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concept of authenticity

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  • Mary
    Being authentic is not an isolated concept; it s tied to other concepts such as freedom and responsibility. The U.S. congress has been held hostage by
    Message 1 of 5 , Feb 7, 2013
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      Being authentic is not an isolated concept; it's tied to other concepts such as freedom and responsibility. The U.S. congress has been held hostage by ideologues, not authentic people. When I listened to Rubio question nominee Brennan today, I was embarrassed for him. What laws govern the CIA's treatment of suspected terrorists? Really, Mr. Rubio? Brennan almost stumbled on his most obvious answers. Rubio seemed to have no regard for international conventions and laws or the sovereignty of other other nations. If Brennan is ready to work with Congress, who supposedly represent our best interests, and with the President to lay out for the American people the process of selecting drone targets, I have no problem with him.

      Mary
    • eduardathome
      How is authenticity tied to freedom and responsibility?? Are you suggesting that even though a person may act as they think, they cannot be authentic because
      Message 2 of 5 , Feb 9, 2013
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        How is authenticity tied to freedom and responsibility??

        Are you suggesting that even though a person may act as they think, they
        cannot be authentic because they owned slaves. Or that someone is not
        authentic because they do not take responsibility for their actions.
        Perhaps a person does not take responsibility for their actions because that
        is what they actually think.

        It would seem to me that, in regard to the US congress, you are applying a
        3rd person qualification. How can anyone be said to be authentic when the
        validity of what they do in relation to their thinking is dependent upon
        what someone else thinks??

        eduard

        -----Original Message-----
        From: Mary
        Sent: Thursday, February 07, 2013 6:10 PM
        To: existlist@yahoogroups.com
        Subject: [existlist] concept of authenticity

        Being authentic is not an isolated concept; it's tied to other concepts such
        as freedom and responsibility. The U.S. congress has been held hostage by
        ideologues, not authentic people. When I listened to Rubio question nominee
        Brennan today, I was embarrassed for him. What laws govern the CIA's
        treatment of suspected terrorists? Really, Mr. Rubio? Brennan almost
        stumbled on his most obvious answers. Rubio seemed to have no regard for
        international conventions and laws or the sovereignty of other other
        nations. If Brennan is ready to work with Congress, who supposedly represent
        our best interests, and with the President to lay out for the American
        people the process of selecting drone targets, I have no problem with him.

        Mary



        ------------------------------------

        Please support the Existential Primer... dedicated to explaining nothing!

        Home Page: http://www.tameri.com/csw/existYahoo! Groups Links
      • Mary
        eduard, You re probably right about my assessment of right wing obstructionists. I can t possibly know what or that they think at all. It matters whether I
        Message 3 of 5 , Feb 9, 2013
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          eduard,

          You're probably right about my assessment of right wing obstructionists. I can't possibly know what or that they think at all. It matters whether I think owning slaves is acceptable and what I do about it that determines my authenticity, what I think and do about my sense of duty and that I think as freely as possible. Furthermore if I think it's wrong, I will act to end slavery, to expand my values into society. Are you saying political involvement is wrong, or are you saying that because everyone probably acts authentically, we've no basis at all to oppose them? This can't be so because you advocate killing "authentic" terrorists.

          I'm having difficulty understanding your objection to authenticity. The following might be helpful as a basis for explaining your objections which seem "absurd" otherwise.

          Mary

          "By what standard are we to think our efforts "to be," our manner of being a self? If such standards traditionally derive from the essence that a particular thing instantiates—this hammer is a good one if it instantiates what a hammer is supposed to be—and if there is nothing that a human being is, by its essence, supposed to be, can the meaning of existence at all be thought? Existentialism arises with the collapse of the idea that philosophy can provide substantive norms for existing, ones that specify particular ways of life. Nevertheless, there remains the distinction between what I do "as" myself and as "anyone," so in this sense existing is something at which I can succeed or fail. Authenticity—in German, Eigentlichkeit—names that attitude in which I engage in my projects as my own (eigen).

