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re: "Freud"

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  • Gary Davis
    Not quite, Ken. ... Yet, obviously, you re *not* sorry, quite properly. There s *nothing* to be sorry about, in contributing to a discussion, especially re: a
    Message 1 of 8 , Apr 1, 2006
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      Not quite, Ken.

      > Sorry to intervene, carry on...

      Yet, obviously, you're *not* sorry, quite properly.
      There's *nothing* to be sorry about, in contributing
      to a discussion, especially re: a comment about your
      interests.

      Also, your comments aren't an "intervention," but a
      contribution. To see such as an intervention is to
      tacitly confess an animus that might be absent, were
      you not (I suppose) insulted by association with Jung.


      But most interesting, is "carry on," as if something
      has been halted and is awaiting you to finish being
      definitive and settling a matter, so now we are free
      to return, as you are departing. Jolly ho, sorry to be
      the center of attention? Surely not, and, again,
      properly so (*glad* your intelligence is contributing
      to discussion!), as you're a *member* of a discussion
      (not a guest) and are obviously entitled to not be
      misunderstood.

      But wait: You *can't* be a member, as we're not worthy
      of you, so you *are* just a guest, and it *was* an
      intervention, just like you say! Had you not said
      "carry on," should we have waited for another posting
      before posting again, like dinner participants waiting
      for a guest to return to their discussion after an
      intrusion (or waiting for you to comment on Zizek,
      whatever). You're the intrusion? No, the others of the
      group are, now properly marginalized as is "proper".

      Carry on.

      K> [My imaginatary engagement] is about as close to
      Jung as the Eucharist is to drinking wine and eating
      bread in a café after work in Quebec.

      G: Actually, there's a secularity to Taylor, Anderson,
      Castoriadis, and Sartre that is far closer to the café
      than the eucharist (while capitalization of
      'eucharist' signals one's specifically supernaturalist
      engagement with the meaning). Supernaturalism, you
      know, has everything to do with "trans-temporal
      telepathy."

      I don't know about Rundel, but Martin Jay's _The
      Dialectical Imagination_, 1973 his move beyond
      Critical Theory is probably the antecedent of Rundel's
      mode. (Anyway, Rundel has published an imaginative
      article by you, so it's good to stay "fairly close" to
      what's good for one's CV. By the way, his article
      isn't "The imaginary turn in Critical Theory," rather
      "Imaginary turns in Critical Theory"---the difference
      matters fairly much.)

      It's quite likely that your work is closer to Jung's
      thinking than you want to tolerate (thus, he's a
      "hateful crackpot," though the field of Analytical
      Psychology and archetypal literary criticism would
      disagree with you.)

      What's indisputable, though, is that a Darkness in the
      heart of Europe, coming into the 20th century,
      expressed what might be called the German Question
      that one may avoid with French and English influences.
      It is indeed that there was a "Shadow" to the mass
      psychology indicated by Freud and the Frankfurt
      School, in Jung's sense of the Shadow. There is the
      German Question in one's interest in
      especially-Germanic philosophy of the 19th century,
      which is like the "light" in the Platonic Cave, where
      now the Platonic shadows are German discourse of the
      early 20th century, and this haunts Habermas' critique
      of Kant and Hegel, like malicious Kantian mandarins
      becoming victims of Heidegger's _Being & Time_.

      So, you, Ken, are in the café, and the eucharist of
      the Greeks---gratitude, favor, grace, and
      rejoicing---inhabits the spirit of creative
      individuation that is the enlightening gravity of
      Analytical Psychology, not easily disclosed through
      the Platonic, cum Plotinian, Oneness that powered
      political Christianity's imagination of the corporate
      form.

      cheers,

      Gary




      .
    • Kenneth MacKendrick
      ... From: habermas@yahoogroups.com [mailto:habermas@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of Gary Davis Sent: Saturday, April 01, 2006 1:33 PM To:
      Message 2 of 8 , Apr 1, 2006
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        -----Original Message-----
        From: habermas@yahoogroups.com [mailto:habermas@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf
        Of Gary Davis
        Sent: Saturday, April 01, 2006 1:33 PM
        To: habermas@yahoogroups.com
        Subject: [Habermas] re: "Freud"


        But most interesting, is "carry on," as if something
        has been halted and is awaiting you to finish being
        definitive and settling a matter, so now we are free
        to return, as you are departing. Jolly ho, sorry to be
        the center of attention? Surely not, and, again,
        properly so (*glad* your intelligence is contributing
        to discussion!), as you're a *member* of a discussion
        (not a guest) and are obviously entitled to not be
        misunderstood.

