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Re: [existlist] Re: soldering

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  • eduardathome
    The quote in your post does not resolve the issue. There is nothing in the quote that suggests Sartre is saying there are 2 forms of consciousness in the
    Message 1 of 171 , Jun 19, 2013
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      The quote in your post does not resolve the issue. There is nothing in the quote that suggests Sartre is saying there are 2 forms of consciousness in the brain. Although Hegel seems to attribute human thinking to the thoughts of god, I don’t see in his stuff any reference to 2 forms of consciousness, especially one form that can use the other. Although I stand to be corrected, I would not expect Sartre to go there.

      At the base, consciousness is just the functioning of our brain. Even though many do not want to recognize this fact. It is “aware” of the external world by means of its senses. It can equally create an imagined world using learned knowledge and life experiences. To suggest that there are is a form of consciousness [brain functioning] that can “use” a second form of consciousness [more brain functioning] doesn’t make any sense.


      -----Original Message-----
      From: Mary
      Sent: Tuesday, June 18, 2013 11:05 PM
      To: existlist@yahoogroups.com
      Subject: [existlist] Re: soldering


      Please see my post titled "Conscious being is in-itself and for itself" which quotes Sartre's "Being and Nothingness" and which is entirely related to and explains that which I've been trying to explain to you since you seem genuinely interested in understanding Sartre and existential concepts. I haven't introduced any exotic or extraneous material to the conversation; these are part and parcel of existentialism. Sartre builds on and contributes to Hegelian concepts.


      --- In existlist@yahoogroups.com, eduardathome <yeoman@...> wrote:
      > Our discussion was with respect to existentialism and Sartre. You raised new terminology of consciousness-in-itself and consciousness-for-itself, as to suggest it came from Sartre. Now you are moving away from Sartre and bringing in Hegel. I don’t see in the information available on the web that Hegel used anything close to “consciousness-in-itself”. But then if you are only relating it to “akin”, I suppose one could derive it in some fashion. Albeit one could equally state it is “not akin” on the basis of whatever evidence one wished to use.
      > In any case the issue is whether there is such a thing as “consciousness-in-itself” and a different form which is “consciousness-for-itself”. Now you are equating consciousness with “being”. I seriously doubt that this equivalency is advocated by Sartre or anyone. “Being” is existence of the thing. “consciousness” is the entity’s awareness in its being. If Sartre wanted to make it equivalent then he would not have said that being-in-itself is not conscious. Otherwise, that would amount to saying “consciousness-in-itself” is not conscious. Makes no sense.
      > Conscious is not a kind of Being. You are stretching things.
      > Yes, I believe that consciousness is strictly a neural activity. It has not been shown otherwise. I can well anticipate, however, that when you avoid considering the brain as the means of human thinking, you can get into all sorts of stuff ... like Hegel’s idea that human thought is the image and fulfillment of God's thought. It’s all a matter of fanciful guessing. Hegel was born in 1770; I doubt he had any understanding of brain functioning.
      > How do you get ... “If we are consciousness, then we are for ourselves and neural activity is simply an object of our consciousness”?? How can neural activity be an object of consciousness when there is no means by which a human can monitor their neural activity?? Lets go to specifics [it usually helps] ... you are thinking about an apple. You are conscious that you are so thinking. The thinking is neural activity. But how can you have that activity as the object of your consciousness?? Surely the object of your consciousness would be the apple, not the neural activity.
      > eduard
      > -----Original Message-----
      > From: Mary
      > Sent: Monday, June 17, 2013 8:00 PM
      > To: existlist@yahoogroups.com
      > Subject: [existlist] Re: soldering
      > I don't know that Sartre says this exactly; it's more akin to Hegel's concept of the in-itself.
      > Now you're confusing me. I thought you believed consciousness is strictly a neural activity. I'm saying consciousness is a kind of being which is both in-itself and for it-self. It is consciousness in-itself when it is an object for our thinking but also for-itself as our activity.
      > If neural activity is not consciousness, then it definitely is an in it-self. If we are consciousness, then we are for ourselves and neural activity is simply an object of our consciousness.
      > Mary
      > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]


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    • daveylee40
      It seems to me that we are limited to the qualities and capacities of humanness as supplied by the natural state of being human. Other than that, I personally
      Message 171 of 171 , Aug 25, 2013
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        It seems to me that we are limited to the qualities and capacities of humanness as supplied by the natural state of being human. Other than that, I personally cannot conceive of a fixed nature or essence.

