You ask:

Q: But what is "the split" that you mention above in Perception an example of?  

Answer: Well, it's an example of 'the being of the object' proving itself to be 'something that is not'.

You missed the past month discussion where Will was trying to defend the view that the vanishing of finite being was a mere matter of finite being not being.

I pointed out that the non-being of the finite actually persists and as Hegel tells us is the being of the absolute.

This is something apparently you just are unable to think.

For you, the exposition of perception is nothing more than a skeptical refutation. As I have said countless times, skepticism is a position oriented by the opposition of consciousness. It is a position that as you have shown misreads the truth of consciousness to be nothing more than this refutation.

You quote my post but ignore the substance of what Hegel says and what I note about the truth of perception.

The thing of perception is conceived simultaneously in two mutually exclusive ways, as a medium and as an exclusive one. This dialectic culminates in the ideal moments that are being-for-self and being-for-another. The truth of this dialectic is what Hegel calls the unconditioned universal. This is the truth that as absolute persists. It is the logic of the thing of perception, something common reason cannot provide but speculative reason can.

Why do you ignore this? Because you are trapped within your skeptical mindset and are unable to think speculatively.

You have to understand that in my opinion you remain hopelessly lost and have yet to gain even a toehold in your attempt to comprehend Hegel’s speculative logic.

In sense-certainty we do not have a proper test of this consciousness until the third test because in the first two tests we, acting on behalf of this consciousness, apply one of our bright ideas: that there is a distinction between what is and is not essential in knowing what is immediate. Only with the third test do we take up this consciousness without imposing this distinction.

Below I quote from a post that was a response to something Will wrote in his attempt to defend a position very much like the one you attempt to defend today. Since you refuse to recognize anything not written directly to you and will not show the common courtesy to get up to speed about what has been happening on this site recently I offer this before you offer what I suspect will be a wayward reading of Essence.

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Essence begins with much talk about shine – a being that on longer has a being. A being characterized as “the pure moment of non-existence” or “the immediacy of non-existence”.

But Hegel then goes on to say:

“What constitutes the shine is the immediacy of non-being; this non-being, however, is nothing else than the negativity of essence within essence itself. In essence, being is non-being. Its inherent nothingness is the negative nature of essence itself. But the immediacy or indifference which this non-being contains is essence’s own absolute in-itself.”

Are we paying attention?

“The immediacy or indifference which this non-being contains is essence’s own absolute in-itself.”

Hegel goes on to say:

“Shine is essence itself in the determinateness of being. Essence has a shine because it is determined within itself and is therefore distinguished from its absolute unity.”

So this non-being just will not go away.

“Shine is the negative which has a being, but in another, in its negation; it is a non-self-subsisting-being which is sublated within and null. And so it is the negative which returns into itself, the non-subsistent as such, internally non-subsistent. This reference of the negative or the non-subsistence to itself  is the immediacy  of this non-subsistent…”

So, what lacks being is characterized as what returns into itself. This is precisely the point I have been making. The non-being of the finite is a way of being. It is the vanishing that persists as the negative which returns into itself. 

Finally,

“The determinateness that shine is in essence is, therefore, infinite determinateness; it is only the negative which coincides with itself and hence a determinateness that, as determinateness, is self-subsistence and not determined. Contrariwise, the self-subsistence, as self-referring immediacy, equally is just determinateness and moment, negativity solely referring to itself. This negativity which is identical with immediacy, and thus the  immediacy which is identical with negativity, is essence. “

Here we have Hegelian noise at its finest. Shine as negativity – the vanishing that persists – is essence. Or the non-being of the finite is the being of the absolute.

-          Alan