Dear list,

Paul Trejo's ideas contrast with Hegel's on at least three
fundamental points. Below I give you the first major point of
contention between Hegel and Paul.

I. Paul surreptitiously conditions all of Hegel's words with the
arbitrary goal of the ontological proof of God, betraying Hegel's
autonomous method of advance, effectively making Paul's Hegel an
untenable metaphysics and fodder for even the most appathetic and
casual of skeptics. And though Paul acts as if the winds of change
are tinkling chimes as he speaks, Paul's viewpoint is actually the
most common summary view put forth about Hegel. A view that is
motivated by one of the most quoted of Hegel's Summary claims about
the LOGIC:

"Accordingly, logic is to be understood as the system of pure reason,
as the realm of pure thought. The realm is truth as it is without
veil and in its own absolute nature. It can therefore be said that
this content is the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence
before the creation of nature and a finite mind." (SL, trans Miller
50)

1.This association of Logic with God's mind leads many commentators
to believe that Hegel's full theoretical position depends essentially
on some metaphysical doctrine of spiritual substance (an Absolute
Subject), "active" in history and nature, the "blueprint" for whose
activity can be foundin the Logic.

Charles Taylor writes:

The rational, truly universal thought which is expressed as we think
categories is thus spirit's knowledge of itself. Since the external
reality to which these categories apply is not only an embodiment of
Geist, but is posited by Geist as its embodiment, and hence reflects
the rational necessity of thought, in grasping the categories of
thought about things, we are also grasping the ground plan or
essential structure to which the worldd conforms in its unfolding.
(HEGEL, Charles Taylor 1975)

a. Here is Paul last Spring hedging at this same idea:

> The Content of Logic is beyond the rules of logic,
> since the rules themselves originate with this original content.

> Hegel questions whether the rules of logic, the rules of
> thinking, are actually the *only* subject matter of Logic.
> Is it not rather that these rules themselves must be
> legislated, and they did not self-generate? Nor are they
> sacrosanct. Indeed, they are 2,300 years old, and there
> is no Natural Science that deserves respect if it fails to
> criticize its earliest ideas formulated 2,300 years ago.

> So, if the rules of logic are not self-subsistent, then upon
> what do they subsist? It is *this* that the scientist of logic
> will encounter. This *reality* (bluntly, Spirit) is the thinking
> reality that is the ontological basis of a rigorous science of
> logic.

b. Apart from the conditional Paul uses in the above statement, "if
the rules of logic are not self-subsistent", the above position is a
legitimate interpretation of Hegel accepted by many. I think that
this position should be rejected as an untenable metaphysics, but
that is a matter of indifference for my next point. Clearly, through
Hegel's Autonomous method Hegel's logic is a "pure self-
determination", that is, it *IS* self-subsistent. Therefore, with or
without some fundamental relationship to God, the logic must be
developed according to its own autonomous self-articulation. Whether
or not this "self-realization of the Absolute Idea" reveals the
thought or `being' of God is irrelevant to the actual development of
the Logic. Thus whether we are metaphysical or non-metaphysical about
Hegel, we both can take on the immanent development of the Notion.
The relationship to the fully developed LOGIC and God is indeed a
potentially interesting and fruitful undertaking, however as I stated
above, beginning with the ontological proof of God betrays Hegel's
autonomous method of advance.

2. The priority of Hegel's method of advance over the conditioned
textual reference to Hegel's words.

A. The answer to the always conspicuous and turgid pronouncements
about God that Paul has provided from LECTURES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF
RELIGION so many times doesn't lie in that that periphereal text.
Those marginal writings are meant for the reader who has advanced
through the Phenomenology of Spirit, and the Science of Logic
already.

