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Re: [existlist] Re: Meaning and Value of negation

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  • Herman
    Hi Wil and Mary and all, ... WIL You write:  Allow me to offer an opposing view. You didn t expect anything else, did you? :-) All determinations are
    Message 1 of 29 , Apr 27, 2010
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      Hi Wil and Mary and all,

      On 25 April 2010 01:45, <eupraxis@...> wrote:
      > Polly,
      >
      WIL> You write:  Allow me to offer an opposing view. You didn't expect
      anything else, did you? :-) All determinations are negations. The
      being of a relation is thus predicated on non-being. The relation
      between this and that is not "there", just like the this and that that
      are being related are not "there", they come into being by negation.
      >
      > Response: Sounds remotely Hegelian. If so, it would be the negation of the negation that brings Being through Non-Being to Becoming (Dasein). [Added later: Are you assuming that this is a Spinozan idea? If so, I would need some explanation. See below.]

      POLLY>It might sound Hegelian, but perhaps to you, certainly not to
      me. I would not intentionally write anything Hegelian, you see. That
      is because I understand the negation of a negation to be mental
      gymnastics, pure conceptual mindfuck if you will. BTW, I don't intend
      the stem -fuck in any aggressive or harsh manner, more in a poetic
      sense. Though I wouldn't use Hegel as a source, mindfuckery is
      relevant to our discussion, because I am opposing percept to concept,
      and the closer one looks at it, of the two, only concept is the domain
      of mindfuckery. And just to be clear, mindfuckery is thinking trying
      to outsmart itself, by trying to become it's own foundation. Allow me
      to expand.

      It is not so difficult to distinguish between percept and concept.
      There is a little, but ultra reliable, test that can be applied. A
      percept is what was positive, what was present, immanent, what was
      there. On the other hand, one can be sure that anything that relies on
      negation, on non-being, is not a percept. That is simply because
      absence or lack cannot be perceived. A percept is fully what is there.
      Absence or lack, on the other hand, are thought. A thought, being an
      absence of perception, is the fundamental negation of what is there.
      And exponentially, a thought of absence or lack isn't a thought about
      what is there, it is a sure sign of the mindfuck kicking in. For
      example, in a particular deterioration of seeing, there may be the
      conceiving of a negation when looking at the shimmering green, red and
      yellow shades that might popularly be called a tree in rut. I am not
      that tree, is the thought so conceived. And so it can go for every
      possible percept, whatever is perceived, I am not it. So goes the
      thinking, on and on, and by sleight of mind the self is born. It is
      not that there is a percept "I". The concept "I" arises as negation of
      all percepts. Any absence or lack simply cannot be perceived, it is
      thought. Given then that a concept is all about what was not there (a
      negation of what was there), it will perhaps become more apparent that
      a negation of a concept (itself a negation) does not result in
      creation of a percept, something real, something that was there, but
      only in absurdity. And such is the legacy of Hegel.

      Polly
    • eupraxis@aol.com
      Polly, It is not so difficult to distinguish between percept and concept. There is a little, but ultra reliable, test that can be applied. A percept is what
      Message 2 of 29 , Apr 27, 2010
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        Polly,

        "It is not so difficult to distinguish between percept and concept.
        There is a little, but ultra reliable, test that can be applied. A
        percept is what was positive, what was present, immanent, what was
        there."

        Response: What seems simply present is already an image, say, and as such is not the thing. All one need do is consult and observe Kant on this conundrum. If one insists, as all empiricists do from Locke to Kant (and Kant is empiricist in this respect, which is his downfall into noumenality), that a percept is not the actual thing but an idea of that thing (Locke) or a phenomenon (Kant), then one is left (logically) at an infinite remove from the world. From the POV of empiricism (which is not my own POV), what is 'present' is a subject towards its object, not just the object itself. That subject is always late on the scene vis-a-vis the object. As Whitehead shows, for example, the observer is always in a past world; in a world of sight, for example, at a 186,000 miles per second (or 300,000 meters per second) delay. In just that respect, among so many others, one has to accept that the percept is a representation, and not an immediate case of actual 'present-now'.

        So, to reattach the above to the older post, a presentation is necessarily a "semeotic" (Pierce), that is to say a representation, a sign.

        I won't comment on the remarks on Hegel. With all due respect, they demonstrate a lack of familiarity with that body of work, and can only side-track us further.

        Thanks,
        Wil






        -----Original Message-----
        From: Herman <hhofmeister@...>
        To: existlist@yahoogroups.com
        Sent: Tue, Apr 27, 2010 6:09 pm
        Subject: Re: [existlist] Re: Meaning and Value of negation





        Hi Wil and Mary and all,

        On 25 April 2010 01:45, <eupraxis@...> wrote:
        > Polly,
        >
        WIL> You write: Allow me to offer an opposing view. You didn't expect
        anything else, did you? :-) All determinations are negations. The
        being of a relation is thus predicated on non-being. The relation
        between this and that is not "there", just like the this and that that
        are being related are not "there", they come into being by negation.
        >
        > Response: Sounds remotely Hegelian. If so, it would be the negation of the negation that brings Being through Non-Being to Becoming (Dasein). [Added later: Are you assuming that this is a Spinozan idea? If so, I would need some explanation. See below.]

        POLLY>It might sound Hegelian, but perhaps to you, certainly not to
        me. I would not intentionally write anything Hegelian, you see. That
        is because I understand the negation of a negation to be mental
        gymnastics, pure conceptual mindfuck if you will. BTW, I don't intend
        the stem -fuck in any aggressive or harsh manner, more in a poetic
        sense. Though I wouldn't use Hegel as a source, mindfuckery is
        relevant to our discussion, because I am opposing percept to concept,
        and the closer one looks at it, of the two, only concept is the domain
        of mindfuckery. And just to be clear, mindfuckery is thinking trying
        to outsmart itself, by trying to become it's own foundation. Allow me
        to expand.

        It is not so difficult to distinguish between percept and concept.
        There is a little, but ultra reliable, test that can be applied. A
        percept is what was positive, what was present, immanent, what was
        there. On the other hand, one can be sure that anything that relies on
        negation, on non-being, is not a percept. That is simply because
        absence or lack cannot be perceived. A percept is fully what is there.
        Absence or lack, on the other hand, are thought. A thought, being an
        absence of perception, is the fundamental negation of what is there.
        And exponentially, a thought of absence or lack isn't a thought about
        what is there, it is a sure sign of the mindfuck kicking in. For
        example, in a particular deterioration of seeing, there may be the
        conceiving of a negation when looking at the shimmering green, red and
        yellow shades that might popularly be called a tree in rut. I am not
        that tree, is the thought so conceived. And so it can go for every
        possible percept, whatever is perceived, I am not it. So goes the
        thinking, on and on, and by sleight of mind the self is born. It is
        not that there is a percept "I". The concept "I" arises as negation of
        all percepts. Any absence or lack simply cannot be perceived, it is
        thought. Given then that a concept is all about what was not there (a
        negation of what was there), it will perhaps become more apparent that
        a negation of a concept (itself a negation) does not result in
        creation of a percept, something real, something that was there, but
        only in absurdity. And such is the legacy of Hegel.

        Polly








        [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
      • Herman
        Hi Wil, ... I am perfectly at ease, and so is the Intuitionistic School of logic, as are many Eastern Schools of thought, with the understanding that the
        Message 3 of 29 , Apr 27, 2010
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          Hi Wil,

          On 28 April 2010 10:17, <eupraxis@...> wrote:
          >
          > I won't comment on the remarks on Hegel. With all due respect, they demonstrate a lack of familiarity with that body of work, and can only side-track us further.
          >

          I am perfectly at ease, and so is the Intuitionistic School of logic,
          as are many Eastern Schools of thought, with the understanding that
          the negation of a negation is meaningless. You may not comprehend
          this, but for me it is the introduction of Hegel that is the
          side-track.

          And why you allude to Peirce (sic) and Whitehead in a phenomenological
          discussion is quite beyond me.

          Anyway, thanks for the conversation

          Polly
        • Wil
          Polly Well, unfontunately it seems that we are unable to agree even on first things, so I will leave things there with you. Best Wil Sent from my iPhone ...
          Message 4 of 29 , Apr 28, 2010
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            Polly

            Well, unfontunately it seems that we are unable to agree even on first
            things, so I will leave things there with you.