          What this means can perhaps be brought out by considering moral evaluations. In keeping my promise I act in accord with duty; and if I keep it because it is my duty, I also act morally (according to Kant) because I am acting for the sake of duty. But existentially there is still a further evaluation to be made. My moral act is inauthentic if, in keeping my promise for the sake of duty, I do so because that is what "one" does (what "moral people" do). But I can do the same thing authentically if, in keeping my promise for the sake of duty, acting this way is something I choose as my own, something to which, apart from its social sanction, I commit myself. Similarly, doing the right thing from a fixed and stable character—which virtue ethics considers a condition of the good—is not beyond the reach of existential evaluation: such character may simply be a product of my tendency to "do what one does," including feeling "the right way" about things and betaking myself in appropriate ways as one is expected to do. But such character might also be a reflection of my choice of myself, a commitment I make to be a person of this sort. In both cases I have succeeded in being good; only in the latter case, however, have I succeeded in being myself.[12]

          Thus the norm of authenticity refers to a kind of "transparency" with regard to my situation, a recognition that I am a being who can be responsible for who I am. In choosing in light of this norm I can be said to recover myself from alienation, from my absorption in the anonymous "one-self" that characterizes me in my everyday engagement in the world. Authenticity thus indicates a certain kind of integrity—not that of a pre-given whole, an identity waiting to be discovered, but that of a project to which I can either commit myself (and thus "become" what it entails) or else simply occupy for a time, inauthentically drifting in and out of various affairs. Some writers have taken this notion a step further, arguing that the measure of an authentic life lies in the integrity of a narrative, that to be a self is to constitute a story in which a kind of wholeness prevails, to be the author of oneself as a unique individual (Nehamas 1998; Ricoeur 1992). In contrast, the inauthentic life would be one without such integrity, one in which I allow my life-story to be dictated by the world. Be that as it may, it is clear that one can commit oneself to a life of chamealeon-like variety, as does Don Juan in Kierkegaard's version of the legend. Even interpreted narratively, then, the norm of authenticity remains a formal one. As with Kierkegaard's Knight of Faith, one cannot tell who is authentic by looking at the content of their lives.[13]

          Authenticity defines a condition on self-making: do I succeed in making myself, or will who I am merely be a function of the roles I find myself in? Thus to be authentic can also be thought as a way of being autonomous. In choosing "resolutely"—that is, in commiting myself to a certain course of action, a certain way of being in the world—I have given myself the rule that belongs to the role I come to adopt. The inauthentic person, in contrast, merely occupies such a role, and may do so "irresolutely," without commitment. Being a father authentically does not necessarily make me a better father, but what it means to be a father has become explicitly my concern. It is here that existentialism locates the singularity of existence and identifies what is irreducible in the first-person stance. At the same time, authenticity does not hold out some specific way of life as a norm; that is, it does not distinguish between the projects that I might choose. Instead, it governs the manner in which I am engaged in such projects—either as "my own" or as "what one does," transparently or opaquely.

          Thus existentialism's focus on authenticity leads to a distinctive stance toward ethics and value-theory generally. The possibility of authenticity is a mark of my freedom, and it is through freedom that existentialism approaches questions of value, leading to many of its most recognizable doctrines."

          http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/existentialism/#Aut


          --- In existlist@yahoogroups.com, eduardathome wrote:
          >
          > How is authenticity tied to freedom and responsibility??
          >
          > Are you suggesting that even though a person may act as they think, they
          > cannot be authentic because they owned slaves. Or that someone is not
          > authentic because they do not take responsibility for their actions.
          > Perhaps a person does not take responsibility for their actions because that
          > is what they actually think.
          >
          > It would seem to me that, in regard to the US congress, you are applying a
          > 3rd person qualification. How can anyone be said to be authentic when the
          > validity of what they do in relation to their thinking is dependent upon
          > what someone else thinks??
          >
          > eduard
          >
          > -----Original Message-----
          > From: Mary
          > Sent: Thursday, February 07, 2013 6:10 PM
          > To: existlist@yahoogroups.com
          > Subject: [existlist] concept of authenticity
          >
          > Being authentic is not an isolated concept; it's tied to other concepts such
          > as freedom and responsibility. The U.S. congress has been held hostage by
          > ideologues, not authentic people. When I listened to Rubio question nominee
          > Brennan today, I was embarrassed for him. What laws govern the CIA's
          > treatment of suspected terrorists? Really, Mr. Rubio? Brennan almost
          > stumbled on his most obvious answers. Rubio seemed to have no regard for
          > international conventions and laws or the sovereignty of other other
          > nations. If Brennan is ready to work with Congress, who supposedly represent
          > our best interests, and with the President to lay out for the American
          > people the process of selecting drone targets, I have no problem with him.
          >
          > Mary
          >
          >
          >
          > ------------------------------------
          >
          > Please support the Existential Primer... dedicated to explaining nothing!
          >
          > Home Page: http://www.tameri.com/csw/existYahoo! Groups Links
          >
        • eduardathome
          [Are you saying political involvement is wrong, or are you saying that because everyone probably acts authentically, we ve no basis at all to oppose them? ]
          Message 4 of 5 , Feb 9, 2013
          • 0 Attachment
            [Are you saying political involvement is wrong, or are you saying that
            because everyone probably acts authentically, we've no basis at all to
            oppose them? ]

            Neither.

