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13114Re: Rosenkranz on Hegel

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  • Beat Greuter
    Sep 2, 2012
      --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "Stephen Cowley" <stephen.cowley@...> wrote:
      >
      > Hi everyone,
      >
      > Here is another very brief chapter from Hegels Leben (1844) by Karl Rosenkranz. This one is so short and informative that I will translate the whole.
      >
      > BOOK TWO Chapter 25
      > The Encyclopaedia
      >
      > It was only at Heidelberg that Hegel presents himself for the first time with his philosophy as an integrated whole and this was very necessary to defend the third part of the Logic against gross misunderstandings. For use in his lessons, he had the course on the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences printed, that he had composed between Michaelmas [Fall] 1816 and Easter 1817. As a comparison with the Philosophical Propaedeutic [first edited by Rosenkranz] shows, his gymnasium notebooks gave him the best basis for this work, except that with the greater clarity he had achieved, he could allow himself this time a more elevated form.
      >
      > In the Preface, he announced his very clear opposition one the one hand to the philosophy that wishes to impose itself but which is disordered; on the other hand to lack of thought, to the superficiality of scepticism, to the immediacy of knowledge that strands itself in feeling. Neither a random exposition of the adventure of thought, nor the vanity of an absence of ideas, which have for too long turned the German profundity to ridicule, leaving its need of philosophical development unsatisfied, can favor progress. Only demonstration can achieve this, as it has previously been called: the method that would still, so he hoped, be recognised as the only true one, because it is identical with its content.
      >
      > This first edition of the Encyclopaedia still contains the freshness of the first flow of composition. The subsequent editions are more involved in their elaboration of detail, but above all in polemical and defensive remarks, but to have Hegel’s system in its concentrated totality, such as it came forth with all the strength of first appearance, one must always return to this first edition and therefore also reprint it.
      >
      > [Osmo notes that there is a French version of this first edition in the comprehensive version edited by Bernard Bourgeois â€" Parts I and III having appeared and Part Ii in process in 2004. In English however, we still have only translations of the later editions by Wallace and Miller, though I think another version may have appeared since I had cause to look for copies.]



      I think Rosenkranz is right. The first edition of the Encyclopaedia Logic is an excellent and lively exposition of the dynamic of the Concept in its whole. Me too, use this first edition. In the subsequent editions and also in the Science of Logic the flow is occasionally considerably disturbed. However, with this approach there is the danger of misinterpretation. Therefore, it is important to consult also the corresponding chapters in the Science of Logic.

      Beat Greuter



      >
      > More to follow
      > Stephen Cowley
      >
      >
      > From: Stephen Cowley
      > Sent: Saturday, August 25, 2012 8:19 AM
      > To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
      > Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Rosenkranz on Hegel
      >
      > Hi everyone,
      >
      > I abstract another chapter from Hegels Leben (1844) by Karl Rosenkranz, the first biographer of Hegel:
      >
      > BOOK TWO Chapter 24
      > Activity at Heidelberg
      >
      > Hegel’s wife Marie stayed in Nurnberg following a miscarriage and Hegel left alone for Heidelberg where he arrived on 19 October 1816. Here he met Eschenmayer, the brother of a future opponent of his philosophy. He also met Paulus and his family again. Paulus’ wife mocked reference to absoluteness, but liked Hegel for his enthusiasm for the theatre. They spoke freely and she was sorry when he left for Berlin. Hegel took up again with Voss, Schelver, Daub and Creuzer. Hegel lived on the Friedrichstrasse and dressed in grey.
      >
      > At first, he had only four students, but in lecturing on the Encyclopaedia 20 attended the course and for his course on the history of philosophy there were 30 or more. He lectured here for the first time on anthropology and psychology (i.e.e subjective mind) and on aesthetics. Here he could take inspiration from the Boisseree gallery and the local scenery, architecture and sculpture.
      >
      > Three Students
      >
      > His students at Heidelberg included Carove, Yxkull and Hinrichs. Carove was a jurist who wished to modernise Catholicism. He took an interest in animal magnetism and later moved to Berlin.
      >
      > Yxkull was an Estonian nobleman who had fought with the Russians and was seeking scientific culture. He found from Hegel a “benevolent politeness as well as irony”. According to Yxkull, Hegel told him that:
      > “religion was philosophy in an anticipatory state; philosophy was religion in a completely conscious state. Both sought, only by different means, the same thing, namely to know God.” (470)
      > Thus he ought not to trust a philosophy that was immoral or irreligious.
      >
      > Hinrichs (1794 to 1861) held a seminar at which many people from the different faculties met together, using the Phenomenology to guide discussion. Hinrichs was a right Hegelian, according to Osmo, who taught at Breslau, used Hegels’ vocabulary in commentaries on the Faust of Goethe and on Schiller. He produced a critique of Schleiermacher with an introduction by Hegel. He was then studying law and attended Hegel’s lectures on the Philosophy of Right. Hegel wrote him an important letter on scientific compositions (Corr. II L357).
      >
      > More to follow
      > Stephen Cowley
      >
      > From: Stephen Cowley
      > Sent: Wednesday, August 22, 2012 6:40 PM
      > To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
      > Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Rosenkranz on Hegel
      >
      > Hi everyone,
      >
      > More from Hegels Leben (1844) by Karl Rosenkranz, the first biographer of Hegel:
      >
      > BOOK TWO Chapter 23
      > The Move from Nuremberg to Heidelberg, Fall 1816
      >
      > Hegel increasingly kept a look-out, whilst a schoolteacher at the Gymnasium, for academic positions. One came up at Erlangen in Summer 1816, but his colleague at the school, Heller, got the post. Soon though, Hegel got the post at Heidelberg, where he had friends and supporters in Scheler, Thibaud, Creuzer and Daub. [It is typical of Rosenkranz to mention these relationships with contemporaries, leaving scope for later interpreters to look more closely at them.]
      >
      > The remuneration at Heidelberg was 1,300 florins and amounts of various kinds of wheat. Daub noted proudly in a letter that Spinoza had been invited there, though in the end he had not come. A short essay on philosophy in the universities (SW17; Correspondance II, L284) dates from this time (Raumer is the source for this.)
      >
      > There were already ideas of giving Hegel the old chair of Fichte at Berlin. Raumer, Solger, Link and Niebuhr worked on this on Hegel’s behalf, but the idea came to nought at the time. Niebuhr was a privy-councillor. The Prussian Minister of the Interior wrote to Hegel, referring to his lack of teaching experience and observing that what experience he had was many years ago. Could he give lively and convincing courses, he was asked, given the importance of liveliness where students are busily focussed on remunerative courses? Hegel opted for Heidelberg for the time being.
      >
      > More to follow
      > Stephen Cowley
      >
      >
      >
      > From: Stephen Cowley
      > Sent: Tuesday, August 21, 2012 7:24 PM
      > To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
      > Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Rosenkranz on Hegel
      >
      >
      > Hi everyone,
      >
      > I turn from some interesting conversations on this list to pursue my reading of Hegels Leben (1844) by Karl Rosenkranz.
      >
      > BOOK TWO Chapter 22
      >
      > The Logic 1812 to 1816
      >
      > In several instances, Rosenkranz’ chapters on Hegel’s published books are disappointingly sketchy, though interesting all the same, and this one on the Science of Logic fits the pattern.
