In response to Mon, 7Jul03 post by Paul Trejo (Continuation):


Post (1) by Selva (Continuation):

>>>>>>>>>

(...) I cannot to speak "forming Content"; since "forming" implies passage of unmoving to moving, or potentia to actus, nevertheless in the human consciousness. With this, I distinguish between "formant Content" and "formalizant Form" [not forming Content and formalizing Form], and also between "formed Content" and "formalized Form"; this isn't movement of human consciousness, but the self-movement of the Absolute captivated in the human consciousness.
<<<<<<<<<<<

Reply (1c) by Trejo:

>You will not speak of "forming" Content, Professor
>Selva, but you distinguish between "formant" and
>"formalizant". You explicitly distinguish between
>"formed Content" and "formalized Form", and you
>claim that this does not refer to finite human thinking,
>but to Absolute thinking as it may be grasped by the

human mind.

>Yet I will watch for signs of dualism in this regard.
>The Finite is wholly sublated under the Infinite. The
>Infinite includes the Finite, and to imagine the Infinite
>as simply another Finite that confronts the Finite is to
>retain the old dualism. This was Kant's error as he
>expressed it in his challenge of the $100.

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

My response to Reply (1c) by Trejo:

Yes, I have distinguished between "formant Content" and "formalizant Form", and between "formed Content" and "formalized Form". This is necessary for to explicit way of captivate (apprehension, catch up, etc.) the self-movement of the Absolute (subjective and objective genitive) in/for the human consciousness. The human consciousness, as understanding, has no longer active function here; but as unity of Reason and Faith, or acceded at absolute Knowing.

In this case, "formant Content" and "formed Content" are not "potential" and "actual" [one opposed at other], but two moments of the proper "Actual" (as moment of content of the absolute Form). Also absolute Form has "formalizant Form" and "formalized Form" as its moments, the formal determinations of Absolute; the "formalized Form" is that "with what must Science begin", the "formalizant Form" is the formal development of this beginning. Therefore, "formant Content" and "formalizant Form" [not forming Content and formalizing Form], and "formed Content" and "formalized Form" are not movement of human consciousness, but the self-movement of the Absolute captivated in the human consciousness.

So is that Hegel, in his Encyclopaedia (� 79), could to say:

"In point of form Logical doctrine has three sides: [a] the Abstract side, or that of understanding; [b] the Dialectical, or that of negative reason; [c] the Speculative, or that of positive reason." (translation in MIA).



Also:



"These three sides do not make three parts of logic, but are stages or �moments� in every logical entity, that is, of every notion and truth whatever. They may all be put under the first stage, that of understanding, and so kept isolated from each other; but this would give an inadequate conception of them. The statement of the dividing lines and the characteristic aspects of logic is at this point no more than historical and anticipatory" (� 79, observation).(translation in MIA).

How "they may all be put under the first stage, that of understanding, and so kept isolated from each other"? How to make happen Science go beyond of inadequate conception that result of isolation?.


In Enc. � 17, Hegel says:



"It may seem as if philosophy, in order to start on its course, had, like the rest of the sciences, to begin with a subjective presupposition. The sciences presuppose their respective objects, such as space, number, or whatever it be; and it might be presupposed that philosophy had also presuppose the existence of thought. But the two cases are not exactly parallel. It is by the free act of thought that it occupies a point of view, in which it is for its own self, and thus gives itself an object of its own production. Nor is this all. The very point of view, which originally is taken on its own evidence only, must in the course of the science be converted to a result � the ultimate result in which philosophy returns into itself and reaches the point with which it began. In this manner philosophy exhibits the appearance of a circle which closes with itself, and has no beginning in the same way as the other sciences have. To speak of a beginning of philosophy has a meaning only in
relation to a person who proposes to commence the study, and not in relation to the science as science. The same thing may be thus expressed. The notion of science � the notion therefore with which we start � which, for the very reason that it is initial, implies a separation between the thought which is our object, and the subject philosophising which is, as it were, external to the former, must be grasped and comprehended by the science itself. This is in short, the one single aim, action, and goal of philosophy � to arrive at the notion of its notion, and thus secure its return and its satisfaction." (translation in MIA).

