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authenticity tied to freedom and responsibility

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  • eduardathome
    How is authenticity tied to freedom and responsibility?? Are you suggesting that even though a person may act as they think, they cannot be authentic because
    Message 1 of 5 , Feb 9, 2013
      How is authenticity tied to freedom and responsibility??

      Are you suggesting that even though a person may act as they think, they
      cannot be authentic because they owned slaves. Or that someone is not
      authentic because they do not take responsibility for their actions.
      Perhaps a person does not take responsibility for their actions because that
      is what they actually think.

      It would seem to me that, in regard to the US congress, you are applying a
      3rd person qualification. How can anyone be said to be authentic when the
      validity of what they do in relation to their thinking is dependent upon
      what someone else thinks??

      eduard

      -----Original Message-----
      From: Mary
      Sent: Thursday, February 07, 2013 6:10 PM
      To: existlist@yahoogroups.com
      Subject: [existlist] concept of authenticity

      Being authentic is not an isolated concept; it's tied to other concepts such
      as freedom and responsibility. The U.S. congress has been held hostage by
      ideologues, not authentic people. When I listened to Rubio question nominee
      Brennan today, I was embarrassed for him. What laws govern the CIA's
      treatment of suspected terrorists? Really, Mr. Rubio? Brennan almost
      stumbled on his most obvious answers. Rubio seemed to have no regard for
      international conventions and laws or the sovereignty of other other
      nations. If Brennan is ready to work with Congress, who supposedly represent
      our best interests, and with the President to lay out for the American
      people the process of selecting drone targets, I have no problem with him.

      Mary



      ------------------------------------

      Please support the Existential Primer... dedicated to explaining nothing!

      Home Page: http://www.tameri.com/csw/existYahoo! Groups Links
    • Mary
      eduard, You re probably right about my assessment of right wing obstructionists. I can t possibly know what or that they think at all. It matters whether I
      Message 2 of 5 , Feb 9, 2013
        eduard,

        You're probably right about my assessment of right wing obstructionists. I can't possibly know what or that they think at all. It matters whether I think owning slaves is acceptable and what I do about it that determines my authenticity, what I think and do about my sense of duty and that I think as freely as possible. Furthermore if I think it's wrong, I will act to end slavery, to expand my values into society. Are you saying political involvement is wrong, or are you saying that because everyone probably acts authentically, we've no basis at all to oppose them? This can't be so because you advocate killing "authentic" terrorists.

        I'm having difficulty understanding your objection to authenticity. The following might be helpful as a basis for explaining your objections which seem "absurd" otherwise.

        Mary

        "By what standard are we to think our efforts "to be," our manner of being a self? If such standards traditionally derive from the essence that a particular thing instantiates—this hammer is a good one if it instantiates what a hammer is supposed to be—and if there is nothing that a human being is, by its essence, supposed to be, can the meaning of existence at all be thought? Existentialism arises with the collapse of the idea that philosophy can provide substantive norms for existing, ones that specify particular ways of life. Nevertheless, there remains the distinction between what I do "as" myself and as "anyone," so in this sense existing is something at which I can succeed or fail. Authenticity—in German, Eigentlichkeit—names that attitude in which I engage in my projects as my own (eigen).

        What this means can perhaps be brought out by considering moral evaluations. In keeping my promise I act in accord with duty; and if I keep it because it is my duty, I also act morally (according to Kant) because I am acting for the sake of duty. But existentially there is still a further evaluation to be made. My moral act is inauthentic if, in keeping my promise for the sake of duty, I do so because that is what "one" does (what "moral people" do). But I can do the same thing authentically if, in keeping my promise for the sake of duty, acting this way is something I choose as my own, something to which, apart from its social sanction, I commit myself. Similarly, doing the right thing from a fixed and stable character—which virtue ethics considers a condition of the good—is not beyond the reach of existential evaluation: such character may simply be a product of my tendency to "do what one does," including feeling "the right way" about things and betaking myself in appropriate ways as one is expected to do. But such character might also be a reflection of my choice of myself, a commitment I make to be a person of this sort. In both cases I have succeeded in being good; only in the latter case, however, have I succeeded in being myself.[12]

