... thanx for your statements, Srivats; with the questions you rise on the thing-in-itself and on dualism you do outline an interesting field of reasonable research; I would like to hold this as a storage of open questions ...

Regards - Jürgen H.

 

"negative Grenzbestimmung":  Grenzbestimmung is translated as "determination of boundaries", or "boundary determination" in an online German English dictionary.  When you say negative Grenzbestimmung, you probably mean "limit concept".  But "edge-assignment" works, very evocatively.

Jürgen, while I would be attracted to agreeing with you that the thing in itself is a limit concept or negative edge-assignment for Kant, I wonder why he spends so much time insisting on his position as a dualism?  How does one then distinguish between truth (essence, object, substance) and knowledge (appearance, understanding, subject)?  Where in Kant's system would the problem of striving to get to the essence come from?

Does this make sense?

I am not yet equipped to respond to your tracing of the nuances of Kant's argument with respect to the classical tradition, Leibniz-Wolff school, etc., but will get there eventually I hope.

Srivats

On Sun, Mar 12, 2017 at 12:26 AM, wmdepot wmdepot@... [hegel] <hegel@yahoogroups.com> wrote:

 

... check spelling, thanx for this your hint, Srivats; sorry for my lapsus below ... (which is corrected in this post).

It seems that - as everywhere - different approaches to Kant are given ... and this may, e.g., be indicated by different views on "the-thing-in-itself" ... *if* these views were still different until into 'the last instance'.

While I would argue that "the-thing-in-itself" is a negative Grenzbestimmung, a negative edge-assigment (or how ever to translate this german term), you argue: "And yet, the thing in itself, is by (Kantian) definition something that surely exists outside the representation of externality."

You argue: transcendental realism/empirical idealism is a philosophical framework to which he is opposed ...

I would like to add intuitively: Kant opposes a transcendental realism as in the Leibniz-Wolff-School of classical reception of classical metaphysics, construed as a transcendental realism from above ("ordo"), out of a position of apotheosis, out of a position of sub specie aeternitatis; Kant opposes empirical idealism as he does in opposing classical empiricism: where space and time and the categories of mind are stripped off from - actual - sense-impressions.

Thus, there are different views on what Kantian definitions are, I'd argue ... another indicator could be a different view on the critical notion of substance in CoPR, although Kant is refuting classical substantialism, e.g. of the Leibniz-Wolff-School ... etc.

Regards - Jürgen H.

Am 11.03.2017 um 03:31 schrieb R Srivatsan r.srivats@... [hegel]:

Let me try to answer your question  Jürgen.

As I re-read the Kant section to make sense of what you are saying, I realized first of all that I was commenting on the critique of the fourth paralogism, not the third (on idealism).  When I say:

"By proposing that everything empirical is doubtful -- there is no guarantee that sense intuition is a channel to the outside."

I was paraphrasing, perhaps imprecisely, Kant's description of the transcendental realism/empirical idealism position. It is interesting how he telescopes the realist position into an ultimately skeptical one.

You say: "To say this is only true ... can only be made true if "material"/materially spoken; that's to say: spoken in respect to synthetical judgements aposterioi ... thus, dicourse is running on the level of (empircal) Wahrnehmung/Perception"

Since I am simply repeating what Kant actually proposes: transcendental realism/empirical idealism is a philosophical framework to which he is opposed, I will only say what I think Kant is saying here.

To me he seems to say that empirical idealism is skeptical not because it is based on synthetic judgments a posteriori, but it is skeptical because of an a priori uncertainty about the validity of intuition as an index to an outside world.  That perspective is monist (as opposed to dualist in the Kantian sense).

Now this proposition is not true in the Kantian formal sense as you say, because I would think that the form of external intuition, i.e., space, is precisely that -- it is the representation of an externality in the form of space according to the categories.  And yet, the thing in itself, is by (Kantian) definition something that surely exists outside the representation of externality.

I hope I have understood you correctly and answered you somewhat satisfactorily.  As far as your comments on perception goes, I need to read again, think a bit more and come back some time to the problem

Best

Srivats (check spelling)

On Fri, Mar 10, 2017 at 2:33 PM, wmdepot wmdepot@... [hegel] <hegel@yahoogroups.com> wrote:

 

r.srivats@... wrote:

"By proposing that everything empirical is doubtful -- there is no guarantee that sense intuition is a channel to the outside."

JH:

To say this is only true ... can only be made true if "material"/materially spoken; that's to say: spoken in respect to synthetical judgements aposterioi ... thus, dicourse is running on the level of (empircal) Wahrnehmung/Perception.

Phänomenologie des Geistes, "Wahrnehmung. Das Ding und die Täuschung." - a paragraph that deals with the second layer: material perception of (perception-)things ...

The upper statement is NOT true insofar or as long as "formal"/formally is spoken. With respect to the form is could be made coercive/zwingend that Wahrnehmung ist GEGENSTÄNDLICHE Wahrnehmung, counter-standing perception, perception "im Raume" (Kant)/in spatio.

Counter-standing-ness in spatio, that's the topic ... "Gegenständlichkeit im Raume" ... 'I' can err about materially everything: every-thing; but I cannot err in respect to the Form of Counter-Standing-Ness. Because it is given certainly, given in sensuous certainty.