            All I am saying is that it is likely that Moussa in Mali is acting
            authentically, because he is evil. You are acting authentically when what
            you do is what you think. It's as simple as that. There is no link with
            freedom and responsibility. These are qualifications of a 3rd party and
            authenticity is of the individual themselves.

            The term "freedom" in the essay you provided isn't the "freedom" as I had
            thought. For reason being that you linked it with "responsibility". What
            the essay is getting at is that one is transparent ... you freely act as you
            think. As far as Moussa is concerned, I think he is being transparent. He
            isn't doing something that he would not do otherwise. Granted, it is my
            guess, but I think that he follows the doctrine because it suits his
            character. He chooses freely to follow the doctrine that demands violence.

            There is another article in today's newspaper about Mali. This time the
            stories of what went on in Gao over the past 10 months, before the French
            drove out the Islamic nuts.

            Le chief of the Islamic police, Ali Touré, asked Dr Aziz Maïga, who is
            responsible for surgery at the hospital, to help amputate the hands and feet
            of thieves. Touré said ....

            — La charia [loi islamique], c’est la voix de Dieu, a dit Ali Touré.
            On veut couper les mains des voleurs, mais on ne sait pas comment faire.
            Fais-le pour nous.

            "The Sharia is the voice of God. We want to cut off the hands of
            some thieves but don't know how to do it. Do it for us."

            My view is that Touré selects this particular punishment and assigns it to
            God, because he chooses to do so and this is his character. He actually
            wants to cut off hands and thus is acting authentically.

            To give the end of the story, Dr Aziz Maïga refused to help and said his
            role is to people who are injured. So they cut off the hands with a meat
            cleaver in the village square and rushed the victims to the hospital to be
            cared for, before they bled to death. A total of 9 amputations in Gao and 1
            in Timbuktu.

            eduard

            -----Original Message-----
            From: Mary
            Sent: Saturday, February 09, 2013 11:28 AM
            To: existlist@yahoogroups.com
            Subject: [existlist] Re: authenticity tied to freedom and responsibility

            eduard,

            You're probably right about my assessment of right wing obstructionists. I
            can't possibly know what or that they think at all. It matters whether I
            think owning slaves is acceptable and what I do about it that determines my
            authenticity, what I think and do about my sense of duty and that I think as
            freely as possible. Furthermore if I think it's wrong, I will act to end
            slavery, to expand my values into society. Are you saying political
            involvement is wrong, or are you saying that because everyone probably acts
            authentically, we've no basis at all to oppose them? This can't be so
            because you advocate killing "authentic" terrorists.

            I'm having difficulty understanding your objection to authenticity. The
            following might be helpful as a basis for explaining your objections which
            seem "absurd" otherwise.

            Mary

            "By what standard are we to think our efforts "to be," our manner of being a
            self? If such standards traditionally derive from the essence that a
            particular thing instantiates—this hammer is a good one if it instantiates
            what a hammer is supposed to be—and if there is nothing that a human being
            is, by its essence, supposed to be, can the meaning of existence at all be
            thought? Existentialism arises with the collapse of the idea that philosophy
            can provide substantive norms for existing, ones that specify particular
            ways of life. Nevertheless, there remains the distinction between what I do
            "as" myself and as "anyone," so in this sense existing is something at which
            I can succeed or fail. Authenticity—in German, Eigentlichkeit—names that
            attitude in which I engage in my projects as my own (eigen).

