In response to Sat28Jun03 post by Paul Trejo

My dear Trejo, thank you for yours amiables responses. You are for the most part good with me and my attempt at the retake of Hegel�s philosophy. Therefore, excuse-me for this retarded response. In this week, I am working on the final exames of my pupils.

But, let�s go on your post:

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> This "level of abstraction" contains in-and-for-itself the
> process of self-movement of the Content. Or, as I say,
> the self-movement of the formativity of the Content, or
> the activity of the self-formation of the Content.

Yet, Professor Selva, when you speak of self-formation,
which is the activity of Hegel's Spirit, do you not also
speed ahead toward the negative and the concrete,
thus sublating the merely abstract?
<<<<<<<<<<<<<

Dear Trejo, I agree completely. The self-movement of the formativity of the Content, or
"the activity of Hegel's [self-formation] Spirit", is the "speed ahead toward the negative and the concrete". Or, in other way, it is immediately within itself self-unfold of the negative and the concrete. Thus "sublating the merely abstract" [for us] or still sublating the finite Pure Understanding (if it has been passed for the phenomenological movement of finite consciousness and reconciled with him in the Science). Finally, this that is abstract for us also abstract is within itself; but as abstract within itself it isn�t the same "abstract for we". So it is abstract because imediat, the imediat that has that "speed ahead toward the negative and the concrete", for Nature, History and absolute Spirit.

>>>>>>>>>>>>>

>(...) we could distinguish a formant Content
> and a formed Content, the unity of formant Content and
> formed Content is the absolute Form.

Professor Selva, I take your word, 'formant' to be a Latin
form of the English word, 'forming.' There is indeed a
forming Content and a formed Content. This corresponds
to the potential and the actual. The synthesis of the two
is indeed the Absolute Form.

<<<<<<<<<<<<<

Dear Trejo, excuse-me for the confusion. Unhappyly, I konw good not English language, then my natural language is portuguese; but I will to speak "formant Content" and not at all "forming Content". As you said, the English word 'forming.' in "forming Content" correspond to the "potential" and the �formed� in "formed Content" correspond to the "actual". With "formant Content" and "formed Content" I will not and can not to speak "potential" and "actual", one opposed at other; but I want to speak two moments of the proper "Actual". With Hegel, I retake not only the "potential" and "actual", but too, precisely, the "Natura naturans" and "Natura naturata" from metaphysical tradiction (See between others: Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., I, II, 85; Spinoza, Ethic, I, 29). But, in Hegel�s System "formant Content" is "Natura naturans", the creative Natura, Substance, Causa sui or self-movement of Content as still unconsciousness of his determinations; or just now the Substance that still has
been passed to Subject, or no still consciousness of the self-movement of Content [that is, consciousness of his proper sel-movement]. Therefore, I cannot to speak "forming Content"; then "forming" imply passage of unmoving to moving, or potentia to actus, nevertheless in the human consciousness. With this, I distinguish between "formant Content" and "formalizant Form" [not forming Content and formalizing Form], and also between "formed Content" and "formalized Form"; this isn�t movement of human consciousness, but the self-movement of the Absolute captvated in the human consciousness. In next mail I want to develope these concepts.

>>>>>>>>>>>>>

The apriori and the aposteriori are
derived from the Absolute. Freedom and actuality
are derived from the Absolute. Forming and formed
are derived from the Absolute. The Absolute is the Whole.
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<


I agree that apriori and aposteriori, and also "forming Content" [as potentia] and formal "formed Content" [as only actus] are derived from the Absolute. But I cannot agree that Freedom and actuality [as Actuality] are derived from the Absolute, because Freedom is the substance of the Absolute and Actuality is the process of presentation of the Absolute itself at itself.

>>>>>>>>>>>>
> So, the Philosophy of Religion has considered Religion (as rational negative moment of the absolute Spirit) by means of speculative procedure. Thus, Religion is comprehended as that arising from the Subject (or subjectively), but also of the absolute Spirit itself (objectively) [see Enc. � 554].

