Hi Alan,

It has been a difficult period to find time for philosophy, but let me see if I can advance a series of questions that have cropped up over the last few months. The first part of the post is really meant to set up the question(s) that I ask at the conclusion of my post:  

Q:  Why is this distinction between form and content that you cling to unconquerable? 

Presumably you have no difficulty removing all content in order to arrive at the "indeterminate immediacy" of a completely empty content. But, why can't we simply remove the last given distinction between form and content?

What happens when you attempt to remove the distinction between form and content?  And what does that say about the Science of Logic?

 [Alan]

> The “two names” argument shows what should follow from Hegel’s account if

> we were to limit what we are talking about to the thought content alone. Being

> and nothing – once we have established them as each having a standing - as

> thought content are identical. 

Firstly the part above about "once we have established them as each having a standing" explains being and nothing by anticipating a comparison of the two from the standpoint of "we" (i.e. a third).

But, this passes over precisely what is in question--i.e. it passes over the emergence of the second "indeterminate immediacy" (i.e. nothing) from the pure "indeterminate immediacy" of being. 

Or, in other words, it passes over the emergence of a distinction (or, "the negative") from the "indeterminacy immediacy" of pure being. 

Q: Why do you pass over the emergence of the distinction? 

Well you pass over this "speculative negation", in order to set up your own analytic explanation of the distinction.

Your explanation is analytic in the sense that "the distinction" of the two "indeterminate immediacies" is for you, the result of a prior given structure (i.e. the separation of the activity of thinking and the thinking of the content).

This is an analytic approach in the same way that Kant works backwards from "the necessary conditions of experience". 

In your approach, you begin with the distinction between the two "indeterminate immediacies", and then move backwards by asking: "How is such a distinction possible?". 

But, if we don't allow ourselves to anticipate the distinction, and instead simply let the logic unfold from "indeterminate immediacy" itself we have…

 "Indeterminate immediacy" (or, pure being) vanishing into "indeterminate immediacy" (or, nothing). 

In the above case, there cannot be anything behind or prior to the first move of the logic, because there is literally nothing behind it, or in it, or outside of pure "indeterminate immediacy" itself. 

Yet, you would like to explain why the "indeterminate immediacy" of being  vanishes by simply pointing to the second "indeterminate immediacy", and then asking how is it possible that they are distinct.

You begin to answer this question by comparing the two distinct "indeterminate immediacies" from the vantage point of a third (i.e. "we"), you then point to the fact that as "indeterminate immediacy", the second is indistinguishable from the first "indeterminate immediacy".

At moments you even suggest that being and nothing are indistinguishable even though your entire inquiry begins with their very distinction. 

- By comparing the two "indeterminate immediacies" from the viewpoint of a third (i.e. the vantage point of "we"), you declare that they cannot be distinguished from each other, because "we" have no criterion from which to distinguish the two. 

- From here you externally introduce the prior distinction of form and content and then declare that the two "indeterminate immediacies" cannot be distinguished in terms of content, but they can be distinguished in terms of form. 

You point out then that the distinction (or the "speculative negative") between the two "indeterminate immediacies" (that appeared to emerge spontaneously with the vanishing of being) is really a given distinction (i.e. form and content) that was there all along.

The distinction then is analytic for you, not speculative. 

This distinction of form and content that you appeal to, is of course nothing other than the given separation inherent in ordinary knowing. 

So if we look at your statement again:

[Alan]

> if we were to limit what we are talking about to the thought content alone.

Your conditional request to "limit what we are talking about" is nothing more than an appeal to the separation of content from form which is contrary to everything Hegel explicitly says about how we are to arrive at pure being in the first place (see Introduction to SL)

You explain then the emergence of the "spontaneous" distinction (viz. the "absolute distinction") that emerges with the vanishing of being, by an appeal to a prior given distinction between "the activity of thinking" and "thought content". 

[Alan]

> As content, they are indistinguishable. Thus, they appear to function as two 

> names for the same content. 

Again, with this talk of "two names for the same content" you pass over what is in question, viz. the emergence of the distinction (or the negation) itself.  

The "second name" (i.e. nothing) refers to the distinction (or "the negation") that has spontaneously emerged with the vanishing of the pure "indeterminate immediacy" of being.

[Alan]

> The point of the argument is to show that if we ignore the activity of thinking

> then all we are left with are two names for the same content. 

It should be clear by now that your conclusion is completely dependent on the conditionals that you have arbitrarily employed and asked us to accept. 

What are these arbitrarily employed conditionals?

- Well, firstly, you begin with the established distinction of the two "indeterminate immediacies", and then ask "what are the necessary conditions for their distinction?"

- Secondly, from the standpoint of "we", you externally re-introduce the separation of form and content.

- Lastly, you suggest that if we isolate the content from the form we are left with a distinction that is in name only. 

But, all of the above ignores the fact that if we have entered into "the element of the Science" properly, then the activity of thinking (i.e. the form) is the content, and therefore, there is no such prior distinction that you speak of, between the activity of thinking and the content of thinking. 

"But in the first place, it is quite inept to say that the logic abstracts from all content, that it teaches only the rules of thinking without any reference to what is thought or without being able to consider its nature. For as thinking and the rules of thinking are supposed to be the subject matter of logic, these directly constitute its peculiar content…" (SL p. 44)

[Alan]

> We have no movement from being to nothing or from nothing to being 

> because all we would seem to be doing is disguising what based on 

> the content is merely a repetition. 

The term "movement" that you employ above, seems to bring in an unnecessary term, and can only result in further confusion.  

Instead, what is at stake is… the emergence of distinction with the vanishing of being.

Again, according to you, the distinction between the two "indeterminate immediacies" is the already given distinction between form and content. 

Which means that the second "indeterminate immediacy" that emerges with the vanishing of being, is really only this already given distinction between form and content which is present (for you) as a prior given all along. 

This brings up a key question about your position. Why is this distinction between form and content unconquerable? 

It's unclear to me why you're unable to take heed of what Hegel says, "bars the entrance to philosophy and what must be discarded at its portals" (see SL 45).

Presumably you have no difficulty removing all content in order to arrive at the "indeterminate immediacy" of a completely empty content. But, why can't we simply remove the last given distinction between form and content?

What happens when you attempt to remove the distinction between form and content?  And what does that say about the Science of Logic?

R