        ** Har. My reference to "carry on" is actually a quote from Tim, the fashion
        guru on the TV show Project Runway. His infamous lines are "carry on" and
        "get to work." My use of the phrase was an imitation and reference and
        tribute to his catchy remarks to the fashion designers.

        But wait: You *can't* be a member, as we're not worthy
        of you, so you *are* just a guest, and it *was* an
        intervention, just like you say! Had you not said
        "carry on," should we have waited for another posting
        before posting again, like dinner participants waiting
        for a guest to return to their discussion after an
        intrusion (or waiting for you to comment on Zizek,
        whatever). You're the intrusion? No, the others of the
        group are, now properly marginalized as is "proper".

        Carry on.

        ** For a rather orthodoxican Habermasian scholar you certainly are full of
        mirth and hilarity. I suspect for a variety of reasons we both enjoy
        needling one another, I'll take this in stride.

        K> [My imaginatary engagement] is about as close to
        Jung as the Eucharist is to drinking wine and eating
        bread in a café after work in Quebec.

        G: Actually, there's a secularity to Taylor, Anderson,
        Castoriadis, and Sartre that is far closer to the café
        than the eucharist (while capitalization of
        'eucharist' signals one's specifically supernaturalist
        engagement with the meaning). Supernaturalism, you
        know, has everything to do with "trans-temporal
        telepathy."

        ** My capitalization of the eucharist means that I have my auto-correct
        spell check on. Had I noticed I would have reduced the e, like I did here.
        Yes, the folks mentioned all have more in common with the café than the
        Eucharist (capitalized to indicate a sacrament, as opposed simply to the
        Greek "eukaristos" which means "thanksgiving" or "grateful") ... except
        maybe Taylor. Taylor is cautious about expressing his sympathies with
        religion but he does express them from time to time. Although it appears as
        though he's trying to translate the religious into the philosophical he's
        also trying to make the philosophical more religious. See his book on
        William James... However, the Eucharist (as sacrament) has very little to do
        with eating bread and drinking wine in a café. And, by analogy, my work has
        very little to do with Jung.

        I don't know about Rundel, but Martin Jay's _The
        Dialectical Imagination_, 1973 his move beyond
        Critical Theory is probably the antecedent of Rundel's
        mode. (Anyway, Rundel has published an imaginative
        article by you, so it's good to stay "fairly close" to
        what's good for one's CV. By the way, his article
        isn't "The imaginary turn in Critical Theory," rather
        "Imaginary turns in Critical Theory"---the difference
        matters fairly much.)

        ** Jay's "dialectical imagination" is not a theory of imagination. Sartre,
        Castoriadis, Taylor, and Anderson all develop a theory of imagination
        drawing on a range of philosophical, psychoanalytic, and sociological
        resources (between them). Jay's work simply suggests that the Frankfurt
        School theorists had some sort of vision. Saying that someone is a creative
        thinker is not the same as developing a theory of the imaginary. Also, you
        say "staying close to one's CV" as if that's a bad thing, or something
        simply out of self-interest. My work on Habermas and Castoriadis (written
        almost a decade ago) was an initial foray into the field. Rundel is very
        interested in trends that are critical of Habermas and the commonalities that
        many of them have, despite coming from very different places. If you work
        through Honneth's critique of Habermas, it is fairly evident that Honneth is
        criticizing Habermas for not having an adequate understanding of the
        imaginary, hence his use of Winnicot's work for example.

        It's quite likely that your work is closer to Jung's
        thinking than you want to tolerate (thus, he's a
        "hateful crackpot," though the field of Analytical
        Psychology and archetypal literary criticism would
        disagree with you.)

        ** Most of his biographers wouldn't disagree with me, except the
        hagiographers, of which there are many. Come to think of it, there is more
        hagiography on Jung than there is serious research... sigh. I guess when he
        threw one of his mistresses down a flight of stairs or physically forced his
        children to say "hello" to the pots and pans in the kitchen each morning
        that was just implicit, rather than explicit, love. And, I'll ask for a
        reference here. Where - in any of my posts - have I come close to Jung's
        position? (we're both interested in psychology and religion... is that
        enough to say "closer to Jung's thinking that you want to tolerate"). Do my
        posts have the stench of archetypes, alchemy, the inner greatness of
        mythology, the dualistic notions of light and dark, the two halves of the
        whole "masculine" and "feminine" ... have I argued that neurosis is a good
        thing, that suffering is actually a gift? Or that if you are ok, then you
        need to embrace some sort of neurosis in order to get into the truth of
        religion? Am I somehow encouraging mysticism? If I am that poorly
        misunderstood it would be better for me not to write.


        So, you, Ken, are in the café, and the eucharist of
        the Greeks---gratitude, favor, grace, and
        rejoicing---inhabits the spirit of creative
        individuation that is the enlightening gravity of
        Analytical Psychology, not easily disclosed through
        the Platonic, cum Plotinian, Oneness that powered
        political Christianity's imagination of the corporate
        form.