      >
      > He says that Nuremberg, with its ditches outside town walls and views of the country from crowded streets, is a city of contrasting movements aloft and downwards. The tempos of life of its Slav and Franconian inhabitants also contrast with each other. Hegel described the social life of the town in a letter to Knebel (14/12/1810). In this town be wrote his Science of Logic, published between March 1812 and July 1816 according to the dates on the prefaces. Here the towers of the eternal categories are erected in abstraction.
      >
      > The Logic follows the Phenomenology but, abstracting from the development of consciousness to maturity, it is the first part of the system as such and this serves to make the Phenomenology itself comprehensible, for it shows pure knowledge in itself rather than knowledge in relation and also gives an example of the method recommended in the Phenomenology.
      >
      > Logic and metaphysics, Hegel argues, lag behind the other sciences. A people without metaphysics is as astonishing as one with no constitutional theory, he remarks. Mind has achieved a new form, but this needs scientific development. Hegel writes: “As science, truth is the pure self-consciousness developing itself and it has the form of self[hood]; this in and for itself is the known concept; whilst the concept as such is in-and-for-itself.” (448) Thus Hegel rejects the idea of Logic as a realm of logical forms indifferent to the matter or content of knowledge. we are dealing with objective thought in Logic.
      >
      > Rosenkranz states that the equation of Logic with God prior to creation stupefied the theologians, then tries to explain it by treating it as a residue. Hegel also stupefied logicians who saw logical forms as subjective. Also, the positive sciences were sceptical of an apparently a priori aspect to their subject matter. “It never came into Hegel’s head to deny the concrete in such a lazy fashion.” (449) Rather, nature is a transcendence (depassement) of Logic, as Mind is of Nature. one cannot find much in the Logic starting from concrete sciences. Being is not some particular being, for example.
      >
      > Terminology
      >
      > In his terminology, Hegel either borrows from German as it has developed since the 14th century, as in Wesen, for example, or forges new terms after the Greek fashion of Plato and Aristotle, though the Greeks were often more audacious than he (e.g. to ti en einai, entelecheia [essence, end-state]). Hence in German we have:
      > Fursichsein
      > Ansichsein
      > Anundfursichsein
      > Sichselbstgleichheit
      >
      > The Content
      >
      > Hegel compares the theory of syllogism to arithmetic, as forms of calculus. Living thought on the other hand needs to know that contradictions do not resolve to zero, that a negative is just as much a positive result. Only a particular thing is negated. [Osmo the French translator equates chose and causa in translating Sache rather than Ding.] A richer concept emerges from the wreckage.
      >
      > Hegel recognises as merits in Kant the identifications of the categories as forms of self-consciousness and of contradiction as a feature of dialectical reason. However, seeing the categories as subjective and contradiction only as negative are faults, he thinks, for reason has means to overcome contradiction and is only a moment of an affirmative unity (453).
      >
      > Hegel divides ontological and ideological (that is, objective and subjective) Logic, but with a middle point of essence, where the terms do no pass into one another, as in quality, quantity and measure, but have meaning only as contrasts. i.e.
      > identity and difference
      > content and form
      > cause and effect
      >
      > The Doctrine of the Concept
      >
      > The Concept is the most original part of the book, thinks Rosenkranz. The determinations of the Concept are a unity of immediacy and mediation. Thus they develop, or else each moment is the whole. In other words, the material divides itself into the particular, which is realised in the individual.
      >
      > In the doctrine of the Concept, Hegel discusses his relation to Kant and the relations of Logic and the real. He equates Being with intuition and sensation, or with space and time; essence with representation and perception, or inorganic nature; and the Concept with self-consciousness, or organic nature. But the logical forms are independent of their realisation.
      >
      > The step at the end of the Logic to nature is “ein freies Entlassung” (a free releasing). Rosenkranz points out that this Entlassung is on the part of the Idea. i.e. conceived in unity with the real. He brings on St John’s Gospel, but says that Hegel is not being gnostic or logo-theistic, as Schelling later alleged.
      >
      > From 1812, Hegel was pursued by criticism of his ideas on the “identity of being and non-being”. Rosenkranz refers to a correspondence with Pfaff, a mathematician, on Hegel’s views of Newton and the differential calculus, which survives on Pfaff’s side only.
      >
      > More to follow
      > Stephen Cowley
      >
      > From: Stephen Cowley
      > Sent: Saturday, August 11, 2012 8:02 AM
      > To: mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com
      > Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Rosenkranz on Hegel
      >
      > Hi everyone,
      >
      > I continue my reading of Hegels Leben (1844) by Karl Rosenkranz. For anyone new to the list, this is the first biography of Hegel, from which all later scholars draw.
      >
      > BOOK TWO
      > Chapter 21
      > Hegel’s relations with the Philosophers of his Time (Part Two)
      >
      > There is also correspondence with Karl Windischmann (1775 to 1839), Nicolaus von Thalen (d1848), Berger of Kiel, Karl Solger (1780 to 1819) and van Ghert. It is typical of Rosenkranz that he summarises the relations between Hegel and his contemporaries, leaving room for further investigations into who they were and what the significance of their relationship with Hegel was. Since Rosenkranz wrote, much of this correspondence has been published. In general, more evidence of interest in Spinoza emerges here.
      >
      > Karl Windischmann
      >
      > Hegel discussed Catholicism and medicine with Windischmann. In 1810 Windischmann wrote that the Phenomenology was a manual of human liberation, like the key to the gospel that Lessing had announced. He tried to relate religion in medicine, to awaken the priest in the doctor, as he put it. He was also interested in somnambulism and annotated a translation of De Maistre s Soirees de Saint Petersbourg (1824). This of course was a famous text of the Restoration similar to Reflections on the Revolution in France of Burke. He praised the review of Aphorisms on absolute Knowing and not Knowing by Goschel (see Rosenkranz III,15). Hegel later thought he saw plagiarism in Windischmann s Philosophy in the Course of World History (4 vols, 1824 to 34).
      >
      > von Thalen
      >
      > He discussed Protestantism and political economy with von Thalen. Thalen was a Danish student at Flensburg who knew Reinhold and had studied philosophy at Kiel. He also knew Hulsen of the League of Free Men and Rosenkranz says more of him in his edition of volume 23 of Kant s Werke. He sought rational precision rather than the mystical enthusiasm of Windischmann. He responded to the Logic and wrote on it in 1815. The Science of Logic had been given three reviews, by Fries, Krug and an anonymous reviewer, published in Heidelberg, Halle and Leipzig. By 1816, Hegel had accepted a post at Heidelberg in preference to Erlangen and suggestions from Berlin which came later. He says that up to then he had worked in quasi solitude. A university post is necessary to disseminate a philosophy and personal contact will improve his ability to express it.
      >
      > Thalen liked the First Edition of the Encyclopaedia and the essay on the Wurttemberg Estates, but not so much the Philosophy of Right (1821) and in particular its defence of primogeniture (paras 305 to 307). Pride is a fault of philosophers, he reminds Hegel, whom he accuses (wrongly) of having written about Fries and Schopenhauer in the Wiener Jahrbucher. He offered various advice, e.g. about calming the dispute with Schleiermacher.
      >
      > Berger
      >
      > Berger of Kiel published an Elements of Science that drew syncretically on Kant and Schelling. He had a typically North German sense of pious attention to the secular and its duties. Like Sinclair, he is now forgotten, Rosenkranz remarks.
