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13075Re: [hegel] Rosenkranz on Hegel

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  • Stephen Cowley
    Aug 24, 2012
      Hi Beat,

      I take it you are taking issue with Rosenkranz’ characterisation of the Logic. I think there is little doubt that the starting point of the Logic is the point of greatest abstraction, as pure Being is characterised in just this way. Indeed, some critics, e.g. Trendelenberg, say that the real method of the Logic is the progressive removal of abstraction and return to common sense concepts. I think this is probably not right as the intentions at least. The metaphysical, objective Logic does not use the Kantian distinction of a priori and a posteriori to any great extent, as I remember. even if it did, we have to remember that, for Kant, Space and Time themselves are a priori intuitions, so much of Quantity could be considered a priori on that division. I’m not sure what Rosenkranz’ position on Kant was.

      Stephen Cowley

      From: greuterb
      Sent: Thursday, August 23, 2012 3:30 PM
      To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
      Subject: [hegel] Rosenkranz on Hegel

      Stephen Cowley writes:

      > Hi everyone,
      > I turn from some interesting conversations on this list to pursue my
      > reading of
      > Hegels Leben (1844) by Karl Rosenkranz.
      > BOOK TWO Chapter 18
      > The Logic 1812 to 1816
      > In several instances, Rosenkranz⤙ chapters on Hegel⤙s published
      > books are
      > disappointingly sketchy, though interesting all the same, and this one
      > on the
      > Science of Logic fits the pattern.
      > He says that Nuremberg, with its ditches outside town walls and views
      > of the
      > country from crowded streets, is a city of contrasting movements aloft and
      > downwards. The tempos of life of its Slav and Franconian inhabitants also
      > contrast with each other. Hegel described the social life of the town in a
      > letter to Knebel (14/12/1810). In this town be wrote his Science of Logic,
      > published between March 1812 and July 1816 according to the dates on the
      > prefaces. Here the towers of the eternal categories are erected in
      > abstraction.

      "........ Hegel finished his Logic which erected the towers of the
      eternal categories in the elment of the purest abstraction." (Karl
      Rosenkranz, "Hegels Leben", "Die Logik 1812-1816")

      According to Kant this is impossible and against the condition a priori
      of the possibility of knowledge. How can new knowledge arise from mere
      analysis? How can new knowledge arise from the mere abstract concept
      without synthesis with something other? Rosenkranz writes some line
      below the above quotation (my translation):

      "As the essence of the science of the logical Hegel established the
      immanent development of the concept whose ideal movement is the absolute
      method of knowing [Erkennen] and at once the intrinsic soul of the
      content itself."

      This sounds already better: the method is the soul of the content. So,
      the Logic expounds the essence of knowing as a specific organic activity
      of the concept. It is not mainly an architectonic structure of eternal
      categories. However, an organism needs from time to time concrete
      external contents. It cannot live "in the element of the purest
      abstraction" alone. But for Hegel there is no external content in the
      Logic in which the concept determines only itself. It also is no use to
      refer to the PhdG as the phenomenological ground of the Logic. The Logic
      beginns in and for itself and the beginning is an arbitrary act of
      thought (see "With what must science begin?").

      So, what does justify Hegel's Logic according to Rosenkranz?