(1)As is the same case when Hegel states in his Philosophy of Right
that the `proof' or development of the concept of right falls outside
of the Science of Right and is thus presupposed in that work (PR
p26, trans ), also he says the same thing in the Philosophy of
History, "That this `Idea' of `Reason' is the True, the Eternal…is
the thesis which, as we have said, has been proved in Philosophy, and
is here regarded as demonstrated." (The Philosophy of History 9-10,
trans. J. Sibree).


B. Paul has attempted to arrive at the Absolute through the
ontological proof of God. Thus, Paul surreptitiously conditions
Hegel's *words* by the arbitrary goal of proving God's existence. In
doing so, he has demonstrated to the list that he does not
understand *the method of advance* of the Phenomenology or the
Science of Logic. Considering the prolific breadth of topics that
Hegel covers and his use of "reductio arguments", any superficial
reader of Hegel can condition Hegel's words with some arbitrary goal,
and effectively support that goal by selectively choosing, arranging
and re-arranging passages (sometimes even "cannablizing" the correct
meaning) to support that goal, in other words by divorcing Hegel's
words from his scientific method of advance. This has in fact been
done many times throughout history to make Hegel a monster. Case in
point, "A World historical individual…is devoted to one aim…It is
even possible that such men treat other great interest,
inconsiderately…But so mighty a form must trample down many an
innocent flower…" How many times have you seen this one thrown in
Hegel's face?

Here is an example of Paul's device (notice that the word "immediate"
is excluded from Paul's citation, the key term of Hegel's statement):

"The beginnig, the principle, or the Absolute, as at first
immediately ununciated, is only the universal...the words, the
Divine, the Absolute, the Eternal, etc.. do not express what is
contained in them; and only such words, in fact, do express the
intuition as something immediate. Whatever is more than such a word,
even the transition to a mere proposition, contains a becoming-other
that has to be taken back, or is a mediation. stating the aim ahead
of a philosophical project is inappropriate and misleading"(Hegel,
PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT, 1807,
trans. Miller, 1977, para. 20)


Now compare Paul's "Modified" version of the same text:

> "It is plain that the words, 'Divine,' 'Absolute,'
> 'Eternal,' do not express [explicitly] what is
> contained in them [implicitly]...it is just this
> that is rejected with horror...But the horror,
> in fact, stems from ignorance of the nature of
> mediation, and of Absolute Cognition itself."
> (Hegel, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT, 1807,
> trans. Miller, 1977, para. 20-21)

(1) Paul's appeal is to the impatience of the many—those who want to
be finished already before they even begin-- so he promptly satisfies
the masses by *beginnig with the end*, therebye depriving the reader
of the distinctive moments of spirit, leading the beginners
hopelessly astray from the start, and distracting the not-so-
beginners from advancing down the proper Hegelian pathway.

a. "The true is the whole. But the whole is nothing other than the
essence consummating itself through its development. Of the Absolute
it must be said that it is essentially a result, that only in the end
is it what it truely is; and that precisely in this consists its
nature viz. to be actual, subject, the spontaneous becoming of
itself."

b. "But the actuality of this whole consists in those various shapes
and forms which have become its moments, and which will now develop
and take shape afresh, this time in their new element, in thier newly
acquired meaning."

(2) To conclude I would like to plead my case to the list and to Paul
to move away from the aim of the ontological proof of God, and the
seemingly endless conditioned textual references to God, and instead
step inside Hegel's autonomous method of advance.

c."For the real issue is not exhausted by stating it as an aim, but
by carry it out, nor is the result the actual whole, but rather the
result together with the process through which it came about. The
aim by itself is a lifeless universal, just as the guiding tendency
is a mere drive that as yet lacks an actual existence; and the bare
result is the corpse which has left the guiding tendency behind it."

d.The true shape in which truth exists can only be the scientific
system of such truth. To help bring philosophy closer to the form of
Science, to the goal where it can lay aside the title `love of
knowing' and be actual knowing

Next post I will critique Paul's take on the immanent development of
the Notion, his attributing a "Trial and Error" method to Hegel.


Kind regards,

Randall Jackwak