Yes, agreed again Professor Selva, yet the question for the modern reader becomes, 'how are we to understand this?' Metaphysical ideas are uncommon in the modern and postmodern literature.
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<

For me, the question 'how are we to understand this?' can to be responded with the retake of Hegel�s speculative philosophy as a "Critique of Pressupposeds". The "pressupposed" ins�t only a subjective pressupposed in the mind of the individuals, this is a "supposed" (as a hypothesis), but it is a objective pressupposed (as unconditioned Condition of all "posed") in sense of the Objectivity of Hegel�s Logic. So this "Critique of Pressupposeds" is a Critique of the unconditioned Condition of all "posed". This is a starting point that could be agreed for the moderns and postmoderns thinkers. So, the aim of the "Critique of Pressupposeds" (as Critique of the unconditioned Condition of all "posed") is to show that in all posed there is a uncosidered pressupposed. Our "Critique" will not and cannot to justificate the pressupposed, but to make the criticism of that is posed as pressupposed or that is pressupposed as posed. These pressupposed and posed are positions of the proper Absolute
in his self-movement of self-formation; thus our Critique is only observation of presentation from this movement while his actualization to place on display for us it.

>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> In the side of the Subject (or, the empirical subject or the subject of faith) the determination of the Content (in the present time in form of the religious experience) is the concrete representation (faith, belief, sentiment). In the side of the absolute Spirit (or the Absolute himself in-and-for-itself) the determination of this same Content (now under form of the return at itself of the absolute Spirit) is the manifestation/revelation of the absolute Spirit in the subject of faith.

Yes, Professor Selva, but faith is not merely passive belief. Faith is the Spirit itself reflecting upon itself within its Divine Self-consciousness.

>>>>>>>>>>>>

Yes, the Spirit itself reflecting upon itself within its Divine Self-consciousness while this reflecting upon itself within its Divine Self-consciousness is captivated in the Faith of Consciousness (Imediate Knowing) and in the Consciousness of Faith (mediate Knowing) speed ahead toward the absolute Knowing from Divine Self-consciousness.

<<<<<<<<<<<
Yet Hegel's Ontological Solution is the very first step that the Kantian reader must deal with. Have we already established Hegel's Active and Living Spirit, the Whole, as the solution for the Ontological Problem? Not yet, I suspect. I wonder if we should separate the current
discussion away from the current thread and form a new thread.

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

Upon subject-matter, in hegelnet, I say:

My position is that "Hegel's ontological solution" isn�t a authentic expression for the discussion of hegelian solution of Being�s problem (or the Proofs of God's Existence), because Hegel himself has sublated precisely the ontological level (jointly with transcendental level) in the speculative level of the his Science of Logic. In speculative sense, the authentic solution of this problem is developed in the primary determination of the Concept, intituled "Objectivity". In other mail, I develope it.

So, if "have we already established Hegel's Active and Living Spirit, the Whole, as the solution for the Ontological Problem?" I concord to you: Not yet.

Upon "if we should separate the current
discussion away from the current thread and form a new thread". I take your directive.

<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<
You have already traced Hegel's Ontological Solution, Professor Selva, but I suspect many readers on this List are still contemplating Hegel's opening arguments.

Best regards,
--Paul Trejo

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

I agree too it. Because the Concept is pacient.

All the best,

Emmanuel Selva.


Paul Trejo <petrejo@...> wrote:In response to a Sat28Jun03 post by Professor Emmanuel Selva:

> Trejo wrote:
> > Yes, the level of the Pure Understanding, as Kant termed
> > it, is the level of abstraction. That is indeed a fitting
> > starting point, Professor Selva.
>
> Yes! But "the level of abstraction" of the Absolute itself.
> This abstraction is the negativity into itself, that is, it isn't
> only the Kantian Pure Understanding; but is also the Pure
> Being of the traditional Ontology...

I agree, Professor Selva, insofar as Kant's discovery of the
Pure Understanding discovered only finite data, and Pure
Being, even abstractly, already sublates all finite data. Yet,
as Hegel shows, Pure Being (like the Pure Understanding)
is one-sided, and does not make explicit the moment of
Pure Self-consciousness and Subjectivity.

> ...(that is, the Ontology as Christian Wolff conceives it;
> and as Hegel has comprehended it). This is the question
> of the organon of the Truth and of the constitution of
> doctrine of the infinite (for an historical comprehension,
> see Enc., �� 26-35, 40-52).

I know these sections of Hegel's ENCYCLOPEDIA LOGIC,
Professor Selva, and they refer directly to Ontology and
Metaphysics and their search for the truly Objective. As
you note, Hegel's Ontology has formal and classical roots.
The questions addressed are the classical questions; can
the human mind know the thing-in-itself?