If philosophy had to begin with a subjective presupposition, and if its presupposition is free act of thought, and if its beginning has a meaning only in relation to a person who proposes to commence the study, and not in relation to the science as science, then its beginning had to be "no more than historical and anticipatory" (� 79, observation). This is a phenomenological beginning (for human consciousness), a beginning reduced at understanding (no still beginning of the thought and for the thought); in this phenomenological beginning, the "historical and anticipatory" content (the characteristic aspects of logic reduced at the first stage) can to be anticipate because "for the thought" (the Concept or Notion for-itself), beginning is only "formalized Form" (the abstract forms of being and essence). The Form was formalized not for the human understanding (as forming Form or formalizing form), but for the "free act of thought" itself; so, this "free act of thought" for-itself is
properly beginning "of the thought" (the pure being or the Notion in-itself) or, "in relation to a person who proposes to commence the study", the "formalizant Form" (the movement of anticipation/manifestation in/for us for the proper Concept for-itself in his immediate unity with Concept in-itself). In this "commence of study", "the notion of science � the notion therefore with which we start � which, for the very reason that it is initial, implies a separation between the thought which is our object, and the subject philosophising which is, as it were, external to the former, must be grasped and comprehended by the science itself" (Enc., � 17), justly because the absolute beginning is presupposed (Enc., � 1; SL, I, 1832, 37-43, GW, 21) as unity of the "formalized Form" and "formalizant Form".

In Introduction of his Logic (SL, I, 1832, p. 1-2), Hegel says:

"Logic (...) cannot presuppose any of these forms of reflection and laws of thinking, for these constitute part of its own content and have first to be established within the science. But not only the account of scientific method, but even the Notion itself of the science as such belongs to its content, and in fact constitutes its final result; what logic is cannot be stated beforehand, rather does this knowledge of what it is first emerge as the final outcome and consummation of the whole exposition. Similarly, it is essentially within the science that the subject matter of logic, namely, thinking or more specifically comprehensive thinking is considered; the Notion of logic has its genesis in the course of exposition and cannot therefore be premised."(translation in MIA).

Also (ibid., p. 15-17):

"(...) without exception all those rules such as, for example, that one must think out and test what one reads in books or hears by word of mouth, that when one's sight is not good one should help one's eyes by wearing spectacles � rules which in textbooks of so-called applied logic were solemnly set out in paragraphs and put forward as aids to the attainment of truth � these must strike everyone as superfluous � except only the writer or teacher who finds difficulty in expanding by some means or other the otherwise scanty and life-less content of logic.

"(...)

"Before these dead bones of logic can be quickened by spirit, and so become possessed of a substantial, significant content, its method must be that which alone can enable it to be pure science."(translation in MIA).

And still (SL, I, 1832, 27-29):



"But in the Introduction, the Notion of logic was itself stated to be the result of a preceding science, and so here, too, it is a presupposition. In accordance with that result logic was defined as the science of pure thought, the principle of which is pure knowing, the unity which is not abstract but a living, concrete unity in virtue of the fact that in it the opposition in consciousness between a self-determined entity, a subject, and a second such entity, an object, is known to be overcome; being is known to be the pure Notion in its own self, and the pure Notion to be the true being. These, then, are the two moments contained in logic. But now they are known to be inseparable, not as in consciousness where each also has a separate being of its own; it is solely because they are at the same time known as distinct (yet not with an independent being) that their unity is not abstract, dead and inert, but concrete.

This unity also constitutes the logical principle as element, so that the development of the difference directly present in that principle proceeds only within this element. For since the division is, as we have said, the judgement of the Notion, the positing of the determination already immanent in it, and therefore of the difference, we must not understand this positing as a resolving of that concrete unity back into its determinations as if these had an independent self-subsistence, for this would be an empty return to the previous standpoint, to the opposition of consciousness. This however has vanished; the said unity remains the element, and the distinctions of the division and of the development no longer originate outside that element. Consequently the earlier determinations (those used on the pathway to truth) such as subjectivity and objectivity, or even thought and being, or Notion and reality, no matter from what standpoint they were determined, have lost their
independent and purely affirmative character and are now in their truth, that is, in their unity, reduced to forms. In their difference, therefore, they themselves remain implicitly the whole Notion, and this, in the division, is posited only under its own specifications.