      >
      > Karl Solger
      >
      > Karl Solger was a medium between Hegel and Schelling, but only knew Hegel when he went to Berlin. In fact, Solger proposed Hegel to Berlin, but dies a year later. Solger studied Spinoza.
      >
      > van Ghert
      >
      > Hegel had a Dutch pupil, van Ghert, who was later helpful to him. Van Ghert stayed in Amsterdam and later Brussels where he had administrative posts. He offered to help Hegel, commenting that the Dutch liked Spinoza, but not Kantian philosophy in general. Hegel asked if he knew of any manuscripts of Spinoza and van Ghert identified a Hebrew grammar. He sent Hegel an edition of Jacob Boehme. His interests included animal magnetism [what is that?] (see SW16, 475 to 483).
      >
      > More to follow
      > Stephen Cowley
      >
      > From: Stephen Cowley
      > Sent: Sunday, August 05, 2012 3:39 PM
      > To: mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com
      > Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Rosenkranz on Hegel
      >
      > Hi everyone,
      >
      > I have found a little time to continue my reading of Rosenkranz’s Life of Hegel (1844) and will continue to share this. I also managed to read the first chapter of Alexandra Birkert’s Hegels Schwester and was surprised to read that, as well as Christiane and Ludwig, Hegel had several other brothers and sisters who died in infancy, but who normally seem to be overlooked in biographies. She has also found out that his and Christiane’s house tutor was a friend of the poet Schiller, who Hegel cites at the end of the Phenomenology. She paints quite a lively picture of Stuttgart on the basis of church and family records. However, to Rosenkranz. This next is a long chapter, so I deal here with the first part:
      >
      > BOOK TWO Chapter 21 (part one)
      > Relations of Hegel with the Philosophers of his Time
      >
      > Rosenkranz notes that Hegel slowly emerged as a central figure in the German philosophy of his time, taking up contemporary debates in his own work. At this time, those around him included:
      >
      > followers of Schelling (such as Ast, Kanne and Goerres)
      > more detached followers of Schelling (such as Steffens, Oken, Stutzmann, Klein)
      > those leaning towards Hegel.
      >
      > The Philosophical Researches on the Essence of Human Freedom (1809) of Schelling had sown the seeds of a intended reply to Hegel. Another thinker, Wagner, tried to unify logic and mathematics. Herbart in Koenigsberg was an isolated figure who anyway published his works late in life. In an important piece of publicity, Bachmann reviewed the Phenomenology in the Heidelberger Jahrbucher in 1810.
      >
      > Sinclair
      >
      > Hegel kept up relations with Isaak von Sinclair (1775 to 1815). This I think is often overlooked in English commentaries as Sinclair is not known in English language philosophical literature. However, the letters between them are interesting. Hegel reserved holidays for replying to letters and often only a sketch of his reply survives rather than the actual letter. Sinclair had written poetry and tragedy, but had recently published three volumes of philosophy under the title
      > Truth and Certainty (1811)
      > This gave rise to an exchange of letters. Hegel writes asking if Sinclair is still relentlessly Fichtean and what does he say about the progress to infinity. He writes to Sinclair:
      >
      > I am an educator who has to teach philosophy, and that is perhaps why it is my conviction that philosophy must be a structured edifice, as well as geometry, which can be taught as well as it. (429)
      >
      > The content of philosophy is one thing, creative talent another, he continues, saying that he wishes to add to the scientific form. He recalls how from doleful Frankfurt he looked at Feldberg and Altkoenig, mountains of the Taurus range.
      >
      > The work of Sinclair begins of doubt, which is a medium between certainty and ignorance. This sounds similar to ideas that Hegel had already absorbed from Sextus Empiricus. In his book, Sinclair passes in review relations to self, world and God from something of a Fichtean standpoint. Doubt again is a midpoint between life and science. Hegel writes to Sinclair:
      >
      > It is above all the new philosophers who demand a beginning that would be an absolute to which they would not straight away oppose their verbiage, an irrefutable first... (431)
      >
      > The non-philosopher wants to bring in his own understanding, full of common sense. There is a note of irritation here, I think. He and Sinclair had been sufficiently methodical in starting out, he thinks, in their different ways. A beginning is bound to be imperfect, just because it is a beginning. Yet, he continues, it must be a beginning of philosophy, and therefore already philosophy itself. Sinclair on the other hand starts with a need for philosophy and Hegel disagrees with this. Hegel writes:
      >
      > I assuredly agree with you that one cannot start blindly. The point is that the beginning be essentially a beginning of philosophy. In consequence, I require for the beginning still more than you do, that it already itself be, in fact and in substance, philosophy and avow itself as such, that it thus be more than the need alone of philosophy, but also not more than it can be as a beginning of philosophy. (432)
      >
      > An analysis of doubt such as Sinclair includes, itself brings in a lot of philosophy indirectly, in an underhand way. Sinclair smuggles in contraband goods. He admits doubt as a fact. Hegel says that his own beginning is a fact, the immediate. This is a beginning because it is not yet progress. He writes:
      >
      > Now contraband is forbidden by Imperial decree and it would be necessary that a tribunal should recognise already, in the unwarranted character of this activity a metaphysics or an ideology. (431)
      >
      > This is a rare reference to Ideologie by Hegel, writes Osmo, for the terms are in French in the text. The content of doubt is already more than immediacy. He writes “ My sole and unique goal is to teach in a university.” (433) The tumult of the present day leaves little room for expenditure on universities, still less for metaphysics. Ministerial priorities are the professions â€" law, medicine, theology â€" but of these philosophy is a foundation (see Correspondance II, letter 218) Sinclair soon died at the Congress of Vienna and is now (1844) forgotten.
      >
      > More to follow...
      >
      > All the best
      > Stephen Cowley
      >
      > From: Stephen Cowley
      > Sent: Thursday, April 12, 2012 4:59 AM
      > To: mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com
      > Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Rosenkranz on Hegel
      >
      > Hi everyone,
      >
      > Here is another chapter commentary from Hegels Leben (1844) by Karl Rosenkranz.
      >
      > BOOK TWO Chapter Twenty
      > Marriage of Hegel, Fall 1811
      >
      > The life of Hegel was characterised by tranquil progress and organic maturity. There was no rush to action, but matters were brought to fruition in due course. In this spirit, says Rosenkranz, Hegel married at age 40. In the 17th and 18th centuries, Descartes, Spinoza, Malebranche, Locke, Hume and Kant had remained bachelors. Fichte was the first modern philosopher of world importance to marry, as did Herbart and Schelling. Christiane, Hegel’s sister, rejoiced for him.
      >
      > His wife, Marie von Tucher (1791 to 1857) was from a noble family with local roots. Her father had been a Burgermeister of Nuremberg. She reflected the feelings Hegel had for her. They complemented each other as personalities, which leads Rosenkranz to praise her vivacity and imagination. Rosenkranz reproduces some verses that Hegel wrote for her. She seems like a joyful and assured person to judge from the anecdotes relating to her and letters by her. Some explanations were required during the engagement. She took offence or was concerned by an expression he used:
      > in as much as happiness is my destiny in this world.
      > Hegel thought marriage was essentially religious. He wrote a letter saying that happiness is tinged with melancholy in higher natures and arguing that she had promised to heal him from what led him away from belief in happiness. Love is our love, not mine for you and yours for me, he says.
