13078Re: [hegel] Re: Rosenkranz on Hegel
- Aug 25, 2012Perhaps the following quote (from Book 3 chapter 2) sheds light on Rosenkranz’ interpretation of Hegel:
“Hegel never disputed the necessity of experience as such, but he well and truly showed how, by its own contradictions, it pushes onward from itself to universality and to the necessity of determinations.”
Sent: Saturday, August 25, 2012 2:11 PM
Subject: [hegel] Re: Rosenkranz on Hegel
--- In mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com, "Stephen Cowley" <stephen.cowley@...> wrote:
> Hi Beat,
> I take it you are taking issue with Rosenkranzâ characterisation of the Logic. I think there is little doubt that the starting point of the Logic is the point of greatest abstraction, as pure Being is characterised in just this way.<
It's quite clear that the cited text with which Rosenkranz characterized Hegel's Logic does not only refer to the beginning of the Logic but to the Logic as a whole: "...... Hegel finished his Logic which erected the towers of the eternal categories in the elment of the purest abstraction." (Karl Rosenkranz, "Hegels Leben", "Die Logik 1812-1816"), and "As the essence of the science of the logical Hegel established the immanent development of the concept whose ideal movement is the absolute method of knowing [Erkennen] and at once the intrinsic soul of the content itself."
>Indeed, some critics, e.g. Trendelenberg, say that the real method of the Logic is the progressive removal of abstraction and return to common sense concepts. I think this is probably not right as the intentions at least. The metaphysical, objective Logic does not use the Kantian distinction of a priori and a posteriori to any great extent, as I remember. even if it did, we have to remember that, for Kant, Space and Time themselves are a priori intuitions, so much of Quantity could be considered a priori on that division.<
Yes, but Kant's transcendental syntheses (including the time-space intuitions a priori) are for itself empty and need in addition empirical content. This is the main point of Hegel's critique of Kants's epistemology as the so called Copernican revolution. Hegel then thought that his Logic is the adequate reply to this critique. But is this true according to what Rosenkranz wrote about Hegel's Logic?
>Iâm not sure what Rosenkranzâ position on Kant was.
> Stephen Cowley
> From: greuterb
> Sent: Thursday, August 23, 2012 3:30 PM
> To: mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com
> Subject: [hegel] Rosenkranz on Hegel
> Stephen Cowley writes:
> > Hi everyone,
> > I turn from some interesting conversations on this list to pursue my
> > reading of
> > Hegels Leben (1844) by Karl Rosenkranz.
> > BOOK TWO Chapter 18
> > The Logic 1812 to 1816
> > In several instances, RosenkranzÃ¢Â¤â¢ chapters on HegelÃ¢Â¤â¢s published
> > books are
> > disappointingly sketchy, though interesting all the same, and this one
> > on the
> > Science of Logic fits the pattern.
> > He says that Nuremberg, with its ditches outside town walls and views
> > of the
> > country from crowded streets, is a city of contrasting movements aloft and
> > downwards. The tempos of life of its Slav and Franconian inhabitants also
> > contrast with each other. Hegel described the social life of the town in a
> > letter to Knebel (14/12/1810). In this town be wrote his Science of Logic,
> > published between March 1812 and July 1816 according to the dates on the
> > prefaces. Here the towers of the eternal categories are erected in
> > abstraction.
> "........ Hegel finished his Logic which erected the towers of the
> eternal categories in the elment of the purest abstraction." (Karl
> Rosenkranz, "Hegels Leben", "Die Logik 1812-1816")
> According to Kant this is impossible and against the condition a priori
> of the possibility of knowledge. How can new knowledge arise from mere
> analysis? How can new knowledge arise from the mere abstract concept
> without synthesis with something other? Rosenkranz writes some line
> below the above quotation (my translation):
> "As the essence of the science of the logical Hegel established the
> immanent development of the concept whose ideal movement is the absolute
> method of knowing [Erkennen] and at once the intrinsic soul of the
> content itself."
> This sounds already better: the method is the soul of the content. So,
> the Logic expounds the essence of knowing as a specific organic activity
> of the concept. It is not mainly an architectonic structure of eternal
> categories. However, an organism needs from time to time concrete
> external contents. It cannot live "in the element of the purest
> abstraction" alone. But for Hegel there is no external content in the
> Logic in which the concept determines only itself. It also is no use to
> refer to the PhdG as the phenomenological ground of the Logic. The Logic
> beginns in and for itself and the beginning is an arbitrary act of
> thought (see "With what must science begin?").
> So, what does justify Hegel's Logic according to Rosenkranz?
