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- Apr 26, 2016Further just after the previous quote:Hegel’s account of the actualization of the idea is the proper inheritor of the Kantian view of synthesis. The strictures of the actualization of the idea are elaborated in the Logic at a formal register, bracketing a substantive reference to Geist as the concrete ground of actualization. Parts 2 and 3 of this book are dedicated to explicating and assessing these strictures by focusing on the relation between determinacy and intelligibility developed in the Logic. While Hegel’s theory of intelligibility is developed as a theory of normative authority under the banner of the idea, his theory of determinacy establishes the inseparability of form and content crucial for clarifying his view of the actualization of the idea. A logic of actualization indicates that intelligibility is not only historically specific but also precarious and ambivalent. The system as a whole— logic, nature, Geist— provides the context for fully elaborating Geist as the concrete ground of actualization. Such a task is beyond the bounds of this book.Zambrana, Rocío (2015-11-20). Hegel's Theory of Intelligibility (Kindle Locations 1054-1058). University of Chicago Press. Kindle Edition.It would seem to me Alan, that Zambrana is focusing on the this side of the speculative. She is referring precisely to the interlocked stability of the 'hurly burly of the space of reasons' and of the challenge of hypostasis (or the tendency of conservation of a previous state-- being stuck at a lower level) to the work (that is never guaranteed) of actualization. However, it is not exactly clear to me what you mean by speculative in your response. Is it the 'progressive' or the rationally emergent, or is it the 'view of the whole, or the frame'. Wouldn't focusing on the character of the rational space and the logical configuration as a whole, which constitutes a given impasse be precisely speculative? How would the inner difference work in such a space?
SrivatsOn Tue, Apr 26, 2016 at 9:31 PM, Alan Ponikvar ponikvaraj@... [hegel] <hegel@yahoogroups.com> wrote:In reading this I am reminded of how Hegel makes a distinction that gets lost here between the actual as rational and everything that happens to be the case being rational.Put differently, Zambrana does not seem to respect the difference between the hurly burly that is the space of reasons and speculative conceptual space.I suspect that Hegel would appreciate what Brandom is doing but would note that there is nothing to prevent ill-conceived concepts from being carved out in the space of reasons.Speculative concepts are defined by their inner difference and not by how they function within the space of reasons.Because there is a certain family resemblance between a systematic array of determinations and an inferential net I can see how this confusion might take hold.
- AlanImpressively solid argument:Hegel argues that “the concept is to be regarded . . . not just as a subjective presupposition but as absolute foundation; but it cannot be the latter except to the extent that it has made itself into one.” The concept is not a presupposed foundation; it is not a unity that is not itself the result of synthetic activity. It is made into a foundation, it counts as a foundation, when it adequately expresses a form of rationality specific to concrete conditions at hand. The concept must make itself into a foundation, must establish itself as authoritative, given that it itself is a synthetic unity, a concrete form of rationality specific to the context at hand. Determinacy is not the result of the work of the concept, then, if we understand by concept an abstract rule or norm that makes possible the unity of an object of experience. It is a matter of distinctions articulated by and within specific concrete conditions— conditions that refer us to a specific shape of Geist. Any determination is maintained or debunked by the ongoing work of synthesis within and by concrete practices, discourses, institutions that comprise a shape of a world. But these practices and institutions are themselves synthetic unities. They are themselves sustained by forms of rationality and hence articulated by historically specific conditions. The concept must make itself into the foundation, then, because the normative commitment at work in the determinacy of any way of life is itself a concrete form of rationality that may or may not express or capture the conditions at hand. It may or may not be actual or, as we will see, authoritative.Zambrana, Rocío (2015-11-20). Hegel's Theory of Intelligibility (Kindle Locations 1040-1049). University of Chicago Press. Kindle Edition.Srivats--R Srivatsan
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Anveshi Research Centre for Women's Studies
2-2-18/2/A Durgabai Deshmukh Colony
Hyderabad 500 013
Phone: +91 40 27423690
Fax: +91 40 27423168
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