      Beat Greuter

      > The Logic follows the Phenomenology but, abstracting from the
      > development of
      > consciousness to maturity, it is the first part of the system as such
      > and this
      > serves to make the Phenomenology itself comprehensible, for it shows pure
      > knowledge in itself rather than knowledge in relation and also gives
      > an example
      > of the method recommended in the Phenomenology.
      > Logic and metaphysics, Hegel argues, lag behind the other sciences. A
      > people
      > without metaphysics is as astonishing as one with no constitutional
      > theory, he
      > remarks. Mind has achieved a new form, but this needs scientific
      > development.
      > Hegel writes: ⤽As science, truth is the pure self-consciousness
      > developing
      > itself and it has the form of self[hood]; this in and for itself is
      > the known
      > concept; whilst the concept as such is in-and-for-itself.⤝ (448)
      > Thus Hegel
      > rejects the idea of Logic as a realm of logical forms indifferent to
      > the matter
      > or content of knowledge. we are dealing with objective thought in Logic.
      > Rosenkranz states that the equation of Logic with God prior to creation
      > stupefied the theologians, then tries to explain it by treating it as
      > a residue.
      > Hegel also stupefied logicians who saw logical forms as subjective.
      > Also, the
      > positive sciences were sceptical of an apparently a priori aspect to their
      > subject matter. ⤽It never came into Hegel⤙s head to deny the
      > concrete in
      > such a lazy fashion.⤝ (449) Rather, nature is a transcendence
      > (depassement) of
      > Logic, as Mind is of Nature. one cannot find much in the Logic
      > starting from
      > concrete sciences. Being is not some particular being, for example.
      > Terminology
      > In his terminology, Hegel either borrows from German as it has
      > developed since
      > the 14th century, as in Wesen, for example, or forges new terms after
      > the Greek
      > fashion of Plato and Aristotle, though the Greeks were often more
      > audacious than
      > he (e.g. to ti en einai, entelecheia [essence, end-state]). Hence in
      > German we
      > have:
      > Fursichsein
      > Ansichsein
      > Anundfursichsein
      > Sichselbstgleichheit
      > The Content
      > Hegel compares the theory of syllogism to arithmetic, as forms of
      > calculus.
      > Living thought on the other hand needs to know that contradictions do not
      > resolve to zero, that a negative is just as much a positive result. Only a
      > particular thing is negated. [Osmo the French translator equates chose
      > and causa
      > in translating Sache rather than Ding.] A richer concept emerges from the
      > wreckage.
      > Hegel recognises as merits in Kant the identifications of the
      > categories as
      > forms of self-consciousness and of contradiction as a feature of
      > dialectical
      > reason. However, seeing the categories as subjective and contradiction
      > only as
      > negative are faults, he thinks, for reason has means to overcome
      > contradiction
      > and is only a moment of an affirmative unity (453).
      > Hegel divides ontological and ideological (that is, objective and
      > subjective)
      > Logic, but with a middle point of essence, where the terms do no pass
      > into one
      > another, as in quality, quantity and measure, but have meaning only as
      > contrasts. i.e.
      > identity and difference
      > content and form
      > cause and effect
      > The Doctrine of the Concept
      > The Concept is the most original part of the book, thinks Rosenkranz. The
      > determinations of the Concept are a unity of immediacy and mediation.
      > Thus they
      > develop, or else each moment is the whole. In other words, the
      > material divides
      > itself into the particular, which is realised in the individual.
      > In the doctrine of the Concept, Hegel discusses his relation to Kant
      > and the
      > relations of Logic and the real. He equates Being with intuition and
      > sensation,
      > or with space and time; essence with representation and perception, or
      > inorganic
      > nature; and the Concept with self-consciousness, or organic nature.
      > But the
      > logical forms are independent of their realisation.
      > The step at the end of the Logic to nature is ⤽ein freies
      > Entlassung⤝ (a
      > free releasing). Rosenkranz points out that this Entlassung is on the
      > part of
      > the Idea. i.e. conceived in unity with the real. He brings on St John⤙s
      > Gospel, but says that Hegel is not being gnostic or logo-theistic, as
      > Schelling
      > later alleged.
      > From 1812, Hegel was pursued by criticism of his ideas on the
      > ⤽identity of
      > being and non-being⤝. Rosenkranz refers to a correspondence with
      > Pfaff, a
      > mathematician, on Hegel⤙s views of Newton and the differential
      > calculus, which
      > survives on Pfaff⤙s side only.
      > More to follow
      > Stephen Cowley

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