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1219Re: [hegel] needing to be outside Hegel to understand Hegel?

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  • Omar Lughod
    May 31, 2003
      --- Paul Trejo <petrejo@...> wrote:
      > In response to this Fri30May03 post by Omar Lughod:
      >
      > > There is another informal fallacy called the
      > > "straw-man argument". It puts forth an absurd
      > > representation of an argument as an archetype for
      > > all arguments.
      >
      > Yes, Omar, I know of that fallacy, and I also know
      > that
      > atheists use the straw-man argument continually when
      >
      > dealing with theology.

      Are you aware that you have committed another informal
      fallacy here. You have answered a criticism by
      accusing your opponent of the same vice, rather than
      answer for it!

      No doubt, there are bad atheists. But the entire
      point of my last email was to show that the prejudice
      in a premise does not preclude its being true. One
      must show the invalidity of the argument on its own
      terms. it is only after the argument has been shown to
      be invalid that one can reveal, as an etiological
      aside, that it went wrong because the author was
      prejudiced in a certain way. even if we assume, as you
      do, that all atheists are deeply prejudiced against
      God, that by itself does not preclude that they cannot
      gain knowledge of religion. Consider the following
      thought experiment that demonstrates this:

      a large hole opens up into another world, and we want
      to understand the religious practices of that world's
      inhabitants. You have a choice: you can send in either
      two believers to study them, or one believer and one
      atheist. Which duo will you send if you have no other
      options?


      My own intution, and i would appreciate input from
      others into this, is that the two would provide both a
      corrective to each other's prejudices, and that the
      atheist's particular prejudices may permit hir to
      consider aspects (material, phenomonological, etc.,)
      of their religious experience that the believer
      couldnt appreciate. But more interesting, i think,
      than these virtues of the second pair, is that it is
      their very prejudices that would count as an objective
      variable for us when we were considering their
      conclusions: knowing that a person is an atheist
      allows us to be suspicious of certain procedures in
      hir analysis; rather than count as a negative, this is
      in fact positive knowledge as far as we are concerned,
      for we know how to better understand the data we are
      given. For in a real sense, if they shared our own
      prejudices (if we were believers interpreting the
      first duo's results,) we would be more prone to miss
      something that would otherwise be picked up if we were
      atheists interpreting the same.

      a prejudice does not make an argument, or analysis
      automatically false: 1) to begin with, a prejudiced
      premise can still be true; the fact of the prejudice
      only reveals that the reasoner will probably be
      ineffective in the long run, since most truths operate
      outside the parameters of any limited framework (which
      is what a prejudice is); a prejudice is a fact about
      the reasoner, but whether it in fact affects the
      validity of hir argument must be shown. in any case,
      it cannot be shown on logical grounds, since there is
      no logical argument from the definition of an atheist,
      to congenital religious blindness. the first is an
      analytic argument, the second requires empirical
      verification, and such verification is not apriori. 2)
      sometimes a prejudiced perspective gives you insights
      that an unprejudiced perspective will not. For it
      gives you an 'angle', that a wider perspective, the
      presumed, "God's eye view" would not. one could indeed
      argue that God cannot know anything because he has too
      much perspective. to know a chair for example is to
      belong to a world of pragmatic concerns, "to have a
      world" as Heidegger would say. And what does God need
      with a chair? It is in fact that chairness of the
      chair that is lost with too much perspective. Kant's
      real insight was to claim apriori knowledge for us,
      only by reflecting on our finite difference from God.
      Consider, in this respect, the real confessions about
      the motivations and discoveries of scientists in the
      field (see Watson's 'Double Helix').! their prejudices
      are part and parcel of their discoveries.
      >
      Omar said:
      > > To begin with, your exposition is ignoring
      > arguments
      > > that begin with the presumption of God's
      > existence,
      > > and lead us, by inference, to the falsity or
      > absurdity
      > > of that initial presumption. Such an
      > argumentative
      > > procedure is quite valid and well represented in
      > the
      > > philosophical literature, whatever the worth of
      > the
      > > particular arguments in question.
      >
      > Paul said: You are quite mistaken, Omar. I do not
      presume that
      > God exists -- and Hegel does not presume that God
      > exists. Hegel has *proved* scientifically that God
      > exists. He said so. If you had read more of his
      > writings you would know that. His LECTURES ON
      > THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION (1818-1831) greatly
      > stress the critical necessity to *prove* that God
      > exists. That is the difference between Religion and
      > Philosophy -- Religion may *presume* that God
      > exists, and Philosophy must *prove* that God exists.


      Check again what 'Omar' said. i did not claim that
      you presume that God exists; i claim that you are
      failing to consider arguments that begin with the
      premise of God's existence, and argue, to the
      absurdity, or the falsity of the idea that that
      existence. Such an argumentative procedure is quite
      valid, and arguments against God often take this form.
      My point is that you simply ignored arguments that in
      fact presuppose that God exists, but on that basis are
      led to the opposite conclusion.

      Moreover, you claim that it is logically impossible,if
      an atheist, to provide a scholarly analysis of
      religion that is of any real value. Consider the
      following summary of Nietzsche's view, which is built
      on, among other things, philological analysis:


      >
      Nietzsche makes a genealogical examination,
      specifically a psychological and philological one, of
      the motivations for the religious impulse (I am
      working here specifically from his 'Genealogy of
      Morals'). Hypothesizing power as the determining
      factor in all events, Nietzsche shows (through the
      examination of language changes: the word 'bad'
      initially meant 'common' or 'weak') how moral values
      were transformed, with the rise of a religious
      priesthood, to favor the meek, and to put the warrior
      class on a moral defensive. Resentment characterizes
      this class, since it remains, fundamentally, envious
      of the health of the warrior: Nietzsche points among
      other things to the relish the religious fathers took
      in the postulated punishments of the wicked. It
      generates a religion that makes a virtue of its own
      impotence, and a vice of all the virtues originally
      associated with the warrior: their guiltless, life
      affirming, will to power. the will to power has been
      transformed into a life denying will with the ultimate
      product of an all consuming nihilism. [paradoxically,
      religion makes a virtue of 'truthfulness' as a means
      of gaining power over the warrior class, but that
      truthfulness leads to the skepticism that puts the
      belief in God in peril]. this nihilism collapses the
      whole notion of value, but it also prepares us for the
      postmodern capacity to experiment with our own lives,
      since we have learned, through the process of
      religious self denial, to shape and guide our values
      experimentally. The uberman that Nietzsche
      postulates, is an experimenter with life, and would be
      the ultimate product of the nihilist's biological
      logic.

      Such an account cannot withstand much scrutiny by
      todays standards of philological scholarship, but can
      you deny its intuitively plausible insights? Do you
      not consider the will to power, if not a
      scientifically viable concept, still, a
      phenomenologically plausible one? Do you not consider
      such motivations when examining the behavior of
      academic philosophers? it is such insights that would
      lead first to Freud, and then to a whole slew of great
      novelists, and literary critics who recognized in
      Nietzche one of their own: that is, one who
      understands, in a profoundly aesthetic manner, what it
      is they give expression to through the devices of art.


      Eric Erickson provides a very interesting neo Freudian
      analysis of Luther's religious experiences, if you
      would like to consider an interesting counter argument
      to your claim that it is impossible to say anything
      valuable about religion while remaining an atheist.

      =====
      Omar

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