Re: Party List P.S.
- Regarding the candidate withdrawal option: Maybe someone could
pay a candidate to refuse to withdraw, & to be a "spoiler", but
that would likely be the end of that candidate's career. Of course
if they paid him well enough, he wouldn't care about the career.
But then we'd be no worse off than if we didn't have candidate
withdrawal as an option.
As for coalitions, I don't know. What is certain, though, is
that when a candidate withdraws, his votes go exactly where
his voters would want them to. His withdrawal when he loses,
but holds votes that could go to my next choice--that withdrawal
is in my interest. Of course maybe I'm in the minority, and
most of his voters have ranked someone after him whom I don't
like, but it's perfectly democratic, since every voter's
Plurality vote goes to his next choice.
(If anyone says that means that IRO is democratic, then I
emphasize that there's nothing democratic about IRO's
_elimination_, when it eliminates someone preferred by the
majority. Voluntary candidate withdrawals are quite different,
being done in order to _avoid_ that sort of problem in whichever
method they're used with).
It _will_ be obvious to a candidate that he didn't win
the Plurality count, and that if he doesn't withdraw, then,
because he's holding those votes, someone unnecessarily bad
wins. So he doesn't have to be able to forsee the future--the
present is all he has to go by.
Why not instead use a better method, that has less need for
candidate withdrawal? Of course there's a strong case for that.
But the reason for Plurality With Withdrawal is merely the
fact that Plurality is already well-known, and it avoids arguments
about what new count rule should be used. The withdrawal option
is the obvious answer to Plurality's well-known problem.
The fact that your ballots are mailed doesn't prevent using
the candidate withdrawal option. The ballots would be ranked,
and need only be sent once. Only 1 set of rankings is needed,
on which the Plurality counts are based. It's the candidates,
not the voters, who would react to the results of a Plurality
One problem, if Plurality With Withdrawal were used as the
single-winner method for the system that I've proposed for
choosing & ordering party lists, would be if it were _often_
the case that not all of the N-1 candidates already chosen
for the list were in the current N chosen by the N-candidate
STV count. Because, then it would be often that the single-winner
method would be needed, and each time PWW is used, the candidates
would have to be on hand to withdraw when necessary.
But if the house monotonicity violations are few, there wouldn't
be a problem.
Anyway, I'm not really _pushing_ for PWW over the other very
good methods from EM. I merely mention it as one of those very
good methods with its own advantages.
It had occurred to me, then, that if it's necessary to apply
the single-winner method often, it would be better to use
one that works well automaticlly, like Condorcet(EM),
Smith//Condorcet(EM), & Schulze.
What does the EM stand for? The name of this list, election-methods.
It's named after this list because here is where that version
of Condorcet's method was proposed & discussed, and we recommended
it to the ER list.
MR. Condorcet, in the 18th century, wasn't specific about how
to measure defeats. He probably assumed that everyone would vote
a complete ranking of _all_ the alternatives. But that does't
happen in real elections. So we don't know if Condorcet would
have favored measuring the defeat of B by A according to
"votes-against" (how many people ranked A over B); or "votes
for" (how few people ranked B over A); or "margins" (the
difference of those 2 numbers); or the ratio of those 2
But we've shown here that "votes against" is what gets rid
of the lesser-of-2-evils problem and protects majority rule.
(Tell me if I'm mistaken)
* A beats B if more voters rank A over B than vice-versa.
* The strength of that defeat is the number of voters who ranked
A over B.
* There's a "beat path" from A to B if either A beats B, or
if A beats something that has a beat path to B.
* The strength of a beat path is measured by its weakest defeat.
*If A has a stronger beat path to B than B has to A, then A
has a Schulze win against B.
*If an alternative has a Sculze win against each one of the
others, then it wins.
However it seems to me that there could be elections without
a Schulze winner. In that case Condorcet(EM) would be a good
way to choose the winner. Or maybe there's always the possibility
that a different tie-breaker could confer new properties.
Maybe one could hope for a method that would avoid _all_
subcycle fratricide, not just in clone-sets. Or a method
that meets Positive Involvement (if Schulze doesn't already).
Schulze automatically chooses from the Smith set, and so avoids
the need to define the Smith set. But Schulze's definition is
(seemingly unavoidably) longer than that of Condorcet(EM), and
that could be an important factor in explainability. So Schulze
is almost surely better than Smith//Condorcet(EM), at least because
Schulze avoids subcycle fratricide in clone sets, and therefore
meets the stronger Independence from Clones Criterion.
But that's a "fine point" compared to the gross problems that
both Schulze & Condorcet(EM) get rid of.
- In a message dated 98-07-27 04:04:21 EDT, you write:
>Candidates can withdraw any time a result is announced, and soOf course, this method has at least three obvious flaws. One, for an extended
>the process of withdrawals & new count is repeated till no one
>else wants to withdraw.
period of time after the election it is indeterminate who the winner is.
Two, this method won't work when candidates are things/proposals, not people.