      >
      > They married on 16 September 1811. A daughter died in early childhood (of a suffocating catarrh). They had two sons: Karl Hegel (1813 to 1901) who became a professor of history and Immanuel Hegel (1814 to 1891) who became a civil servant. Karl Hegel edited the second edition of The Philosophy of History in 1848, the first having been edited by Edouard Gans in 1837. He also produced the first edition of the Correspondence (1887), says Osmo.
      >
      > Hegel was an attentive husband. His homes were functional more than elegant. The family had a servant, but only one, save after children were born. He kept household accounts. In Berlin, his flat was well situated. You entered the sitting room straight from the corridor. He and Marie enjoyed excursions as a way of relaxing. They visited Niethammer and his wife in Munich who return visited.
      >
      > More to follow
      > Stephen Cowley
      >
      > From: Stephen Cowley
      > Sent: Wednesday, April 11, 2012 6:15 AM
      > To: mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com
      > Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Rosenkranz on Hegel
      >
      > Hi Everyone,
      >
      > Here is another chapter commentary from Hegels Leben (1844) by Professor Karl Rosenkranz, the first biography of Hegel.
      >
      > BOOK TWO Chapter Nineteen
      > The Philosophical Propaedeutic 1808 to 1812
      >
      > Bavarian standards for philosophy teachers were contained in a directive, which Rosenkranz reproduces. The teaching was intended to lead up to a Speculative standpoint and to deal with ideas as its end at a university entrance level. For students for whom this aimed too high, the content of the course would start with logic (using Lambert and Plouquet as texts); followed by cosmology and natural theology; then psychology, ethics and juridical concepts (with Carus and Kant as texts); and finally what was called Philosophical Encyclopaedia, a view of the whole. This sounds ambitious enough to me, though something of the sort is attempted in the last year of French secondary education.
      >
      > Hegel changed this, proceeding instead:
      > Lower class: law, morality and religion
      > Middle class: psychology and logic (including the antinomies of Kant)
      > Higher class: Encyclopaedia (per the directive)
      >
      > This latter covered syllogism, scientific method, phenomenology, the State and religion. He wrote a report to Niethammer on this initiative (see SW17), in which he explains that the ethical subject matter was more adapted to the younger students. Rosenkranz edited the Philosophical Propaedeutic himself (SW18) and says that it was decisive for Hegel, who learned to combine brevity and precision.
      >
      > In the Propaedeutic, he formulated the following tripartite plan for Logic:
      >
      > 1. Objective Logic
      > Being
      > Essence (essence as such, proposition, ground)
      > Reality (Wirklichkeit)
      >
      > 2. Subjective Logic
      > Concept
      > Judgement
      > Syllogism (incorporating the idea of goal)
      >
      > 3. Doctrine of Ideas
      > Life
      > Knowing and Willing
      > Science as System
      >
      > These, Rosenkranz comments, mark an advance on the Jena structure. [To comment, it also diverges from the published Science of Logic, and in fact makes more sense to me than the published version. I have always had difficulty seeing the subjective logic as a consequence of the objective logic on analogy with the development of metaphysical ideas in the first part and indeed seeing how the concluding path to the absolute idea was a part of subjective logic as such. I suppose the third part corresponds loosely to the concept of definition in Aristotle.]
      >
      > Rosenkranz remarks finally that in the philosophy of mind of this era there is greater attention to subjective mental phenomena, namely intuition, imagination, memory, language, etc.
      >
      > More to follow
      > Stephen Cowley
      >
      > From: Stephen Cowley
      > Sent: Tuesday, April 10, 2012 7:04 AM
      > To: mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com
      > Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Rosenkranz on Hegel
      >
      > Hi Everyone,
      >
      > Here is another chapter summary from Hegels Leben (1844) by Karl Rosenkranz, the first biography of Hegel.
      >
      > BOOK TWO Chapter Eighteen
      > Hegel as a Teacher
      >
      > [Osmo first notes that Rosenkranz edited Volume 17 of the Werke of Hegel that includes the Philosophical Propaedeutic. His experience at the Aegidiengymnasium increased his clarity of expression, thinks Rosenkranz.]
      >
      > Hegel was indefatigable as a teacher. Until 1812, he rewrote his courses thoroughly each semester and adapted them to the age of the pupils. He taught philosophy and religion, though in the absence of other teachers, he could turn his hand to Greek and even mathematics (calculus). In his principal classes, he dictated paragraphs, then explained them. He used tobacco. Pupils had to make fair copies and were asked to summarise the last lesson orally in the next class. They could ask questions in class. He addressed the pupils formally (as Monsieur, presumably Herr) to encourage responsibility. The school overall was a success.
      >
      > From 1811 and more so after the retreat from Moscow reaction grew against French oppression. As Rector, Hegel remained outwardly aloof and impartial. However, Rosenkranz remarks that:
      > In town, and above all amongst the teaching staff, he passed for a Francophile. (403)
      > He did not encourage a German reading group amongst the pupils though, recommending Homer instead. The group continued clandestinely. [To interject, my impression from Rosenkranz is that Hegel was more a steady influence than an agitator.] He insisted on religious observance by both Catholic and Protestant pupils.
      >
      > Hegel dressed in a grey suit and hat, properly but without ostentation. In the evenings, he read the newspapers in the Nuremberg Musee (which had a reading room). [Reading rooms had become a social institution in Europe at this time.] Socially, he visited Paulus (the editor of Spinoza) and Seebeck. He took an interest in the researches of the latter into the theory of colours of Goethe. He was an examiner of philosophy teachers, for which purpose he set questions on the history of philosophy.
      >
      > Five talks on teaching by Hegel, given on school prize days, are contained in Werke 16 (there is also a French edition edited by B Bourgeois, but I do not recall hearing of this in English yet.) In these, he sees the school as a medium between the family and public life. Rosenkranz polemicises at this point that there is a great deal of ethical content here, as there is in the Philosophy of Right, arguing against those who deny an ethical content in Hegel. Hegel argued that the study of the ancients gives a sense of wholeness that modern life with its distinct trades and professions does not facilitate. [This thought is more associated with Adam Smith in the UK, but seems to reflect a concern of the era.] There is a similar talk on the retirement of Schenk, his predecessor. The individual pupil, says Hegel, is animated by the life around him: family, school, country, church. Rosenkranz refers to a faulty edition of these talks in 1835 and to a newspaper critique where the faults were identified.
      >
      > More to follow
      > Stephen Cowley
      >
      > From: Stephen Cowley
      > Sent: Monday, April 09, 2012 7:22 AM
      > To: mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com
      > Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Rosenkranz on Hegel
      >
      > Hi everyone,
      >
      > Here is another chapter summary from Hegels Leben (1844) by Karl Rosenkranz, the first biography of Hegel.
      >
      > BOOK TWO Chapter Seventeen
      > Passage to the Nuremberg Rectorate, End of Fall 1808
      >
      > There was a spirit of reform afoot in South and South West Germany, i.e. Baden, Wurtemberg and Bavaria. In Bavaria, this particularly concerned education. Rival scholastic and utilitarian schemes had emerged and set the tone of the debate. Niethammer (1766-1848) wrote:
      > The Conflict of Philanthropy and Humanism in the Educational Theory of our Time (Jena, 1808)
      > In this, he sought a middle way between the Middle Ages and the Enlightenment. He also composed a Directive [in an official capacity]. There are also writings by Hegel on this subject.
