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38690Re: Reason and Feeling

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  • Trinidad Cruz
    Jun 1, 2006
      --- In existlist@yahoogroups.com, "Herman B. Triplegood" <hb3g@...> wrote:

      Try TOPS Herm. Theory of practical something. Epistemology can only
      ever be partial and temporary. It cannot even directly reflect. Just
      because it cannot escape the constraints of time and circumstance does
      not mean that it cannot be valid in time and circumstance. If you are
      a terrific writer, and you are, it's still your view: limited and
      quaint. That is the constraint of our nature on all of us, and why we
      must always challenge pragmatically, or go nowhere at all.



      > In talking about reason I am talking about reason as a canon, not
      reason as a hypostatized theoretical entity. This is not a theory of
      everything. Without a canon of reasoning there can be no theory of
      anything. The exposition of such a canon of reasoning and its ultimate
      justification cannot be achieved by means of mere definition. It can
      only be accomplished by means of a concrete process of reflection that
      is grounded in acts of judgment, as Kant would say, a critique of reason.
      > The very word "epistemology" which means "theory of knowledge" is an
      oxymoron based upon an infinite definitional regress. Before one can
      say what constitutes a theory of everything, what constitutes a theory
      of anything must first be explicated. Prior to this, however, one must
      have a theory of knowledge. But, in order to have a theory of
      knowledge one must know what counts as a good theory. In other words,
      one must have a theory of a theory. And so it goes, ad infinitum.
      > The fallacy that goes with this regress is precisely the confusion
      that exists between definition and exposition in philosophical
      discourse. The idea that there can ever be such a thing as a theory of
      knowledge is a fallacious notion that arises from the inappropriate
      application of axiomatic discourse to a subject matter that requires
      dialectical discourse.
      > The use of the term "moralistic" as an epithet only serves to poison
      the well and to distract discourse from an objective discussion of the
      moral absolute. That there is such a thing as a moral absolute cannot
      really be denied. The assertion that there is no moral absolute is
      itself an assertion of an absolute with respect to moral order,
      namely, that it is absolutely relative, which is a self-contradictory
      > Hb3g
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