Three, a losing candidate who either withdraws or does not withdraw is now in
a position to directly influence the outcome. Issues of corruption and
bribery aside, clearly the outcome is now a consequence not merely of the
wishes of the voters but is also being manipulated by the candidates
themselves. A flaky or unpredictable result indicates a flaky election
system. In a good system the outcome is completely or primarily a reflection
of the feelings of the voters WITHOUT the opportunity of direct manipulation
of the outcome by certain individual participants.
Proponents of ranked voting (first, second, third, etc.) offer us a variety of
"scoring systems" but seem unable to find a single scoring system that is not
obviously flawed. (And Arrow has essentially proven that they will never find
such an ideal scoring system based on ranked voting.) In my book this
indicates that a different approach is required.
One such approach involves discarding historical dogma such as "majority
rule", "ranked voting" or the simplistic "one man, one vote" and instead asks:
What is a method of voting which allows for full freedom of expression? What
is a method of scoring such votes that does not create instant paradoxes or
contradictions? And can such a voting/scoring system be devised that does not
create incentives to lie or exaggerate?
Some people on this list believe that the above goals are impossible to
achieve, and prefer instead to stick blindly to the old methods even though
they do not produce satisfactory results in all cases. Perhaps a single ideal
method is impossible to achieve, but personally I think it can be done.
> In a message dated 98-07-27 04:04:21 EDT, you write:Nonsense. We typically have to wait till the next day anyway. How
> >Candidates can withdraw any time a result is announced, and so
> >the process of withdrawals & new count is repeated till no one
> >else wants to withdraw.
> Of course, this method has at least three obvious flaws. One, for an extended
> period of time after the election it is indeterminate who the winner is.
long will it take a count computer do the several counts. The
candidates could be required to remain in town if they want to
withdraw. In Cambridge, the wait has often been several days.
> Two, this method won't work when candidates are things/proposals, not people.Wrong. The proponent of a proposal could withdraw it.
>Remember that if a candidate withdraws, his votes will go, not where
> Three, a losing candidate who either withdraws or does not withdraw is now in
> a position to directly influence the outcome. Issues of corruption and
_he_ says, but where his voters have indicated that they want
them sent. If a winning candidate withdraws, then I'd agree with
your anger. I feel your pain. If a losing candidate withdraws,
then what's your problem?
> bribery aside, clearly the outcome is now a consequence not merely of theManipulating by not being a spoiler? By a loser not hoarding votes
> wishes of the voters but is also being manipulated by the candidates
that his voters would rather send elsewhere? :-)
> themselves. A flaky or unpredictable result indicates a flaky electionYou wouldn't be setting yourself up as the person with authority
> system. In a good system the outcome is completely or primarily a reflection
> of the feelings of the voters WITHOUT the opportunity of direct manipulation
> of the outcome by certain individual participants.
to define what's "good", would you? Your error is that you're
exaggerating the power of a withdrawing candidate. What purpose
remaining in the count, holding votes that his voters want to
help someone else with?
Any election result is unpredictable (and therefore "flaky"?).
What can be predicted, however, is that Condorcet winners will
have pretty much a sure win. Without any strategy or predictive
knowledge on the part of the voters.
>The question is whether you have a proposal that isn't flawed.
> Proponents of ranked voting (first, second, third, etc.) offer us a variety of
> "scoring systems" but seem unable to find a single scoring system that is not
> obviously flawed. (And Arrow has essentially proven that they will never find
After years of discussion, we've minimized the flaws, and found
methods that meet the standards most important to people, based
on conversations & articles, etc.
> such an ideal scoring system based on ranked voting.) In my book this"Some people on this list" have been involved with the subject for
> indicates that a different approach is required.
> One such approach involves discarding historical dogma such as "majority
> rule", "ranked voting" or the simplistic "one man, one vote" and instead asks:
> What is a method of voting which allows for full freedom of expression? What
> is a method of scoring such votes that does not create instant paradoxes or
> contradictions? And can such a voting/scoring system be devised that does not
> create incentives to lie or exaggerate?
> Some people on this list believe that the above goals are impossible to
> achieve, and prefer instead to stick blindly to the old methods even though
> they do not produce satisfactory results in all cases. Perhaps a single ideal
> method is impossible to achieve, but personally I think it can be done.
longer than you have, apparently.
Do you realize how little sense you make when you attempt to
claim that what we do isn't valid, because _maybe_ someone _could_
find something better? Unless you yourself can either propose
something better, or quote someone who has, then what you're
saying has no validity.
It's been pointed out to you that the flexible point systems
that you used to propose, like -100 to 100 are not strategyk
free, and don't encourage sincere voting, and are strategically
the same as Approval (not a bad method, but we have better ones).
Then you talked about charging money from voters to ensure
sincerity. No, the votes that voters pay for would still
be used strategically.
I know of only 1 system that encourages sincerity:
The Clarke tax, using real money. Charging real money froim
voters is quite out of the question. Allowing for differences
in income, savings, expenses, family, debts, gambling problems,
substance habits, etc. etc., to try to make fair equal incentive,
is completely unfeasible.
You've been ousted from each point from which you attacked
rank-balloting, and so now you resort to saying that maybe
some hypothetical unknown, unproposed method might be
> Mike Saari