            Best
            Wil

            Sent from my iPhone

            On Apr 28, 2010, at 12:37 AM, Herman <hhofmeister@...> wrote:

            > Hi Wil,
            >
            > On 28 April 2010 10:17, <eupraxis@...> wrote:
            > >
            > > I won't comment on the remarks on Hegel. With all due respect,
            > they demonstrate a lack of familiarity with that body of work, and
            > can only side-track us further.
            > >
            >
            > I am perfectly at ease, and so is the Intuitionistic School of logic,
            > as are many Eastern Schools of thought, with the understanding that
            > the negation of a negation is meaningless. You may not comprehend
            > this, but for me it is the introduction of Hegel that is the
            > side-track.
            >
            > And why you allude to Peirce (sic) and Whitehead in a phenomenological
            > discussion is quite beyond me.
            >
            > Anyway, thanks for the conversation
            >
            > Polly
            >


            [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
          • Jim
            Wil, In your recent post to Polly, you write: What seems simply present is already an image, say, and as such is not the thing. All one need do is consult and
            Message 5 of 29 , Apr 28, 2010
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              Wil,

              In your recent post to Polly, you write:

              "What seems simply present is already an image, say, and as such is not the thing. All one need do is consult and observe Kant on this conundrum. If one insists, as all empiricists do from Locke to Kant (and Kant is empiricist in this respect, which is his downfall into noumenality), that a percept is not the actual thing but an idea of that thing (Locke) or a phenomenon (Kant), then one is left (logically) at an infinite remove from the world. From the POV of empiricism (which is not my own POV), what is 'present' is a subject towards its object, not just the object itself. That subject is always late on the scene vis-a-vis the object. As Whitehead shows, for example, the observer is always in a past world; in a world of sight, for example, at a 186,000 miles per second (or 300,000 meters per second) delay. In just that respect, among so many others, one has to accept that the percept is a representation, and not an immediate case of actual 'present-now'."

              I am not sure how your argument is supposed to work here, as you are using a Locke/Kant empiricist argument, but then you say empiricism "is not my own POV". So if you actually reject this sort of empiricism, how can you use that erroneous, in your opinion, point of view to mount a valid argument against Polly?

              I also reject this sort of empiricism, and I completely agree with your criticism of empiricism: "If one insists, as all empiricists do from Locke to Kant (and Kant is empiricist in this respect, which is his downfall into noumenality), that a percept is not the actual thing but an idea of that thing (Locke) or a phenomenon (Kant), then one is left (logically) at an infinite remove from the world."

              The way to remain in contact with the world is to deny the Locke/Kant view that we only perceive "ideas" or "images of objects" and not the objects themselves.

              The way forward, I think, is to use Frege's distinct between Bedeutung and Sinn (reference and sense), and characterise Sinn as mode of presentation of the object.

              Thus one perceives objects directly, but under a particular mode of presentation.

              I think this is what Irvin was pointing towards with his characterisation of Heidegger's view:

              "Heidegger equated truth with the uncovering or unveilment of Being. Beings indeed exist independently of us, but disclosure of their Being is necessarily limited given our finitude, and
              will be selectively or, if you will, subjectively disclosed during discrete projects or aesthetic contemplation. And concepts, or shared objects of thought, are that by which we apprehend reality."

              By the way, I completely agree with your view that a presentation is a representation, and that Polly's view, that percepts are completely non-conceptual, is untenable. I just don't see a valid argument in your post 51516.

              Jim
            • eupraxis@aol.com
              Jim, You wrote: I am not sure how your argument is supposed to work here, as you are using a Locke/Kant empiricist argument, but then you say empiricism is
              Message 6 of 29 , Apr 28, 2010
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                Jim,

                You wrote: "I am not sure how your argument is supposed to work here, as you are using a Locke/Kant empiricist argument, but then you say empiricism "is not my own POV". So if you actually reject this sort of empiricism, how can you use that erroneous, in your opinion, point of view to mount a valid argument against Polly?"

                Response: My point is that Polly's position is that very empiricist one, so in arguing from that POV, as it were heuristically, and showing the internal conundrum of its infinite separation from the immediacy of the 'percept', which she continually asserts (but not without contradiction) is the 'thing, there', I can show the impossibility of assuming that "perception" can *mean* anything at all, from that POV. My own position, of course, is not that of the empiricist kind. My point was that rationality works conceptually, that the meaning of things is actually in the world and is comprehensible only conceptually, that rationality finds itself in comcepts -- that the world is conceptual, so to speak. Zizek writes marvelously on this.
                ---
                You wrote: "...The way forward, I think, is to use Frege's distinct between Bedeutung and Sinn (reference and sense), and characterise Sinn as mode of presentation of the object. Thus one perceives objects directly, but under a particular mode of presentation."

                Response: That doesn't get us anywhere, really. Bedeutung is "meaning". So to attempt to outmaneuver the dualistic impasse by redefining subject/object as meaning/sense does little, except to put the world even farther off with a purer kind of nominalism. You cannot reattach meaning to sense without appealing to the Deus Ex Machina of either innatism or nominalism. Frege's value lies elsewhere.
                ---
                You wrote: I think this is what Irvin was pointing towards with his characterisation of Heidegger's view: "Heidegger equated truth with the uncovering or unveilment of Being. Beings indeed exist independently of us, but disclosure of their Being is necessarily limited given our finitude, and
                will be selectively or, if you will, subjectively disclosed during discrete projects or aesthetic contemplation. And concepts, or shared objects of thought, are that by which we apprehend reality.""

                Response: Heidegger is also mute on this problem. His solution to the problem of epistemology is just to say that things are "found". "Befindlichkeit" is that existential state of "finding". This operates purely on the level of description.

                Wil

                =


                [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
              • Mary
                Wil, it seems that you are caught in Thought s trap. Thought admits that concepts are thought and found which lag our immediate perception. Thought also
                Message 7 of 29 , Apr 28, 2010
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                  Wil, it seems that you are caught in Thought's trap. Thought admits that concepts are 'thought' and 'found' which lag our immediate perception. Thought also says we can't do anything about it. Thought doesn't and can't know what to perceive, because a part of each percept is new, fresh, and never before experienced. Though we need some relief from having to experience all things anew, we are trapped without the ability to perceive without concepts. Where is the finding and the thinking which frees us from that which was found and that which was thought.? Mary

                  --- In existlist@yahoogroups.com, eupraxis@... wrote:
                  >
                  > Jim,
                  >
                  > You wrote: "I am not sure how your argument is supposed to work here, as you are using a Locke/Kant empiricist argument, but then you say empiricism "is not my own POV". So if you actually reject this sort of empiricism, how can you use that erroneous, in your opinion, point of view to mount a valid argument against Polly?"
                  >
                  > Response: My point is that Polly's position is that very empiricist one, so in arguing from that POV, as it were heuristically, and showing the internal conundrum of its infinite separation from the immediacy of the 'percept', which she continually asserts (but not without contradiction) is the 'thing, there', I can show the impossibility of assuming that "perception" can *mean* anything at all, from that POV. My own position, of course, is not that of the empiricist kind. My point was that rationality works conceptually, that the meaning of things is actually in the world and is comprehensible only conceptually, that rationality finds itself in comcepts -- that the world is conceptual, so to speak. Zizek writes marvelously on this.
                  > ---
                  > You wrote: "...The way forward, I think, is to use Frege's distinct between Bedeutung and Sinn (reference and sense), and characterise Sinn as mode of presentation of the object. Thus one perceives objects directly, but under a particular mode of presentation."
                  >
                  > Response: That doesn't get us anywhere, really. Bedeutung is "meaning". So to attempt to outmaneuver the dualistic impasse by redefining subject/object as meaning/sense does little, except to put the world even farther off with a purer kind of nominalism. You cannot reattach meaning to sense without appealing to the Deus Ex Machina of either innatism or nominalism. Frege's value lies elsewhere.
                  > ---
                  > You wrote: I think this is what Irvin was pointing towards with his characterisation of Heidegger's view: "Heidegger equated truth with the uncovering or unveilment of Being. Beings indeed exist independently of us, but disclosure of their Being is necessarily limited given our finitude, and
                  > will be selectively or, if you will, subjectively disclosed during discrete projects or aesthetic contemplation. And concepts, or shared objects of thought, are that by which we apprehend reality.""
                  >
                  > Response: Heidegger is also mute on this problem. His solution to the problem of epistemology is just to say that things are "found". "Befindlichkeit" is that existential state of "finding". This operates purely on the level of description.
                  >
                  > Wil
                  >
                  > =
                  >
                  >
                  > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                  >
                • eupraxis@aol.com
                  Mary, You wrote: Wil, it seems that you are caught in Thought s trap. Thought admits that concepts are thought and found which lag our immediate
                  Message 8 of 29 , Apr 28, 2010
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                    Mary,

                    You wrote: "Wil, it seems that you are caught in Thought's trap. Thought admits that concepts are 'thought' and 'found' which lag our immediate perception. Thought also says we can't do anything about it. Thought doesn't and can't know what to perceive, because a part of each percept is new, fresh, and never before experienced. Though we need some relief from having to experience all things anew, we are trapped without the ability to perceive without concepts. Where is the finding and the thinking which frees us from that which was found and that which was thought.?"