        Thus the norm of authenticity refers to a kind of "transparency" with regard to my situation, a recognition that I am a being who can be responsible for who I am. In choosing in light of this norm I can be said to recover myself from alienation, from my absorption in the anonymous "one-self" that characterizes me in my everyday engagement in the world. Authenticity thus indicates a certain kind of integrity—not that of a pre-given whole, an identity waiting to be discovered, but that of a project to which I can either commit myself (and thus "become" what it entails) or else simply occupy for a time, inauthentically drifting in and out of various affairs. Some writers have taken this notion a step further, arguing that the measure of an authentic life lies in the integrity of a narrative, that to be a self is to constitute a story in which a kind of wholeness prevails, to be the author of oneself as a unique individual (Nehamas 1998; Ricoeur 1992). In contrast, the inauthentic life would be one without such integrity, one in which I allow my life-story to be dictated by the world. Be that as it may, it is clear that one can commit oneself to a life of chamealeon-like variety, as does Don Juan in Kierkegaard's version of the legend. Even interpreted narratively, then, the norm of authenticity remains a formal one. As with Kierkegaard's Knight of Faith, one cannot tell who is authentic by looking at the content of their lives.[13]

        Authenticity defines a condition on self-making: do I succeed in making myself, or will who I am merely be a function of the roles I find myself in? Thus to be authentic can also be thought as a way of being autonomous. In choosing "resolutely"—that is, in commiting myself to a certain course of action, a certain way of being in the world—I have given myself the rule that belongs to the role I come to adopt. The inauthentic person, in contrast, merely occupies such a role, and may do so "irresolutely," without commitment. Being a father authentically does not necessarily make me a better father, but what it means to be a father has become explicitly my concern. It is here that existentialism locates the singularity of existence and identifies what is irreducible in the first-person stance. At the same time, authenticity does not hold out some specific way of life as a norm; that is, it does not distinguish between the projects that I might choose. Instead, it governs the manner in which I am engaged in such projects—either as "my own" or as "what one does," transparently or opaquely.

        Thus existentialism's focus on authenticity leads to a distinctive stance toward ethics and value-theory generally. The possibility of authenticity is a mark of my freedom, and it is through freedom that existentialism approaches questions of value, leading to many of its most recognizable doctrines."

        http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/existentialism/#Aut


        --- In existlist@yahoogroups.com, eduardathome wrote:
        >
        > How is authenticity tied to freedom and responsibility??
        >
        > Are you suggesting that even though a person may act as they think, they
        > cannot be authentic because they owned slaves. Or that someone is not
        > authentic because they do not take responsibility for their actions.
        > Perhaps a person does not take responsibility for their actions because that
        > is what they actually think.
        >
        > It would seem to me that, in regard to the US congress, you are applying a
        > 3rd person qualification. How can anyone be said to be authentic when the
        > validity of what they do in relation to their thinking is dependent upon
        > what someone else thinks??
        >
        > eduard
        >
        > -----Original Message-----
        > From: Mary
        > Sent: Thursday, February 07, 2013 6:10 PM
        > To: existlist@yahoogroups.com
        > Subject: [existlist] concept of authenticity
        >
        > Being authentic is not an isolated concept; it's tied to other concepts such
        > as freedom and responsibility. The U.S. congress has been held hostage by
        > ideologues, not authentic people. When I listened to Rubio question nominee
        > Brennan today, I was embarrassed for him. What laws govern the CIA's
        > treatment of suspected terrorists? Really, Mr. Rubio? Brennan almost
        > stumbled on his most obvious answers. Rubio seemed to have no regard for
        > international conventions and laws or the sovereignty of other other
        > nations. If Brennan is ready to work with Congress, who supposedly represent
        > our best interests, and with the President to lay out for the American
        > people the process of selecting drone targets, I have no problem with him.
        >
        > Mary
        >
        >
        >
        > ------------------------------------
        >
        > Please support the Existential Primer... dedicated to explaining nothing!
        >
        > Home Page: http://www.tameri.com/csw/existYahoo! Groups Links
        >
      • eduardathome
        [Are you saying political involvement is wrong, or are you saying that because everyone probably acts authentically, we ve no basis at all to oppose them? ]
        Message 3 of 5 , Feb 9, 2013
          [Are you saying political involvement is wrong, or are you saying that
          because everyone probably acts authentically, we've no basis at all to
          oppose them? ]

          Neither.