            What this means can perhaps be brought out by considering moral evaluations.
            In keeping my promise I act in accord with duty; and if I keep it because it
            is my duty, I also act morally (according to Kant) because I am acting for
            the sake of duty. But existentially there is still a further evaluation to
            be made. My moral act is inauthentic if, in keeping my promise for the sake
            of duty, I do so because that is what "one" does (what "moral people" do).
            But I can do the same thing authentically if, in keeping my promise for the
            sake of duty, acting this way is something I choose as my own, something to
            which, apart from its social sanction, I commit myself. Similarly, doing the
            right thing from a fixed and stable character—which virtue ethics considers
            a condition of the good—is not beyond the reach of existential evaluation:
            such character may simply be a product of my tendency to "do what one does,"
            including feeling "the right way" about things and betaking myself in
            appropriate ways as one is expected to do. But such character might also be
            a reflection of my choice of myself, a commitment I make to be a person of
            this sort. In both cases I have succeeded in being good; only in the latter
            case, however, have I succeeded in being myself.[12]

            Thus the norm of authenticity refers to a kind of "transparency" with regard
            to my situation, a recognition that I am a being who can be responsible for
            who I am. In choosing in light of this norm I can be said to recover myself
            from alienation, from my absorption in the anonymous "one-self" that
            characterizes me in my everyday engagement in the world. Authenticity thus
            indicates a certain kind of integrity—not that of a pre-given whole, an
            identity waiting to be discovered, but that of a project to which I can
            either commit myself (and thus "become" what it entails) or else simply
            occupy for a time, inauthentically drifting in and out of various affairs.
            Some writers have taken this notion a step further, arguing that the measure
            of an authentic life lies in the integrity of a narrative, that to be a self
            is to constitute a story in which a kind of wholeness prevails, to be the
            author of oneself as a unique individual (Nehamas 1998; Ricoeur 1992). In
            contrast, the inauthentic life would be one without such integrity, one in
            which I allow my life-story to be dictated by the world. Be that as it may,
            it is clear that one can commit oneself to a life of chamealeon-like
            variety, as does Don Juan in Kierkegaard's version of the legend. Even
            interpreted narratively, then, the norm of authenticity remains a formal
            one. As with Kierkegaard's Knight of Faith, one cannot tell who is authentic
            by looking at the content of their lives.[13]

            Authenticity defines a condition on self-making: do I succeed in making
            myself, or will who I am merely be a function of the roles I find myself in?
            Thus to be authentic can also be thought as a way of being autonomous. In
            choosing "resolutely"—that is, in commiting myself to a certain course of
            action, a certain way of being in the world—I have given myself the rule
            that belongs to the role I come to adopt. The inauthentic person, in
            contrast, merely occupies such a role, and may do so "irresolutely," without
            commitment. Being a father authentically does not necessarily make me a
            better father, but what it means to be a father has become explicitly my
            concern. It is here that existentialism locates the singularity of existence
            and identifies what is irreducible in the first-person stance. At the same
            time, authenticity does not hold out some specific way of life as a norm;
            that is, it does not distinguish between the projects that I might choose.
            Instead, it governs the manner in which I am engaged in such projects—either
            as "my own" or as "what one does," transparently or opaquely.

            Thus existentialism's focus on authenticity leads to a distinctive stance
            toward ethics and value-theory generally. The possibility of authenticity is
            a mark of my freedom, and it is through freedom that existentialism
            approaches questions of value, leading to many of its most recognizable
            doctrines."

            http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/existentialism/#Aut


            --- In existlist@yahoogroups.com, eduardathome wrote:
            >
            > How is authenticity tied to freedom and responsibility??
            >
            > Are you suggesting that even though a person may act as they think, they
            > cannot be authentic because they owned slaves. Or that someone is not
            > authentic because they do not take responsibility for their actions.
            > Perhaps a person does not take responsibility for their actions because
            > that
            > is what they actually think.
            >
            > It would seem to me that, in regard to the US congress, you are applying a
            > 3rd person qualification. How can anyone be said to be authentic when the
            > validity of what they do in relation to their thinking is dependent upon
            > what someone else thinks??
            >
            > eduard
            >
            > -----Original Message-----
            > From: Mary
            > Sent: Thursday, February 07, 2013 6:10 PM
            > To: existlist@yahoogroups.com
            > Subject: [existlist] concept of authenticity
            >
            > Being authentic is not an isolated concept; it's tied to other concepts
            > such
            > as freedom and responsibility. The U.S. congress has been held hostage by
            > ideologues, not authentic people. When I listened to Rubio question
            > nominee
            > Brennan today, I was embarrassed for him. What laws govern the CIA's
            > treatment of suspected terrorists? Really, Mr. Rubio? Brennan almost
            > stumbled on his most obvious answers. Rubio seemed to have no regard for
            > international conventions and laws or the sovereignty of other other
            > nations. If Brennan is ready to work with Congress, who supposedly
            > represent
            > our best interests, and with the President to lay out for the American
            > people the process of selecting drone targets, I have no problem with him.
            >
            > Mary
            >
            >
            >
            > ------------------------------------
            >
            > Please support the Existential Primer... dedicated to explaining nothing!
            >
            > Home Page: http://www.tameri.com/csw/existYahoo! Groups Links
            >




            ------------------------------------

            Please support the Existential Primer... dedicated to explaining nothing!