                    Response: No, I don't think so. I would say that the position that Polly seems to favor is caught in that epistemic trap. I realize that you are suspicious of being limited by the conceptual, as if this means that one is forced to make correspondences between one's experiences and some lexical standard. That is not my position at all. I concur on the anarchic and 'original' character of discovery in the adventure of thinking, creating and living in the world. But this necessary rupture and upsurge from within the manifold nevertheless lies in our hands as something that we exploit, and thus becomes real to the extent that it is enriched with our purpose. This is the conceptual in its creative power.

                    Wil








                    -----Original Message-----
                    From: Mary <josephson45r@...>
                    To: existlist@yahoogroups.com
                    Sent: Wed, Apr 28, 2010 8:59 am
                    Subject: [existlist] Thought is negation





                    Wil, it seems that you are caught in Thought's trap. Thought admits that concepts are 'thought' and 'found' which lag our immediate perception. Thought also says we can't do anything about it. Thought doesn't and can't know what to perceive, because a part of each percept is new, fresh, and never before experienced. Though we need some relief from having to experience all things anew, we are trapped without the ability to perceive without concepts. Where is the finding and the thinking which frees us from that which was found and that which was thought.? Mary

                    --- In existlist@yahoogroups.com, eupraxis@... wrote:
                    >
                    > Jim,
                    >
                    > You wrote: "I am not sure how your argument is supposed to work here, as you are using a Locke/Kant empiricist argument, but then you say empiricism "is not my own POV". So if you actually reject this sort of empiricism, how can you use that erroneous, in your opinion, point of view to mount a valid argument against Polly?"
                    >
                    > Response: My point is that Polly's position is that very empiricist one, so in arguing from that POV, as it were heuristically, and showing the internal conundrum of its infinite separation from the immediacy of the 'percept', which she continually asserts (but not without contradiction) is the 'thing, there', I can show the impossibility of assuming that "perception" can *mean* anything at all, from that POV. My own position, of course, is not that of the empiricist kind. My point was that rationality works conceptually, that the meaning of things is actually in the world and is comprehensible only conceptually, that rationality finds itself in comcepts -- that the world is conceptual, so to speak. Zizek writes marvelously on this.
                    > ---
                    > You wrote: "...The way forward, I think, is to use Frege's distinct between Bedeutung and Sinn (reference and sense), and characterise Sinn as mode of presentation of the object. Thus one perceives objects directly, but under a particular mode of presentation."
                    >
                    > Response: That doesn't get us anywhere, really. Bedeutung is "meaning". So to attempt to outmaneuver the dualistic impasse by redefining subject/object as meaning/sense does little, except to put the world even farther off with a purer kind of nominalism. You cannot reattach meaning to sense without appealing to the Deus Ex Machina of either innatism or nominalism. Frege's value lies elsewhere.
                    > ---
                    > You wrote: I think this is what Irvin was pointing towards with his characterisation of Heidegger's view: "Heidegger equated truth with the uncovering or unveilment of Being. Beings indeed exist independently of us, but disclosure of their Being is necessarily limited given our finitude, and
                    > will be selectively or, if you will, subjectively disclosed during discrete projects or aesthetic contemplation. And concepts, or shared objects of thought, are that by which we apprehend reality.""
                    >
                    > Response: Heidegger is also mute on this problem. His solution to the problem of epistemology is just to say that things are "found". "Befindlichkeit" is that existential state of "finding". This operates purely on the level of description.
                    >
                    > Wil
                    >
                    > =
                    >
                    >
                    > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                    >









                    [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                  • Mary
                    Thanks, Wil. As I poke, prod, and provoke ala Bohm, I feel we re getting closer to the existentialist agenda of defining or discarding our purpose. Mary
                    Message 9 of 29 , Apr 28, 2010
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                      Thanks, Wil. As I poke, prod, and provoke ala Bohm, I feel we're getting closer to the existentialist agenda of defining or discarding "our purpose." Mary

                      --- In existlist@yahoogroups.com, eupraxis@... wrote:
                      >
                      >
                      > Mary,
                      >
                      > You wrote: "Wil, it seems that you are caught in Thought's trap. Thought admits that concepts are 'thought' and 'found' which lag our immediate perception. Thought also says we can't do anything about it. Thought doesn't and can't know what to perceive, because a part of each percept is new, fresh, and never before experienced. Though we need some relief from having to experience all things anew, we are trapped without the ability to perceive without concepts. Where is the finding and the thinking which frees us from that which was found and that which was thought.?"
                      >
                      > Response: No, I don't think so. I would say that the position that Polly seems to favor is caught in that epistemic trap. I realize that you are suspicious of being limited by the conceptual, as if this means that one is forced to make correspondences between one's experiences and some lexical standard. That is not my position at all. I concur on the anarchic and 'original' character of discovery in the adventure of thinking, creating and living in the world. But this necessary rupture and upsurge from within the manifold nevertheless lies in our hands as something that we exploit, and thus becomes real to the extent that it is enriched with our purpose. This is the conceptual in its creative power.
                      >
                      > Wil
                    • Jim
                      Wil, Thank you for your email. Your strategy in repling to Polly now makes good sense. Sorry, I misunderstood originally. As for your comments about Frege, I
                      Message 10 of 29 , Apr 28, 2010
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                        Wil,

                        Thank you for your email.

                        Your strategy in repling to Polly now makes good sense. Sorry, I misunderstood originally.

                        As for your comments about Frege, I think perhaps you are unaware of how Frege's ideas have been developed by certain philosophers in the analytic tradition (e.g. Evans, McDowell, McCulloch, Dancy), but their aim is to bring the subject directly into contact with the world, probably in a similar way to that attempted by Zizek. Such philosophers reject the indirect realism of Locke, Kant and other empiricists, in favour of a direct realism where objects are experienced without any intermediary.

                        Such philosophers would agree with your characterisation of Zizek's position that "the meaning of things is actually in the world and is comprehensible only conceptually, that rationality finds itself in concepts -- that the world is conceptual, so to speak".

                        I shall have to read Zizek on this – is there a particular book of his where he outlines his view?

                        Jim
                      • eupraxis@aol.com
                        Jim, Thanks. Zizek has written on this general thing in most of his last books. I will go over a few of them and suggest the best, easiest, example. A drawback
                        Message 11 of 29 , Apr 28, 2010
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                          Jim,

                          Thanks. Zizek has written on this general thing in most of his last books. I will go over a few of them and suggest the best, easiest, example. A drawback with Zizek is that he presumes a full familiarity with Hegel, Lacan, Badiou and Deleuze.

                          I would like to extend this gesture in reverse and ask what Analytical text(s) you have in mind here.

                          Thanks again,
                          Wil


                          -----Original Message-----
                          From: Jim <jjimstuart1@...>
                          To: existlist@yahoogroups.com
                          Sent: Wed, Apr 28, 2010 12:04 pm
                          Subject: [existlist] Re: Meaning and Value of negation





                          Wil,

                          Thank you for your email.

                          Your strategy in repling to Polly now makes good sense. Sorry, I misunderstood originally.

                          As for your comments about Frege, I think perhaps you are unaware of how Frege's ideas have been developed by certain philosophers in the analytic tradition (e.g. Evans, McDowell, McCulloch, Dancy), but their aim is to bring the subject directly into contact with the world, probably in a similar way to that attempted by Zizek. Such philosophers reject the indirect realism of Locke, Kant and other empiricists, in favour of a direct realism where objects are experienced without any intermediary.

                          Such philosophers would agree with your characterisation of Zizek's position that "the meaning of things is actually in the world and is comprehensible only conceptually, that rationality finds itself in concepts -- that the world is conceptual, so to speak".

                          I shall have to read Zizek on this – is there a particular book of his where he outlines his view?

                          Jim









                          [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                        • Mary
                          Well, Polly, it appears you re the remaining shred of hope here holding us from this retreat into absurdity. As if we ever escaped it. No pressure though. I m
                          Message 12 of 29 , Apr 28, 2010
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                            Well, Polly, it appears you're the remaining shred of hope here holding us from this retreat into absurdity. As if we ever escaped it. No pressure though. I'm content staring out at the big lake and sky. Some day I'll escape thinking, but I won't be able to appreciate it :) Mary
                          • eupraxis@aol.com
                            Thanks Mary. Wil ... From: Mary To: existlist@yahoogroups.com Sent: Wed, Apr 28, 2010 2:10 pm Subject: [existlist] Re: Meaning and
                            Message 13 of 29 , Apr 28, 2010
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                              Thanks Mary.

