Re: The problem with Heideggers
- On the contrary, I find similarities between H. and V.: the "story"
in-between, the weight sedimented in history that pulls thought toward
the presence & meaning of being, etc.
Heidegger's playful etymology is annoying at times, but mostly
stimulating, unlike Derrida's (D. goes nowhere). A good place to start
is a late series of lectures in Freiburg, "Was heisst Denken?" (What
is called thinking?) If I remember well, H.'s comeback after the
interdiction to teach or speak in public.
In those lectures H. quotes very relevant material from Parmenides,
Nietzsche, Holderlin, and (again, if memory serves well) some
Aristotle. He aims for the thought that thinks itself through...
thinking. Reflection is circular, in some way.
P.S. On Heidegger's course on the Sophist, and its shortcomings see
Francisco J Gonzalez' interesting article in the Journal of the
History of Philosophy
Mr. Dolph also wrote a short review on Amazon.com for Gonzalez'
excellent book (Dialectic and Dialogue, Plato's Practice of
Philosophical Inquiry, 1999). I met Dr. Gonzalez at a Heidegger
conference in New York, in 2001 :)
--- In email@example.com, "S. Barret Dolph" <wheds8@...> wrote:
> This is an old strategy that starts with Aristotle, and to some
> Plato but in different way. The presentation is given as if the
> merely listing facts in a neutral way. How then should a commentary be
> written? As a mathematical proportion?
> The odd thing about Heidegger's commentary is that they are almost
> Heidegger shows his theory in the commentary which comes from the
> which goes back into the theory. In the end it is like a hall of
> without anyone there. It is no wonder that the deconstructionists who
> followed him ended up saying there is no author and there is no
> there any reason to believe that Heidegger did this in order to free
> the weight of the past?
> On Sunday 29 January 2006 23:12, Martin Pagnan wrote:
> > The problem with Heidegger, and Hegel, is that they used bad
> > They searched the works of the known "great thinkers" to find passages
> > to support their positions
- First off, I concur on the closing points about H vs. V. That
discussion has wandered off. Which is OK with me. I think that
discussion has continued to unfold in a very interesting way. But, I am
personally more focused on Mr. Munteanu's refutation of V's primary
interpretation of Aristotle. There, H comes in more as a helpful
contrast with the allegedly careless V than anything else.
If the first list makes more sense, that's all right, although I can't
I hate to be so clueless, but maybe it would be worthwhile to hammer out
the Aristotle a little more clearly.
First off, 'partaking' for 'metalepsis' seems about equivalent to me,
but OK. I note that Joe Sachs uses that translation too.
Now, Mr. Munteanu noted that
thought (noesis) acts on its own, but it can be the same
as the actuality of the object, so in this sense it truly "partakes"
in it. But the object is not the efficient cause. And it cannot be
said to partake in my thought, either. It is passive in its
relationship to me
>>So, second, noesis acts on its own. Is this acting a motion? If so, is
human noesis automotion? How are we to understand Aristotle's
contention that "thought is moved by the intelligible?"
Third, noesis can be the same as the actuality of its object.
'Actuality' here translates energeia, is that right? Is there a
concrete example handy of noesis being the same as the acuality of its
Fourth, the object is not the efficient cause. OK. But, a cause
nonetheless, right? Then, what sort of cause?
Fifth, the object of thought cannot be said to partake in the thought.
OK. But, what does that mean in the cases where thought is the same as
the actuality of the object of the thought? In what does the sameness
consist if it cannot be said to be a mutual partaking of a single nature?
Sixth, and not quite directly related to Mr. Munteanu's reply, a key
sentence in V's treatment is Met 1072b20. Does the thinking Aristotle
describes there extend to humans or not?
I look forward to any help on these issues as time permits and am very
grateful that to Mr. Munteanu for putting such a specfic criticism of
Voegelin's work to the forum.
PS. The treatment in The Consciousness of the Ground is paralleled
somewhat by one orginally written in English as Reason: The Classic
Experience. So we have at least 4 renditions of the key sentence by V.
The original German of Anamnesis, the two English translations of it,
and the English one given by Voegelin in the Reason essay.