> This "level of abstraction" contains in-and-for-itself the
> process of self-movement of the Content. Or, as I say,
> the self-movement of the formativity of the Content, or
> the activity of the self-formation of the Content.

Yet, Professor Selva, when you speak of self-formation,
which is the activity of Hegel's Spirit, do you not also
speed ahead toward the negative and the concrete,
thus sublating the merely abstract?

> In this process, we could distinguish a formant Content
> and a formed Content, the unity of formant Content and
> formed Content is the absolute Form.

Professor Selva, I take your word, 'formant' to be a Latin
form of the English word, 'forming.' There is indeed a
forming Content and a formed Content. This corresponds
to the potential and the actual. The synthesis of the two
is indeed the Absolute Form. In my reading of Hegel, the
Absolute Form expresses the Science of Logic. In this
new science, the Dialectical Form of Logic is employed to
explain even the data of Metaphysics, despite the Antinomy
of Kant. (Where Kant used Antinomy to challenge
metaphysics, Hegel built upon the challenge of Antinomy
to construct a radically new metaphysics.)

> The absolute Form conforms the categorial movement of
> the Actuality; the categorial movement of the Actuality is:
> 1. Free Actuality (this contains the necessary Actuality
> and the possible Actuality);
> 2. Actual Actuality (this contains the contingent Actuality
> and the real Actuality). The result of this movement is the
> Idea, the unity of the Free Actuality and Actual Actuality,
> or, as Hegel says, the unity of Concept and Objectivity,
> the absolute Actuality. Its final result is the absolute Idea.

These terms fit Hegel's construction of his three-moment
logical form, Professor Selva. The three moments are, at
the most general level: (1) the abstract; (2) the negative;
and (3) the concrete. The Absolute Idea is the synthesis
of all three. In this way Hegel answers Kant's famous
question: "how are apriori synthetic judgments possible?"
They are possible by a system of logic that deduces each
moment in the Encyclopedia from a previous moment,
starting from Nothing (and empty, Pure Being). The
inner motor power of the three-moments operating
together exhibit the negative and the sublating activity.
Thus with Hegel's Absolute Idea we are truly at the
level of the concrete. The concrete *includes* or
*sublates* the abstract.

> Yes, this is the level of abstraction; but, of the abstraction
> as pure reflection of the Absolute into itself. This is the
> true process of the theoretical articulation of ontological-
> metaphysical principles with a historical constitution of
> philosophical systems, but, only in-and-for-itself into
> Understanding, into absolute Understanding or divine
> Understanding as Proclo conceives it (see Theol. Plat.
> III, p. 140, apud Hegel, Gesch. Der Phil., III, pp. 87-88,
> ed. Glockner)...

Proclus has a Mystic language, Professor Selva, and
Hegel comments upon it. However, Hegel follows Kant's
division of mental processes into two general divisions:
the Pure Understanding and Reason.

The Pure Understanding is a form of consciousness that
remains at the level of the finite. It cannot see beyond
Antinomy, and thus it concludes that real, objective
synthesis is strictly impossible. So Kant speaks of the
"Unknowable Thing-in-itself."

However, Reason can truly know the Thing-in-itself,
says Hegel. Not with the naive metaphysics of Aristotle
that minimized human Perception and is many errors.
For Hegel, Reason can know the Thing-in-itself only by
passing through the valley of Antinomy, so to speak,
through the moment of the negative. Kant stopped
there, but Hegel pressed forward from that point.

> So, this process is ontologicaly and speculatively anterior
> to wolffian Pure Being and kantian Pure Understanding.
> It isn't apriori, it isn't, too, aposteriori; it isn't anterior at
> the apriori and aposteriori; it is the Absolute into itself.

I agree, Professor Selva, insofar as the Absolute Idea
is productive of all three moments, and contains Pure
Being and the finite Pure Understanding as two of its
determinations. The apriori and the aposteriori are
derived from the Absolute. Freedom and actuality
are derived from the Absolute. Forming and formed
are derived from the Absolute. The Absolute is the
Whole.

> > ...the level of Speculative Philosophy, as Hegel
> > demonstrates it...
>
> > Exactly! But, the level of Speculative Philosophy (or
> the properly speculative level of the Pure Speculative
> Philosophy) has to contain the antecedent levels.