          All I am saying is that it is likely that Moussa in Mali is acting
          authentically, because he is evil. You are acting authentically when what
          you do is what you think. It's as simple as that. There is no link with
          freedom and responsibility. These are qualifications of a 3rd party and
          authenticity is of the individual themselves.

          The term "freedom" in the essay you provided isn't the "freedom" as I had
          thought. For reason being that you linked it with "responsibility". What
          the essay is getting at is that one is transparent ... you freely act as you
          think. As far as Moussa is concerned, I think he is being transparent. He
          isn't doing something that he would not do otherwise. Granted, it is my
          guess, but I think that he follows the doctrine because it suits his
          character. He chooses freely to follow the doctrine that demands violence.

          There is another article in today's newspaper about Mali. This time the
          stories of what went on in Gao over the past 10 months, before the French
          drove out the Islamic nuts.

          Le chief of the Islamic police, Ali Touré, asked Dr Aziz Maïga, who is
          responsible for surgery at the hospital, to help amputate the hands and feet
          of thieves. Touré said ....

          — La charia [loi islamique], c’est la voix de Dieu, a dit Ali Touré.
          On veut couper les mains des voleurs, mais on ne sait pas comment faire.
          Fais-le pour nous.

          "The Sharia is the voice of God. We want to cut off the hands of
          some thieves but don't know how to do it. Do it for us."

          My view is that Touré selects this particular punishment and assigns it to
          God, because he chooses to do so and this is his character. He actually
          wants to cut off hands and thus is acting authentically.

          To give the end of the story, Dr Aziz Maïga refused to help and said his
          role is to people who are injured. So they cut off the hands with a meat
          cleaver in the village square and rushed the victims to the hospital to be
          cared for, before they bled to death. A total of 9 amputations in Gao and 1
          in Timbuktu.

          eduard

          -----Original Message-----
          From: Mary
          Sent: Saturday, February 09, 2013 11:28 AM
          To: existlist@yahoogroups.com
          Subject: [existlist] Re: authenticity tied to freedom and responsibility

          eduard,

          You're probably right about my assessment of right wing obstructionists. I
          can't possibly know what or that they think at all. It matters whether I
          think owning slaves is acceptable and what I do about it that determines my
          authenticity, what I think and do about my sense of duty and that I think as
          freely as possible. Furthermore if I think it's wrong, I will act to end
          slavery, to expand my values into society. Are you saying political
          involvement is wrong, or are you saying that because everyone probably acts
          authentically, we've no basis at all to oppose them? This can't be so
          because you advocate killing "authentic" terrorists.

          I'm having difficulty understanding your objection to authenticity. The
          following might be helpful as a basis for explaining your objections which
          seem "absurd" otherwise.

          Mary

          "By what standard are we to think our efforts "to be," our manner of being a
          self? If such standards traditionally derive from the essence that a
          particular thing instantiates—this hammer is a good one if it instantiates
          what a hammer is supposed to be—and if there is nothing that a human being
          is, by its essence, supposed to be, can the meaning of existence at all be
          thought? Existentialism arises with the collapse of the idea that philosophy
          can provide substantive norms for existing, ones that specify particular
          ways of life. Nevertheless, there remains the distinction between what I do
          "as" myself and as "anyone," so in this sense existing is something at which
          I can succeed or fail. Authenticity—in German, Eigentlichkeit—names that
          attitude in which I engage in my projects as my own (eigen).

          What this means can perhaps be brought out by considering moral evaluations.
          In keeping my promise I act in accord with duty; and if I keep it because it
          is my duty, I also act morally (according to Kant) because I am acting for
          the sake of duty. But existentially there is still a further evaluation to
          be made. My moral act is inauthentic if, in keeping my promise for the sake
          of duty, I do so because that is what "one" does (what "moral people" do).
          But I can do the same thing authentically if, in keeping my promise for the
          sake of duty, acting this way is something I choose as my own, something to
          which, apart from its social sanction, I commit myself. Similarly, doing the
          right thing from a fixed and stable character—which virtue ethics considers
          a condition of the good—is not beyond the reach of existential evaluation:
          such character may simply be a product of my tendency to "do what one does,"
          including feeling "the right way" about things and betaking myself in
          appropriate ways as one is expected to do. But such character might also be
          a reflection of my choice of myself, a commitment I make to be a person of
          this sort. In both cases I have succeeded in being good; only in the latter
          case, however, have I succeeded in being myself.[12]