            Home Page: http://www.tameri.com/csw/existYahoo! Groups Links
          • devindersingh
            Freedom is not a being: it is the being of man, that is to say, his not-being . A very cryptic mantra. Let us try to unveil the Shekinah. Being means
            Message 5 of 5 , Feb 9, 2013
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              "Freedom is not a being: it is the being of man, that is to say, his
              not-being". A very cryptic mantra. Let us try to unveil the Shekinah.
              "Being" means "be-ing" i.e. existing, something persisting, continuing
              in the same condition, something fixed, a status. Freedom is not a thing
              of that kind, it is movement: even so, it is not a continuous movement.
              According to Bergson, the true, the ultimate reality is a continuity of
              urge (élan vital); according to Sartre, however, in line with the
              trend of modern scientific knowledge, the reality is an assemblage of
              discrete units of energy, packets or quanta. So freedom is an urge, a
              spurt(jaillissement): it acts in a disconnected fashion and it is
              absolute and unconditional. It is veritably the wind that bloweth where
              it listeth. It has no purpose, no direction, no relation: for all those
              attributes or definitions would annul its absoluteness. It does not stop
              or halt or dwell upon, it bursts forth and passes. It does not exist,
              that is stay: therefore it is non-being. Man's being then consist of a
              conglomeration (ensemble) of such freedoms. And that is the whole
              reality of I man, his very essence. We have said that a heavy sense of
              responsibility hangs upon the .free Purusha: but it appears the Sartrian
              Purusha is a divided personality. In spite of the sense of
              responsibility (or because of it?) he acts irresponsibly; for, acting
              otherwise would not be freedom. Sartre too cannot ignore the fact that
              the free being is not an isolated phenomenon in the world; it exists
              along with and in the company of others of the same nature and quality.
              Indeed human society is that in essence, anassociation of freedoms,
              although these movements of freedom are camouflaged in appearance and
              are not recognised by the free persons themselves. The interaction
              between the free persons, the reflection of oneself in others and the
              mutual dependence of egos is a constant theme in the novels and plays of
              Sartre.

              'Freedom cannot be real freedom unless it is licence : yet society means
              a curtailment or inhibition or modification of this absolute liberty.
              This, conflict has never been resolved in Sartre and is fundamental to
              his ideology, 'the source of his tragic nihilism.