I agree, Professor Selva, insofar as Hegel himself says
that, for the Science of Logic that must begin without
presuppositions, the Absolute Idea is a *result*.
(Hegel, SCIENCE OF LOGIC, trans. Miller, p. 837)

> For Hegel, the level of positive Reason contains the
> levels of Understanding and negative Reason; in
> a methodological sense, the speculative [as self-
> movement of the ontological-metaphysical element
> and its principles] has that to contain the analytic
> moment (or the to-go-out-of-itself of the Absolute) and
> the synthetic Moment (or the position of contradiction
> of the Absolute in itself [the Absolute posed, posed
> for the interior Reflection ] and the Absolute for itself
> [the Absolute presupposed, presupposed for the
> exterior Reflection, that is, presupposed for the
> "kantian" Pure Understanding])

That was quite a sentence, Professor Selva, and it is
entirely Hegelian from start to finish. The Absolute
Idea is the result of the Science of Logic, yet it can
be shown to be the Whole, the Reality from which
all subordinate Realities are deduced -- including
Pure Being, the Pure Understanding, the finite
consciousness, the negative and the concrete
synthesis of the negative by the activity of a
negation of the negation.

> > ...the level of the concrete, the synthesis, the final result.
>
> Exactly again! But it is the level of the spiritual synthesis
> [or, the level of the absolute Spirit] and the final result
> that is too the starting point. This is the circle of the
> circles [or the third Syllogism of the Encyclopaedia],
> or, the demonstration of that the philosophical science
> haven't beginning; or, of that the beginning is only for
> the philosopher (cf. Enc., � 17). So, the final result is
> too only for the philosopher, the final result of the
> presentation of the Science in/for the philosopher.

I can agree, Professor Selva, insofar as Hegel says (in his
theological writings) that Divine Self-consciousness, in
its Self-return from the Fall of Creation, returns only to
its original Self-consciousness. Thus the finite human
elevation to the Divine occurs in reality, yet only by the
negation of the finite, since the finite was the original
negation. When the finite Ego surrenders itself to the
Absolute Self-consciousness, then the Unity has been
attained. When humanity in general will have attained
this Unity with the Divine Self-consciousness, then
the End will reveal the Beginning.

However, as you imply, Professor Selva, today is not
the day for this ultimate Self-return. Hegel does not
see our time as the End of History. Our philosophers
today -- if and only if they rise to the level of Hegel's
spiritual dialectical logic -- can reveal the Absolute
in perfect clarity. All others, the overwhelming majority
of humanity, only have the picture-thinking of Religion
to help them grasp the Divine Self-consciousness.
Hegel says,

"Religion is for everyone. It is
not Philosophy, which is not for
everyone." (Hegel, LPR, trans.
Hodgson, vol. 1, p. 180)

Hegel did not presume to predict the future, and perhaps
one day all human beings will have the inalienable right
to study philosophy. But today this is strictly optional,
and only a few people appear to have the propensity for it.

> Yes, the methodology of Religion is representational
> and the methodology of Philosophy is conceptual.
> But, the methodology of the Philosophy of Religion
> is, too, conceptual.

I agree with this, too, Professor Selva, since Hegel
shows that the Philosophy of Religion is a Science
that will catalog all the representations of God (and
all the doctrines against representation) that are
offered by all the world religions.

> So, the Philosophy of Religion has considered Religion
> (as rational negative moment of the absolute Spirit)
> by means of speculative procedure. Thus, Religion
> is comprehended as that arising from the Subject (or
> subjectively), but also of the absolute Spirit
> itself (objectively) [see Enc. � 554].

Yes, agreed again Professor Selva, yet the question for
the modern reader becomes, 'how are we to understand
this?' Metaphysical ideas are uncommon in the modern
and postmodern literature.

Hegel offers a startling explanation, that nevertheless
explains it very logically. Religion is not only the human
understanding of God, but it is the Self-return of God
back to God. Hegel says,

"The reconciliation...makes no sense
unless if God is not known as the
Triune God; if it is not recognized that
God *is*, but also is as the Other, as
self-distinguishing, so that this Other
is God himself, having implicitly this
Divine nature within it, and that the
sublation of this difference, this
Otherness, and the return of Love,
are the Spirit." (Hegel, LPR, ibid.
vol. 3, p. 327.

