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- Jan 6, 2015Thanks Paul,I do appreciate your remarks. There are puzzling questions which can yet be raised, but I'll set them aside given, as you know, my broad and underdeveloped conception of realism in its manifold guises.To be a tad more explicit, I ought to point out directly that for me, (at least presently,) the term 'realism' is something of a term of art, it is a concept which I use in order to frame my philosophical discourses, despite the fact that I've never really taken time to consider what realism actually is, or would be in an absolute sense, let alone a concrete sense. Generally speaking, the only philosopher I can think of off the top of my head who carried out discussion of the concept in a manner which would be fully intelligible to someone with my philosophical orientation (or prejudice, you decide) would be Michael Dummett. (I'm more analytically trained, but I prefer to avoid thinking of 'philosophical clubs', or 'philosophico-cultural?) divides'. Personally, I'm more interested in sharing thoughts, and having thoughts shared with me, rather than defeating someone in an argument, though there are occasions where such an action is called for.)I'll check out this Chihara fellow. Thanks.-ChuckOn Tue, Jan 6, 2015 at 8:36 AM, paulmsrf@... [hegel] <hegel@yahoogroups.com> wrote:
You might have a very different take on realism, but if there is
to be a marked difference between it and actualism (I thinkCharles S. Chihara's 1998 is one iven his critique of realismin 'The Worlds of Possibility) it it should I think rest on howthey stand torwards the dialectic method. Here's my spin:Realism, or more specifically scientific realism seems tobe concerned with hypothetical thinking. The essential,determinate and universal for the absolute is subjugated tothe accidental, indeterminate and particular. What countsis just that which is experienced.Actual experience includes the reasons for the understandingof experience; the facts for what is good, bad, beautiful etc.,are not independent of the mind. Unlike the realist, it seemsto me that what is actually the case includes thespeculative value of judgements. These are determined by the conditions of inference, not as Mill would have itby the expectation of their uniformity. If the actualistis also an idealist, these can constructed in a way thatis more or less coherent.Paul healey - << Previous post in topic