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The obvious

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  • Mary
    What was new about Sartre s contribution to consciousness, in-itself, and for-itself was their interrelation with nothing, freedom, and responsibility. But in
    Message 1 of 171 , Jul 10, 2013
      What was new about Sartre's contribution to consciousness, in-itself, and for-itself was their interrelation with nothing, freedom, and responsibility. But in order to comprehend this, considering the concepts piecemeal simply doesn't work. Nothingness which lies at the heart of being is that on which being depends.

      I'm beginning to understand why Hazel Barnes omitted the Bad Faith chapter from her translation. It too easily distracts from the greater issue— flight from the anguish of freedom to choose. In order to deny our freedom, we deceive ourselves into believing we have no other choice. One may feel insulted and then criticize Sartre for his 'assumption' about their own life and refuse to read any further. To do that, however, is to miss his logic as to why we tend to identify with our roles rather than with our freedom. If one's choice is a flight from freedom, it is chosen in the wrong belief that one has no choice. It's easy to tell the difference: someone who chooses freely doesn't need to act the part of or resent the role— one is a natural.

      Nothing and the responsibility of freedom are not so obvious.


      --- In existlist@yahoogroups.com, eduardathome <yeoman@...> wrote:
      > Jim,
      > My reaction was that all of this seemed obvious. Rather than what seemed Sartre’s expression that the consiousness of thinking about thinking was somehow significantly new to general knowledge. We do it all the time ... as my thinking about my thoughts on the Lac-Megantic train wreck which occurred last Saturday in Quebec.
      > eduard
      > -----Original Message-----
      > From: Jim
      > Sent: Monday, July 08, 2013 4:57 PM
      > To: existlist@yahoogroups.com
      > Subject: [existlist] Re: The circularity of consciousness
      > Eduard,
      > I think there are important things about Sartre's account of consciousness. First, as Mary says, consciousness is always consciousness of something (what McCulloch calls the intentional object of the conscious act). Second, Sartre's distinction between thetic consciousness and non-thetic consciousness.
      > Sartre says that for every thetic or explicit act of consciousness there is an implicit or non-thetic awareness of the thetic conscious act.
      > Consider the common phenomenon where I can be conscious of the road as I drive my car around familiar locations whilst focusing on how to respond to the latest Existlist post. I can drive `on autopilot' and not recall afterwards features of the landscape or other traffic. However my non-thetic consciousness was all along aware of my first-order conscious experience, such that if a small child ventured into the road I would notice straightaway and put in a strategy for avoiding running the child down.
      > My first-order thetic conscious experience was being monitored by my non-thetic awareness of this experience.
      > Sartre would also say that I could consciously focus my attention on my first-order experience of the road â€" then I would have a second-order thetic conscious experience whose intentional object was my first-order thetic experience of the road. The sort of thing a nervous new deriver might have on their driving test. But this case is different from the first case where an experienced driver drives along familiar roads thinking about Existlist posts.
      > Sartre argues (I think) that this thetic vs. non-thetic distinction helps us avoid the "infinite regress" of a second order thetic conscious act to monitor a first order conscious act, and then the need for a third-order thetic conscious act to monitor the second-order conscious act, etc.
      > So some of us may be able to generate third-order and fourth-order conscious acts, but whether we can or not, this ability is nothing that causes Sartre's account any particular trouble.
      > Jim
      > ------------------------------------
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      > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
    • daveylee40
      It seems to me that we are limited to the qualities and capacities of humanness as supplied by the natural state of being human. Other than that, I personally
      Message 171 of 171 , Aug 25 12:38 PM
        It seems to me that we are limited to the qualities and capacities of humanness as supplied by the natural state of being human. Other than that, I personally cannot conceive of a fixed nature or essence.

