The beginning of the Science of Logic must begin with the Absolute Beginning. The Absolute beginning of the Science of Logic is nothing more or less than the "indeterminate immediacy" of pure being.  

Yet, "indeterminate immediacy" proves itself to be unable to sustain itself as such, and thus the development of the logic can't help but give way to "the removal of indeterminate immediacy" (i.e. nothing).

However, "the removal of indeterminate immediacy" is equally "indeterminate immediacy" and thus immediately gives way to its removal.

The unrest of these incompatible "indeterminate immediacies" (i.e. becoming or, the vanishing of being and nothing) comes to interpenetrate, and paralyze one another, unfolding into a stable unity of "the oneness of being and nothing".

Determinate Being as Such - "the simple oneness" of being and non-being. 

Or, the issuing of "Being which is there" [or Dasein]  

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In the opening paragraphs of the Chapter, Hegel works to spell out what exactly has been achieved with Dasein, using terminology that captures the issuing of Dasein from becoming in both its minimal determinacy, and its immediacy.   

Q1: Why is the issuing of determinate being as such considered to be "immediate"?

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Q2: Why is determinate being as such unable to sustain itself in its "immediacy"?

Well, it's in the form of "immediacy", because its mediation (viz. becoming) has sublated itself. Determinate being as such then, is not to be conceived in reference to what lies behind it, nor is it to be conceived in reference to any moves that may lie ahead of it (e.g. negation)

Hegel then, not only emphasizes that determinate being as such has issued from becoming in its "immediacy" (or, in the form of being), but he also emphasizes that its mediation is behind it, and so there is again a start of the development from "a first".  

So, there is again the beginning with "immediacy", but we no longer have the "indeterminate immediacy" of pure being, but instead, we have determinate being as such.

Thus, determinate being as such is now to be taken as a first (or, the starting point) for an ensuing development.  We can anticipate then, that there will be a move from the first to a second, and if no such move emerges, we can anticipate that the immediacy of determinate being as such will simply relapse into the prior sphere of "indeterminate immediacy."

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So, "the oneness of the unity of being and nothing" first issues forth in the form of the "abstract immediacy of determinate being as such". Hegel generally refers to this determinate being that is in" the one-sided form of being", Quality.  

Q3: What significance does the oneness of being and non-being have on the development moving forward?

With the issuing of 'determinate being as such', Hegel suggests that being and nothing no longer extend beyond one another (see SL p. 111). 

This means that the unity of being and nothing will underly the development of determinate being moving forward. Or more generally, it will define the medium of development for the entire sphere, and thus we can anticipate that henceforth, at no point will being and non-being be severed from one another in the unfolding of the development.

If being and non-being were to again come to extend beyond one another (i.e. either in the case of being extending beyond nothing, or nothing extending beyond being), the development would simply relapse into the prior medium of "indeterminate immediacy". 

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Q4: If determinate being as such first issues from becoming in the one-sided form of being only, how does it avoid the inevitable relapse into "indeterminate immediacy"?

In its "abstract immediacy", the determinacy of quality is without any further determination, or specification (i.e. its non-being is concealed). We can anticipate then that the removal of its "immediacy" is necessary in order for it to reveal the nature of its determinacy.

Thus, as it first issues from becoming in its "immediacy" (or in the form of being only), determinate being as such is unable to sustain itself. 

If it were to remain in its abstract "immediacy", determinate being as such would then be the equivalent of being that has extended beyond nothing, and thus it would simply relapse into the realm of "indeterminate immediacy" (or, pure being). 

In the case of a relapse into "indeterminate immediacy", the logic would simply re-enter the sequence of Being, Nothing, Becoming, and then there would once again be the return to the moment of the issuing of determinate being as such.  

Instead, determinate being as such immediately gives way to…or, it can't help but give way to its own negation. Or, we can also say that quality simply gives way to "the removal of its abstract immediacy".

Here, with negation we have an advance from a first to a second.

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Q5: Does negation completely extinguish determinate being as such?

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Q6: What is preserved (if anything) when the "immediacy" of determinate being as such gives way to negation?

Well, firstly, we must consider that if all trace of determinate being is extinguished with the negation, this "sheer deficiency" would then be the equivalent of nothing that has extended beyond being, and therefore negation would amount to "the indeterminate immediacy" of nothing (see SL p.111).  

If this were the case, negation would again send the logic through the sequence of "indeterminate immediacy", and we already know from the development of the prior sphere, that this sequence results in the issuing of determinate being as such… and its giving way to negation.

So, we have established above that (1) 'determinate being as such' must be removed from its abstract immediacy--or, it will relapse into "indeterminacy immediacy"--however, (2) if this removal completely extinguishes 'determinate being as such', then "the negation" will become relation-less, and thereby extinguish itself into "indeterminate immediacy" (i.e. relapsing into nothing).

Instead, (3) what is preserved then, when 'determinate being as such' is removed from its immediacy, is an "abstract distinction" between two determinate immediacies, viz. the being of qualitative determinacy (i.e. reality), and the non-being of qualitative determinacy (i.e. negation).