Thus what is to be considered is the whole Notion, firstly as the Notion in the form of being, secondly, as the Notion; in the first case, the Notion is only in itself, the Notion of reality or being; in the second case, it is the Notion as such, the Notion existing for itself (as it is, to name concrete forms, in thinking man, and even in the sentient animal and in organic individuality generally, although, of course, in these it is not conscious, still less known; it is only in inorganic nature that it is in itself)."(translation in MIA).

So, Hegel himself help me in my response at you reply. Clearly, as I said in last mail and above, 1) if "formant Content" and "formed Content" are [concrete] moments of the self-formation of Content (as absolute Form or the Actual) and 2) if "formalizant Form" and "formalized Form" are too moments of the formal determinations of Absolute, I can to speak "that this does not refer to finite human thinking, but to Absolute thinking as it may be grasped by the human mind".
There is "signs of dualism" only where the dogmatism of "absolute Concrete" wasn�t still sublated in infinite self-movement of the Whole or Totality-in-movement. If there is a infinite self-movement that is the proper Infinite, thus you cannot to say that "Finite is wholly sublated under the Infinite" or that "Infinite includes the Finite"; but also that the Finite con-template the Infinite in his totality, because the Infinite can be only in this reflection of the his Finite determinations. They are the moving Whole in that the unmoving Infinite have been determined by itself, in-itself and for-itself.

Also I will watch for signs of dualism in your regard. Who affirm "the Finite is wholly sublated under the Infinite" and "the Infinite includes the Finite" without remainder, to to take a chance to remain in the pure abstraction of the "absolutely concrete". That is, not only return to Parmenides and Spinoza, but also will not "to imagine the Infinite as simply another Finite that confronts the Finite" and, without knowing, to retain the old formalism (that includes the core of Kant�s dualism and the Schelling�s Mythology).

Post (2) by Selva:

>>>>>>>>>>>>>

I agree that apriori and aposteriori, and also "forming Content" [as potentia] and formal "formed Content" [as only actus] are derived from the Absolute. But I cannot agree that Freedom and actuality [as Actuality] are derived from the Absolute, because Freedom is the substance of the Absolute and Actuality is the process of presentation of the Absolute itself at itself.
<<<<<<<<<<<<<

Reply (2) by Trejo:

>Dear Professor Selva, I think this argument must be
>referred to Hegel's theory of dualism. All things are
>derived from the Absolute, since the Absolute is the
>True Infinite, the Whole. Freedom and Actuality are
>thus also derived from the Absolute, for Hegel. To
>divide the Absolute from Freedom is perhaps to regard
>the Absolute as a hypostatic, subjective notion that is
>not the Whole. Even as regards empirical freedom in
>the finite world of political science, this does not arise
>solely from human nature, but obtains a theological
>impetus, according to Hegel.

<<<<<<<<<<<<<

My response:

Dear Trejo, I can to agree that all [finite] things (in sense of german "Ding") are derived from the Absolute, and that since the Absolute is the True Infinite, the Whole; I can too agree that [human] Freedom and [contingent] Actuality are thus also derived from the Absolute. But I can not agree that it is for Hegel, because this is justly that you has objected me; you has supposed that I think as you can to comprehend me, but I haven�t saying that all things are not derived from the Absolute or that Absolute isn�t the True Infinite, or Freedom and Actuality aren�t thus also derived from the Absolute, for Hegel. For me, as for Hegel, all finite things are determinations from the Absolute; like as the Absolute, that is the True Infinite, the Whole, only can to be the True Infinite and the Whole if, and only if, the speculative Freedom and absolute Actuality are thus also not derived from the Absolute, but the Absolute itself in his infinite self-movement of self-determination or
reflection in-the-finite as his go out itself and into itself.

I can to agree that to divide the Absolute from Freedom is perhaps to regard the Absolute as a hypostatic, subjective notion that is not the Whole. But, what is hypostatic isn�t necessarily a subjective notion; certainly, the subjective notion is not the Whole, but what is hypostatic is justly that mediate the human apprehension of the Whole and the manifestation/reflection of the Whole in the human consciousness, this without to be these apprehension, manifestation or reflection. Therefore is that empirical freedom in the finite world of political science does not arise solely from human nature, but obtains a theological impetus; but I haven�t said nothing on it.

