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Re: Emptiness and Analytical practice

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  • Ken H
    Hi Pt, ... KH: I don t think it *can* be presumed. But perhaps I am not following you properly. ... attachment (or with aversion when there s no affinity with
    Message 1 of 35 , Jan 22, 2013
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      Hi Pt,

      ----
      > pt: I am wondering on what basis can it be presumed that intellectual comprehension of certain "right" ideas (when it "clicks", when it makes sense, etc) is in fact with panna (of right intellectual/theoretical kind) and not with attachment?
      ----

      KH: I don't think it *can* be presumed. But perhaps I am not following you properly.

      --------------------
      > Pt: I mean, the same ideas can be thought about with panna or with
      attachment (or with aversion when there's no affinity with the particular
      ideas). So, it seems it's not the particular ideas that make the difference.
      Further, if it's not the ideas, then how is it that hearing of certain "right"
      ideas in fact conditions arising of panna? I still don't get the connection.
      --------------------

      KH: I assume 'hearing the true Dhamma' refers to the vipakka-citta, hearing. Panna does not occur in vipakka cittas, so there is no `wise hearing.'

      `Wise consideration of what has been heard' would have to refer to the javana cittas in hearing, and other, citta processes.

      Having heard audible objects, or seen visible objects, we form concepts of what has been heard or seen. But there are no actual concepts [out there] in ultimate reality.

      The concepts created and experienced by cittas with *panna* could be called right concepts, I suppose, for the sake of convenience. But how can we know what they are? until we have experienced them with panna?

      The main point here is we never hear ideas, right or wrong. We hear audible objects, desirable, moderately desirable and undesirable.

      -------------------
      > Pt: Furthermore, what of stories of Theris and Theras when the liberating understanding arose in moments of perceiving (an idea of a) pot breaking or something like that. It seems panna can accompany any sort of intellectual idea, not necessarily just the "right" ones. So then, why not Mahayana ideas, "wrong" ideas, etc?
      -------------------

      KH: They saw (conceptualized) the pots break and the curries burn etc., after having heard and considered the Dhamma many times over many lifetimes. In those circumstances the concept of a breaking pot could easily prompt panna to arise and experience anicca. But that would occur in a subsequent citta with a dhamma as its object.

      Ken H
    • jonoabb
      Hi Ken and Tony (129110) ... J: Right. The Buddha has clearly said that dhammas do exist -- see SN22:94 Flowers: And what is it, bhikkhus, that the wise in
      Message 35 of 35 , Feb 21, 2013
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        Hi Ken and Tony

        (129110)
        --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Ken H" wrote:
        >
        > Hi Jon and Tony,
        >
        > -------
        > >>Tony H: Seeing how things DO exist (i.e. as conventional appearances to the mind in dependence upon their aggregates etc...) also reveals how things don't exist (i.e. their emptiness and illusory nature as dependent related phenomena, mere appearances to the mind.
        > >>
        >
        > > J: In the suttas the Buddha declares that the idea that things do exist and the idea that things don't exist are both views that are not taught by him.
        >
        > > So it is not the function of understanding to see "how things exist" or "don't exist", but rather to see the conditioned, and momentary, nature of dhammas.
        > --------
        >
        > KH: Excuse me for interrupting, but I don't think that was the answer Tony needed to hear. I am sure it is perfectly valid with regard to concepts, but Tony's problem (if I may call it that) is that he thinks dhammas have no existence outside the mind. In other words, he sees them as concepts.
        >
        > The Buddha has clearly said that dhammas do exist (see Useful Posts under "Exists & does not Exist, Emptiness").
        > ===============

        J: Right. The Buddha has clearly said that dhammas do exist -- see SN22:94 Flowers:

        "And what is it, bhikkhus, that the wise in the world agree upon as existing, of which I too say that it exists?
        "Form that is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as existing, and I too say that it exists. Feeling ...Perception...Volitional formations...Consciousness that is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as existing, and I too say that it exists."

        However, when I made my comment about the idea that things do or don't exist, I had in mind the sutta SN12:15:

        "'Everything exists,' this is one extreme [view]; 'nothing exists,' this is the other extreme. Avoiding both extremes the Tathaagata teaches a doctrine of the middle: Conditioned by ignorance are the formations ... So there comes about the arising of this entire mass of suffering. But from the complete fading away and cessation of ignorance there comes the cessation of the formations, from the cessation of the formations comes the cessation of consciousness... So there comes about the complete cessation of this entire mass of suffering."
        http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn12/sn12.015.wlsh.html

        In his post Tony had talked about the importance of seeing how things do or don't exist. I read him as suggesting that nothing actually exists in any meaningful sense of that word; all is just an appearance to the mind (Tony may like to comment on that).

        Jon
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