                              Wil
                              -----Original Message-----

                              From: Mary <josephson45r@...>
                              To: existlist@yahoogroups.com
                              Sent: Wed, Apr 28, 2010 2:10 pm
                              Subject: [existlist] Re: Meaning and Value of negation





                              Well, Polly, it appears you're the remaining shred of hope here holding us from this retreat into absurdity. As if we ever escaped it. No pressure though. I'm content staring out at the big lake and sky. Some day I'll escape thinking, but I won't be able to appreciate it :) Mary









                              [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                            • Jim
                              Wil, Mind and World by John McDowell is probably the best book to represent this outlook. Jim
                              Message 14 of 29 , Apr 28, 2010
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                                Wil,

                                "Mind and World" by John McDowell is probably the best book to represent this outlook.

                                Jim



                                --- In existlist@yahoogroups.com, eupraxis@... wrote:
                                >
                                >
                                > Jim,
                                >
                                > Thanks. Zizek has written on this general thing in most of his last books. I will go over a few of them and suggest the best, easiest, example. A drawback with Zizek is that he presumes a full familiarity with Hegel, Lacan, Badiou and Deleuze.
                                >
                                > I would like to extend this gesture in reverse and ask what Analytical text(s) you have in mind here.
                                >
                                > Thanks again,
                                > Wil
                                >
                                >
                              • Mary
                                I apologize Wil. I m impatient.
                                Message 15 of 29 , Apr 28, 2010
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                                  I apologize Wil. I'm impatient.
                                • eupraxis@aol.com
                                  Mary, No problem. Wil ... From: Mary To: existlist@yahoogroups.com Sent: Wed, Apr 28, 2010 3:31 pm Subject: [existlist] Re: Meaning
                                  Message 16 of 29 , Apr 28, 2010
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                                    Mary,

                                    No problem.

                                    Wil


                                    -----Original Message-----
                                    From: Mary <josephson45r@...>
                                    To: existlist@yahoogroups.com
                                    Sent: Wed, Apr 28, 2010 3:31 pm
                                    Subject: [existlist] Re: Meaning and Value of negation





                                    I apologize Wil. I'm impatient.









                                    [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                                  • eupraxis@aol.com
                                    Jim, A good friend of mine who is reasonably well-read in that direction warned me a bit against McDowell (he disagrees with his take on Rorty) and suggested
                                    Message 17 of 29 , Apr 28, 2010
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                                      Jim,

                                      A good friend of mine who is reasonably well-read in that direction warned me a bit against McDowell (he disagrees with his take on Rorty) and suggested Robert Brandom instead. Do you know him?

                                      Wil


                                      -----Original Message-----
                                      From: Jim <jjimstuart1@...>
                                      To: existlist@yahoogroups.com
                                      Sent: Wed, Apr 28, 2010 2:33 pm
                                      Subject: [existlist] Re: Meaning and Value of negation





                                      Wil,

                                      "Mind and World" by John McDowell is probably the best book to represent this outlook.

                                      Jim

                                      --- In existlist@yahoogroups.com, eupraxis@... wrote:
                                      >
                                      >
                                      > Jim,
                                      >
                                      > Thanks. Zizek has written on this general thing in most of his last books. I will go over a few of them and suggest the best, easiest, example. A drawback with Zizek is that he presumes a full familiarity with Hegel, Lacan, Badiou and Deleuze.
                                      >
                                      > I would like to extend this gesture in reverse and ask what Analytical text(s) you have in mind here.
                                      >
                                      > Thanks again,
                                      > Wil
                                      >
                                      >









                                      [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                                    • Herman
                                      Hi Wil, Jim, Mary and all, ... Wil and Jim, I doubt that you have understood anything that I have written. Nor have you understood that you do not understand.
                                      Message 18 of 29 , Apr 28, 2010
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                                        Hi Wil, Jim, Mary and all,

                                        On 28 April 2010 23:28, <eupraxis@...> wrote:
                                        > Jim,
                                        >
                                        > You wrote: "I am not sure how your argument is supposed to work here, as you are using a Locke/Kant empiricist argument, but then you say empiricism "is not my own POV". So if you actually reject this sort of empiricism, how can you use that erroneous, in your opinion, point of view to mount a valid argument against Polly?"
                                        >
                                        > Response: My point is that Polly's position is that very empiricist one, so in arguing from that POV, as it were heuristically, and showing the internal conundrum of its infinite separation from the immediacy of the 'percept', which she continually asserts (but not without contradiction) is the 'thing, there', I can show the impossibility of assuming that "perception" can *mean* anything at all, from that POV. My own position, of course, is not that of the >empiricist kind.

                                        Wil and Jim, I doubt that you have understood anything that I have
                                        written. Nor have you understood that you do not understand. You seem
                                        to have no flair for any kind of phenomenology. Now I'll wager London
                                        to a brick that you'll write back with a long list of luminary authors
                                        whose books you have read, to prove me wrong. That won't alter a
                                        thing, you are still incapable of seeing that in order to approach
                                        phenomena you need to stop representing the world in terms of other
                                        things, in your cases the concepts you have gleaned from reading
                                        selected philosophy texts (while avoiding selected others).



                                        > My point was that rationality works conceptually,

                                        To start to appreciate what a phenomenon is, you need to bracket your
                                        explanations of the world, that unbeknowns to you transform all
                                        experience into appearances, rather than just being what it is. If you
                                        are interested in approaching phenomena, you need to stop thinking the
                                        world. It may sound very difficult, and unappealing even, but believe
                                        me, that is the state you were born in, you have simply acquired some
                                        bad habits on the way :-)


                                        > that the meaning of things is actually in the world

                                        This is an embracing of bad faith and comprehensively
                                        anti-existentialist. Freedom finds meaning through the act. As Mary
                                        pointed out "we need some relief from having to experience all things
                                        anew". But that is not a warrant to imagine that meaning is inscribed
                                        on the world (there for you to discover), rather than a consequence of
                                        your act of flight into the safety of thinking your world.

                                        > and is comprehensible only conceptually,

                                        I agree that the phenomenal world is explained conceptually and
                                        rationality. The fact remains one does not experience explanations, no
                                        matter how good they are. An explanation is thought. What project
                                        underlies your need to live the world as though it consists of your
                                        explanations? What are you thinking now, and what on earth for?


                                        > that rationality finds itself in comcepts -- that the world is conceptual, so to speak.

                                        This is purely circular. And that is always the case when thought
                                        tries to found itself in the real.

                                        Thanks Mary for you contributions. They have made clear that you
                                        understand what I have written. I don't know what the right answers
                                        are, but that becomes moot when you stop asking questions :-)

                                        Polly
                                      • eupraxis@aol.com
                                        Polly, You wrote: Wil and Jim, I doubt that you have understood anything that I have written. Nor have you understood that you do not understand. You seem to
                                        Message 19 of 29 , Apr 28, 2010
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                                          Polly,

                                          You wrote: " Wil and Jim, I doubt that you have understood anything that I have written. Nor have you understood that you do not understand. You seem to have no flair for any kind of phenomenology. ..."

                                          Response: Is that so? I had hoped not to get into this kind of echo chamber, but I am game if you are. For your information, I teethed on phenomenology, my bookshelves are full of texts on the subject, etc. I am well aware of the issues.
                                          ---
                                          You wrote: "... in order to approach phenomena you need to stop representing the world in terms of other things, in your cases the concepts you have gleaned from reading selected philosophy texts (while avoiding selected others).

                                          Response: Really? It all comes down to your texts vs. my texts? Not Husserl? Or Merleau-Ponty? Okay, select a text for me. We can work it that way. I'm game. In the meantime, I will try to explain my misgivings with classical phenomenology on this topic.
                                          ---
                                          You wrote: To start to appreciate what a phenomenon is, you need to bracket your explanations of the world, that unbeknownst to you transform all experience into appearances, rather than just being what it is. ..."

                                          Response: A phenomenon is, by definition, an appearance, a specific adumbration in time and space. It is not, despite assertions to the contrary, a pure presentation such that the object is unmediated. That is my objection. Husserl tried to find a more original experience than the Kantian phenomenon, the relation of pure intuition and its description. It is my opinion, and certainly not just my own, that he never realized such a quest. In other words, I know the claims very well, and I have followed the tortured texts by the Master, but while they contain many interesting insights and rich observations, that never solve the problem of noetic and noemic polarities. To say that this is due to some deficiency on my part or in my background is unnecessary and unfortunate. Let's not go there.
                                          ---
                                          You wrote: "... If you are interested in approaching phenomena, you need to stop thinking the world. It may sound very difficult, and unappealing even, but believe me, that is the state you were born in, you have simply acquired some bad habits on the way :-)"

                                          Response: Okay, but my relationship to any meaning or knowledge was somewhat curtailed when I was born, as well as my general intentionality and awareness. Frankly, I wasn't paying much attention to anything, and was not much of a thinker, either. I have no doubt that if we "stop the world", as Casteneda used to put it, there are no ideas, but there is also no world. I am not interested in Nirvana.