Hegel loses a few theologians with his next statement, yet
I suspect he reaches a few others:

"This is not a single act, but the
eternal Divine history. It is a moment
in the nature of God himself, and has
taken place in God himself." (Hegel,
LPR, ibid. vol. 3, p. 328)

This at first seems like representational language to
express the truth of the Living Spirit, yet Hegel presents
this aspect of his theology as the Concept. Here are the
three moments of the dialectic presented in a concrete
example.

> In the side of the Subject (or, the empirical subject
> or the subject of faith) the determination of the
> Content (in the present time in form of the religious
> experience) is the concrete representation (faith,
> belief, sentiment). In the side of the absolute Spirit
> (or the Absolute himself in-and-for-itself) the
> determination of this same Content (now under
> form of the return at itself of the absolute Spirit)
> is the manifestation/revelation of the absolute
> Spirit in the subject of faith.

Yes, Professor Selva, but faith is not merely passive
belief. Faith is the Spirit itself reflecting upon itself
within its Divine Self-consciousness. Hegel says,

"It is a question precisely of the
conscious presence of God, of unity
with God, the Mystic Union, one's
self-feeling of God, the feeling of
God's immediate presence within
the subjective." (Hegel, LPR, ibid.
p.337)

These words are most unexpected after seeing Hegel's
words refracted through the materialism of the 20th
century for so long. Yet Hegel does not present these
ideas as common occult obscurity. Hegel is following
the logical consequences of his dialectical logic when
applied to metaphysical categories.

> In the subject of faith, this manifestation/revelation
> is an immediate Knowing; in the absolute Spirit, it is
> the absolute Knowing. The movement of immediate
> Knowing at the absolute Knowing is the movement
> of sublation of the transcendental and the whole
> objective representation.

Yes, Professor Selva, I agree again, because Hegel
also says in his first Phenomenology,

"The joy of beholding itself in Absolute
Being enters self-consciousness and seizes
the whole world; for it is Spirit, it is the
simple movement of those pure moments
which expresses just this: that only when
Absolute Being is beheld as an immediate
Self-consciousness is it known as Spirit."
(Hegel, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT,
1807, trans. Miller, 1977, para. 761)

In this metaphor, Self-consciousness "seizes the whole
world." The Union of Self and Other is experienced as
"joy," according to Hegel.

> As the transcendental and the whole objective
> representation have been founded on the
> distinction between Faith and knowing,
> this is the starting point of all kinds of
> Proof of God's Existence.
>
> Well! The Proofs of God's Existence in Hegel's
> philosophy is the most consequent attempt [at the]
> sublation/reconciliation of Faith and knowing.
> So, Hegel's philosophy is the retaking and
> development of the augustinian identity of
> Faith and Reason.
>
> Let's go on to discuss it?
> That's all for now.
> Emmanuel Selva

I am delighted to discuss this further, Professor Selva. It
seems to me that Hegel's proposed synthesis of Religion
and Science remains as revolutionary today as it was in
1831. Hegel remains out-numbered by experts in every
direction -- however, they remain unapprised of Hegel's
speculative dialectic. When Hegel's new science is better
disseminated, then we may expect more fruitful comments
about his radically new theology that is based on his idea
of a speculative Absolute.

Yet Hegel's Ontological Solution is the very first step that
the Kantian reader must deal with. Have we already
established Hegel's Active and Living Spirit, the Whole,
as the solution for the Ontological Problem? Not yet,
I suspect. I wonder if we should separate the current
discussion away from the current thread and form a new
thread. You have already traced Hegel's Ontological
Solution, Professor Selva, but I suspect many readers
on this List are still contemplating Hegel's opening
arguments.

Best regards,
--Paul Trejo




































Yahoo! Groups Sponsor
Homepage: http://hegel.net
Group Homepage: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/hegel
other Hegel mailing lists: http://Hegel.net/res/ml.htm
Listowners Homepage: http://kai.froeb.net

To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:
Hegel-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com

Group policy:
slightly moderated, only plain Text (no HTML/RTF), no attachments,
only Hegel related mails, scientific level intended.

Particpants are expected to show a respectfull and scientific attitude both to Hegel and to each other. The usual "netiquette" as well as scientific standards apply.

The copyright policy for mails sent to this list is same as for Hegel.Net, that is the copyright belongs to the author but the mails are issued under the GNU FDL (see ttp://www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html)

Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo! Terms of Service.



---------------------------------
Do you Yahoo!?
SBC Yahoo! DSL - Now only $29.95 per month!

[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]