FORM and the topos of an adaquate notion on Form ... Kant: Nebeneinander-Sein im Raume, Hegel: Außereinandersein- "im Raume" (Kant) ...

Sensuous intuition is 'serving' form, performing form. Sensuous intuition has got form a priori: Nebeneinandersein, Außereinandersein im Raume ... Gegenständlichkeit ... Counter-Standing-Ness ... Sensuous Intuition gives certainty on form. All material things are counterstanding things in space, and 'I' am just one of them ... am I not?  Things are gegenständliches Material/counterstanding material.

It's just the opposite then: sensuous intuition, the intuitions of sensuous certainty, sensous certain intuitions - a topos dealing with certainty, not with the senses. Form of Nebeneinandersein, Außereinandersein im Raume, condition of possibility for any (my mis-)perception.

The first layer is: Sensuous Certainty. The This and Meaning.

... and it is meant in space or it is not meant: a paragraph, then, that deals with certainty and not with the senses ... thus, dicourse is running on the level of sensuous certainty in respect to  FORM.

... what do YOU mean, what is your MEANING in respect to the topic ...

Regards - Jürgen H.

Am 10.03.2017 um 05:43 schrieb R Srivatsan r.srivats@... [hegel]:

 

How I would read Hegel's dissolution of the distinction between understanding and sensibility after Kant.

In the his critique of the third paralogism of transcendental psychology, Kant argues the difference between the transcendental realist/empirical idealist on the one hand and the transcendental idealist/dualist on the other -- from the perspective of the latter.

It seems to me that the transcendental realist/empirical idealist too (in a preliminary similarity with Hegel) in a pre-Kantian moment does not honor the distinction between understanding and sensibility.  By proposing that everything empirical is doubtful -- there is no guarantee that sense intuition is a channel to the outside. Hence what both the understanding and sensibility refer to is ultimately doubtful.  This is one version of skepticism of course.

What would be Hegel's difference with respect to the transcendental realist/empirical idealist on the one hand, and the transendental idealist/dualist on the other?

Hegel on the one hand proposes that what we intuit in sense is through and through determined down to the point of intuition of being itself, by the understanding.  On the other hand he speculates on the impasse engendered by the distinction between substance (object) and subject and dissolves that distinction with the insight that substance is subject.  

Transcendental idealism seems to remain at the level of an elementary epistemology and a conditioned skepticism.  Speculative thought and absolute idealism are about the movement of thought across such self imposed boundaries.  Absolute idealism is different from transcendental idealism (in one aspect) in that it disrespects the boundary between understanding and intuition.  Absolute idealism is different from empirical idealism in that it moves beyond skepticism -- it doesn't say that we are doubtful about the truth of what we know.  The truth is what we know, and what we know is the truth -- with the proviso that in this Doppelsatz, both the truth and what we know are in motion as it were.

Srivats

On Tue, Mar 7, 2017 at 9:16 AM, 'Alan Ponikvar' ponikvaraj@... [hegel] <hegel@yahoogroups.com> wrote:

 

I think it is interesting how little has been said by Kantians (and Hegelians for that matter) about how Hegel does not seem to honor the distinction between the understanding and sensibility.

 

You would think that Hegel would be a suitable test case of how the failure to honor this distinction should undo one’s philosophy. There should be some price to pay. So what is this price?

 

If nothing else, this might be an interesting entry point into Hegel’s philosophy.

 

-          Alan

 

From: hegel@yahoogroups.com [mailto:hegel@yahoogroups.com]
Sent: Monday, March 6, 2017 9:58 PM
To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
Subject: Re: Apropos: [hegel] Re: Kant

 

 

I looked at the other Kant threads and saw if what I am about to say could fit, but seemingly not -- though it lies comfortably alongside the other discussions.   This is in lieu of an apology for my seeming insularity.

 

Kant's critique of the paralogisms of rational psychology establishes its point by demonstrating that the four categorical terms, when used to describe the I, or the subject, or the soul, are of limited utility.  This is because the I is inaccessible to intuition.  It is only a logical deduction based on several intuitions.  Hence it is impossible to approach the I except as a possible inference from the possibility of understanding and reasoning about phenomena.

 

This is the threshold or rather the limit of reason that marks the emergence of the domain of the transcendental subject.  At this threshold the applicability of reason begins to waver.  Kant therefore, seems to suggest that if reason is to be regulative, one has to draw sharp boundaries regarding what one can reason about -- and the transcendental subject is not something one can reason about.

 

Hegel's move seems entirely different.  The problem is not what can and cannot be thought legitimately, but how actual thought thinks both legitimately and illegitimately.  Through his critical engagement in the Doctrine of Essence Hegel shows that intuition is never simple -- that the engagement of reason with intuition is the infusion of thought into reality.  Thus, the idea of sense and intuition is already rational.  The thing in itself is trivial.  Just as what you see in the object is an infusion of reason into it, the subject too, is divided and shaped into its component parts through thought.  When applied to the subject, the transcendental subject as the thing in itself is trivial.  What matters is how it organizes itself. Thus at the moment or at the limit where Kant stops to establish the paralogisms to delineate what can and cannot be legitimately inferred about the subject, Hegel takes off and shows how thought proceeds through illegitimacy and contradiction.

Srivats

 

 

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