                                          The phenomenological reduction -- which is NOT any such closing down of the world in ANY of the literature that I know, but is supposed to be a special disclosure of the lived, intentional world -- is in its classic rendering not concerned with anything but the disclosure of the intentional content without any contamination from informed reflection or the contextualization of understanding.

                                          Let me explain my reservations by means of one of the flagship texts, Husserl's Ideas (Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, translated by J. Kersten; Marinus Nijhoff, 1982). The following is a close reading where Husserl attempts to get to the 'things' directly and without any contamination from concepts or language.

                                          In the Ideas, on page 92, Husserl asserts, and I would say merely asserts, "The spatial physical thing which we see is, with all its transcendence, still something perceived, given "in person" in the manner peculiar to consciousness. It is not the case that in its stead, a picture or sign is given." The rest of the text tries to support this, but at each juncture he cannot escape the representational character of the perceived.

                                          In section, §124 (The Noetic-Noematic Stratum of "Logos"; Signifying and Signification), Husserl discusses signification-proper, and posits a "parallelism" between the noesis and noema. Already here, we are given a representational *mirroring* right when we were expecting a direct intuition entering the noesis.

                                          The noematic "act-sense" (that is, the sense) is like a silent meaning, without voice or expression. It is a 'signified' which is anterior to any signification-as-such. This sense becomes fused (stamped) onto the noematic correlate of expression such that the expressing adds nothing to the sense, and hence cannot pervert the objectivity of the noetic-noematic relation. The noetic act-intention thus remains purely parallel to the phenomenal noematic sense, via the transparency of the expressive stratum which, at this point in the analysis, purely mirrors the sense itself.

                                          Whatever is thought is presumably already to have occasioned a co-present stratum which is "unified with the pure perceptually 'meant as meant'." This latter is the 'noematic sense' which is "expressible by means of expression."

                                          That is to say that sense is like a pre-expressive meaning which language 'adapts' to itself "[raising] it to the realm of 'Logos'…" -- all noematic content, on any level, is already in some way a pre-linguistic meaning.

                                          This is of course merely a delay in signification. To say that the noema has a sense which is pre-expressively available to language, but which is not affected by the language that mirrors it, is to say the least unsatisfactory.

                                          Merleau-Ponty, in my opinion the best and last exponent of phenomenology, tried to solve this impasse by means of dialectics, and his works devoted to this are very interesting. Given your comments in this post, you would also consider him as dim as you do me.

                                          Now, if you have something to disabuse me of my errant ways, please respond in kind.

                                          Wil









                                          -----Original Message-----
                                          From: Herman <hhofmeister@...>
                                          To: existlist@yahoogroups.com
                                          Sent: Wed, Apr 28, 2010 6:34 pm
                                          Subject: Re: [existlist] Re: Meaning and Value of negation





                                          Hi Wil, Jim, Mary and all,

                                          On 28 April 2010 23:28, <eupraxis@...> wrote:
                                          > Jim,
                                          >
                                          > You wrote: "I am not sure how your argument is supposed to work here, as you are using a Locke/Kant empiricist argument, but then you say empiricism "is not my own POV". So if you actually reject this sort of empiricism, how can you use that erroneous, in your opinion, point of view to mount a valid argument against Polly?"
                                          >
                                          > Response: My point is that Polly's position is that very empiricist one, so in arguing from that POV, as it were heuristically, and showing the internal conundrum of its infinite separation from the immediacy of the 'percept', which she continually asserts (but not without contradiction) is the 'thing, there', I can show the impossibility of assuming that "perception" can *mean* anything at all, from that POV. My own position, of course, is not that of the >empiricist kind.

                                          Wil and Jim, I doubt that you have understood anything that I have
                                          written. Nor have you understood that you do not understand. You seem
                                          to have no flair for any kind of phenomenology. Now I'll wager London
                                          to a brick that you'll write back with a long list of luminary authors
                                          whose books you have read, to prove me wrong. That won't alter a
                                          thing, you are still incapable of seeing that in order to approach
                                          phenomena you need to stop representing the world in terms of other
                                          things, in your cases the concepts you have gleaned from reading
                                          selected philosophy texts (while avoiding selected others).

                                          > My point was that rationality works conceptually,

                                          To start to appreciate what a phenomenon is, you need to bracket your
                                          explanations of the world, that unbeknowns to you transform all
                                          experience into appearances, rather than just being what it is. If you
                                          are interested in approaching phenomena, you need to stop thinking the
                                          world. It may sound very difficult, and unappealing even, but believe
                                          me, that is the state you were born in, you have simply acquired some
                                          bad habits on the way :-)

                                          > that the meaning of things is actually in the world

                                          This is an embracing of bad faith and comprehensively
                                          anti-existentialist. Freedom finds meaning through the act. As Mary
                                          pointed out "we need some relief from having to experience all things
                                          anew". But that is not a warrant to imagine that meaning is inscribed
                                          on the world (there for you to discover), rather than a consequence of
                                          your act of flight into the safety of thinking your world.

                                          > and is comprehensible only conceptually,

                                          I agree that the phenomenal world is explained conceptually and
                                          rationality. The fact remains one does not experience explanations, no
                                          matter how good they are. An explanation is thought. What project
                                          underlies your need to live the world as though it consists of your
                                          explanations? What are you thinking now, and what on earth for?

                                          > that rationality finds itself in comcepts -- that the world is conceptual, so to speak.

                                          This is purely circular. And that is always the case when thought
                                          tries to found itself in the real.

                                          Thanks Mary for you contributions. They have made clear that you
                                          understand what I have written. I don't know what the right answers
                                          are, but that becomes moot when you stop asking questions :-)

                                          Polly








                                          [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                                        • Herman
                                          Hi Wil, ... POLLY It is as I suspected. You now are going to tell me about all the books you have read on the subject. ... POLLY Your email has been very
                                          Message 20 of 29 , Apr 29, 2010
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                                            Hi Wil,

                                            On 29 April 2010 11:45, <eupraxis@...> wrote:
                                            >
                                            >  Polly,
                                            >
                                            > You wrote: " Wil and Jim, I doubt that you have understood anything that I have written. Nor have you understood that you do not understand. You seem to have no flair for any kind of phenomenology. ..."
                                            >
                                            > Response: Is that so? I had hoped not to get into this kind of echo chamber, but I am game if you are. For your information, I teethed on phenomenology, my bookshelves are full of texts on the subject, etc. I am well aware of the issues.
                                            > ---

                                            POLLY>It is as I suspected. You now are going to tell me about all the
                                            books you have read on the subject.


                                            > You wrote: "... in order to approach phenomena you need to stop representing the world in terms of other things, in your cases the concepts you have gleaned from reading selected philosophy texts (while avoiding selected others).
                                            >

                                            > Response: Really? It all comes down to your texts vs. my texts? Not Husserl? Or Merleau-Ponty? Okay, select a text for me. We can work it that way. I'm game. In the meantime, I will try to explain my misgivings with classical phenomenology on this topic.
                                            > ---
                                            > You wrote: To start to appreciate what a phenomenon is, you need to bracket your explanations of the world, that unbeknownst to you transform all experience into appearances, rather than just being what it is. ..."
                                            >
                                            > Response: A phenomenon is, by definition, an appearance, a specific adumbration in time and space. It is not, despite assertions to the contrary, a pure presentation such that the object is unmediated. That is my objection. Husserl tried to find a more original experience than the Kantian phenomenon, the relation of pure intuition and its description. It is my opinion, and certainly not just my own, that he never realized such a quest. In other words, I know the claims very well, and I have followed the tortured texts by the Master, but while they contain many interesting insights and rich observations, that never solve the problem of noetic and noemic polarities. To say that this is due to some deficiency on my part or in my background is unnecessary and unfortunate. Let's not go there.
                                            > ---

                                            POLLY>Your email has been very clarifying. It makes it clear without
                                            any doubt that we are on totally different pages. It is not that I am
                                            a Heideggerist or anything sinister like that, but just to demonstrate
                                            that your definition is by no means universally accepted, in Being and
                                            Time, a phenomenon is "that which shows itself in itself" and an
                                            appearance is "that which shows itself in something else".

