Re: [dsg] charactoristic of citta
- Hi Alex (& Howard),
--- On Sat, 31/10/09, truth_aerator <truth_aerator@...> wrote:
>Visual consciousness is functional meeting of working eye-sense organ with appropriate visual sense object.
S: In other words, with visual sense object and eye-sense base as essential conditions, visual consciousness may arise and experience that visual object.
>The external sense objects are there, whether cognized or not.
S: Yes, yes, yes! Would you now explain this to Howard? TIA, lol!
- Dear pt,
#102526 on attachment, conceit and wrong view....
--- In email@example.com, "ptaus1" <ptaus1@...> wrote:
> > S: Under the section on pathavi dhatu (earth element) in the commentary to the Mulapariyaya Sutta, it gives examples of hair, nails, teeth and skin.
> > For example, under the first one, simple craving, one might wish that one's hair was a different colour or texture or is attached to the way it is.
> > Under conceit, on account of the beauty or ugliness of one's hair, there may be conceit, thinking it is superior, inferior or equal to someone else's. At that time, one is just comparing or even subtly judging another's hair-cut, for example, without comparing. There's no wrong idea of 'me' or 'someone' or 'a thing' at such a time.
> > Under the wrong atta-view, the hair is taken as being part of one's body or jiiva (life-force). It is not understood as merely dhatus (elements), not belonging to anyone. At that moment of atta-di.t.thi, the hair itself is taken for being something.
> Yes, this seems straight-forward. Though, in real-life, to me it seems that I would never compare my hair to someone else's and then feel good if my hair was better, or hurt if my hair was worse, if there wasn't already the craving that the hair is mine with the wrong view that it's something that makes my "self' - so something worthy of comparison. I mean, if I was to compare hair of two different people, there would be no conceit, because none of it is mine (craving) nor my self (wrong view).
S: I think that conceit can be a lot more subtle, prompted by attachment or finding of oneself as important, but not necessarily with any wrong view involved at all. For example, we might just read what someone says here or see the way someone dresses and just have a quick thought that it's not very tasteful without any obvious comparing. Behind our thought, however, is the idea that we'd have spoken/dressed better, but not necessarily any self-view involved at that moment. We might go into a restaurant and just make a mental judgment about the decor. Conceit is likely to be involved already.
Of course, all these different kinds of attachment are closely entangled. We can't begin to imagined how subtle the conceit of an anagami must be before it's eradicated. Clearly no self-view involved, but quite unlike any of the relatively gross examples I've given too.
> Perhaps they alternate quickly, i.e. there are a few moments of wrong view, and then very soon there are a few moments of conceit (both are lined with craving of course)? So, although they are different processes, they often arise in association/succession?
S: Yes, I'm sure this is right, but only panna can tell when they arise, exactly what the reality is. I think craving is very, very common, conceit very common, with wrong view not arising so much in a day. For example, children whilst playing have plenty of attachment and conceit arising all the time, but very little if any wrong view because there's no thinking about the Truth or realities. The same applies to animals - just ignorance and attachment and conceit, but not wrong view.