          Thus the norm of authenticity refers to a kind of "transparency" with regard
          to my situation, a recognition that I am a being who can be responsible for
          who I am. In choosing in light of this norm I can be said to recover myself
          from alienation, from my absorption in the anonymous "one-self" that
          characterizes me in my everyday engagement in the world. Authenticity thus
          indicates a certain kind of integrity—not that of a pre-given whole, an
          identity waiting to be discovered, but that of a project to which I can
          either commit myself (and thus "become" what it entails) or else simply
          occupy for a time, inauthentically drifting in and out of various affairs.
          Some writers have taken this notion a step further, arguing that the measure
          of an authentic life lies in the integrity of a narrative, that to be a self
          is to constitute a story in which a kind of wholeness prevails, to be the
          author of oneself as a unique individual (Nehamas 1998; Ricoeur 1992). In
          contrast, the inauthentic life would be one without such integrity, one in
          which I allow my life-story to be dictated by the world. Be that as it may,
          it is clear that one can commit oneself to a life of chamealeon-like
          variety, as does Don Juan in Kierkegaard's version of the legend. Even
          interpreted narratively, then, the norm of authenticity remains a formal
          one. As with Kierkegaard's Knight of Faith, one cannot tell who is authentic
          by looking at the content of their lives.[13]

          Authenticity defines a condition on self-making: do I succeed in making
          myself, or will who I am merely be a function of the roles I find myself in?
          Thus to be authentic can also be thought as a way of being autonomous. In
          choosing "resolutely"—that is, in commiting myself to a certain course of
          action, a certain way of being in the world—I have given myself the rule
          that belongs to the role I come to adopt. The inauthentic person, in
          contrast, merely occupies such a role, and may do so "irresolutely," without
          commitment. Being a father authentically does not necessarily make me a
          better father, but what it means to be a father has become explicitly my
          concern. It is here that existentialism locates the singularity of existence
          and identifies what is irreducible in the first-person stance. At the same
          time, authenticity does not hold out some specific way of life as a norm;
          that is, it does not distinguish between the projects that I might choose.
          Instead, it governs the manner in which I am engaged in such projects—either
          as "my own" or as "what one does," transparently or opaquely.

          Thus existentialism's focus on authenticity leads to a distinctive stance
          toward ethics and value-theory generally. The possibility of authenticity is
          a mark of my freedom, and it is through freedom that existentialism
          approaches questions of value, leading to many of its most recognizable
          doctrines."

          http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/existentialism/#Aut


          --- In existlist@yahoogroups.com, eduardathome wrote:
          >
          > How is authenticity tied to freedom and responsibility??
          >
          > Are you suggesting that even though a person may act as they think, they
          > cannot be authentic because they owned slaves. Or that someone is not
          > authentic because they do not take responsibility for their actions.
          > Perhaps a person does not take responsibility for their actions because
          > that
          > is what they actually think.
          >
          > It would seem to me that, in regard to the US congress, you are applying a
          > 3rd person qualification. How can anyone be said to be authentic when the
          > validity of what they do in relation to their thinking is dependent upon
          > what someone else thinks??
          >
          > eduard
          >
          > -----Original Message-----
          > From: Mary
          > Sent: Thursday, February 07, 2013 6:10 PM
          > To: existlist@yahoogroups.com
          > Subject: [existlist] concept of authenticity
          >
          > Being authentic is not an isolated concept; it's tied to other concepts
          > such
          > as freedom and responsibility. The U.S. congress has been held hostage by
          > ideologues, not authentic people. When I listened to Rubio question
          > nominee
          > Brennan today, I was embarrassed for him. What laws govern the CIA's
          > treatment of suspected terrorists? Really, Mr. Rubio? Brennan almost
          > stumbled on his most obvious answers. Rubio seemed to have no regard for
          > international conventions and laws or the sovereignty of other other
          > nations. If Brennan is ready to work with Congress, who supposedly
          > represent
          > our best interests, and with the President to lay out for the American
          > people the process of selecting drone targets, I have no problem with him.
          >
          > Mary
          >
          >
          >
          > ------------------------------------
          >
          > Please support the Existential Primer... dedicated to explaining nothing!
          >
          > Home Page: http://www.tameri.com/csw/existYahoo! Groups Links
          >




          ------------------------------------

          Please support the Existential Primer... dedicated to explaining nothing!

