If we put this together we begin to see that Randall does NOT agree that removing consciousness from the picture the object of perception loses its dialectical nature, by which we can only conclude that for Randall the object of perception independently of perception still maintains its dialectical life, its antinomical character let's add it to bring the passages from Hegel. 

For Randall, thus, antinomy and self-negation is a characteristic of objects themselves independently of their relation to and with us. If not, then he agrees with me. But he doesn't agree with me and so,

Let's hear from Hegel what these objects, independently from their relation to consciousness, to us, are:

"The Thing-in-itself (and under 'thing' is embraced even Mind and God) expresses the object when we leave out of sight all that consciousness makes of it, all its emotional aspects, and all specific thoughts of it. It is easy to see what is left utter abstraction, total emptiness, only described still as an 'other-world' the negative of every image, feeling, and definite thought. Nor does it require much penetration to see that this caput mortuum is still only a product of thought (...)"

https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ge/hegel.htm parag. 44.

So, Randall, do tell us about those antinomies that populate all the objects independently of our relation to them. 

João.