              [http://sriaurobindoashram.com/Content.aspx?ContentURL=_StaticContent/Sr\
              iAurobindoAshram/-09%20E-Library/-03%20Disciples/Nolini%20Kanta%20Gupta/\
              Volume-1/-63_sartrian%20Freedom.html]
              --- In existlist@yahoogroups.com, eduardathome wrote:
              >
              > [Are you saying political involvement is wrong, or are you saying
              that
              > because everyone probably acts authentically, we've no basis at all to
              > oppose them? ]
              >
              > Neither.
              >
              > All I am saying is that it is likely that Moussa in Mali is acting
              > authentically, because he is evil. You are acting authentically when
              what
              > you do is what you think. It's as simple as that. There is no link
              with
              > freedom and responsibility. These are qualifications of a 3rd party
              and
              > authenticity is of the individual themselves.
              >
              > The term "freedom" in the essay you provided isn't the "freedom" as I
              had
              > thought. For reason being that you linked it with "responsibility".
              What
              > the essay is getting at is that one is transparent ... you freely act
              as you
              > think. As far as Moussa is concerned, I think he is being
              transparent. He
              > isn't doing something that he would not do otherwise. Granted, it is
              my
              > guess, but I think that he follows the doctrine because it suits his
              > character. He chooses freely to follow the doctrine that demands
              violence.
              >
              > There is another article in today's newspaper about Mali. This time
              the
              > stories of what went on in Gao over the past 10 months, before the
              French
              > drove out the Islamic nuts.
              >
              > Le chief of the Islamic police, Ali Touré, asked Dr Aziz
              Maïga, who is
              > responsible for surgery at the hospital, to help amputate the hands
              and feet
              > of thieves. Touré said ....
              >
              > â€" La charia [loi islamique], c’est la voix de
              Dieu, a dit Ali Touré.
              > On veut couper les mains des voleurs, mais on ne sait pas comment
              faire.
              > Fais-le pour nous.
              >
              > "The Sharia is the voice of God. We want to cut off the hands
              of
              > some thieves but don't know how to do it. Do it for us."
              >
              > My view is that Touré selects this particular punishment and
              assigns it to
              > God, because he chooses to do so and this is his character. He
              actually
              > wants to cut off hands and thus is acting authentically.
              >
              > To give the end of the story, Dr Aziz Maïga refused to help and
              said his
              > role is to people who are injured. So they cut off the hands with a
              meat
              > cleaver in the village square and rushed the victims to the hospital
              to be
              > cared for, before they bled to death. A total of 9 amputations in Gao
              and 1
              > in Timbuktu.
              >
              > eduard
              >
              > -----Original Message-----
              > From: Mary
              > Sent: Saturday, February 09, 2013 11:28 AM
              > To: existlist@yahoogroups.com
              > Subject: [existlist] Re: authenticity tied to freedom and
              responsibility
              >
              > eduard,
              >
              > You're probably right about my assessment of right wing
              obstructionists. I
              > can't possibly know what or that they think at all. It matters whether
              I
              > think owning slaves is acceptable and what I do about it that
              determines my
              > authenticity, what I think and do about my sense of duty and that I
              think as
              > freely as possible. Furthermore if I think it's wrong, I will act to
              end
              > slavery, to expand my values into society. Are you saying political
              > involvement is wrong, or are you saying that because everyone
              probably acts
              > authentically, we've no basis at all to oppose them? This can't be so
              > because you advocate killing "authentic" terrorists.
              >
              > I'm having difficulty understanding your objection to authenticity.
              The
              > following might be helpful as a basis for explaining your objections
              which
              > seem "absurd" otherwise.
              >
              > Mary
              >
              > "By what standard are we to think our efforts "to be," our manner of
              being a
              > self? If such standards traditionally derive from the essence that a
              > particular thing instantiatesâ€"this hammer is a good one if it
              instantiates
              > what a hammer is supposed to beâ€"and if there is nothing that a
              human being
              > is, by its essence, supposed to be, can the meaning of existence at
              all be
              > thought? Existentialism arises with the collapse of the idea that
              philosophy
              > can provide substantive norms for existing, ones that specify
              particular
              > ways of life. Nevertheless, there remains the distinction between what
              I do
              > "as" myself and as "anyone," so in this sense existing is something at
              which
              > I can succeed or fail. Authenticityâ€"in German,
              Eigentlichkeitâ€"names that
              > attitude in which I engage in my projects as my own (eigen).
              >
              > What this means can perhaps be brought out by considering moral
              evaluations.
              > In keeping my promise I act in accord with duty; and if I keep it
              because it
              > is my duty, I also act morally (according to Kant) because I am acting
              for
              > the sake of duty. But existentially there is still a further
              evaluation to
              > be made. My moral act is inauthentic if, in keeping my promise for the
              sake
              > of duty, I do so because that is what "one" does (what "moral people"
              do).
              > But I can do the same thing authentically if, in keeping my promise
              for the
              > sake of duty, acting this way is something I choose as my own,
              something to
              > which, apart from its social sanction, I commit myself. Similarly,
              doing the
              > right thing from a fixed and stable characterâ€"which virtue
              ethics considers