          Home Page: http://www.tameri.com/csw/existYahoo! Groups Links
        • devindersingh
          Freedom is not a being: it is the being of man, that is to say, his not-being . A very cryptic mantra. Let us try to unveil the Shekinah. Being means
          Message 4 of 5 , Feb 9, 2013
            "Freedom is not a being: it is the being of man, that is to say, his
            not-being". A very cryptic mantra. Let us try to unveil the Shekinah.
            "Being" means "be-ing" i.e. existing, something persisting, continuing
            in the same condition, something fixed, a status. Freedom is not a thing
            of that kind, it is movement: even so, it is not a continuous movement.
            According to Bergson, the true, the ultimate reality is a continuity of
            urge (élan vital); according to Sartre, however, in line with the
            trend of modern scientific knowledge, the reality is an assemblage of
            discrete units of energy, packets or quanta. So freedom is an urge, a
            spurt(jaillissement): it acts in a disconnected fashion and it is
            absolute and unconditional. It is veritably the wind that bloweth where
            it listeth. It has no purpose, no direction, no relation: for all those
            attributes or definitions would annul its absoluteness. It does not stop
            or halt or dwell upon, it bursts forth and passes. It does not exist,
            that is stay: therefore it is non-being. Man's being then consist of a
            conglomeration (ensemble) of such freedoms. And that is the whole
            reality of I man, his very essence. We have said that a heavy sense of
            responsibility hangs upon the .free Purusha: but it appears the Sartrian
            Purusha is a divided personality. In spite of the sense of
            responsibility (or because of it?) he acts irresponsibly; for, acting
            otherwise would not be freedom. Sartre too cannot ignore the fact that
            the free being is not an isolated phenomenon in the world; it exists
            along with and in the company of others of the same nature and quality.
            Indeed human society is that in essence, anassociation of freedoms,
            although these movements of freedom are camouflaged in appearance and
            are not recognised by the free persons themselves. The interaction
            between the free persons, the reflection of oneself in others and the
            mutual dependence of egos is a constant theme in the novels and plays of
            Sartre.

            'Freedom cannot be real freedom unless it is licence : yet society means
            a curtailment or inhibition or modification of this absolute liberty.
            This, conflict has never been resolved in Sartre and is fundamental to
            his ideology, 'the source of his tragic nihilism.

