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- Sep 20, 2014This is all wrong.It only takes one son for the mother to be a mother. We are talking about concepts, not about biological facts, from the concept of the son you extract both the concept of the mother and of the non-mother.Without the concept of the son there is no mother-ness.The rest of your arguments I have no idea what they can possibly have to do with what I am saying. What creates a book is a writer but a writer is only one when he creates a book.I write but I am not a writer, if by writer we mean two things: literature and being published. If for you a writer only demands the exercise of writing, then we are all writers here, but, still, only insofar as we write.Form is as important to a painting as it is paint so the relation of paint to a painting lacks the formative activity which is given by the artist, but this form, of art, must be actualized so that the artist may become an artist.Anyway, I have no hope for this debate. I think you are in too deep in your miscomprehension of this subject to ever be willing to come out of it.João.
---In hegel@yahoogroups.com, <willmellon@...> wrote :You are not recognizing the argument that I offered.Consider it this way. A son can have only one mother. A mother can have many sons. There is a difference between them. Therefore, there is no equal reciprocal relation between them.A painting is related to paint. But paint is related to many things. A difference is implied. Therefore there can be no equal reciprocal relation between them.An even more difficult example that challenges your idea of equal reciprocal necessity: the lithographic letters of a book do not cause/create a book. No one writes a book simply by aggregating alphabetical letters. The ideas of the author are the cause of the letters in which they are expressed.
From: "vascojoao2003@... [hegel]" <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
Sent: Friday, September 19, 2014 10:23 PM
Subject: Re: [hegel] ground
Okay Will. I notice your argument and I'll just leave this be for now. I don't comprehend a world where a woman, having no concept of a son, is still a mother...Or where a man having no work of art of his is still an artist.Maybe I understand this world, maybe it is the world of the freedom of the signifier where sentences can be made and presented just because they can.Why do we need a woman to have a son for her to be made a mother if we can JUST SAY that without a son she is already a mother.João.llmellon@...> wrote :A mother doesn't need you to be a mother. You are contingent, she can be a mother without you. There is not an equal reciprocal relation.Paint doesn't need to be used in a painting. Paint is contingent with respect to the painting, but the painting is necessarily related to the paint. There is not an equal reciprocal relation.A mother is the possibility of having you as a child. But you are only an actualization of one of those possibilities.Paint has the possibility of becoming a painting. But it is only one of those possibilities.In each case, the actualization of the possibility depends on the possibility being there to begin with. The actual doesn't create the possible, which is greater than it. Thus there is no reciprocal equality between them.So far as Understanding is concerned, "abandoned" may lead to the kind of misconception it gave you. It would better to say we cannot stay at the level of understanding in order to explain the fact that finite things are not fixed in their isolation.
From: "vascojoao2003@... [hegel]" <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
Sent: Friday, September 19, 2014 3:41 PM
Subject: Re: [hegel] ground
Will,There is probably more I want to comment but for now just a comment on a couple of points:You say:"We have to abandon it in order to rise to Reason and the comprehension of reality as it is."If you abandon the Understanding you will abandon dialectical thought, not because the Understanding is this dialectical thinking but because without the understanding there is no object [of dialectical thinking] for reason. The Understanding properly conceived is not a simple opposition to reason but a moment of reason.This is the case where you cannot throw away the water without throwing away the baby. Which is not the same as saying that baby and water are the same.BTW the paint posits the painter. The being which will have been called a painter can certainly be said the precede the paint but as such he is no painter and cannot be. Only given paint can this same being becomes a painter.You say: "Originally we recognize ourselves as contingent - beings who are posited by what is other than or Mother to ourselves."The mother, the being that will have been conceived as mother is certainly prior to the son, but not as mother. Only after the son is that being a mother. No son, no mother.You can say, no mother no son. And this is correct. The difference is that from the son, from the being of the son we can infer both the being and non-being of the mother, while before a son was ever conceived there was no means to conceive the notion of being or not a mother.If no son was ever conceived there would be no possible concept of mother.João.
---In hegel@yahoogroups.com, <willmellon@...> wrote :Joao: - Will, as you can see yourself it is not the Ground the posits the finite it is the finite that makes itself into the posited element. I think there is a difference here that you are not accounting for. I'll wait for the moment when you account for it to see what comes out of it from you.