              > a condition of the goodâ€"is not beyond the reach of existential
              evaluation:
              > such character may simply be a product of my tendency to "do what one
              does,"
              > including feeling "the right way" about things and betaking myself in
              > appropriate ways as one is expected to do. But such character might
              also be
              > a reflection of my choice of myself, a commitment I make to be a
              person of
              > this sort. In both cases I have succeeded in being good; only in the
              latter
              > case, however, have I succeeded in being myself.[12]
              >
              > Thus the norm of authenticity refers to a kind of "transparency" with
              regard
              > to my situation, a recognition that I am a being who can be
              responsible for
              > who I am. In choosing in light of this norm I can be said to recover
              myself
              > from alienation, from my absorption in the anonymous "one-self" that
              > characterizes me in my everyday engagement in the world. Authenticity
              thus
              > indicates a certain kind of integrityâ€"not that of a pre-given
              whole, an
              > identity waiting to be discovered, but that of a project to which I
              can
              > either commit myself (and thus "become" what it entails) or else
              simply
              > occupy for a time, inauthentically drifting in and out of various
              affairs.
              > Some writers have taken this notion a step further, arguing that the
              measure
              > of an authentic life lies in the integrity of a narrative, that to be
              a self
              > is to constitute a story in which a kind of wholeness prevails, to be
              the
              > author of oneself as a unique individual (Nehamas 1998; Ricoeur 1992).
              In
              > contrast, the inauthentic life would be one without such integrity,
              one in
              > which I allow my life-story to be dictated by the world. Be that as it
              may,
              > it is clear that one can commit oneself to a life of chamealeon-like
              > variety, as does Don Juan in Kierkegaard's version of the legend. Even
              > interpreted narratively, then, the norm of authenticity remains a
              formal
              > one. As with Kierkegaard's Knight of Faith, one cannot tell who is
              authentic
              > by looking at the content of their lives.[13]
              >
              > Authenticity defines a condition on self-making: do I succeed in
              making
              > myself, or will who I am merely be a function of the roles I find
              myself in?
              > Thus to be authentic can also be thought as a way of being autonomous.
              In
              > choosing "resolutely"â€"that is, in commiting myself to a certain
              course of
              > action, a certain way of being in the worldâ€"I have given myself
              the rule
              > that belongs to the role I come to adopt. The inauthentic person, in
              > contrast, merely occupies such a role, and may do so "irresolutely,"
              without
              > commitment. Being a father authentically does not necessarily make me
              a
              > better father, but what it means to be a father has become explicitly
              my
              > concern. It is here that existentialism locates the singularity of
              existence
              > and identifies what is irreducible in the first-person stance. At the
              same
              > time, authenticity does not hold out some specific way of life as a
              norm;
              > that is, it does not distinguish between the projects that I might
              choose.
              > Instead, it governs the manner in which I am engaged in such
              projectsâ€"either
              > as "my own" or as "what one does," transparently or opaquely.
              >
              > Thus existentialism's focus on authenticity leads to a distinctive
              stance
              > toward ethics and value-theory generally. The possibility of
              authenticity is
              > a mark of my freedom, and it is through freedom that existentialism
              > approaches questions of value, leading to many of its most
              recognizable
              > doctrines."
              >
              > http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/existentialism/#Aut
              >
              >
              > --- In existlist@yahoogroups.com, eduardathome wrote:
              > >
              > > How is authenticity tied to freedom and responsibility??
              > >
              > > Are you suggesting that even though a person may act as they think,
              they
              > > cannot be authentic because they owned slaves. Or that someone is
              not
              > > authentic because they do not take responsibility for their actions.
              > > Perhaps a person does not take responsibility for their actions
              because
              > > that
              > > is what they actually think.
              > >
              > > It would seem to me that, in regard to the US congress, you are
              applying a
              > > 3rd person qualification. How can anyone be said to be authentic
              when the
              > > validity of what they do in relation to their thinking is dependent
              upon
              > > what someone else thinks??
              > >
              > > eduard
              > >
              > > -----Original Message-----
              > > From: Mary
              > > Sent: Thursday, February 07, 2013 6:10 PM
              > > To: existlist@yahoogroups.com
              > > Subject: [existlist] concept of authenticity
              > >
              > > Being authentic is not an isolated concept; it's tied to other
              concepts
              > > such
              > > as freedom and responsibility. The U.S. congress has been held
              hostage by
              > > ideologues, not authentic people. When I listened to Rubio question
              > > nominee
              > > Brennan today, I was embarrassed for him. What laws govern the CIA's
              > > treatment of suspected terrorists? Really, Mr. Rubio? Brennan almost
              > > stumbled on his most obvious answers. Rubio seemed to have no regard
              for
              > > international conventions and laws or the sovereignty of other other
              > > nations. If Brennan is ready to work with Congress, who supposedly
              > > represent
              > > our best interests, and with the President to lay out for the
              American
              > > people the process of selecting drone targets, I have no problem
              with him.
              > >
              > > Mary



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