Post (3) by Selva:

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

For me, the question 'how are we to understand this?'
can to be responded with the retake of Hegel's
speculative philosophy as a "Critique of Presupposed".
The "presupposed" isn't only a subjective presupposed
in the mind of the individual, this is a "supposed" (as
a hypothesis), but it is a objective presupposed (as
unconditioned Condition of all "posed") in sense of the
Objectivity of Hegel's Logic. So this "Critique of
Presupposed" is a Critique of the unconditioned
Condition of all "posed". This is a starting point that
could be agreed for the moderns and postmodern
thinkers. So, the aim of the "Critique of Presupposed"
(as Critique of the unconditioned Condition of all
"posed") is to show that in all posed there is a
unconsidered presupposed. Our "Critique" will not
and cannot justify the presupposed, but to make the
criticism of that is posed as presupposed or that is
presupposed as posed. These presupposed and
posed are positions of the proper Absolute in its
self-movement of self-formation; thus our Critique is
only observation of presentation from this movement
while his actualization to place on display for us it.

<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<

Reply (3) by Trejo:

>Your argument will not be easy, Professor Selva, since
>Hegel himself speaks of the Presupposed in a special
>context in his science of logic. In the beginning of his
>system, when he speaks of the problem of where to begin,
>Hegel says,
>
> "Logic cannot presuppose any of the
> forms of reflection and laws of thinking,
> for these constitute part of its own
> content and have first to be established
> within the science." (Hegel, SCIENCE
> OF LOGIC, 1812, trans. Miller, p. 43)
>
>And also:
>
> "But not only the account of scientific
> method, but even the Notion itself of
> the science as such belongs to its
> content.What logic is cannot be stated
> beforehand, rather this knowledge of
> what it is first emerges as the final
> outcome and consummation of the
> whole exposition." (Hegel, SL, ibid.)
>
>And also,
>
> "It is quite inept to say that logic
> abstracts from all Content, that it
> teaches only the rules of thinking
> without any reference to *what*
> is thought, or without being able
> to consider its nature." (Hegel, SL, ibid.)
>
>And also,
>
> "Until now, the Notion of Logic has
> rested on the separation, presupposed
> once and for all in the ordinary
> consciousness, of the Content
> of cognition and its Form.as a
> ready-made world apart from
> thought." (Hegel, SL, ibid. p. 44)
>
>Hegel will show that these presuppositions give
>support to Kant's theory that thinking does not go
>outside itself. Hegel will challenge Kant's theory
>down to its roots. Hegel adds,
>
> "They are errors the refutation of
> which is Philosophy, throughout
> every part of the spiritual and natural
> universe. Rather, as they bar the
> entrance to Philosophy, these errors
> must be discarded at the portals."
> (Hegel, SL, ibid. p. 45)
>
>The problem of presuppositions speaks to the very
>beginnings of Hegel's theory of Logic. Hegel will only
>begin his entire Encyclopedia with the most empty and
>abstract concepts possible - Being and Nothingness.
>From these raw materials Hegel will deduce his entire
>Encyclopedia.

<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<


My response:

Dear Trejo, I agree your observations. As I show above, with quotation of Introduction of Hegel's Logic (SL, I, 1832, p. 1-2; you have cited edition 1812, trans. Miller, p. 43), the "Logic (...) cannot presuppose any of these forms of reflection and laws of thinking, for these constitute part of its own content and have first to be established within the science". But now, if "these constitute part of its own content and have first to be established within the science", how can to be they "established within the science"?

In development of his Logic, Hegel have showing only the establishment, but did not to show justly this "how"; because this "how" is precisely the self-movement of Content (or the modality of being determined in and for itself) and plus properly the consciousness of the self-movement of Content (or the modality of cognition, posited as determined by the Notion and as form). For this, see SL, III, 1816, p. 373-374:

"Method may appear at first as the mere manner peculiar to the process of cognition, and as a matter of fact it has the nature of such. But the peculiar manner, as method, is not merely a modality of being determined in and for itself; it is a modality of cognition, and as such is posited as determined by the Notion and as form, in so far as the form is the soul of all objectivity and all otherwise determined content has its truth in the form alone.