            [http://sriaurobindoashram.com/Content.aspx?ContentURL=_StaticContent/Sr\
            iAurobindoAshram/-09%20E-Library/-03%20Disciples/Nolini%20Kanta%20Gupta/\
            Volume-1/-63_sartrian%20Freedom.html]
            --- In existlist@yahoogroups.com, eduardathome wrote:
            >
            > [Are you saying political involvement is wrong, or are you saying
            that
            > because everyone probably acts authentically, we've no basis at all to
            > oppose them? ]
            >
            > Neither.
            >
            > All I am saying is that it is likely that Moussa in Mali is acting
            > authentically, because he is evil. You are acting authentically when
            what
            > you do is what you think. It's as simple as that. There is no link
            with
            > freedom and responsibility. These are qualifications of a 3rd party
            and
            > authenticity is of the individual themselves.
            >
            > The term "freedom" in the essay you provided isn't the "freedom" as I
            had
            > thought. For reason being that you linked it with "responsibility".
            What
            > the essay is getting at is that one is transparent ... you freely act
            as you
            > think. As far as Moussa is concerned, I think he is being
            transparent. He
            > isn't doing something that he would not do otherwise. Granted, it is
            my
            > guess, but I think that he follows the doctrine because it suits his
            > character. He chooses freely to follow the doctrine that demands
            violence.
            >
            > There is another article in today's newspaper about Mali. This time
            the
            > stories of what went on in Gao over the past 10 months, before the
            French
            > drove out the Islamic nuts.
            >
            > Le chief of the Islamic police, Ali Touré, asked Dr Aziz
            Maïga, who is
            > responsible for surgery at the hospital, to help amputate the hands
            and feet
            > of thieves. Touré said ....
            >
            > â€" La charia [loi islamique], c’est la voix de
            Dieu, a dit Ali Touré.
            > On veut couper les mains des voleurs, mais on ne sait pas comment
            faire.
            > Fais-le pour nous.
            >
            > "The Sharia is the voice of God. We want to cut off the hands
            of
            > some thieves but don't know how to do it. Do it for us."
            >
            > My view is that Touré selects this particular punishment and
            assigns it to
            > God, because he chooses to do so and this is his character. He
            actually
            > wants to cut off hands and thus is acting authentically.
            >
            > To give the end of the story, Dr Aziz Maïga refused to help and
            said his
            > role is to people who are injured. So they cut off the hands with a
            meat
            > cleaver in the village square and rushed the victims to the hospital
            to be
            > cared for, before they bled to death. A total of 9 amputations in Gao
            and 1
            > in Timbuktu.
            >
            > eduard
            >
            > -----Original Message-----
            > From: Mary
            > Sent: Saturday, February 09, 2013 11:28 AM
            > To: existlist@yahoogroups.com
            > Subject: [existlist] Re: authenticity tied to freedom and
            responsibility
            >
            > eduard,
            >
            > You're probably right about my assessment of right wing
            obstructionists. I
            > can't possibly know what or that they think at all. It matters whether
            I
            > think owning slaves is acceptable and what I do about it that
            determines my
            > authenticity, what I think and do about my sense of duty and that I
            think as
            > freely as possible. Furthermore if I think it's wrong, I will act to
            end
            > slavery, to expand my values into society. Are you saying political
            > involvement is wrong, or are you saying that because everyone
            probably acts
            > authentically, we've no basis at all to oppose them? This can't be so
            > because you advocate killing "authentic" terrorists.
            >
            > I'm having difficulty understanding your objection to authenticity.
            The
            > following might be helpful as a basis for explaining your objections
            which
            > seem "absurd" otherwise.
            >
            > Mary
            >
            > "By what standard are we to think our efforts "to be," our manner of
            being a
            > self? If such standards traditionally derive from the essence that a
            > particular thing instantiatesâ€"this hammer is a good one if it
            instantiates
            > what a hammer is supposed to beâ€"and if there is nothing that a
            human being
            > is, by its essence, supposed to be, can the meaning of existence at
            all be
            > thought? Existentialism arises with the collapse of the idea that
            philosophy
            > can provide substantive norms for existing, ones that specify
            particular
            > ways of life. Nevertheless, there remains the distinction between what
            I do
            > "as" myself and as "anyone," so in this sense existing is something at
            which
            > I can succeed or fail. Authenticityâ€"in German,
            Eigentlichkeitâ€"names that
            > attitude in which I engage in my projects as my own (eigen).
            >
            > What this means can perhaps be brought out by considering moral
            evaluations.
            > In keeping my promise I act in accord with duty; and if I keep it
            because it
            > is my duty, I also act morally (according to Kant) because I am acting
            for
            > the sake of duty. But existentially there is still a further
            evaluation to
            > be made. My moral act is inauthentic if, in keeping my promise for the
            sake
            > of duty, I do so because that is what "one" does (what "moral people"
            do).
            > But I can do the same thing authentically if, in keeping my promise
            for the
            > sake of duty, acting this way is something I choose as my own,
            something to
            > which, apart from its social sanction, I commit myself. Similarly,
            doing the
            > right thing from a fixed and stable characterâ€"which virtue
            ethics considers