> Beat Greuter
> > The Logic follows the Phenomenology but, abstracting from the
> > development of
> > consciousness to maturity, it is the first part of the system as such
> > and this
> > serves to make the Phenomenology itself comprehensible, for it shows pure
> > knowledge in itself rather than knowledge in relation and also gives
> > an example
> > of the method recommended in the Phenomenology.
> > Logic and metaphysics, Hegel argues, lag behind the other sciences. A
> > people
> > without metaphysics is as astonishing as one with no constitutional
> > theory, he
> > remarks. Mind has achieved a new form, but this needs scientific
> > development.
> > Hegel writes: Ã¢Â¤Â½As science, truth is the pure self-consciousness
> > developing
> > itself and it has the form of self[hood]; this in and for itself is
> > the known
> > concept; whilst the concept as such is in-and-for-itself.Ã¢Â¤Â (448)
> > Thus Hegel
> > rejects the idea of Logic as a realm of logical forms indifferent to
> > the matter
> > or content of knowledge. we are dealing with objective thought in Logic.
> > Rosenkranz states that the equation of Logic with God prior to creation
> > stupefied the theologians, then tries to explain it by treating it as
> > a residue.
> > Hegel also stupefied logicians who saw logical forms as subjective.
> > Also, the
> > positive sciences were sceptical of an apparently a priori aspect to their
> > subject matter. Ã¢Â¤Â½It never came into HegelÃ¢Â¤â¢s head to deny the
> > concrete in
> > such a lazy fashion.Ã¢Â¤Â (449) Rather, nature is a transcendence
> > (depassement) of
> > Logic, as Mind is of Nature. one cannot find much in the Logic
> > starting from
> > concrete sciences. Being is not some particular being, for example.
> > Terminology
> > In his terminology, Hegel either borrows from German as it has
> > developed since
> > the 14th century, as in Wesen, for example, or forges new terms after
> > the Greek
> > fashion of Plato and Aristotle, though the Greeks were often more
> > audacious than
> > he (e.g. to ti en einai, entelecheia [essence, end-state]). Hence in
> > German we
> > have:
> > Fursichsein
> > Ansichsein
> > Anundfursichsein
> > Sichselbstgleichheit
> > The Content
> > Hegel compares the theory of syllogism to arithmetic, as forms of
> > calculus.
> > Living thought on the other hand needs to know that contradictions do not
> > resolve to zero, that a negative is just as much a positive result. Only a
> > particular thing is negated. [Osmo the French translator equates chose
> > and causa
> > in translating Sache rather than Ding.] A richer concept emerges from the
> > wreckage.
> > Hegel recognises as merits in Kant the identifications of the
> > categories as
> > forms of self-consciousness and of contradiction as a feature of
> > dialectical
> > reason. However, seeing the categories as subjective and contradiction
> > only as
> > negative are faults, he thinks, for reason has means to overcome
> > contradiction
> > and is only a moment of an affirmative unity (453).
> > Hegel divides ontological and ideological (that is, objective and
> > subjective)
> > Logic, but with a middle point of essence, where the terms do no pass
> > into one
> > another, as in quality, quantity and measure, but have meaning only as
> > contrasts. i.e.
> > identity and difference
> > content and form
> > cause and effect
> > The Doctrine of the Concept
> > The Concept is the most original part of the book, thinks Rosenkranz. The
> > determinations of the Concept are a unity of immediacy and mediation.
> > Thus they
> > develop, or else each moment is the whole. In other words, the
> > material divides
> > itself into the particular, which is realised in the individual.
> > In the doctrine of the Concept, Hegel discusses his relation to Kant
> > and the
> > relations of Logic and the real. He equates Being with intuition and
> > sensation,
> > or with space and time; essence with representation and perception, or
> > inorganic
> > nature; and the Concept with self-consciousness, or organic nature.
> > But the
> > logical forms are independent of their realisation.
> > The step at the end of the Logic to nature is Ã¢Â¤Â½ein freies
> > EntlassungÃ¢Â¤Â (a
> > free releasing). Rosenkranz points out that this Entlassung is on the
> > part of
> > the Idea. i.e. conceived in unity with the real. He brings on St JohnÃ¢Â¤â¢s
> > Gospel, but says that Hegel is not being gnostic or logo-theistic, as
> > Schelling
> > later alleged.
> > From 1812, Hegel was pursued by criticism of his ideas on the
> > Ã¢Â¤Â½identity of
> > being and non-beingÃ¢Â¤Â. Rosenkranz refers to a correspondence with
> > Pfaff, a
> > mathematician, on HegelÃ¢Â¤â¢s views of Newton and the differential
> > calculus, which
> > survives on PfaffÃ¢Â¤â¢s side only.
> > More to follow
> > Stephen Cowley
> [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
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