                                            So it appears that we are completely talking past each other. If you
                                            do not accept that there are things that can only be defined by
                                            ostentation, and not in terms of other things, then there is no point
                                            in our conversation. And typically, these things would be sensations,
                                            feelings and the like. For they are not reducible to anything else. As
                                            an example, no matter how clever the conceptual definitions one uses,
                                            a blind man will not understand what red is.

                                            It is no use, and I therefore won't comment on the rest of your post
                                            without some consensus on the basis of our conversation, phenomena.

                                            But I would just like to add that phenomenology is a method, and not a
                                            body of facts. Just like science. Knowing a lot about phenomenology
                                            does not mean one is capable of using the method.


                                            Polly
                                          • eupraxis@aol.com
                                            Polly, I mean universally accepted in classical phenomenology, not existential phenomenology, but ... From: Herman To:
                                            Message 21 of 29 , Apr 29, 2010
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                                              Polly,

                                              I mean universally accepted in classical phenomenology, not existential phenomenology, but








                                              -----Original Message-----
                                              From: Herman <hhofmeister@...>
                                              To: existlist@yahoogroups.com
                                              Sent: Thu, Apr 29, 2010 4:47 pm
                                              Subject: Re: [existlist] Re: Meaning and Value of negation





                                              Hi Wil,

                                              On 29 April 2010 11:45, <eupraxis@...> wrote:
                                              >
                                              > Polly,
                                              >
                                              > You wrote: " Wil and Jim, I doubt that you have understood anything that I have written. Nor have you understood that you do not understand. You seem to have no flair for any kind of phenomenology. ..."
                                              >
                                              > Response: Is that so? I had hoped not to get into this kind of echo chamber, but I am game if you are. For your information, I teethed on phenomenology, my bookshelves are full of texts on the subject, etc. I am well aware of the issues.
                                              > ---

                                              POLLY>It is as I suspected. You now are going to tell me about all the
                                              books you have read on the subject.

                                              > You wrote: "... in order to approach phenomena you need to stop representing the world in terms of other things, in your cases the concepts you have gleaned from reading selected philosophy texts (while avoiding selected others).
                                              >

                                              > Response: Really? It all comes down to your texts vs. my texts? Not Husserl? Or Merleau-Ponty? Okay, select a text for me. We can work it that way. I'm game. In the meantime, I will try to explain my misgivings with classical phenomenology on this topic.
                                              > ---
                                              > You wrote: To start to appreciate what a phenomenon is, you need to bracket your explanations of the world, that unbeknownst to you transform all experience into appearances, rather than just being what it is. ..."
                                              >
                                              > Response: A phenomenon is, by definition, an appearance, a specific adumbration in time and space. It is not, despite assertions to the contrary, a pure presentation such that the object is unmediated. That is my objection. Husserl tried to find a more original experience than the Kantian phenomenon, the relation of pure intuition and its description. It is my opinion, and certainly not just my own, that he never realized such a quest. In other words, I know the claims very well, and I have followed the tortured texts by the Master, but while they contain many interesting insights and rich observations, that never solve the problem of noetic and noemic polarities. To say that this is due to some deficiency on my part or in my background is unnecessary and unfortunate. Let's not go there.
                                              > ---

                                              POLLY>Your email has been very clarifying. It makes it clear without
                                              any doubt that we are on totally different pages. It is not that I am
                                              a Heideggerist or anything sinister like that, but just to demonstrate
                                              that your definition is by no means universally accepted, in Being and
                                              Time, a phenomenon is "that which shows itself in itself" and an
                                              appearance is "that which shows itself in something else".

                                              So it appears that we are completely talking past each other. If you
                                              do not accept that there are things that can only be defined by
                                              ostentation, and not in terms of other things, then there is no point
                                              in our conversation. And typically, these things would be sensations,
                                              feelings and the like. For they are not reducible to anything else. As
                                              an example, no matter how clever the conceptual definitions one uses,
                                              a blind man will not understand what red is.

                                              It is no use, and I therefore won't comment on the rest of your post
                                              without some consensus on the basis of our conversation, phenomena.

                                              But I would just like to add that phenomenology is a method, and not a
                                              body of facts. Just like science. Knowing a lot about phenomenology
                                              does not mean one is capable of using the method.

                                              Polly








                                              [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                                            • Herman
                                              Hey Wil, ... I only got this one snippet as a reply. Possibly a premature click of the send button, perhaps? Polly
                                              Message 22 of 29 , Apr 29, 2010
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                                                Hey Wil,

                                                On 30 April 2010 08:02, <eupraxis@...> wrote:
                                                >
                                                >  Polly,
                                                >
                                                > I mean universally accepted in classical phenomenology, not existential phenomenology, but
                                                >

                                                I only got this one snippet as a reply. Possibly a premature click of
                                                the send button, perhaps?

                                                Polly
                                              • Mary
                                                Wil, there are several things in your post which intrigue me. You wrote: Okay, but my relationship to any meaning or knowledge was somewhat curtailed when I
                                                Message 23 of 29 , Apr 30, 2010
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                                                  Wil, there are several things in your post which intrigue me.

                                                  You wrote: Okay, but my relationship to any meaning or knowledge was somewhat curtailed when I was born, as well as my general intentionality and awareness. Frankly, I wasn't paying much attention to anything, and was not much of a thinker, either. I have no doubt that if we "stop the world", as Casteneda used to put it, there are no ideas, but there is also no world. I am not interested in Nirvana.

                                                  Response: Except for your non-interest in Nirvana, you can't be certain about the rest. Also, I cringe at these words used throughout: stratum, parallel, and mirror. Why? Because they imply separation and deny the entanglement which is signified by sign=sign. I'm willing to accede to the this latter conundrum, but I also maintain that Thought gets too big for its breeches when it tries to present itself as merely representations. The Monstrosity of Thought is this very innocence. Thought blinds us with its enlightenment, so we don't notice the "endarkenment," which unintentionally obscures the obvious: object/object, object/subject and observed/observer are One. This is the meaning (significance, intention) of being, and there is no escaping it. Where is the necessity of dialogue?

                                                  Mary
                                                • eupraxis@aol.com
                                                  Mary, I had originally written: Okay, but my relationship to any meaning or knowledge was somewhat curtailed when I was born, as well as my general
                                                  Message 24 of 29 , Apr 30, 2010
                                                  • 0 Attachment
                                                    Mary,

                                                    I had originally written: "Okay, but my relationship to any meaning or knowledge was somewhat curtailed when I was born, as well as my general intentionality and awareness. Frankly, I wasn't paying much attention to anything, and was not much of a thinker, either. I have no doubt that if we "stop the world", as Casteneda used to put it, there are no ideas, but there is also no world. I am not interested in Nirvana."

                                                    You wrote: "Except for your non-interest in Nirvana, you can't be certain about the rest."

                                                    Response: Sure I can. An infant is certainly incapable of being a full intentional subject. Cranial size alone would prevent that. If a new born is the ideal of a subject unaffected by 'conditioning', then we have a very different aim in mind for our theoretical discussion. I am interested in what we adults are about, not what a natal event produces.
                                                    ---
                                                    You wrote: "... Also, I cringe at these words used throughout: stratum, parallel, and mirror. Why?

                                                    Response: Why, indeed! Those are the contortions that Husserl puts himself through to try to reattach the noema and noesis, or the world and the thinking/perceiving person. That was my point.
                                                    ---
                                                    You wrote: "... Because they imply separation and deny the entanglement which is signified by sign=sign. I'm willing to accede to ... this latter conundrum, but I also maintain that Thought gets too big for its breeches when it tries to present itself as merely representations."

                                                    Response: If one is bound to empiricist dualism as the basis of explanation, then despite assertions to the contrary (that one is in direct relation to an object), one is necessarily at a remove from the world and all percepts are thus what Locke called "ideas", which we would call representations. I do hold an empiricist point of view. I therefore do not accept that we are stuck in a hopeless mirroring. What you seem to be attributing to me is what I am sayingt is the radical consequence of the former position (Polly's position).
                                                    ---
                                                    You wrote: "... The Monstrosity of Thought is this very innocence. Thought blinds us with its enlightenment, so we don't notice the "endarkenment," which unintentionally obscures the obvious: object/object, object/subject and observed/observer are One. This is the meaning (significance, intention) of being, and there is no escaping it. Where is the necessity of dialogue?"

                                                    Response: I am not sure that I agree, but I am not sure that I do not. I do agree, with reservations, with the sense behind, "object/object, object/subject and observed/observer are One," as long as we do not advocate a static monism, as opposed to a dialectical inter-relatedness.