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Q7: So, what is actually posited with negation?

Negation is the abstract deficiency of 'determinate being as such' (or, it is the non-being of quality)

However, the "absence of determinate being as such" (i.e. negation) is itself determinate in virtue of its contact with determinate being. With negation then, we for the first time have "abstract distinction", and with it, the bifurcation of quality (or, reality and negation). 

Remember, we started determinate being with merely the oneness of its abstract immediacy, but with negation we now have a doubling of quality. 

At the same time, it's important to note that "the affirmative presence" of what is preserved with negation is not immediately at hand. Instead, what has emerged with this move is simply "the non-being of qualitative determinacy".

However, as I have explained above, the removal of 'determinate being as such'  is determinate being in its own right, otherwise it would simply extinguish itself into "indeterminate immediacy" (i.e. nothing).  But this "affirmative presence" of negation as determinate being is initially concealed.

And so what negation is as determinate being is not immediately specified. 

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Reality and Negation                                                                 

With negation, there is the doubling of quality, and with this bifurcation, what is now at hand is, the abstract distinction between (1) the "non-being of qualitative determinacy" (i.e. negation), and (2) the "being of qualitative determinacy" (i.e. reality).

On either side of the "abstract distinction", quality does not extend beyond determinate being (see p.115), this means that "the non-being of quality" equally has an affirmative presence as determinate qualitative being. 

With the acknowledgement that "the non-being of quality" (i.e. negation) is affirmatively present as determinate being, the resources for the next logical advance are already at hand.

On either side of the "abstract distinction", what emerges is the sublation of the "abstract distinction"--or, the sublation of the first negation (i.e. the negation of the negation).

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The negation of the negation 

From the vantage point of a third (i.e. from the vantage point of reflection), we can envisage here that on either side of the "abstract distinction" between reality and negation, there is the "affirmative presence" of determinate qualitative being. 

But, from the strict vantage point of the advance of the logic itself, what is preserved on one side of the "abstract distinction" or another, is determinate being's relation to itself. 

This being that is preserved on the other side of what it is not, is the negative unity of determinate being with itself --or, it is the negation of the negation.

So, here--after initially giving way to abstract negation--determinate being is again "equal to itself", through the sublation of the "abstract distinction" that was generated by the first negation.

Now for first time, with determine being's mediated relation to itself, we have a reflected determinate being, or a something.  

The determinacy of the determinate being of a something is first posited in its immediacy without any further determination, or specification. 

Hegel writes...

"This mediation with itself which something is in itself, taken only as negation of the negation, has no concrete determinations for its sides; it thus collapses into the simple oneness which is being." (SL p. 116)

Here with the positing of a determinate determinacy (or, a something), we again have arrived at the abstraction of immediacy in the development.  And, if the something remains in itself (i.e. if it remains in its immediacy with no concrete determinations for its sides) it will simply collapse into the "indeterminate immediacy" of pure being. 

Thus, the something is initially in itself (or, it is immediate). The in itself is a term that Hegel has borrowed from the tradition of Kant. A term which indicate for Hegel a determinate being that has been stripped from its relation to an other (see SL p.87-88). 

The something must reveal the nature of its determinacy, or face a collapse into "indeterminate immediacy". Thus, in a similar way to the prior forms that have issued forth as "abstract immediacy" in the development so far (e.g. pure being, determinate being as such), the something cannot help but give way to its own negation.

However, its negation is not (1) the nothing of "indeterminate immediacy", nor is its negation, (2) the non-being of qualitative determinacy, instead its negation is (3) the alteration into an other qualitative determinacy.

Yet, similar to the instances of negation that we have encountered thus far in the development, what the negation (i.e. "the alteration") of the something is, is not immediately at hand. 

Its negation does not (1) extinguish the something, for if this were the case it would simply collapse into "indeterminate immediacy", nor does its negation (2) "abstractly distinguish" the being of qualitative determinacy from the non-being of qualitative determinacy, instead its negation is (3) "the alteration" into the in itself of an other qualitative determinacy.

The in itself of 'the other' into which the something alters, is an equally immediate in itself (i.e. it has no concrete determinations for its sides), and thus with the alteration, the development of the logic again arrives at an immediacy which can't help but remove itself, or else face a collapse into "indeterminate immediacy".  

The in itself of a something then necessarily passes into a becoming, because that which it has passed into (i.e. the in itself of an other) is quite the same as what has passed over, and so the in itself of the other is equally unable to sustain itself, and thus alters into its other--with the passing into "the other of the other", the development is right back to the in itself of the something.

Hegel writes…

"Something is, and is, then, also a determinate being; further, it is in itself also becoming, which, however, no longer has being and nothing for its moments. One of these, being, is now determinate being, and further a determinate being. The second is equally a determinate being, but determined as a negative of the something--an other. Something as a becoming is a transition, the moments of which are themselves somethings, so that the transition is alteration--a becoming which has already become concrete." (Hegel SL p. 116)

R