        --- In existlist@yahoogroups.com, "Mary" <josephson45r@...> wrote:
        > No congratulations from Sartre unless I understand how I am being in-itself and being for-itself. Since I'm sufficiently satisfied with my grasp of Sartre's Bad Faith, I'm now going to spend some time with how Sartre explains what he considers the 'correct' view of in-itself for being human. What for Sartre is fixed as human essence other than existence, nothing, and freedom?
        > Mary
        > --- In existlist@yahoogroups.com, eduardathome <yeoman@> wrote:
        > > Sartre could encounter the waiter whilst serving the table and ask "what are
        > > you??"
        > >
        > > "I'm a waiter"
        > >
        > > "Aha ... and obvious case of mauvais foi". "But, what are you besides a
        > > waiter??"
        > >
        > > "I'm a father of a family"
        > >
        > > "Still mauvais foi ... a sad case". "I mean, underneath, besides these
        > > particular roles??"
        > >
        > > "Of course, I am a human being".
        > >
        > > "Congratulations".
        > >
        > > eduard
        > >
        > > -----Original Message-----
        > > From: Mary
        > > Sent: Saturday, July 20, 2013 10:28 AM
        > > To: existlist@yahoogroups.com
        > > Subject: [existlist] Fixed nature
        > >
        > > We reject labels which identify us as essentially one particular thing. I am
        > > not my job, so whichever occupation I choose or find myself in and
        > > regardless of the education and training it requires, I am still not that
        > > position/role/job in-itself. It is this idea of having a fixed nature, a
        > > something in-itself, which Sartre opposes. We are being for-itself and
        > > either struggle or recoil at the thought of having the freedom of not having
        > > an identity (an in-itself) so we find ourselves in the 'project' or
        > > condition of bad faith. Sartre thinks our nature is to desire a fixed
        > > nature. But this is further complicated by the fact that others tend to
        > > label us as having a fixed nature.
        > >
        > > If I say you, eduard, are essentially a positivist or a reductionist or
        > > whatever, you reject this because you feel you are not that. If I say you
        > > are an electrical engineer, you're more likely to say this is true, but are
        > > you really only or strictly what your job entails? Aren't you first eduard,
        > > a human being who thinks and does many things besides his job? Aren't your
        > > ideas and ways of being constantly changing? To say that you perform your
        > > job/role as an electrical engineer means you are not strictly that block of
        > > identity. Even if you were to change careers, you wouldn't strictly be that
        > > new identity either. You would be free to be more than just that. Sartre
        > > means that all jobs are equal only in the sense that we still would not be
        > > identified strictly with what we do.
        > >
        > > To say I am not *that* means I am not merely a being in-itself. But it's
        > > more complicated, because if there weren't some facticity about being human,
        > > we wouldn't be able to negate it and be a being for-itself. We would merely
        > > be this block of identity. This is really what Sartre uses bad faith to
        > > explainâ€"the relationship between being in-itself and for-itself.
        > >
        > > Mary
        > >
        > > --- In existlist@yahoogroups.com, eduardathome <yeoman@> wrote:
        > > >
        > > > Mary,
        > > >
        > > > I think that part of the difficulty may be that we are dealing with
        > > > 1930’s thought. The way I see it, Sartre is describing psychology as to
        > > > mental functioning and associated behaviour. But in the 1930’s there
        > > > was very little in the way of realising that we actually used our brains
        > > > to think, so Sartre and others had to resort to labels and phraseology
        > > > which might suffice.
        > > >
        > > > But since such phraseology is disconnected from reality, it easily leads
        > > > to convoluted statements such as, "If I am a cafe waiter, this can be only
        > > > in the mode of *not being* one." That statement makes no sense, and I
        > > > can well appreciate the need for 800 pages of reading to obtain some kind
        > > > of understanding. I don’t believe that such a statement would be made
        > > > by anyone today in the 21st century.
        > > >
        > > > I read the paragraph at least 4 times now and still cannot make any sense
        > > > of it. For example, â€Å"This is the result of the fact that while I must
        > > > *play at being* a cafe waiter in order to be one, still it would be in
        > > > vain for me to play at being a diplomat or a sailor, for I would not be
        > > > one”. I think that what Sartre is saying is that a â€Å"diplomat” is a
        > > > position that requires substantial training and something to which you are
        > > > assigned. You can’t just walk into the Ministry of State building and
        > > > start acting like a diplomat as one might act as a waiter when walking
        > > > into a restaurant. But if that is the case, then Sartre weakens his
        > > > argument for mauvais foi, since the diplomat could equally confuse himself
        > > > with his role.
        > > >
        > > > I agree with your understanding of bad faith. I asked at the office, what
        > > > was the meaning of â€Å"mauvais foi”. It comes down to misrepresenting
        > > > yourself to others, as for example to have a hidden agenda. Sartre seems
        > > > to be using the term as misrepresenting yourself to yourself. In regard
        > > > to the question of whether it is possible to misrepresent yourself to
        > > > yourself, I should think that it is entirely possible. There is nothing
        > > > in the rule book of brain thinking that one has to be entirely logical and
        > > > transparent.
        > > >
        > > > I think the example of the waiter is put in the wrong sense which
        > > > compounds the difficulty. The waiter is said to be too precise and
        > > > therefore he/she has mauvais foi. But it really should be expressed the
        > > > other way around, as waiters who have mauvais foi tend to act in too
        > > > precise a manner. Not all waiters who act precisely have mauvais foi.
        > > > Neither do all beau parleurs.
        > > >
        > > > eduard
        > >
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