      >
      > Niethammer had been called to Munich and had a class there. [He had become a Commissioner of Education in Bavaria in 1807.] He offered a post at a Gymnasium in Nuremberg to Hegel, who was glad of it. It turned out Paulus was also interested in the position when he heard of it. Thus was Pegasus harnessed to the plough of a school, says Rosenkranz. Yet, he goes on, it was not such a bad thing. Although Hegel aimed at a university post, the German universities under Napoleon had little freedom between 1808 and 1813; and Hegel had already been a tutor for eight years and so had a practical grasp of teaching. All of the letters of Hegel from Nuremberg express satisfaction with his lot, though he never lost sight of possibilities in the universities.
      >
      > At the Aegidiengymnasium of Nuremberg, he had to teach philosophy. In doing so, he further increased the attention he had begun to pay at Jena to the relations of non philosophical consciousness and speculation. [To interject, I wonder if there is not an unnecessary dualism at work here, but I think this is developed elsewhere.]
      >
      > More to follow
      > Stephen Cowley
      >
      > From: Stephen Cowley
      > Sent: Sunday, April 08, 2012 9:30 AM
      > To: mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com
      > Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Rosenkranz on Hegel
      >
      > Hi Everyone,
      >
      > Here is another chapter summary for Hegel Leben (1844) by Karl Rosenkranz, the first biography of Hegel. [On Paulus, I do not see any letter from Hegel to Paulus prior to 1811 and that makes no reference to Schelling. I wonder if there is a more precise reference?]
      >
      > BOOK TWO Chapter Sixteen
      > The Critique of the German Constitution 1806 to 1808
      >
      > [This is a fairly lengthy chapter. Osmo advises that the manuscript of the German Constitution exists in two versions from 1801 and 1802, with an introduction from 1799. The previous scholars Haym (1857) and Rosenzweig (1920) put it in its proper date. Thereafter, Georg Lasson published in in 1923, Mollat in 1935. (Osmo does not say so, but I think there is also an earlier version by Mollat and another later version by Habermas.) Osmo refers to articles in Hegel Studien 2 and 4 by Schuler and Kimmerle (1963, 1967) as giving a definitive account of the date. He does not state what makes their account definitive in his view.]
      >
      > Rosenkranz states at the outset that Hegel wished to become the Machiavelli of Germany (384). He notes that Fichte read Machiavelli around this time also, indicating that the idea was in the air. He returns to this at the end of the chapter. He then cites the famous dictum of Hegel that:
      >
      > Germany is no longer a state. (385)
      >
      > Voltaire also referred to Germany as a constituted anarchy. Hegel thus proposes in his essay to draw up a new constitution for Germany. However, circumstances were not favourable to its completion or publication. A letter of Hegel to Zellmann (23/1/1807, Correspondance I) shows his sense of French military might. The French, he supposes, had left behind daily existence and the fear of death. The Germans would fight about religion, not politics. He then tries to analyse the situation of Germany, though in a partly polemical spirit. Personal courage was not an explanation of German weakness, but rather regional division and lack of generalship. Neither were national debt or bankruptcy; not ethics, culture or religion. It was a matter rather of the feudal form of the State. In Germany, the former vassal princes had become in effect sovereign [in effect is Wirklichkeit].
      >
      > Warfare had been changed by gunpowder from a duel to a combat of massed ranks of men. The universality of death left no significance in a variety of uniforms. In finance, payments in kind had been replaced by another universal, money. Rosenkranz summarises:
      >
      > From the financial angle, whilst the Middle Ages were characterised , under various forms, by a mode of contributions in kind, modern times have centred everything on the *power of money*, understood as a universal value of all things and as the most mobile medium in this area. (386)
      >
      > In the Middle Ages in Germany, war was coloured by culture and religion. The idea grew though that a State religion must not be.
      > Fiat justitia aut pereat mundus [Let justice be done though the world perish]
      > was adopted as a maxim in Germany. The rational content of State activity was not looked for and there grew a limitless control over all spheres of life. Hegel comes to the conclusion that German politics had to orient itself towards an external concentration of its power to be able to protect itself against the assaults of other nations. A common foreign policy and centrally funded Army should go along with free cultural and social development internally. From here on, Rosenkranz combined paraphrase and citations. [To interject here, my memory of the text is is of a biased seeking out of confirming instances for an idealistic vision of German unity. The thing did not deserve publication as a dispassionate political analysis, but only for purposes of biography.]
      >
      > Hegel turns to a survey of recent European history. France, he recounts, has destroyed the German Empire, leaving the states (Laender) like fruits lying under a tree to decay or be picked at random. Public debt in the South of Germany will prolong the misery of war. National unity is manifested in war more than peace. Some Lander have come under foreign control. Hegel states that he wishes to understand, rather than lament over what is, as this will produce a greater serenity of political vision. Things are as they must be, not as they should be. They are not the outcome of chance. The Germans attribute necessity to law and duties, but outward events do not follow this necessity. [To interject, this is of interest with regard to his philosophy, especially the Philosophy of Right.]
      >
      > Germany was thus isolated. It needed not only to defend itself, but to resist external aggression. Representative participation on the large scale of a modern State is not possible, so he thinks. What needs to be established then, is a central government assured of the loyalty of the people, as where a Monarch is determined by birth, accompanied by a delegation of real power to a local level.
      >
      > Hegel then turns to the peace treaties signed by German statesmen. Half of Germany had been at war, whilst the rest was in internal conflict or neutral. Population and fertile land do not compensate for a lack of rational organisation for common defence. In Germany, obligations are bogged down in legal processes without resolution. Barbarism in practice is a crowd that constitutes a people, but not a State, he says. (394). A cultivated state puts law, i.e. universality, between the Monarch and the individual citizen. He rails a little against detailed regulation of private matters, for example filling in forms to repair a window.
      >
      > How then to achieve unity? Hegel writes:
      >
      > Such an event has never been the fruit of reflection, but of violence. (395)
      >
      > The strength of a conqueror that constrains, is meant here. However, such a Theseus must grant popular participation in matters of general interest. He must be able to bear up under hatred, as did Richelieu in France for example, for the sake of a political goal. Hegel speaks directly here of Machiavelli, whom Rosenkranz earlier invoked, in his discussion of Italy. Osmo notes that Frederick the Great wrote a book Anti Machiavelli (1739). Hegel writes with regard to it that Frederick himself denies that treaties between States are binding when they no longer serve state interests in his preface to the History of the First Silesian War. The hatred for The Prince thus does not speak against the truth of its content. Hegel writes:
      >
      > The Work of Machiavelli remains a great witness of his time and his own conviction that the destiny of a people running to its own ruin can be saved by genius. (396)
      >
      > The public has reclaimed his reputation by supposing that he spoke ironically. Osmo remarks that Rosenkranz omits the final remark of Hegel in this passage that The voice of Machiavelli was extinguished without leaving an echo. [To interject, I am not aware of any comparison of Hegel and Machiavelli, except perhaps the work of Friedrich Meinecke, but it sounds an challenging comparison to make.]
      >
      > More to follow
      > Stephen Cowley
      >
      > From: Stephen Cowley
      > Sent: Saturday, April 07, 2012 7:34 AM
      > To: mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com
      > Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Rosenkranz on Hegel
      >
      > Hi Everyone,
      >
      > Here is another chapter summary from Hegels Leben (1844) by Karl Rosenkranz, the first biographer of Hegel. [With regard the the previous chapter, there seems to be a conflict as to when the manuscript of the Phenomenology (assuming there was only one) was sent to the publisher, the letter of 13 October saying it was sent, but Rosenkranz saying Hegel took it with him on the 14th. Rather than try to resolve this, I will mention it and move on.]
