions are opposed to Philosophy.

First there is the conceit of the Pure Under-

standing, which is displeased by the fact that

Philosophy still exhibits the Truth in Religion

and demonstrates that Reason resides within

it.  The Enlightenment wants to have nothing

further to do with the CONTENT, and therefore

is highly displeased that Philosophy, as conscious,

methodical thinking, curbs the fancies, caprice

and the contingency of thinking.  Second,

ingenuous religiosity is opposed to Philosophy."

(Hegel, LPR, vol. 3, p. 347)

According to Hegel, there are three broad, Dialectical positions in the history of the philosophy of religion: (1) Immediate Religion; (2) the Enlightenment of the Pure Understanding; and (3) the Rational Cognition of Religion.

It is this last position that Hegel has tried to reveal in his LPR1, LPR2 and LPR3 (1818-1831).

Now -- where does Hegel see Kant in these 5 pages?   In my opinion, Hegel regards Kant as the greatest Enlightenment thinker -- who yet fails to rise to the level of the Rational Cognition of Religion (and the Trinity) as Hegel does.

Did I pinpoint the same 5 pages you were thinking of, Stephen?

All best,

--Paul

---

From: "stephen theron stephentheron@... [hegel]" <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
To: "hegel@yahoogroups.com" <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Tuesday, December 26, 2017 6:34 AM
Subject: Re: [hegel] Form

 

Paul,

It seems to me the closing four or five pages of LPR3 are the nearest Hegel comes to endorsing (resignedly but yet there is a suggestion he is standing it on his head?) the Kantian view of things as generally received at that time at least. I would be interested in any views of yours on this wild suggestion of mine.

Stephen