[Joào]

> For Randall, thus, antinomy and self-negation is a characteristic of objects

> themselves independently of their relation to and with us. If not, then he 

> agrees with me. But he doesn't agree with me and so,

> Let's hear from Hegel what these objects, independently from their

> relation to consciousness, to us, are:

"The Thing-in-itself (and under 'thing' is embraced even Mind and God) expresses the object when we leave out of sight all that consciousness makes of it, all its emotional aspects, and all specific thoughts of it. It is easy to see what is left utter abstraction, total emptiness, only described still as an 'other-world' the negative of every image, feeling, and definite thought. Nor does it require much penetration to see that this caput mortuum is still only a product of thought (...)"

> So, Randall, do tell us about those antinomies that populate all 

>the objects independently of our relation to them. 

Hi Joào,

Again here I don't have to do much to refute your above reasoning, because Hegel himself spells out in detail what it means to conceive "the determinate being of a given object" as the "thing-in-itself" in his $100 argument.  

But I should point out that you assail my position (i.e. that "in virtue of their own determinate being, given objects fall into negation by themselves"), by deploying two incompatible counter arguments.

The two incompatible counter arguments are as follows:

1) Firstly, appealing to a "realism", you point to the absurdity of the idea that "independent and self-supporting objects" such as stones, apples and bricks could fall into negation in virtue of their own determinacy.

- But my position is that Hegel is an idealist, and he considers even rocks and apples to be ideas. And, because the determinate being (i.e. the reality) of rocks and apples is defined by their determinate limit, these objects fall into negation by the nature of their own determinacy.

2) Secondly, appealing to a merely "subjective idealism" you suggest in your most recent post that apart from its relation to consciousness, the determinate object is nothing.

So, here I get to debate with Alan's favorite Janus face.

But concerning Hegel's comment concerning "the in-itself", the full argument is provided in Remark 1 of the Being Chapter of the SL.

But let's keep a question in mind...

Q: What is it that is so easy to see concerning what the "thing-in-itself" would amount to?

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[Hegel] SL: Being, Remark 1

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A determinate, a finite, being is one that is in relation to another; it is a content standing in a necessary relation to another content, to the whole world. As regards the reciprocally determining context of the whole, metaphysics could make the — at bottom tautological — assertion that if a speck of dust were destroyed the whole universe would collapse. In the instances against the proposition in question something appears as not indifferent to whether it is or is not, not on account of being or non-being, but on account of its content,which brings it into relation with something else. If a specific content, any determinate being, is presupposed, then because it is determinate, it is in a manifold relationship with another content; it is not a matter of indifference to it whether a certain other content with which it is in relation is, or is not; for it is only through such relation that it essentially is what it is. The same is the case in the ordinary way of thinking (taking non-being in the more specific sense of such way of thinking as contrasted with actuality) in the context of which the being or the absence of a content, which, as determinate, is conceived as in relation to another, is not a matter of indifference (SL p.86).

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Hegel suggests above that…

- A determinate being is one that is in relation to another.

- A determinate being is a content standing in a necessary relation to another content, to the whole world.

- A determinate being is in a manifold relationship with another content. 

- It is not a matter of indifference to it whether a certain other content with which it is in relation is, or is not; for it is only through such relation that it essentially is what it is. 

So, determinate being is what is in relation to another.  If we speak of a "thing-in-itself", we are essentially attempting to speak of a determinate being completely isolated from what makes it determinate (i.e. its relation to another).

When we attempt to conceive the "thing-in-itself", we are isolating the determinate being of the object from its very own determinacy.  We can go even further and take the universal skepticism of Descartes, abstracting from everything, with the exception of the being of thinking itself. 

Does that mean that consciousness is responsible for determinate being? No, it means that we've abstracted from what makes determinate being determinate.

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[Hegel] SL: Being, Remark 1

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As Kant expresses it, 'through its existence something enters into the context of the whole of experience. ... we obtain thereby an additional object of perception without anything being added to our concept of the object'. As our explanation has shown, this means simply that something, through its existence, just because it is a determinate existence, is essentially in relationship with others, including also a percipient subject. The concept of the hundred dollars, says Kant, gains nothing by their being perceived. Concept here means the hundred dollars previously noted as thought in isolation. As thus isolated they are, it is true, an empirical content, but cut off, having no relationship with any other content and possessing no determinate character relatively to such; the form of identity-with-self strips them of any connection with an other, so that it is a matter of indifference whether they are perceived or not. But this so-called concept of the hundred dollars is a spurious concept; the form of simple self-relation does not belong to such a limited, finite content itself; it is a borrowed form attached to it by the subjective understanding; the being of the hundred dollars is not self-related but alterable and perishable. (Hegel SL p.88)

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Hegel suggests above that…

- Just because something is a determinate existence, it is essentially in relationship with others, including also a percipient subject.

Notice here Hegel says that "a determinate existence is essentially in relationship with others", and then says INCLUDING A PERCIPIENT SUBJECT.

So, "determinate existence" is not something that is in virtue of a percipient subject.  

- the hundred dollars thought in isolation are cut off, having no relationship with any other content and possessing no determinate character relatively to such; this form of identity-with-self strips them of any connection with an other, so that it is a matter of indifference whether they are perceived or not. 

Perception is not even necessary to demonstrate that the "thing-in-itself" is a sham!

[Joào]

> So, Randall, do tell us about those antinomies that populate all 

>the objects independently of our relation to them. 

So, what you are essentially trying to say is that if we abstract from all the relations that make up the inherent determinacy of determinate being, then there can be no antinomies that take place within the determinate being of the object itself.  

But here we are no longer speaking about the determinate being of the object, we have instead withdrawn into indeterminacy.

R