By stating that the finite posits the ground as positing itself, the finite is necessarily going through a mediation (the Ground) in order to get to itself as posited. In going through this mediation of the Ground, the finite is already presupposing that the idea of the Ground contains the possibility of posing the finite. That possibility does not come from the finite, but is already in the idea of the Ground.
In the example of the painting, we have to first consider the relation between the paint and the painting. Obviously the paint is a contingent element that can be used to paint a building or anything else, including a painting. It would therefore be illegitimate to say that the paint posits the painter. Once we have a painting then we can presume necessarily that the paint was used to make the painting by a painter. But even then, ontologically we cannot say that the painting made the painter. It is only for cognition or knowing that we see a painting and then posit a painter. Logically or in the order of being, the painter must come before the painting.
This is a error that is generally made when ordo cogniscendi is conflated with ordo essendi.
Originally we recognize ourselves as contingent - beings who are posited by what is other than or Mother to ourselves. Why? Because the finite is self-cancelling. It does not sustain its own being. Thus it must posit a Ground or Other to itself by which it obtained its temporary or contingent being. We posit a Ground, because we know the Ground necessarily first posited us.
It is not that the Understanding goes away. Understanding is limited. It cannot get beyond its own fixed isolations of abstract identities. Finite identities actually vanish. Understanding can't explain that. The actual and the Understanding don't match. To comprehend the vanishing, dialectical (negative) reason is needed. But that also proves to be inadequate. Vanishing as such is the stage that simple skepticism reaches. But affirmatively there is not just vanishing, there is also the negation of the vanishing. This is comprehended in and by positive (speculative) reason called the concept.
You may ask where dialectical reason came from. It was already existing, as the actual but Understanding abstracted from it the fixed identities which were never really there to begin with. Understanding doesn't capture the truth of reality. We have to abandon it in order to rise to Reason and the comprehension of reality as it is.
From: "vascojoao2003@... [hegel]" <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
Sent: Friday, September 19, 2014 11:34 AM
Subject: Re: [hegel] ground
My reply below, in bold.
---In hegel@yahoogroups.com, <willmellon@...> wrote :Hegel [SL: § 963]l: "the true inference from a finite and contingent being to an absolutely necessary Being does not consist in inferring the latter from the former as from a Being which is and remains Ground, on the contrary, the inference is from a being that, as is also implied immediately in contingency, is only in a state of collapse and is inherently self-contradictory; or rather, the true inference consists in showing that contingent Being in its own self withdraws into its Ground, in which it is sublated — and, further, that by this withdrawal it posits Ground in such a manner only that it makes itself into the posited element."
Joao:Where is it said that ground posits the finite?
In the very last few words of the quote, Hegel writes: "it makes itself into the posited element [i.e. posited by the Ground]."- Will, as you can see yourself it is not the Ground the posits the finite it is the finite that makes itself into the posited element. I think there is a difference here that you are not accounting for. I'll wait for the moment when you account for it to see what comes out of it from you.
Joao: "The finite, properly conceived is infinite, a true infinity which its movement is of self-determination. Insofar as finite being posits the ground that posits it - it posits itself; or, it posits its presuppositions and this is no longer viable as finity. It is indeed an infinite movement. A true infinity. An absolute. A self-determined movement."
Very nice argument, Joao. But if you more carefully consider what you are saying, we can find the actual meaning.
In saying that the finite only "posits its presuppositions" you are admiting that it is only because it is originally posited by the infinte (ground) that it can posit itself as posited. In other words, if the finite were never posited (created) in the first place by the Ground/God, it would never be able to posit or think it, or determine itself as posited by it.- The finite is not posited by the infinite. The finite shows itself, for reason, as reason, to be infinite. It is a different thing. The finite endures as a product of the understanding and what is interesting to see in Hegel by the recurrent appearance of what for him is not - the finite - is that is shows the recurrent appearance of the Understanding and how, in my view, this means that the Understanding is a fundamental moment of reason.The Understanding never goes away and this is also why reason is infinite, it infinitely recollects the impasses of the understanding into rational activity.