      >
      > BOOK TWO Chapter 15
      > Journalistic Activity as Bamberg 1807 to 1808
      >
      > [Firstly, Osmo notes that this period is also the subject of:
      > Between Phenomenology and Logic: Hegel as Editor of the Bamberg Zeitung (Frankfurt, 1955) by W R Beyer.
      > I seem to recall that Kaufmann cites this.]
      >
      > Hegel now felt that Jena was cut off from the world. It attached a universal value to books that sold a hundred copies. In contrast, Heidelberg was a greater conduit of influence. Knowledge that did not penetrate reality was superficial, he felt. [Of course, there was also the relationship with Mrs Fischer, as we now know.]
      >
      > Hegel thus accepted a move to Bamberg to edit the local newspaper, the Bamberg Gazette (or Times). In this venture, Hegel was a commercial associate of the proprietor. He had to ensure that the printing equipment was maintained and return it in the state he found it. In February 1807, he wrote that he considered the position interesting, but transitory. He hoped to approximate the tone of a French newspaper, but also to maintain the pedantic impartiality that was expected in Germany. [This suggests a slightly cavalier attitude to factual accuracy, but it is a passing remark.]
      >
      > Bamberg itself was a Catholic centre. In 1807, Niethammer and Paulus the biographer of Spinoza lived there. Here at last Hegel had the opportunity to see a Catholic town at close hand. There were festivals and a French Theatre.
      >
      > Hegel remained as editor for about a year to Autumn 1807. Edouard Gans described the articles in the newspaper as spirited and politically committed, but Rosenkranz says bluntly that Gans is mistaken. There were no editorials and the tone was factual. Rosenkranz hints at Napoleonic censorship. The rise of Napoleon and the destiny of Prussia were at stake in the public life of the day.
      >
      > The letters of Hegel to Knebel (Correspondance I, L104, 109, 131) show a degree of self mockery, but also the efforts he made to acquire information from elsewhere in Germany. Knebel was a former Prussian army officer who lived at Weimar and had translated Lucretius, the Epicurean philosopher and poet. For his part, Knebel recounted a meeting of Napoleon and Tsar Alexander at Erfurt. Napoleon, he recounted, had an air of melancholy that, he remarks, Aristotle thought was an element of all greatness of character. Napoleon also had several conversations with Goethe and this reconciled him a little with local opinion. [Osmo refers to Hoffmeister who confirms this from the journal of Goethe for 26 September to 14 October, 1807.]
      >
      > The Phenomenology was now expected [from the publisher Goebhardt] by the friends of Hegel. The publisher Frommann distributed some sheets of the Preface. Knebel wrote admiring it (Correspondance I, Letters 105, 110), but regretting the absence of concrete illustrations. [To interject, this has been a common reproach ever since and it is interesting that the earliest readers felt the same. The intended audience is thus not automatically an explanation for the obscurity.] Letters to Hegel from Paulus, Seebeck and Knebel show that one effect of the Phenomenology was a more critical attitude towards Schelling. [Perhaps then, this contributed to the negative reaction of Schelling from November 1807. The correspondence with Paulus also suggests that Spinoza would have been in the air for Hegel at this time.]
      >
      > More to follow
      > Stephen Cowley
      >
      > From: Stephen Cowley
      > Sent: Friday, April 06, 2012 8:12 AM
      > To: mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com
      > Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Rosenkranz on Hegel
      >
      > Hi Everyone,
      >
      > [] Here is another chapter summary from Hegels Leben (1844) by Karl Rosenkranz, the first biography of Hegel and basis of all later ones. []
      >
      > BOOK TWO Chapter 14
      > The Catastrophe of Jena, Autumn/Fall 1806
      >
      > The passage of the Prussian army through Jena drew a remark from Hegel whose critical tone proved all too apt. Many letters to Niethammer in Bamberg survive from this time. A letter of 13 October 1806 survives, the day of the entry of Napoleon into the town. This was a Monday and he had sent off the manuscript of the Phenomenology on Wednesday and Friday last. This is where he writes:
      >
      > I saw the Emperor, this world soul, ride through the town ...
      >
      > It is impossible not to admire him, he went on and is seems that many people felt this. Napoleon met with Goethe around this time. Hegel even wishes luck to the French army, who were more impressive than the Prussians, and that peace will thereby return. Edouard Gans said dramatically that he finished the manuscript as the cannons roared at the battle of Jena. Certainly he put the last sheets in the post to the printer at this time, uncertain of their fate.
      >
      > Hegel was pillaged by French soldiers who turned menacing. He appealed to the Legion dHonneur of one soldier, saying that hoped such a man would respect a simple German scholar. On 14 October he was put up by the Vice Rector of the University, taking his manuscript of the Phenomenology and leaving his books. Napoleon ordered the fire that was raging in the town to be circumscribed and Hegel was then able to return to his lodging. Hegel had to borrow pen and paper locally and ask for money from Niethammer.
      >
      > More to follow
      > Stephen Cowley
      >
      > From: Stephen Cowley
      > Sent: Thursday, April 05, 2012 6:53 PM
      > To: mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com
      > Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Rosenkranz on Hegel
      >
      > Hi everyone,
      >
      > Here is another chapter summary from Hegels Leben (1844) by Karl Rosenkranz, the first biographer of Hegel.
      >
      > BOOK TWO Chapter Thirteen
      > Projects
      >
      > Hegel had wished to publish his system since his second year at Jena. Eventually, the project was accepted by Goebhardt of Bamberg and thus the Phenomenology was in due course brought to fruition. This is the subject of another chapter.
      >
      > Rosenkranz mentions several friends who wished Hegel to join them at Heidelberg, as well as some cool reaction to the idea of his moving there or to Baden. [On the sources for this this see Correspondance I, letter of Kastner 15/11/1805 and Hegel to Voss, pages 95 to 98.] In the letters to Voss, the translator of Homer, he makes the remark of making philosophy speak German, as Luther had the Bible (and Voss Homer). However, the New Philosophy as it was known was seen by some in authority at this time as a threat to religion, which was considered in turn a support of the State.
      >
      > In the course of this correspondence, Hegel also proposed to teach Aesthetics on the model of French literature. He also wished to translate the Physiologie (1801) of Richerrand, a pupil of Bichat whose name will be known to readers of Schopenhauer.
      >
      > Most of all Hegel projected a Critical Review that would focus on important publications rather than aiming to be comprehensive or exhaustive in its treatment of the literary and scientific output of the day. He would aim not at summaries and verdicts, but at analyses of content and principles which would most benefit the reader. [To interject here, this might be modelled on the Edinburgh Review which took advantage of new paper and printing technology and identified a new market.] Hegel got as far as a prospectus for the new journal, which was to be called the Journal of German Literature. This consisted of Maxims which are preserved in the modern Suhrkamp edition of Jenaer Schriften, Works Vol II, 568. The journal was to have commenced publication in July 1807, but by then other events of a pressing nature had intervened.