                                                    Wil



                                                    [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                                                  • eupraxis@aol.com
                                                    Correction: Response: If one is bound to empiricist dualism as the basis of explanation, then despite assertions to the contrary (that one is in direct
                                                    Message 25 of 29 , Apr 30, 2010
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                                                      Correction:

                                                      Response: If one is bound to empiricist dualism as the basis of explanation, then despite assertions to the contrary (that one is in direct relation to an object), one is necessarily at a remove from the world and all percepts are thus what Locke called "ideas", which we would call representations. I do NOT hold an empiricist point of view. I therefore do not accept that we are stuck in a hopeless mirroring. What you seem to be attributing to me is what I am sayingt is the radical consequence of the former position (Polly's position).








                                                      -----Original Message-----
                                                      From: eupraxis@...
                                                      To: existlist@yahoogroups.com
                                                      Sent: Fri, Apr 30, 2010 9:39 am
                                                      Subject: Re: [existlist] The Monstrosity of Thought





                                                      Mary,

                                                      I had originally written: "Okay, but my relationship to any meaning or knowledge was somewhat curtailed when I was born, as well as my general intentionality and awareness. Frankly, I wasn't paying much attention to anything, and was not much of a thinker, either. I have no doubt that if we "stop the world", as Casteneda used to put it, there are no ideas, but there is also no world. I am not interested in Nirvana."

                                                      You wrote: "Except for your non-interest in Nirvana, you can't be certain about the rest."

                                                      Response: Sure I can. An infant is certainly incapable of being a full intentional subject. Cranial size alone would prevent that. If a new born is the ideal of a subject unaffected by 'conditioning', then we have a very different aim in mind for our theoretical discussion. I am interested in what we adults are about, not what a natal event produces.
                                                      ---
                                                      You wrote: "... Also, I cringe at these words used throughout: stratum, parallel, and mirror. Why?

                                                      Response: Why, indeed! Those are the contortions that Husserl puts himself through to try to reattach the noema and noesis, or the world and the thinking/perceiving person. That was my point.
                                                      ---
                                                      You wrote: "... Because they imply separation and deny the entanglement which is signified by sign=sign. I'm willing to accede to ... this latter conundrum, but I also maintain that Thought gets too big for its breeches when it tries to present itself as merely representations."

                                                      Response: If one is bound to empiricist dualism as the basis of explanation, then despite assertions to the contrary (that one is in direct relation to an object), one is necessarily at a remove from the world and all percepts are thus what Locke called "ideas", which we would call representations. I do hold an empiricist point of view. I therefore do not accept that we are stuck in a hopeless mirroring. What you seem to be attributing to me is what I am sayingt is the radical consequence of the former position (Polly's position).
                                                      ---
                                                      You wrote: "... The Monstrosity of Thought is this very innocence. Thought blinds us with its enlightenment, so we don't notice the "endarkenment," which unintentionally obscures the obvious: object/object, object/subject and observed/observer are One. This is the meaning (significance, intention) of being, and there is no escaping it. Where is the necessity of dialogue?"

                                                      Response: I am not sure that I agree, but I am not sure that I do not. I do agree, with reservations, with the sense behind, "object/object, object/subject and observed/observer are One," as long as we do not advocate a static monism, as opposed to a dialectical inter-relatedness.

                                                      Wil

                                                      [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]









                                                      [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                                                    • Mary
                                                      Wil, certainly not a static monism. This should be obvious to in my recent posts. And who better to intend and be aware than nascence itself. However, thought
                                                      Message 26 of 29 , Apr 30, 2010
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                                                        Wil, certainly not a static monism. This should be obvious to in my recent posts. And who better to intend and be aware than nascence itself. However, thought twists the path of that innocence and keeps us immature. How else can you account for the neotonous state of the world--big heads and little understanding? Mary

                                                        --- In existlist@yahoogroups.com, eupraxis@... wrote:
                                                        >
                                                        > Mary,
                                                        >
                                                        > I had originally written: "Okay, but my relationship to any meaning or knowledge was somewhat curtailed when I was born, as well as my general intentionality and awareness. Frankly, I wasn't paying much attention to anything, and was not much of a thinker, either. I have no doubt that if we "stop the world", as Casteneda used to put it, there are no ideas, but there is also no world. I am not interested in Nirvana."
                                                        >
                                                        > You wrote: "Except for your non-interest in Nirvana, you can't be certain about the rest."
                                                        >
                                                        > Response: Sure I can. An infant is certainly incapable of being a full intentional subject. Cranial size alone would prevent that. If a new born is the ideal of a subject unaffected by 'conditioning', then we have a very different aim in mind for our theoretical discussion. I am interested in what we adults are about, not what a natal event produces.
                                                        > ---
                                                        > You wrote: "... Also, I cringe at these words used throughout: stratum, parallel, and mirror. Why?
                                                        >
                                                        > Response: Why, indeed! Those are the contortions that Husserl puts himself through to try to reattach the noema and noesis, or the world and the thinking/perceiving person. That was my point.
                                                        > ---
                                                        > You wrote: "... Because they imply separation and deny the entanglement which is signified by sign=sign. I'm willing to accede to ... this latter conundrum, but I also maintain that Thought gets too big for its breeches when it tries to present itself as merely representations."
                                                        >
                                                        > Response: If one is bound to empiricist dualism as the basis of explanation, then despite assertions to the contrary (that one is in direct relation to an object), one is necessarily at a remove from the world and all percepts are thus what Locke called "ideas", which we would call representations. I do hold an empiricist point of view. I therefore do not accept that we are stuck in a hopeless mirroring. What you seem to be attributing to me is what I am sayingt is the radical consequence of the former position (Polly's position).
                                                        > ---
                                                        > You wrote: "... The Monstrosity of Thought is this very innocence. Thought blinds us with its enlightenment, so we don't notice the "endarkenment," which unintentionally obscures the obvious: object/object, object/subject and observed/observer are One. This is the meaning (significance, intention) of being, and there is no escaping it. Where is the necessity of dialogue?"
                                                        >
                                                        > Response: I am not sure that I agree, but I am not sure that I do not. I do agree, with reservations, with the sense behind, "object/object, object/subject and observed/observer are One," as long as we do not advocate a static monism, as opposed to a dialectical inter-relatedness.
                                                        >
                                                        > Wil
                                                        >
                                                        >
                                                        >
                                                        > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                                                        >
                                                      • hb3g@ymail.com
                                                        But the dualistic situation is not a hopeless situation. It is just the situation that we are in. I don t see how direct, or indirect, has anything to do with
                                                        Message 27 of 29 , May 1 7:25 PM
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                                                          But the dualistic situation is not a hopeless situation.

                                                          It is just the situation that we are in.

                                                          I don't see how direct, or indirect, has anything to do with it.

                                                          It matters, I think, where we locate the line of demarcation when we talk about the duality of our experience.

                                                          If, in recognizing that duality, we draw the line between the appearances of a phenomenon, and some real X that, so we postulate, exists behind the appearances of that phenomenon, then yes, the situation is hopeless.

                                                          For, we have no means of comparing what is an appearance to what is not.

                                                          But, it is a completely different kind of duality that we are talking about when we locate the line of demarcation, not between the appearance and the reality, but between the phenomenon, and what we presume to think, or know, or assume, about the phenomenon.

                                                          This is not a hopeless situation. But neither is it, in all cases, and for all modes of cognition, an absolutely veridical state. Some parts of it are absolutely veridical, even if we haven't yet realized it, and some parts of it are not, even if we haven't yet realized that.

                                                          We are sometimes wrong, or uncertain, not because we are indirectly related to the phenomena, but because we sometimes think wrongly, or inattentively, or do not have all the facts, or do not see all the relations.

                                                          Only the transcendental object is a simple X; and that, as we all know, is just a concept that we have in our own minds. But the phenomena are always manifolds. That is why it takes an effort, sometimes, much effort, to adequately describe them, and to fully understand them.