            > a condition of the goodâ€"is not beyond the reach of existential
            evaluation:
            > such character may simply be a product of my tendency to "do what one
            does,"
            > including feeling "the right way" about things and betaking myself in
            > appropriate ways as one is expected to do. But such character might
            also be
            > a reflection of my choice of myself, a commitment I make to be a
            person of
            > this sort. In both cases I have succeeded in being good; only in the
            latter
            > case, however, have I succeeded in being myself.[12]
            >
            > Thus the norm of authenticity refers to a kind of "transparency" with
            regard
            > to my situation, a recognition that I am a being who can be
            responsible for
            > who I am. In choosing in light of this norm I can be said to recover
            myself
            > from alienation, from my absorption in the anonymous "one-self" that
            > characterizes me in my everyday engagement in the world. Authenticity
            thus
            > indicates a certain kind of integrityâ€"not that of a pre-given
            whole, an
            > identity waiting to be discovered, but that of a project to which I
            can
            > either commit myself (and thus "become" what it entails) or else
            simply
            > occupy for a time, inauthentically drifting in and out of various
            affairs.
            > Some writers have taken this notion a step further, arguing that the
            measure
            > of an authentic life lies in the integrity of a narrative, that to be
            a self
            > is to constitute a story in which a kind of wholeness prevails, to be
            the
            > author of oneself as a unique individual (Nehamas 1998; Ricoeur 1992).
            In
            > contrast, the inauthentic life would be one without such integrity,
            one in
            > which I allow my life-story to be dictated by the world. Be that as it
            may,
            > it is clear that one can commit oneself to a life of chamealeon-like
            > variety, as does Don Juan in Kierkegaard's version of the legend. Even
            > interpreted narratively, then, the norm of authenticity remains a
            formal
            > one. As with Kierkegaard's Knight of Faith, one cannot tell who is
            authentic
            > by looking at the content of their lives.[13]
            >
            > Authenticity defines a condition on self-making: do I succeed in
            making
            > myself, or will who I am merely be a function of the roles I find
            myself in?
            > Thus to be authentic can also be thought as a way of being autonomous.
            In
            > choosing "resolutely"â€"that is, in commiting myself to a certain
            course of
            > action, a certain way of being in the worldâ€"I have given myself
            the rule
            > that belongs to the role I come to adopt. The inauthentic person, in
            > contrast, merely occupies such a role, and may do so "irresolutely,"
            without
            > commitment. Being a father authentically does not necessarily make me
            a
            > better father, but what it means to be a father has become explicitly
            my
            > concern. It is here that existentialism locates the singularity of
            existence
            > and identifies what is irreducible in the first-person stance. At the
            same
            > time, authenticity does not hold out some specific way of life as a
            norm;
            > that is, it does not distinguish between the projects that I might
            choose.
            > Instead, it governs the manner in which I am engaged in such
            projectsâ€"either
            > as "my own" or as "what one does," transparently or opaquely.
            >
            > Thus existentialism's focus on authenticity leads to a distinctive
            stance
            > toward ethics and value-theory generally. The possibility of
            authenticity is
            > a mark of my freedom, and it is through freedom that existentialism
            > approaches questions of value, leading to many of its most
            recognizable
            > doctrines."
            >
            > http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/existentialism/#Aut
            >
            >
            > --- In existlist@yahoogroups.com, eduardathome wrote:
            > >
            > > How is authenticity tied to freedom and responsibility??
            > >
            > > Are you suggesting that even though a person may act as they think,
            they
            > > cannot be authentic because they owned slaves. Or that someone is
            not
            > > authentic because they do not take responsibility for their actions.
            > > Perhaps a person does not take responsibility for their actions
            because
            > > that
            > > is what they actually think.
            > >
            > > It would seem to me that, in regard to the US congress, you are
            applying a
            > > 3rd person qualification. How can anyone be said to be authentic
            when the
            > > validity of what they do in relation to their thinking is dependent
            upon
            > > what someone else thinks??
            > >
            > > eduard
            > >
            > > -----Original Message-----
            > > From: Mary
            > > Sent: Thursday, February 07, 2013 6:10 PM
            > > To: existlist@yahoogroups.com
            > > Subject: [existlist] concept of authenticity
            > >
            > > Being authentic is not an isolated concept; it's tied to other
            concepts
            > > such
            > > as freedom and responsibility. The U.S. congress has been held
            hostage by
            > > ideologues, not authentic people. When I listened to Rubio question
            > > nominee
            > > Brennan today, I was embarrassed for him. What laws govern the CIA's
            > > treatment of suspected terrorists? Really, Mr. Rubio? Brennan almost
            > > stumbled on his most obvious answers. Rubio seemed to have no regard
            for
            > > international conventions and laws or the sovereignty of other other
            > > nations. If Brennan is ready to work with Congress, who supposedly
            > > represent
            > > our best interests, and with the President to lay out for the
            American
            > > people the process of selecting drone targets, I have no problem
            with him.
            > >
            > > Mary



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