        --- In existlist@yahoogroups.com, "Mary" <josephson45r@...> wrote:
        > No congratulations from Sartre unless I understand how I am being in-itself and being for-itself. Since I'm sufficiently satisfied with my grasp of Sartre's Bad Faith, I'm now going to spend some time with how Sartre explains what he considers the 'correct' view of in-itself for being human. What for Sartre is fixed as human essence other than existence, nothing, and freedom?
        > Mary
        > --- In existlist@yahoogroups.com, eduardathome <yeoman@> wrote:
        > > Sartre could encounter the waiter whilst serving the table and ask "what are
        > > you??"
        > >
        > > "I'm a waiter"
        > >
        > > "Aha ... and obvious case of mauvais foi". "But, what are you besides a
        > > waiter??"
        > >
        > > "I'm a father of a family"
        > >
        > > "Still mauvais foi ... a sad case". "I mean, underneath, besides these
        > > particular roles??"
        > >
        > > "Of course, I am a human being".
        > >
        > > "Congratulations".
        > >
        > > eduard
        > >
        > > -----Original Message-----
        > > From: Mary
        > > Sent: Saturday, July 20, 2013 10:28 AM
        > > To: existlist@yahoogroups.com
        > > Subject: [existlist] Fixed nature
        > >
        > > We reject labels which identify us as essentially one particular thing. I am
        > > not my job, so whichever occupation I choose or find myself in and
        > > regardless of the education and training it requires, I am still not that
        > > position/role/job in-itself. It is this idea of having a fixed nature, a
        > > something in-itself, which Sartre opposes. We are being for-itself and
        > > either struggle or recoil at the thought of having the freedom of not having
        > > an identity (an in-itself) so we find ourselves in the 'project' or
        > > condition of bad faith. Sartre thinks our nature is to desire a fixed
        > > nature. But this is further complicated by the fact that others tend to
        > > label us as having a fixed nature.
        > >
        > > If I say you, eduard, are essentially a positivist or a reductionist or
        > > whatever, you reject this because you feel you are not that. If I say you
        > > are an electrical engineer, you're more likely to say this is true, but are
        > > you really only or strictly what your job entails? Aren't you first eduard,
        > > a human being who thinks and does many things besides his job? Aren't your
        > > ideas and ways of being constantly changing? To say that you perform your
        > > job/role as an electrical engineer means you are not strictly that block of
        > > identity. Even if you were to change careers, you wouldn't strictly be that
        > > new identity either. You would be free to be more than just that. Sartre
        > > means that all jobs are equal only in the sense that we still would not be
        > > identified strictly with what we do.
        > >
        > > To say I am not *that* means I am not merely a being in-itself. But it's
        > > more complicated, because if there weren't some facticity about being human,
        > > we wouldn't be able to negate it and be a being for-itself. We would merely
        > > be this block of identity. This is really what Sartre uses bad faith to
        > > explainâ€"the relationship between being in-itself and for-itself.
        > >
        > > Mary
        > >
        > > --- In existlist@yahoogroups.com, eduardathome <yeoman@> wrote:
        > > >
        > > > Mary,
        > > >
        > > > I think that part of the difficulty may be that we are dealing with
        > > > 1930’s thought. The way I see it, Sartre is describing psychology as to
        > > > mental functioning and associated behaviour. But in the 1930’s there
        > > > was very little in the way of realising that we actually used our brains
        > > > to think, so Sartre and others had to resort to labels and phraseology
        > > > which might suffice.
        > > >
        > > > But since such phraseology is disconnected from reality, it easily leads
        > > > to convoluted statements such as, "If I am a cafe waiter, this can be only
        > > > in the mode of *not being* one." That statement makes no sense, and I
        > > > can well appreciate the need for 800 pages of reading to obtain some kind
        > > > of understanding. I don’t believe that such a statement would be made
        > > > by anyone today in the 21st century.
        > > >
        > > > I read the paragraph at least 4 times now and still cannot make any sense
        > > > of it. For example, â€Å"This is the result of the fact that while I must
        > > > *play at being* a cafe waiter in order to be one, still it would be in
        > > > vain for me to play at being a diplomat or a sailor, for I would not be
        > > > one”. I think that what Sartre is saying is that a â€Å"diplomat” is a
        > > > position that requires substantial training and something to which you are
        > > > assigned. You can’t just walk into the Ministry of State building and
        > > > start acting like a diplomat as one might act as a waiter when walking
        > > > into a restaurant. But if that is the case, then Sartre weakens his
        > > > argument for mauvais foi, since the diplomat could equally confuse himself
        > > > with his role.
        > > >
        > > > I agree with your understanding of bad faith. I asked at the office, what
        > > > was the meaning of â€Å"mauvais foi”. It comes down to misrepresenting
        > > > yourself to others, as for example to have a hidden agenda. Sartre seems
        > > > to be using the term as misrepresenting yourself to yourself. In regard
        > > > to the question of whether it is possible to misrepresent yourself to
        > > > yourself, I should think that it is entirely possible. There is nothing
        > > > in the rule book of brain thinking that one has to be entirely logical and
        > > > transparent.
        > > >
        > > > I think the example of the waiter is put in the wrong sense which
        > > > compounds the difficulty. The waiter is said to be too precise and
        > > > therefore he/she has mauvais foi. But it really should be expressed the
        > > > other way around, as waiters who have mauvais foi tend to act in too
        > > > precise a manner. Not all waiters who act precisely have mauvais foi.
        > > > Neither do all beau parleurs.
        > > >
        > > > eduard
        > >
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