        ** Now you're just making stuff up. But I'm rubber and you're glue, and
        cryptic associations bounce off of me and stick to you. : )

        ken
      • sartre88@adelphia.net
        ... ============= Gary: My point was that the mass media aren t being used to communicate but to force and/or manipulate. I have no doubt that Habermas is
        Message 3 of 8 , Apr 1, 2006
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          ---- Gary Davis <coherings@...> wrote:

          =========================Gary:

          My point was that the mass media aren't being used to communicate but to force and/or manipulate. I have no doubt that Habermas is more aware of this than I am and probably
          (certainly) has some interesting theories about it.. I gather from various sources that he no longer feels attached to the political orientation of the old Frankfurt School although I don't know why he should be. In my view, Americas invasion of Iraq and the vast economic boondoggle Bush and company are working is hardly a pleasing political example to exhibit to the world. Marcuse's views don't upset me but they don't convert me, either. In any event, the basic problem isn't political: mass manipulation through the media are employed by all political persuasions and it doesn't take politics to deal with the problem--it probably would take a miracle. Heaven knows the bloggers are complaining enough but they might as well be shouting into a wind.

          But I don't know that any of the current crop of depth psychologists, or sociologists, is really confronting the problem LeBon and Freud were discussing. The general picture they give us is that humanity is and may always be irrational. No news there, I guess. But what does that auger for democracy, which presupposes sufficient rationality in the collective mass of people to face facts and deal with them following democratic rules and procedures? One of the founding fathers (Hamilton?) is said to have declared, after the Constitution was ratified: "You have been given a democracy, if you can keep it." Can we keep it? One bunch of religious nut cases wants America to become a theocracy; another is cheering the war in hopes it will lead us to Armageddon and "Rapture," which is an ecstatic state believes will be accompanying the Second Coming. Meanwhile, nut cases on the other side of the war are blowing themselves into smithereens because they've been guaranteed a trip to paradise, where dozens of virgins will be waiting on them. (Just what the female nut cases expect isn't clear--maybe they're gay.) Meanwhile our President chats with God, who tells him just what stupid mistake he is to make next.
          --0--

          Isn't it awesome how I can deal with deep issues?

          I don't think language problems interested Freud much. He said in the "Group Psych" selection I quoted in a previous missive that thought proceeds by images, not by words. The idea of a "private language" is nowhere in Freud so far as I remember (of course I don't have all 24 volumes in memory). As a theory, it has been discredited by Wittgenstein's discussion in Philosophical Investigations, and although Wittgenstein was the primary inspiration of the Vienna Circle (the breeding ground of logical positivism), Habermas refers to him with respect. Norman Malcolm offers an excellent exposition of Wittgenstein's position in an essay in Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Man and His Philosophy, edited by K.T. Fann, p. 181ff. He says:

          The idea of a private language is presupposed by every program of inferring or constructing the "external world" and "other minds." It is contained in the philosophy of Descartes and in the theory of ideas of classical British empiricism, as well as in recent and contemporary phenomenalism and sense-datum theory. At bottom it is the idea that there is only a contingent and not an essential connection between a sensation and its outward expression--an idea that appeals to us all. Such thoughts as these are typical expressions of the idea of a private language: that I know only from my own
          case what the word "pain" means [ Philosophical Investigations ¶¶ 293, 295]; that I can only believe that someone else is in pain, but I know it if I am [303]; that another person cannot have my pains [253]; that I can undertake to call this (pointing inward) "pain" in the future [263]; that when I say, "I am in pain" I am at any rate justified before myself. (P. 182)

          I can't summarize all of the arguments W. brings to bear but the following is a sample:

          If I have a language that is really private (i.e., it is a logical impossibility that anyone else should understand it or should have any basis for knowing whether I am using a particular name consistently) my assertion that my memory tells me so and so will be utterly empty. "My memory" will not even mean--my memory impression. For by a memory impression we understand something that is either accurate or inaccurate; whereas there would not be, in the private language, any conception of what would establish a memory impression as correct, any conception of what ‘correct' would mean here.

          I think Sartre's approach to phenomenology avoided this problem. Sartre denied the existence of a "transcendental ego," a notion that played a central role in Husserl's philosophy. Mind is a consciousness of everything else--the "in-itself"--while mind ("for-itself") is not an immediate datum. Sartre's theory is much more complex but I am satisfied to think that self-reflection is
          the remembering of past memories, even if "past" only by a nanosecond. Memories are in-itself; so is language. There is no problem of an "external" world: everything is right there for consciousness, which is non-positional.

          Cheers!

          Bill Barger
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