      >
      > More to follow
      > Stephen Cowley
      >
      > From: Stephen Cowley
      > Sent: Wednesday, April 04, 2012 7:36 AM
      > To: mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com
      > Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Rosenkranz on Hegel
      >
      > Hi everyone,
      >
      > Here is another summary from Hegels Leben (1844) by Karl Rosenkranz, the first biography of Hegel
      >
      > BOOK TWO Chapter 12
      > Close Friendships
      >
      > Schelling then Niethammer, were the closest friends of Hegel during his time at Jena. Schelling left in the summer of 1803 and they corresponded until November 1807 when Schelling read the
      > night in which all cows are black
      > passage in the preface to the Phenomenology on his A is A formula for the Absolute. Rosenkranz did not have access to many of the letters between them prior to that, according to Osmo.
      >
      > He prints a letter from Hegel to Schelling from 1803 with news of Jena. In this Hegel expresses dislike of Kotzebue (1761 to 1819) who was later assassinated as an alleged spy of the Tsar in liberal and nationalist circles. He remarks that Schiller is writing William Tell. Goethe and Schiller also remark on Hegel in their letters, more Goethe than Schiller. Goethe recognised his profundity, but lamented his obscurity and presentation. Goethe and Hegel discussed books together, including God (1800) by Herder and the differences between its two editions.
      >
      > Hegel was also close to Jakob Gries (1775 to 1842), a translator of Romance poetry and member of that became the League of Free Men. He was not close to F Schlegel, who lectured once on transcendental idealism with no great success and was mistakenly reckoned an influence on Hegel by some later writers. At this time, conversions to Catholicism were no rarity and there is a letter from a student to Hegel on the subject.
      >
      > He looked over a French translation of Spinoza in connections with the edition of Paulus (1802) which was accompanied by a biography by Paulus. [This is what I was thinking of in some earlier comments, but overall other thinkers seem to have been more influential on Hegel. On this see SW15, 371 and Correspondance I, Letter 32, 67.]
      >
      > Hegel also knew Knebel who translated Lucretius and whose wife was a singer; and Niethammer from whom, says Rosenkranz, he had no secrets and his wife. He kept up this latter acquaintance until his death. Niethammer helped in various ways, continuing after his move to Munich.
      >
      > More to follow
      > Stephen Cowley
      >
      > From: Stephen Cowley
      > Sent: Tuesday, April 03, 2012 5:36 AM
      > To: mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com
      > Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Rosenkranz on Hegel
      >
      > Hi everyone,
      >
      > Another brief chapter from Hegels Leben (1844) by Karl Rosenkranz, the first biographer of Hegel.
      >
      > BOOK TWO Chapter Eleven
      > Marks of Honor and Professorship
      >
      > Hegel studied nature in these years. In particular he studied physiology with Ackermann; botany with Schelver; chemistry with Seebeck; medical science with Kastner. He also studied geology. He was a member or played a role with the Mineralogical society of Jena, the Association of Naturalists of Westphalia at Brockhausen. The Physicians Association of Heidelberg recognised him in various ways.
      >
      > In Jena, hegel was awarded an extraordinary professorship in February, after he had complained in a letter about the promotions of others with less experience than he. On 1st July 1806 he received his first and last payment of 100 Thalers, with an accompanying letter from Goethe apologising that it was not more, but stating that much was accomplished once the first step was taken. [I cannot but feel that someone in the ministry may have had a sense of humour in choosing the amount of 100 Thalers, given its role in Kant and the feigned indifference of Hegel in his discussion of the Ontological argument.]
      >
      > Hegel had to apply to Stuttgart for permission to accept the sum, as having income elsewhere would have implications for his citizenship of Wurttemberg. When he moved to Nuremberg later, he lost his Wurttemberg citizenship. [It is interesting to note these restrictions on commerce within what is now a single country.]
      >
      > More to follow
      > Stephen Cowley
      >
      > From: Stephen Cowley
      > Sent: Monday, April 02, 2012 7:31 PM
      > To: mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com
      > Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Rosenkranz on Hegel
      >
      > Hi everyone,
      >
      > Here is another chapter summary of Hegels Leben (1844) by Karl Rosenkranz, the first biography of Hegel. This is the first of several related chapters concluding coverage of the Jena period.
      >
      > BOOK TWO Chapter Ten
      > Influence on Students
      >
      > Rosenkranz turns to the social life of Hegel in Jena for the next several chapters and in this chapter discusses his influence on students. In terms of character, Hegel at this time held to facts, being stimulated to thought by the impulsions of the present day and he made advances in thought, but was sometimes dogmatic in his expression. His eyes turned inwards, but his glance became impressive when they shone forth. So too, his voice was not sonorous, but he was capable of inspirational utterance. His smile was benevolent, but he could be acerbic, cutting, pained, or perhaps rather ironical, at the same time.
      >
      > On the body of students in the university town, he made little impression other than as a distant oddity. Those who wished to try out one of the younger assistants rather than the more experienced professors would sooner turn to Jakob Fries (1773-1843). Osmo comments here that Fries was a student of Fichte who approached a Kantian problematic from a psychological perspective close to Jacobi. He published a New Critique of Pure Reason (1807) and wrote extensively. Fries taught at Heidelberg from 1805 and at Jena from 1816. He was suspended for his role in the patriotic Wartburgfest in October 1817, but reinstated in 1825. Hegel had a low opinion of him. Another lecturer Krause also had hearers.
      >
      > One student Suthmeier advocated for Hegel, but was felt to be dissolute in his manners and this was felt by some to bolster the case against the orthodoxy of the philosophy of the Absolute; another, Zellman was more profound. Rosenkranz illustrates a humour that grew up around the obscurity of the Absolute as an idea. One student said he didn’t know if was ducks or geese and a verse was composed on the saying. In the late course on the history of philosophy, a student from Mecklenberg burst out,
      > Then all must die!
      > Suthmeier replied that through such death there was life. In another anecdote, Hegel turned up an hour early and lectured to the wrong class, on which he made a jest about the illusions of sense certainty. Rosenkranz draws attention to a letter to Zellman (Correspondance I, L85, 129) as illustrative of close relations to students. The letters of Hegel to another student, Van Ghent, were later published.
      >
      > There was gossip: he had a pipe for example and casual remarks were given an imagined significance. In a small university town, such things were events. He knew the bookshop owner From[m]ann, whose sister in law looked after his natural son, Ludwig Fischer. Rosenkranz of course passes over this in silence.
      >
      > More to follow
      > Stephen Cowley
      >
      > From: Stephen Cowley
      > Sent: Sunday, April 01, 2012 7:31 AM
      > To: mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com
      > Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Rosenkranz on Hegel
      >
      > Hi everyone,
      >
      > Here is my summary of another chapter of Hegels Leben (1844) by Karl Rosenkranz, the first biography of Hegel.
      >
      > BOOK TWO Chapter Nine
      > The Phenomenological Crisis of the System up to 1807
      >
      > Hegel had announced a Manual from the publisher Cotta, but this did not appear. Rosenkranz suggests that perhaps the frequent changes in his views explains the delay. The lectures on the history of philosophy in 1805 to 1806 mark a step forward for Hegel. In these he discerned a unity of philosophy in its diverse manifestations. [It is indeed worth noting that the amount of solid knowledge in philosophy could be reduced to a much smaller compass if one eliminated all the repetition of errors, etc that make up the bulk of the literature and this Hegel attempted to do in the Encyclopaedia. I take it though that what is meant may be a unity of development.] By this point, Hegel conceived universal history from the standpoint of absolute knowledge. [As always, I find this concluding standpoint questionable, as do many, but I will not develop my own musings here.]
