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13765Re: The Non-Metaphysical View of Hegel as Post-Kantian

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  • Beat Greuter
    Dec 7, 2012
      --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "heiss93" <heiss93@...> wrote:
      >
      > I sympathize with the critic's general view that Hegel revisionism restores logical clarity at the expense of what is "most interesting in his thought". This would be my more general criticism of Analytic philosophy in general, from a Continental perspective. I do think much is lost if Hegel is reduced to merely a epistemologist, and the existentialist insights of the "French Hegel" of Kojeve and Hyppolite. I do agree that Hegel's practical philosophy can not be separated from his System, but not necessarily his epistemology. I would emphasize more his ontology/logic over epistemology.
      >


      What is the difference between Hegel's 'ontology/logic' and his 'epistemology'? Klaus Hartmann says that Hegel's philosophy is an ontology in form of a doctrine of categories. Is this no epistemolgoy since it has no truth value in the sense of Analytic Philosophy? However, even if there is no explicit propositionality in Hegel's Logic (at least in its Objective part) because of its assumed unity of subject and object there is nevertheless a truth value in the transition of the categories in which the propostionality is (yet implicitly) comprised. Moreover, Analytic Philosophy has recently changed from a propositional logic as its main dogma (since Plato) to an analysis of the conceptual expressivity, and this is close to Hegel as also Brandom admits: it is the conceptual relation between the implicit and the explicit of this implicit which is a relation in both direction, and this is a good general description of the path of Hegel's Logic.

      As far as Hegel's 'practical' philosophy is concerned there is no strong separation between the practical and the theoretical in his philosophy. The conceptional is within nature and spirit and the Logic is 'only' its pure exposition.


      >
      > The dismissive view of French Hegel is expressed in Idealism as Modernism: Hegelian Variations By Robert B. Pippin
      >
      > He writes Kojeve is a "truncated and unsatisfactory jumblings of Hegelian ideas which get a better hearing in the original. It is commonplace among those who admire Kojeve to grumble about the "Hegel scholars" who just don't get it when they criticize Kojeve's eccentric reading don't see that Kojeve was also a child of his time."
      >
      > I find the Kojevian anthropological reading of Hegel to have more to say philosophically, than the epidemiological reading, even if it has the merit of greater logical clarity. Furthermore it is not clear to me that any analytic reading of Hegel is any closer to the "historical Hegel" than the French reading.
      >
      > While I have been reading "non-metaphysical" scholarship for some time now, it is only recently that I became aware of that school as a distinct philosophical position. So I admit I'm still a novice and need to keep an open mind to the alternative. I have found great value in the works of Pippin and Pinkard, as far as general Hegel scholarship goes. However on their polemical points of the epistemological vs anthropological Hegel, I'm almost always on the side of the latter.
      >
      > Best,
      > Heiss
      >
      > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "Beat Greuter" <greuterb@> wrote:
      > >
      > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "heiss93" <heiss93@> wrote:
      > > >
      > > > I've been reading Terry Pinkard's Hegelianism in the 20th Century
      > > > in Dermot Moran (ed.) The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy, 2007, which is available in PDF from his website. It gives an excellent summary of the various schools of Hegel interpretation in the 20th century. The main project for Anglo-American Hegel studies in the 20th century seemed to be, bringing Hegel more in line with analytic philosophy. Findlay and Charles Taylor, while both identifying commonplaces between Hegel and Analysis, still saw Hegel as a metaphysician.
      > > >
      > > > It was only with Hartmann and his followers that the Logical side of Hegel was recognized. The Hartmann School took advantage of the rehabilitation of Kant in analytic philosophy to help restore the reputation of Hegel as a post-Kantian. Hegel had interesting things to say because he was answering Kant's questions. I do recognize the benefit of the Kant-centric reading of Hegel, in better historically situating Hegel in his own zeitgeist of German Idealism.
      > > >
      > > > While on the one-side I appreciate the careful logical analysis of Hegel's categories, which I agree was unfairly ignored in favor of anthropological readings of PhS, I also sympathize with Pinkard's summary of Klaus Hartmann's critics who claim he had only saved Hegel by "banning all that was most interesting in his thought".
      > > >
      > >
      > >
      > > Why do you sympathize with these critics? Do you think that you can separate Hegel's 'practical' philosopyh from his epistemology? What is left after this separation? Perhaps, pre-Kantian metaphysics as we have so much in the 19th century?
      > >
      > >
      > > >
      > > > I had not been aware of the various schools of Hegel interpretation until reading Pinkard's article. However I now realize that nearly all the major contemporary English-language Hegel scholars adhere to the Non-Metaphysical revisionist view.
      > > >
      > > > The Post-Kantians seem in particular to want to banish the French anthropologist reading of Hegel, of Hypolite and Kojeve. And I have noticed that many recent Hegel works are rather polemical against Kojeve. Kojeve incorrectly imposes a Marxist-anthropologist social reading of the Master-Slave dialectic. Which is supposed to be read as a metaphor for the epistemological and logical development of self-consciousness. The Other needs to be understood as the object which opposes the will of consciousness, as opposed to a historical Master and Slave.
      > > >
      > > > Beiser , the non-metaphysical Hegel has a good summary of the recent trend "Much recent Hegel scholarship, for example, has attempted to separate Hegel's
      > > > 'rational core' from his 'mystical shell'. While the rational core consists in
      > > > his system of categories, his adherence to the Kantian transcendental project,
      > > > and whatever 'arguments' can be reconstructed from his texts, the mystical shell
      > > > comprises his Spinozistic metaphysics, his dialectical logic, and, worst of all,
      > > > his lingering involvement with Naturphilosophie [and not even Beiser will dare
      > > > mention his Christian theology].
      > > >
      > > > [in a footnote: "This tendency is especially apparent in the work of Robert
      > > > Pippin, Alan White, Terry Pinkard, Klaus Hartmann, and the work of the Hartmann
      > > > school".]
      > > >
      > > > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/hegel/message/10275
      > > >
      > >
      >
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