                                                          Hb3g

                                                          --- In existlist@yahoogroups.com, eupraxis@... wrote:
                                                          >
                                                          >
                                                          > Correction:
                                                          >
                                                          > Response: If one is bound to empiricist dualism as the basis of explanation, then despite assertions to the contrary (that one is in direct relation to an object), one is necessarily at a remove from the world and all percepts are thus what Locke called "ideas", which we would call representations. I do NOT hold an empiricist point of view. I therefore do not accept that we are stuck in a hopeless mirroring. What you seem to be attributing to me is what I am sayingt is the radical consequence of the former position (Polly's position).
                                                          >
                                                          >
                                                          >
                                                          >
                                                          >
                                                          >
                                                          >
                                                          >
                                                          > -----Original Message-----
                                                          > From: eupraxis@...
                                                          > To: existlist@yahoogroups.com
                                                          > Sent: Fri, Apr 30, 2010 9:39 am
                                                          > Subject: Re: [existlist] The Monstrosity of Thought
                                                          >
                                                          >
                                                          >
                                                          >
                                                          >
                                                          > Mary,
                                                          >
                                                          > I had originally written: "Okay, but my relationship to any meaning or knowledge was somewhat curtailed when I was born, as well as my general intentionality and awareness. Frankly, I wasn't paying much attention to anything, and was not much of a thinker, either. I have no doubt that if we "stop the world", as Casteneda used to put it, there are no ideas, but there is also no world. I am not interested in Nirvana."
                                                          >
                                                          > You wrote: "Except for your non-interest in Nirvana, you can't be certain about the rest."
                                                          >
                                                          > Response: Sure I can. An infant is certainly incapable of being a full intentional subject. Cranial size alone would prevent that. If a new born is the ideal of a subject unaffected by 'conditioning', then we have a very different aim in mind for our theoretical discussion. I am interested in what we adults are about, not what a natal event produces.
                                                          > ---
                                                          > You wrote: "... Also, I cringe at these words used throughout: stratum, parallel, and mirror. Why?
                                                          >
                                                          > Response: Why, indeed! Those are the contortions that Husserl puts himself through to try to reattach the noema and noesis, or the world and the thinking/perceiving person. That was my point.
                                                          > ---
                                                          > You wrote: "... Because they imply separation and deny the entanglement which is signified by sign=sign. I'm willing to accede to ... this latter conundrum, but I also maintain that Thought gets too big for its breeches when it tries to present itself as merely representations."
                                                          >
                                                          > Response: If one is bound to empiricist dualism as the basis of explanation, then despite assertions to the contrary (that one is in direct relation to an object), one is necessarily at a remove from the world and all percepts are thus what Locke called "ideas", which we would call representations. I do hold an empiricist point of view. I therefore do not accept that we are stuck in a hopeless mirroring. What you seem to be attributing to me is what I am sayingt is the radical consequence of the former position (Polly's position).
                                                          > ---
                                                          > You wrote: "... The Monstrosity of Thought is this very innocence. Thought blinds us with its enlightenment, so we don't notice the "endarkenment," which unintentionally obscures the obvious: object/object, object/subject and observed/observer are One. This is the meaning (significance, intention) of being, and there is no escaping it. Where is the necessity of dialogue?"
                                                          >
                                                          > Response: I am not sure that I agree, but I am not sure that I do not. I do agree, with reservations, with the sense behind, "object/object, object/subject and observed/observer are One," as long as we do not advocate a static monism, as opposed to a dialectical inter-relatedness.
                                                          >
                                                          > Wil
                                                          >
                                                          > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                                                          >
                                                          >
                                                          >
                                                          >
                                                          >
                                                          >
                                                          >
                                                          >
                                                          >
                                                          > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                                                          >
                                                        • eupraxis@aol.com
                                                          HB3G, First part of Phenomenology of Spirit. No more, no less. Wil ... From: hb3g@ymail.com To: existlist@yahoogroups.com Sent: Sat, May 1, 2010
                                                          Message 28 of 29 , May 1 7:34 PM
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                                                            HB3G,

                                                            First part of Phenomenology of Spirit. No more, no less.

                                                            Wil




                                                            -----Original Message-----
                                                            From: hb3g@... <hb3g@...>
                                                            To: existlist@yahoogroups.com
                                                            Sent: Sat, May 1, 2010 9:25 pm
                                                            Subject: [existlist] Re: The Monstrosity of Thought





                                                            But the dualistic situation is not a hopeless situation.

                                                            It is just the situation that we are in.

                                                            I don't see how direct, or indirect, has anything to do with it.

                                                            It matters, I think, where we locate the line of demarcation when we talk about the duality of our experience.

                                                            If, in recognizing that duality, we draw the line between the appearances of a phenomenon, and some real X that, so we postulate, exists behind the appearances of that phenomenon, then yes, the situation is hopeless.

                                                            For, we have no means of comparing what is an appearance to what is not.

                                                            But, it is a completely different kind of duality that we are talking about when we locate the line of demarcation, not between the appearance and the reality, but between the phenomenon, and what we presume to think, or know, or assume, about the phenomenon.

                                                            This is not a hopeless situation. But neither is it, in all cases, and for all modes of cognition, an absolutely veridical state. Some parts of it are absolutely veridical, even if we haven't yet realized it, and some parts of it are not, even if we haven't yet realized that.

                                                            We are sometimes wrong, or uncertain, not because we are indirectly related to the phenomena, but because we sometimes think wrongly, or inattentively, or do not have all the facts, or do not see all the relations.

                                                            Only the transcendental object is a simple X; and that, as we all know, is just a concept that we have in our own minds. But the phenomena are always manifolds. That is why it takes an effort, sometimes, much effort, to adequately describe them, and to fully understand them.

                                                            Hb3g

                                                            --- In existlist@yahoogroups.com, eupraxis@... wrote:
                                                            >
                                                            >
                                                            > Correction:
                                                            >
                                                            > Response: If one is bound to empiricist dualism as the basis of explanation, then despite assertions to the contrary (that one is in direct relation to an object), one is necessarily at a remove from the world and all percepts are thus what Locke called "ideas", which we would call representations. I do NOT hold an empiricist point of view. I therefore do not accept that we are stuck in a hopeless mirroring. What you seem to be attributing to me is what I am sayingt is the radical consequence of the former position (Polly's position).
                                                            >
                                                            >
                                                            >
                                                            >
                                                            >
                                                            >
                                                            >
                                                            >
                                                            > -----Original Message-----
                                                            > From: eupraxis@...
                                                            > To: existlist@yahoogroups.com
                                                            > Sent: Fri, Apr 30, 2010 9:39 am
                                                            > Subject: Re: [existlist] The Monstrosity of Thought
                                                            >
                                                            >
                                                            >
                                                            >
                                                            >
                                                            > Mary,
                                                            >
                                                            > I had originally written: "Okay, but my relationship to any meaning or knowledge was somewhat curtailed when I was born, as well as my general intentionality and awareness. Frankly, I wasn't paying much attention to anything, and was not much of a thinker, either. I have no doubt that if we "stop the world", as Casteneda used to put it, there are no ideas, but there is also no world. I am not interested in Nirvana."
                                                            >
                                                            > You wrote: "Except for your non-interest in Nirvana, you can't be certain about the rest."
                                                            >
                                                            > Response: Sure I can. An infant is certainly incapable of being a full intentional subject. Cranial size alone would prevent that. If a new born is the ideal of a subject unaffected by 'conditioning', then we have a very different aim in mind for our theoretical discussion. I am interested in what we adults are about, not what a natal event produces.
                                                            > ---
                                                            > You wrote: "... Also, I cringe at these words used throughout: stratum, parallel, and mirror. Why?
                                                            >
                                                            > Response: Why, indeed! Those are the contortions that Husserl puts himself through to try to reattach the noema and noesis, or the world and the thinking/perceiving person. That was my point.
                                                            > ---
                                                            > You wrote: "... Because they imply separation and deny the entanglement which is signified by sign=sign. I'm willing to accede to ... this latter conundrum, but I also maintain that Thought gets too big for its breeches when it tries to present itself as merely representations."
                                                            >
                                                            > Response: If one is bound to empiricist dualism as the basis of explanation, then despite assertions to the contrary (that one is in direct relation to an object), one is necessarily at a remove from the world and all percepts are thus what Locke called "ideas", which we would call representations. I do hold an empiricist point of view. I therefore do not accept that we are stuck in a hopeless mirroring. What you seem to be attributing to me is what I am sayingt is the radical consequence of the former position (Polly's position).
                                                            > ---
                                                            > You wrote: "... The Monstrosity of Thought is this very innocence. Thought blinds us with its enlightenment, so we don't notice the "endarkenment," which unintentionally obscures the obvious: object/object, object/subject and observed/observer are One. This is the meaning (significance, intention) of being, and there is no escaping it. Where is the necessity of dialogue?"
                                                            >
                                                            > Response: I am not sure that I agree, but I am not sure that I do not. I do agree, with reservations, with the sense behind, "object/object, object/subject and observed/observer are One," as long as we do not advocate a static monism, as opposed to a dialectical inter-relatedness.
                                                            >
                                                            > Wil
                                                            >
                                                            > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                                                            >
                                                            >
                                                            >
                                                            >
                                                            >
                                                            >
                                                            >
                                                            >
                                                            >
                                                            > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                                                            >









                                                            [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                                                          • Mary
                                                            But a monism, nevertheless :)
                                                            Message 29 of 29 , May 2 6:13 AM
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                                                              But a monism, nevertheless :)

                                                              --- In existlist@yahoogroups.com, "Mary" <josephson45r@...> wrote:
                                                              >
                                                              > Wil, certainly not a static monism. This should be obvious to in my recent posts.
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