      >
      > All modern philosophy, thinks Hegel, issues from the concept of self-consciousness. [To interject again, this is true of Descartes and Locke, as well as Kant.] At this time, Rosenkranz remarks, Hegel employed an idea of substantiality as opposed to self consciousness, but as also being the experience that self consciousness makes for itself. This latter idea became from 1804 a sketch of the Phenomenology. Into this sketch, Hegel consigned the most consistent of his writings.
      >
      > As background, Fichte had analysed theoretical, practical and teleologico aesthetic judgements in his Wissenschaftslehre (the distinctions are Kantian). Schelling in contrast had applied the same distinctions concretely in the treatments of nature, history and art in his System of Transcendental Idealism. This illustrates the interplay of theoretical and concrete approaches in contemporary philosophical literature.
      >
      > Consciousness thus determines itself progressively until it coincides with the infinity of its content. Thus there is a determination, a relation of this to previous consciousness and a progression (aufhebung). This he interprets as self development. Consciousness must attain a form adequate both to its own nature and to its content. It thus abandons a series of shapes that were adopted unilaterally, but which have a relatively absolute value. What we decide sinks back into what we have been, the limitations and consequences of which become apparent as following necessarily from the original decision.
      >
      > Rosenkranz points out that Phenomenology is the title of the fourth chapter of the Metaphysical Elements of Nature (1786) of Kant and before that it appears in the New Organon (1764) of Lambert. The term named a doctrine of appearances. Hegel later called the Phenomenology his Voyages of Discovery.
      >
      > The principal steps are:
      > Consciousness
      > Spirit (meaning subjectivity as substance)
      > Absolute Knowing
      > In the conclusion, consciousness conceives itself as conceiving absolutely. The book thus has the function of an introduction. Consciousness appears again in the system, but in the Phenomenology it appears as knowing itself in nature, ethical life, culture, morality and religion. In this, situations reappear from different angles. For example the passages from stoicism to scepticism, from ethical life to the rule of law, from aesthetic to absolute religion correspond to the passage from the Greek to the Roman worlds in universal history. Similarly the unhappy consciousness, romanticism, faith, alienated spirit, beautiful soul and the passage from revealed religion all correspond and develop a logic of self consciousness torn between consciousness of mutability and the eternal. This is the principle of their renunciation of the world. Hegel thinks of the medieval clerical hierarchy, but the logic applies to all such hierarchies.
      >
      > The interplay of vanity and cultural work is typified by pre revolutionary French culture. Here Diderot (whose Rameaus Nephew was translated by Goethe in 1804), but also Marivaux and Rousseau are meant). Rosenkranz indicates that he could equally have taken Lucien and the Letters of Pliny the Younger as an instance of a culture in dissolution. Likewise, Rosenkranz likens the Beautiful Soul to Wilhelm Meister by Goethe, but it applies generally to the logic of a separation from action.
      >
      > There is thus a journey of self consciousness towards a transparent self knowledge. The method as described in the Preface is to let the subject matter develop in its own terms. Truth arises from interaction of subject and substance. The final reconciliation is figured in the death of Christ, resurrection and advent of the Spirit. [To interject, I think there is a danger of a pridefulness here that is not wholly Christian in sensibility, though of course this has long been a moot point.] Rosenkranz reproduces a long quote, otherwise lost, indicating a confidence in investigating nature and mind. Several of these quotes are reproduced in the Documents of Hoffmeister, Osmo notes.
      >
      > Hegel had been writing the Phenomenology since 1804, but he gave a course on it only once, in the summer of 1806, with pages distributed to his audience. [Would it not be marvellous to go back in time and attend that class! Herr Professor, what did you mean when you wrote...] The printing was completed in 1807. His last course in Jena finished in September 1806 and Rosenkranz cites the peroration from it, about a new era emerging for the human spirit, that philosophy must recognise for what is eternal in it and greet as such. This is often reproduced in biographies.
      >
      > More to follow
      > Stephen Cowley
      >
      > From: Stephen Cowley
      > Sent: Sunday, March 25, 2012 8:25 AM
      > To: mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com
      > Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Rosenkranz on Hegel
      >
      > Hi everyone,
      >
      > Another instalment from Hegels Leben (1844), the biography by Karl Rosenkranz. [I have to say, I gathered the impression that Hegel was involved with an edition of Spinoza, but there seem no sign of this in Rosenkranz though this is the period it would have related to.]
      >
      > BOOK TWO Chapter Eight
      > The Notebook 1803 to 1806
      >
      > Hegel was a colleague of Schelling for two and a half years prior to Schelling moving to Wurzburg in Bavaria in 1803. Perhaps with the consequent end of the Critical Journal, Hegel began to write in a Wastebook (he uses the English expression, says Rosenkranz, though Commonplace book is the one I am familiar with from John Locke). Here there are many extracts in this from English, French and German books, especially on the sciences. He seems to have done experiments on light and there is a mediocre sketch of himself at a window observing the light from it. Some of the comments and aphorisms, especially against Naturphilosophie, found their way into the Phenomenology. There are beautiful remarks on Homer and tragedy. My impressions are that the aphorisms are insightful, without the heady sense of their own importance that you find in Nietzsche but with a similar style and appearance on the page.
      >
      > One telling remark is that he finds that people now expect philosophy to make up for the loss of religion.
      >
      > Rosenkranz then cites a once famous Promethean confession by Hegel reminiscent of a reading of Faust by Goethe which he tries with difficulty to reconcile with the more usual style of Hegel. However, Osmo points out that it was shown in an article in Hegel Studien in 1973 that this is in fact an extract from a review of novels and so the explanations of Rosenkranz are superfluous.
      >
      > Hegel appears here as a patriotic figure. The events of the day elicit sympathy, irony, but most often sarcasm. In the start of a discussion continued later, Rosenkranz says that these remarks reveal that Hegel did not see the real as rational and that he greeted unreason in reality even with anger. He discusses this more in a biographical context later in connection with the Philosophy of Right
      >
      > More to follow
      > Stephen Cowley
      >
      > From: Stephen Cowley
      > Sent: Saturday, March 24, 2012 11:31 AM
      > To: mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com
      > Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Rosenkranz on Hegel
      >
      > Hi again,
      >
      > I continue with my abstract of Hegels Leben (1844) by Karl Rosenkranz, the first biography of Hegel. This marks the half way point of the book.
      >
      > BOOK TWO Chapter Seven
      > Didactic Changes to the System
      >
      > In Jena, Hegel was soon led to modify his system in light of the needs of his students. This is not covered by Walter Kaufmann through whom I first learned about Hegel, though perhaps later biographers include this material. The changes affected the presentation, leading to the addition of lengthy introductions, but also the structure and content of the material. There are problems arising from the conflicting dates attributed to manuscript material, though the main points remain valid.
      >
      > The introductions addressed the need for philosophy and its relations to concrete sciences. Whilst Hegel still used the triad of Idea Nature Mind, he added Religion in his lectures at the end as a reconciling item. His vocabulary and poetic repertoire expand, conceptual determinations become sharper and new images pour forth. He refers to the transparency of knowing as the aether of spirit, for example. He retains a fondness for Greek mythology and the sup<br/><br/>(Message over 64 KB, truncated)
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