For example:
We see an oil painting. Does it mean the oil paint created the picture which created the painter? A painting presupposes the paints, and presupposes an artist, but it doesn't thereby create/produce them.- The painting creates the artist which then is the creator of the painting. I can call myself an artist. What prevents me? Nothing really. But without a work of art what kind of artist am I when I call myself an artist?
From: "vascojoao2003@... [hegel]" <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
Sent: Friday, September 19, 2014 12:00 AM
Subject: Re: [hegel] ground
Will: "Unfortunately, Alan thinks the non-being of the finite produces the Ground."Unfortunately for you Alan is right. There isn't even any ground for dispute.What Hegel says is the complete refutation of your point.Hegel: "the true inference from a finite and contingent being to an absolutely necessary Being does not consist in inferring the latter from the former as from a Being which is and remains Ground, on the contrary, the inference is from a being that, as is also implied immediately in contingency, is only in a state of collapse and is inherently self-contradictory; or rather, the true inference consists in showing that contingent Being in its own self withdraws into its Ground, in which it is sublated — and, further, that by this withdrawal it posits Ground in such a manner only that it makes itself into the posited element."Where does Hegel, here say what you argue? Where it is said that ground posits the finite?Hegel, contrary to what you argue, says "it [contingent, finite being] posits ground (...)".The finite, properly conceived is infinite, a true infinity which its movement is of self-determination. Insofar as finite being posits the ground that posits it - it posits itself; or, it posits its presuppositions and this is no longer viable as finity. It is indeed an infinite movement. A true infinity. An absolute. A self-determined movement.João.
---In hegel@yahoogroups.com, <willmellon@...> wrote :Hegel makes it quite explicit that the ground posits the finite, John. That is exactly what I have been arguing, although it sis so obvious it should not have to be argued. Unfortunately, Alan thinks the non-being of the finite produces the Ground.The odd thing is that Alan is the one who cannot get this simple point. The other oddity is that you could not understand who was arguing what. Or maybe it is not so odd. Posts are flying so fast on this list, no one can keep up with all of them.
From: "John Bardis jgbardis@... [hegel]" <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
Sent: Thursday, September 18, 2014 2:16 PM
Subject: [hegel] ground
I hate to say it, Will, but what you say sounds very odd to me.The grounds for something means the sufficient reason for something. This is the last of the laws of thought. There is the law of identity, of excluded middle, of contradiction and, finally, of ground or sufficient reason.Then these grounds are the grounds of the finite. The ground is the ground of existence which takes the form of the thing and its properties.So the ground isn't the result of the non-existence of the finite. The ground is the presupposition of the finite.Of course you might be referring to the development of the section itself. The section itself has to do with the category of relation at the level of reflection. So the three subsections correspond, on the level of appearance, to part/whole, force/ expression, inner/outer; and at the level of actuality with substance/accident, cause/effect, reciprocity.You mention the word "absolute". Perhaps you are referring to the third subsection of Ground. I really should look it up, but isn't the section on ground a development of the sort of conditions involved in providing reasons for things? In that case the third sort of conditions are absolute conditions if I remember correctly. Of course I could look in the book if that should prove necessary.At any rate these absolute conditions would correspond at this level to inner/outer and reciprocity at the two further levels.So that any of this might have to do with the non-existence of the finite or with "the absolute" doesn't make sense to me.As you undoubtedly know, Hegel deals with the finite in the Doctrine of Being. There would be the section that would be directly relevant to this subject.I do apologize, though, for going on in a matter that is probably of no interest to anyone.But certainly you are right that there is no consciousness nor is there any self anywhere to be found in the doctrine of essence.John
-----Original Message-----
From: Will Mellon willmellon@... [hegel] <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
To: hegel <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Wed, Sep 17, 2014 9:05 pm
Subject: Re: [hegel] the non-existence of the finite
John,
The particular context in which we are discussing the non-being of the finite is at the end of the chapter of Essence, just before the concept of Ground is reached. Hegel refers to the Absolute as Ground or absolute ground at this point. So that is where the Absolute comes in. The Logic really has nothing to do with consciousness at this point.
I think it would be a very bad idea to mix the Phenomenology with the Logic, because the Logic is reached only after the sphere of consciousness has "collapsed" or been superseded, and Being is Thought and Thought is Being. It is only when they are conceived as different that consciousness comes in.
I hope I have not misunderstood you, which seems to be very easy to do on this list.
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