If the content again is assumed as given to the method and of a peculiar nature of its own, then in such a determination method, as with the logical element in general, is a merely external form. Against this however we can appeal not only to the fundamental Notion of the science of logic; its entire course, in which all possible shapes of a given content and of objects came up for consideration, has demonstrated their transition and untruth; also that not merely was it impossible for a given object to be the foundation to which the absolute form stood in a merely external and contingent relationship but that, on the contrary, the absolute form has proved itself to be the absolute foundation and ultimate truth. From this course the method has emerged as the self-knowing Notion that has itself, as the absolute, both subjective and objective, for its subject matter, consequently as the pure correspondence of the Notion and its reality, as a concrete that is the Notion itself."
(translation in MIA).



In this passage, Hegel itself has recognized that presuppositions give not only support to Kant's theory or constitutes merely problem of beginning. For Hegel, and for me, the problem of presuppositions (as objective presuppositions and no more only subjective presuppositions) is major and more intricate problem of Hegel's theory of Logic. Therefore, this is also the problem of objectivity and so has been presented frequently in the course of development of Hegel's System. In the Science of Logic, it present oneself by:



1) SL, III, 1816, pp. 1-30 (the Notion in General),236-266 (Teleology), 276-370 (development of Idea), between others;

2) SL, I, 1812, pp. I-XXVIII (Introduction), 6-20 (With what must Science begin?), and others [unhappily, I have not pages of 1832's edition];

3) SL, II, 1813, pp.16-29 (Reflection), 89-102 (Absolute Ground), 123-135 (The Condition), 245-260 (from Relative Necessity to The relation of Substanciality), 273-280 (passage from The determinate relation of causality to Reciprocity). In next mail, I will to develope it.

Post (4) by Selva:

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

My position is that "Hegel's ontological solution" isn't
an authentic _expression of the discussion of a Hegelian
solution of Being's problem (or the Proofs of God's
Existence), because Hegel himself has sublated precisely
the ontological level (jointly with the transcendental level)
in the speculative level of his Science of Logic. In a
speculative sense, the authentic solution of this problem
is developed in the primary determination of the Concept,
intuited "Objectivity".

<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<

Reply (4a) by Trejo:

>Professor Selva, while it is true that Hegel does not end
>his System with his Ontological Solution, that is, his
>criticism of Kant's $100 challenge to Anselm, and also
>Hegel's own re-statement of Anselm's Ontological
>argument, nevertheless this is a necessary step forward
>in his procedure. It is necessary and it is repeated in

>many places in many of Hegel's books because it is so

>pivotal for the solution of many dialectical problems.

<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<

My response:

I agree. But, it is necessary and it is repeated in many
places in many of Hegel's books, and it is so pivotal
for the solution of many dialectical problems, precisely for the problem of objective presuppositions.

Reply (4b) by Trejo:

>Insofar as you maintain that your grasp of Hegel's
>Ontological Solution is now superseded by Hegel's theory
>of Objectivity, I have renamed this discussion with you,
>"Hegel's Theory of Objectivity", since you invited me to
>direct this emerging thread, and you yourself suggested
>the title with your final sentence above. (Also, I am aware
>that your academic duties will delay your replies, so I will
>also be patient.)

>I note that Hegel's theory of Objectivity comprises the
>first part of his SCIENCE OF LOGIC (1812). To this end I
>expect to produce citations from this section of his LOGIC
>to clarify our terms.

<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<

My response:

Agreed. But Hegel's Ontological Solution that is now superseded by Hegel's theory of Objectivity has been compehended by section two (Objectivity) of Science of Logic, III, Subjective Logic: The Doctrine of the Notion (See expressly SL, III, 1816, pp. 192-201). In Doctrine of essence (SL, II, 1813, pp. 138-142), Hegel has discuted the problem of God's existence [Existenz] in sense of Last Ground. In Doctrine of Being, this problem is only mentioned.

Regards,

Emmanuel Selva.

Yours others mails, I reply in next mail.



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