> > All of this suggests that "Wahrnehmen" fits your description
> > of "intellectual Anschauung."
>
> But not according to Hegel's text in § 449 of the Encyclopaedia.

Here he

> clearly makes a difference between the phenomenology

(consciousness)

> part of the subjective mind (to which as first moment sensuous

intuition

> belongs) and the intellectual or spirit part of the subjective

mind (to

> which as first moment intellectual intuition belongs).

Intellectual

> intuition is then 'pushed' into representation (Vorstellung) which
> includes recollection, imagination and memory. Therefore Hegel

writes in

> § 449 that intellectual intuition grasps the "tasteful substance

of the

> object" and so is a being-in-itself which is no longer external to
> consciousness.

The problem for me here in PhdG, is early in Chapter IV (para 197)
Hegel is already talking about the emmergence of a new form of
consciousness beyond picture repreresentation. And I'm pretty sure
that I can demonstrate by the end of Chapt. 3 that Hegel has already
arrived at determinate representation, (I do not know if it is
Vorstellung though). And it seems that "Intellectual intuition" is
not yet representation. So there is some tension between the terms
for me right around the turn of Chapt. 4.


Additionally, as I stated before in Perception the sense element is
indeed preserved, but as a universal (properties). However,
Perception also has a spiritual element in that it is a "taking to
be true." In fact the percipient is aware that his "taking" can be
false. This fact is instrumental in the movement of Perception to a
further determination. Otherwise, perception could conclude that
the in-itself was simply a vanishing. (see second part of para
118)... So it still seems for me that your "intellectual intuition"
should be placed somewhere in between Sense Certainty and the end of
chapter 3, otherwise we would have to allow intellectual intuition
the capacity to determine objects determinately.


Kind regards,

Randall